Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902881
S. Overgaard
abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
{"title":"Husserl and Disjunctivism: Reply to Bower","authors":"S. Overgaard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902881","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"3 2","pages":"499 - 513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41243448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902887
S. Howard
need not be true but merely believable (15). Here, I think we need to pay more attention to the exact relationship of imagination and reason and consider Spinoza’s acquaintance with Al-Farabi’s political philosophy via Maimonides and with Averroes’s ideas via Elijah Delmedigo. Even if dogmata and narratives are to be characterized as efficacious or useful rather than, strictly speaking, true, can they be divorced from the truth? To my mind, we need more clarity about the character of practical and political reason in Spinoza’s philosophy. Chapter 11, “The Right Concerning Sacred Matters,” draws the theological and political together in a comprehensive and subtle study of Spinoza’s view of church-state relations. Chapter 12, “Conclusion: The Dutch Public Sphere,” moves beyond the early modern contextualization of Spinoza’s thought to compare it to contemporary models, particularly Habermas’s influential account of the bourgeois public sphere and the development of consensus through public debate. Compared to Habermas, Spinoza is a robust defender of the freedom to disagree about crucial issues, and his political theory provides a model for managing disagreements among people who must cohabit. Amid contemporary crises about the meanings of liberty, the relations of religious and state institutions, crises of legitimacy and fraud, and the challenge of collective survival in a time of deep disagreement, Spinoza’s political philosophy merits our attention as a resource for and challenge to our reigning ways of thinking. Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing is a learned, philosophically sharp, and carefully argued guide to its intricacies, offerings, and limitations. Elegantly constructed and written, Lærke’s study is well worth reading and rereading as a major contribution to the lively area of Spinoza scholarship. J u l i e R . K l e i n Villanova University
不需要是真实的，而仅仅是可信的（15）。在这里，我认为我们需要更多地关注想象力和理性的确切关系，并考虑斯宾诺莎通过迈蒙尼德与阿尔·法拉比的政治哲学的认识，以及通过伊利亚·德尔梅迪戈与埃弗罗斯的思想的认识。即使教条和叙事被描述为有效或有用，而不是严格意义上的真实，它们也能脱离真相吗？在我看来，我们需要更清楚地了解斯宾诺莎哲学中的实践理性和政治理性的特征。第11章“关于神圣事务的权利”将神学和政治学结合在一起，对斯宾诺莎的政教关系观进行了全面而微妙的研究。第12章“结论：荷兰公共领域”超越了斯宾诺莎思想的早期现代语境，将其与当代模式进行比较，特别是哈贝马斯对资产阶级公共领域和通过公共辩论发展共识的有影响力的描述。和哈贝马斯相比，斯宾诺莎是在关键问题上持不同意见自由的坚定捍卫者，他的政治理论为管理必须同居的人之间的分歧提供了一个模式。在当代关于自由的意义、宗教和国家机构的关系、合法性和欺诈的危机，以及在深度分歧的时代集体生存的挑战的危机中，斯宾诺莎的政治哲学值得我们关注，因为它是我们统治思维方式的资源和挑战。《斯宾诺莎与哲学自由》是一本学问渊博、哲学敏锐、经过仔细论证的指南，介绍了其复杂性、内容和局限性。Lærke的研究结构和写作都很优雅，值得一读和重读，这是对斯宾诺莎学术活跃领域的一项重大贡献。J u l i e R。维拉诺瓦大学
{"title":"The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic by Ian Proops (review)","authors":"S. Howard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902887","url":null,"abstract":"need not be true but merely believable (15). Here, I think we need to pay more attention to the exact relationship of imagination and reason and consider Spinoza’s acquaintance with Al-Farabi’s political philosophy via Maimonides and with Averroes’s ideas via Elijah Delmedigo. Even if dogmata and narratives are to be characterized as efficacious or useful rather than, strictly speaking, true, can they be divorced from the truth? To my mind, we need more clarity about the character of practical and political reason in Spinoza’s philosophy. Chapter 11, “The Right Concerning Sacred Matters,” draws the theological and political together in a comprehensive and subtle study of Spinoza’s view of church-state relations. Chapter 12, “Conclusion: The Dutch Public Sphere,” moves beyond the early modern contextualization of Spinoza’s thought to compare it to contemporary models, particularly Habermas’s influential account of the bourgeois public sphere and the development of consensus through public debate. Compared to Habermas, Spinoza is a robust defender of the freedom to disagree about crucial issues, and his political theory provides a model for managing disagreements among people who must cohabit. Amid contemporary crises about the meanings of liberty, the relations of religious and state institutions, crises of legitimacy and fraud, and the challenge of collective survival in a time of deep disagreement, Spinoza’s political philosophy merits our attention as a resource for and challenge to our reigning ways of thinking. Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing is a learned, philosophically sharp, and carefully argued guide to its intricacies, offerings, and limitations. Elegantly constructed and written, Lærke’s study is well worth reading and rereading as a major contribution to the lively area of Spinoza scholarship. J u l i e R . K l e i n Villanova University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"525 - 527"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44299662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902879
