Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902876
Chad Engelland
abstract:Kripke raises the question concerning how the reference to God might be fixed, and Augustine makes it the leading question of the Confessions: How can I call upon God and not someone else instead? In this paper, I argue that this question is the central concern of Anselm's Proslogion, which explicitly adopts the dialogical form of Augustine's Confessions. Anselm does not define God but instead fixes the reference to God through an ostension or indexical description. The same linguistic formulation, "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought," has three functions: as an ostension, it points out God as that being and not another; as a criterion for selection, it ostensibly picks out a referent that exists rather than not; finally, as a rule for analysis, it provides a principle to clarify the necessary properties of the God that has been so ostended.
{"title":"Anselm and the Problem of Ostending God","authors":"Chad Engelland","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902876","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Kripke raises the question concerning how the reference to God might be fixed, and Augustine makes it the leading question of the Confessions: How can I call upon God and not someone else instead? In this paper, I argue that this question is the central concern of Anselm's Proslogion, which explicitly adopts the dialogical form of Augustine's Confessions. Anselm does not define God but instead fixes the reference to God through an ostension or indexical description. The same linguistic formulation, \"God is that than which nothing greater can be thought,\" has three functions: as an ostension, it points out God as that being and not another; as a criterion for selection, it ostensibly picks out a referent that exists rather than not; finally, as a rule for analysis, it provides a principle to clarify the necessary properties of the God that has been so ostended.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"373 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45118391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a902886
Julie Klein
{"title":"Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing by Mogens Lærke (review)","authors":"Julie Klein","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.a902886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.a902886","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"523 - 525"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66312239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
(176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns to the cave, in the guise of the Athenian. Thus, Plato’s philosophy, and especially the vision of the Good, remains not merely contemplative, but also has a quite practical purpose founded in the Socratic axiom that virtue is knowledge—in other words, only by knowing the Good are we ultimately able to do the good. One could even say that the Socratic question of “how we should live [pôs bioteon]” (Gorgias 492d5, 500d3–4) is answered in detail in the Laws. The main condition for a happy life is the same for the individual and for the state: first to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others. Of course, this has to be spelled out, and there remains much to do in the cave, so it is understandable that Plato did not give this huge work its final version. In the twentieth century, the Laws generally remained in the shadow of the interpretation of the Republic, although it received more attention than the Republic in antiquity (cf. Aristotle, Politics I.6, 264b26–266a30). In recent years, the situation has changed, and the Laws has received due attention. One culmination, written especially for an Italian audience, is now Centrone’s Introduzione. One problem that readers of the Laws often encounter is that it is easy to lose sight of its main ideas because of the wealth of details. This introduction provides a remedy to this difficulty. It is divided into eleven chapters, which are subdivided into subsections that succinctly treat the content and problems pertaining to the particular parts of Plato’s last magnum opus. One critique may be allowed: the author lucidly interprets the Laws, but he does not compare Plato’s laws with the then existing laws, for example on slavery, nor does he give an overview of the issues that belong definitively to the past and those that may also be considered of value today. This especially applies to Plato’s penal code. Plato does not acknowledge the modern human rights of freedom of conscience and religion, and his penal code harshly punishes atheists (see e.g. 908e2–3). On the other hand, Plato is far ahead of his time in relation to the rights and duties of women, for example, when he urges the same education for women and men, including military service (cf. 829b3–7, e4). On my estimation, very few of us would elect to live in the city of the Laws. We ought, therefore, be relieved that the seconda polis has not been realized. Nevertheless, the Laws discusses a plethora of political considerations, from the regulation of the education of children, to sexual behavior, to funerals, that are still worth pondering today. All this is elucidated by Centrone in his Introduzione, which is not just an intr