Marcy P. Lascano
abstract:The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the "great machines of happiness." I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, increasing, and long-lasting sources of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining "great machines of happiness" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions.
{"title":"Émilie du Châtelet's Theory of Happiness: Passions and Character","authors":"Marcy P. Lascano","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902879","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the \"great machines of happiness.\" I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, increasing, and long-lasting sources of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining \"great machines of happiness\" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"451 - 472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41699701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902888
M. Bykova
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966–71), but with a closer focus on Kant’s arguments. On the other hand, Proops presents the book as driven by a thesis, outlined in the introduction and conclusion, that certain doctrines of previous metaphysics survive the “fiery test” of critique. It is often unclear how the commentaries in the book’s three main parts should contribute to the book’s overall thesis. Here, I found myself wishing that Proops had engaged in more detail with the most important recent book on his topic, Marcus Willaschek’s Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Proops only refers to Willaschek in three footnotes on relatively marginal topics. It would have been helpful to see comparisons with Willaschek’s position when Proops discusses the sources of transcendental illusion (42–58, 130–34). More generally, though, an engagement with Willaschek’s highly systematic interpretation could have clarified how the two implicit tasks of Proops’s book fit together. After his careful attention to Kant’s various arguments, readers would like to know whether Proops considers Kant to definitively possess his philosophical “nuggets”: whether, for Proops, Kant has convincingly defended the positive doctrines said to result from the critical test. S t e p h e n H o w a r d KU Leuven
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902883
K. El-Rouayheb
{"title":"Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin Miller (review)","authors":"K. El-Rouayheb","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902883","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"518 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49579730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902875
A. Barceló-Aspeitia, Edgar González-Varela
abstract:Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue.
{"title":"Plato on False Judgment in the Theaetetus","authors":"A. Barceló-Aspeitia, Edgar González-Varela","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902875","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"349 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42350514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902882
C. Cohoe
{"title":"Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy by Alex G. Long, and: Immortality in Ancient Philosophy ed. by Alex G. Long (review)","authors":"C. Cohoe","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902882","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"515 - 518"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43960132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902880
Gerad Gentry
abstract:Hegel's end-of-art thesis is arguably the most notorious assertion in aesthetics. I outline traditional interpretive strategies before offering an original alternative to these. I develop a conception of art that facilitates a reading of Hegel on which he is able to embrace three seemingly contradictory theses about art, namely, (i) the end-of-art thesis, (ii) the continued significance of art for its own sake (autonomy thesis), and (iii) the necessity of art for robust knowledge (epistemicnecessity thesis). I argue that Hegel is able to embrace all three theses at once through a conception of the work of art as an internally purposive whole (what I call the "IP View" of art). On the IP View, because of the kind of wholes that artworks are, they (i.a) are valuable for their own sake as ends-in-themselves, (i.b) yield valuable experiences because they are valuable for their own sake, and thereby (i.c) are necessary for robust knowledge. Finally, I suggest that not only does Hegel appear to hold the IP View of art, but also that on such a view, there is a very sensible reason for affirming (one reading of) Hegel's end-of-art thesis as an important means to establishing art's actual significance for robust knowledge against soaring, but unsubstantiable, claims about art's potency with respect to robust knowledge.
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Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902889
J. Norman
Subjective Logic “as his own version of a ‘critique of judgment’” (18). She demonstrates that this part of the Logic offers a positive account of the concept of life that Hegel develops in his critical interaction with Kant. The most illustrative in this respect is the “Subjectivity” section of the Logic, in which the form of life is presented as the ground and presupposition of Hegel’s theory of concepts and judgments. According to Ng, such a reading makes evident that “life opens up the space of reasons” (234, 281). Chapter 4 takes up Hegel’s immanent deduction of the Concept argument, revealing that the key to understanding it is the concept of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) (127), most fully recognizable as an internal purposiveness of the Concept itself. Ng traces the purposiveness theme through the entirety of the Subjective Logic, establishing its significance for understanding the deduction of the Concept and for the transition to the Idea. In her analysis, she closely follows Hegel’s division of the Subjective Logic and addresses Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea in chapters 5–8, respectively. With chapter 5, Ng moves to a discussion of how Hegel finds judgment to arise from the “original judgement of life,” the initial unity and division of subject and object within life (172). Chapter 6 extends this discussion by elucidating the tension Hegel finds between the objective ground of purposive activity in genera-concepts and its subjective expression in the workings of self-consciousness. Ng devotes chapter 7 to exploring how life constitutes the immediate Idea—the subjectobject (244)—and the doubling thereof in both immediate life and self-consciousness as each is both subject and object. This chapter also furthers her discussion of the tension between the two. Ng concludes in chapter 8 by exploring Hegel’s absolute method, in which the immediate concerns of life are transmuted into the realm of self-consciousness, manifesting “the ongoing dialectic between life and cognition” (293). Freedom arises from self-consciousness’s ability to pursue its own end; this pursuit is limited without the initial impulse provided by life. Ng’s book is an exciting, new, captivating interpretation of Hegel that is at once an original, comprehensive reinterpretation of his philosophy with the potential to fundamentally alter how it is understood. While this study is very dense and requires solid prior knowledge of Hegel and his immediate predecessors, it is highly recommended for all serious students of Hegel. M a r i n a F . B y k o v a North Carolina State University
主观逻辑“作为他自己版本的‘判断批判’”（18）。她证明，《逻辑学》的这一部分对黑格尔在与康德的批判性互动中发展起来的生命概念提供了积极的描述。在这方面最具说明性的是《逻辑学》的“主体性”部分，在这一部分中，生命的形式被作为黑格尔概念和判断理论的基础和前提。吴认为，这样的解读表明“生活打开了理性的空间”（234281）。第四章论述了黑格尔对概念论证的内在演绎，揭示了理解概念论证的关键是互惠概念（Wechselwirkung）（127），最充分地认识到这是概念本身的内在目的性。吴将目的性主题贯穿于主体逻辑的整体，确立了其理解概念演绎和向概念过渡的意义。在她的分析中，她密切关注黑格尔对主体逻辑的划分，并分别在第5-8章中论述了主体性、客观性和理念。在第五章中，吴讨论了黑格尔如何从“生命的最初判断”中找到判断，即生命中主体和客体的最初统一和划分（172）。第六章通过阐释黑格尔在一般概念中的目的性活动的客观基础与其在自我意识运作中的主观表达之间所发现的张力来扩展这一讨论。吴在第七章中探讨了生命是如何构成直接观念的——主客体（244）——以及它在直接生活和自我意识中的双重性，因为它们既是主体又是客体。本章还进一步探讨了二者之间的紧张关系。吴在第八章中总结了黑格尔的绝对方法，在这种方法中，生命的直接关注转化为自我意识的领域，体现了“生命与认知之间正在进行的辩证法”（293）。自由源于自我意识追求自身目的的能力；如果没有生活提供的最初冲动，这种追求是有限的。吴的书是对黑格尔的一种激动人心的、新的、迷人的解读，同时也是对他的哲学的一种独创的、全面的重新解释，有可能从根本上改变人们对哲学的理解。虽然这项研究非常密集，需要对黑格尔及其前任有扎实的先验知识，但强烈建议所有认真学习黑格尔的学生使用。M a r i n a F。北卡罗来纳州立大学