（176b8–c1），深入法律的洞穴，即处理立法的细节。但是，正如森通正确地观察到的那样，这些只是同一枚硬币的两面（321）。在《泰阿泰德》中，柏拉图假扮柏拉图式的苏格拉底，建议离开洞穴，而在《律法》中，他假扮雅典人回到洞穴。因此，柏拉图的哲学，尤其是善的愿景，不仅是沉思的，而且有一个基于苏格拉底公理的相当实际的目的，即美德就是知识——换句话说，只有知道善，我们才能最终行善。有人甚至可以说，苏格拉底关于“我们应该如何生活[pôs bioteon]”的问题（Gorgias 492d5，500d3-4）在法律中得到了详细的回答。幸福生活的主要条件对个人和国家来说都是一样的：首先不要伤害自己，也不允许别人对你做任何伤害。当然，这是必须阐明的，洞穴里还有很多事情要做，所以柏拉图没有给出这部巨著的最终版本是可以理解的。在二十世纪，法律通常仍处于共和国解释的阴影下，尽管它比古代的共和国受到了更多的关注（参见亚里士多德，《政治学》I.6264b26-266a30）。近年来，情况发生了变化，法律受到了应有的重视。一个特别为意大利观众创作的高潮，现在是Centrone的Introduzione。《法律》的读者经常遇到的一个问题是，由于细节丰富，很容易忽视其主要思想。这一介绍为解决这一困难提供了补救办法。它分为十一章，再细分为小节，简明扼要地处理了柏拉图最后一部巨著特定部分的内容和问题。有一种批评可能是允许的：作者清晰地解释了法律，但他没有将柏拉图的法律与当时现有的法律进行比较，例如关于奴隶制的法律，也没有概述明确属于过去的问题和今天可能被认为有价值的问题。这尤其适用于柏拉图的刑法。柏拉图不承认良心和宗教自由的现代人权，他的刑法严厉惩罚无神论者（见908e2-3）。另一方面，柏拉图在女性的权利和义务方面远远领先于他的时代，例如，当他敦促对女性和男性进行同样的教育，包括服兵役时（参见829b3-7，e4）。据我估计，我们中很少有人会选择住在劳斯城。因此，我们应该松一口气，因为第二个城邦还没有实现。尽管如此，法律讨论了大量的政治考虑，从对儿童教育的监管，到性行为，再到葬礼，这些问题今天仍然值得思考。所有这一切都由森特龙在他的《引论》中阐述，这不仅是一篇引言，而且是对柏拉图最长作品的详尽阐述。我希望这个“introduzione”能将火炬传递给意大利内外的新一代柏拉图学者。R a f a e l f e R b e R卢塞恩大学/苏黎世大学
{"title":"Avicenna's Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology by Riccardo Strobino (review)","authors":"T. Druart","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0025","url":null,"abstract":"(176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns to the cave, in the guise of the Athenian. Thus, Plato’s philosophy, and especially the vision of the Good, remains not merely contemplative, but also has a quite practical purpose founded in the Socratic axiom that virtue is knowledge—in other words, only by knowing the Good are we ultimately able to do the good. One could even say that the Socratic question of “how we should live [pôs bioteon]” (Gorgias 492d5, 500d3–4) is answered in detail in the Laws. The main condition for a happy life is the same for the individual and for the state: first to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others. Of course, this has to be spelled out, and there remains much to do in the cave, so it is understandable that Plato did not give this huge work its final version. In the twentieth century, the Laws generally remained in the shadow of the interpretation of the Republic, although it received more attention than the Republic in antiquity (cf. Aristotle, Politics I.6, 264b26–266a30). In recent years, the situation has changed, and the Laws has received due attention. One culmination, written especially for an Italian audience, is now Centrone’s Introduzione. One problem that readers of the Laws often encounter is that it is easy to lose sight of its main ideas because of the wealth of details. This introduction provides a remedy to this difficulty. It is divided into eleven chapters, which are subdivided into subsections that succinctly treat the content and problems pertaining to the particular parts of Plato’s last magnum opus. One critique may be allowed: the author lucidly interprets the Laws, but he does not compare Plato’s laws with the then existing laws, for example on slavery, nor does he give an overview of the issues that belong definitively to the past and those that may also be considered of value today. This especially applies to Plato’s penal code. Plato does not acknowledge the modern human rights of freedom of conscience and religion, and his penal code harshly punishes atheists (see e.g. 908e2–3). On the other hand, Plato is far ahead of his time in relation to the rights and duties of women, for example, when he urges the same education for women and men, including military service (cf. 829b3–7, e4). On my estimation, very few of us would elect to live in the city of the Laws. We ought, therefore, be relieved that the seconda polis has not been realized. Nevertheless, the Laws discusses a plethora of political considerations, from the regulation of the education of children, to sexual behavior, to funerals, that are still worth pondering today. All this is elucidated by Centrone in his Introduzione, which is not just an intr","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"326 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48209979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values by Thomas H. Brobjer (review)","authors":"Charles P. Rodger","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0032","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"338 - 339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48681724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Breazeale’s analyses provide us with all the means to take a stand about this notion that generated epic battles between interpreters, but also about many others—for instance the status of the second principle, which Hegel deemed “unfounded”; the practical foundation of the system, which some interpreters considered problematic; and the precise meaning of the concept of “check” or “impetus” (Anstoß). Thanks to Breazeale’s introduction, these debates find valuable elements of resolution. Thus, Breazeale accomplishes a real feat: his erudition serves a presentation of Fichte’s philosophy that will be beneficial to every reader, neophyte and specialist alike. I s a b e l l e T h o m a s F o g i e l University of Ottawa