{"title":"Schopenhauer and the Nature of Philosophy by Jonathan Head (review)","authors":"J. Norman","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902889","url":null,"abstract":"Subjective Logic “as his own version of a ‘critique of judgment’” (18). She demonstrates that this part of the Logic offers a positive account of the concept of life that Hegel develops in his critical interaction with Kant. The most illustrative in this respect is the “Subjectivity” section of the Logic, in which the form of life is presented as the ground and presupposition of Hegel’s theory of concepts and judgments. According to Ng, such a reading makes evident that “life opens up the space of reasons” (234, 281). Chapter 4 takes up Hegel’s immanent deduction of the Concept argument, revealing that the key to understanding it is the concept of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) (127), most fully recognizable as an internal purposiveness of the Concept itself. Ng traces the purposiveness theme through the entirety of the Subjective Logic, establishing its significance for understanding the deduction of the Concept and for the transition to the Idea. In her analysis, she closely follows Hegel’s division of the Subjective Logic and addresses Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea in chapters 5–8, respectively. With chapter 5, Ng moves to a discussion of how Hegel finds judgment to arise from the “original judgement of life,” the initial unity and division of subject and object within life (172). Chapter 6 extends this discussion by elucidating the tension Hegel finds between the objective ground of purposive activity in genera-concepts and its subjective expression in the workings of self-consciousness. Ng devotes chapter 7 to exploring how life constitutes the immediate Idea—the subjectobject (244)—and the doubling thereof in both immediate life and self-consciousness as each is both subject and object. This chapter also furthers her discussion of the tension between the two. Ng concludes in chapter 8 by exploring Hegel’s absolute method, in which the immediate concerns of life are transmuted into the realm of self-consciousness, manifesting “the ongoing dialectic between life and cognition” (293). Freedom arises from self-consciousness’s ability to pursue its own end; this pursuit is limited without the initial impulse provided by life. Ng’s book is an exciting, new, captivating interpretation of Hegel that is at once an original, comprehensive reinterpretation of his philosophy with the potential to fundamentally alter how it is understood. While this study is very dense and requires solid prior knowledge of Hegel and his immediate predecessors, it is highly recommended for all serious students of Hegel. M a r i n a F . B y k o v a North Carolina State University","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"528 - 530"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46772198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902877
Valérie Debuiche
abstract:La question de la relation entre le point et l'étendue en géométrie résonne, dans la pensée de Leibniz, avec celle du lien entre la substance simple avec le corps matériel dont elle est l'élément constitutif d'un point de vue métaphysique. En effet, comment ce qui est indivisible et sans dimension pourrait-il être le principe de ce qui se présente, au contraire, comme toujours divisé et étendu? Si la philosophie tardive de l'auteur, une fois devenue monadologie après 1700, rencontre en cela un problème presque insurmontable, il ne semble pas en être de même dans les années 1690. Cet article propose de montrer comment, vers 1695, une solution originale en est fournie qui renvoie aux innovations mathématiques de cette période, au sujet du point, de l'étendue et, de façon centrale, de la continuité, étoffant ainsi la toile qui unit les mathématiques de Leibniz avec sa philosophie.
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