{"title":"Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition ed. by Kristin Gjesdal and Dalia Nassar (review)","authors":"Alison Stone","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0031","url":null,"abstract":"Breazeale’s analyses provide us with all the means to take a stand about this notion that generated epic battles between interpreters, but also about many others—for instance the status of the second principle, which Hegel deemed “unfounded”; the practical foundation of the system, which some interpreters considered problematic; and the precise meaning of the concept of “check” or “impetus” (Anstoß). Thanks to Breazeale’s introduction, these debates find valuable elements of resolution. Thus, Breazeale accomplishes a real feat: his erudition serves a presentation of Fichte’s philosophy that will be beneficial to every reader, neophyte and specialist alike. I s a b e l l e T h o m a s F o g i e l University of Ottawa","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"336 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45586141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
that may have overlapped somewhat with Socianism and Arminianism but owed nothing to either. Locke’s moralist soteriology, along with some of his other Christian beliefs, look like Socinian and Arminian doctrines, admits Lucci. But many of his other beliefs did not, especially, Lucci says, those concerning original sin, satisfaction, and atonement (96–105). This was because Locke’s theological beliefs were formed by neither commitment nor opposition to any particular sect, but rather by his careful, plain, and simple reading of the Gospels (50). Locke had no problem with adopting the views of theologians when their positions were revealed through Scripture, and he had no problem turning away from them when their positions were not. But because Locke was not following any sect in arriving at his own theological positions, it is misleading to label him as a sectarian of any stripe—Locke’s views, in other words, may be like a Socinian’s or an Arminian’s, but he himself was neither, as the basis for his Christian beliefs was independent of both sects. Regarding persons, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s thinking about identity at Judgment Day as a result of his commitment to moral soteriology. According to Lucci, two significant consequences follow from this. First, Locke believed that personal identity resided in the union of mind and body rather than solely in the mind or solely in the body. Second, Locke believed that consciousness was only a necessary condition for moral responsibility (conceptualized as damnation or salvation based on behaviors measured against the law of nature). This, Lucci argues, counters common objections raised by Thiel and Strawson against Locke’s moralist soteriology. Concerning toleration, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s “markedly religious conception of life and morality” (175) and argues that Locke’s was a distinctively Christian form of toleration, pace the common conception of it as an expression of his secularism. The motivating factors for Locke were that Christianity is best seen as the true religion when it outshines alternative forms of salvation in a free and open environment and that acceptance of the law of faith is best when it is freely chosen. This entails that religious forms of life are tolerable so long as they do not undermine people’s commitments to the law of nature. Lucci then discusses how Locke’s exceptions to toleration—Catholics and atheists—run afoul of this moral condition for being tolerable, atheists because they reject any divine lawgiver and Catholics because they are committed to certain immoral principles. Thus, Lucci supports Goldie’s position that Locke found Catholic antinomianism intolerable (and not Catholicism as such) because he found antinomianism to be fundamentally intolerable (190). Lucci not only provides an excellent account of Locke’s Christian beliefs but also shows how those beliefs are relevant for interpreting and understanding some of Locke’s philosophical positions. Lucci’s book w
{"title":"Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason by Sofie Møller (review)","authors":"J. Tizzard","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0029","url":null,"abstract":"that may have overlapped somewhat with Socianism and Arminianism but owed nothing to either. Locke’s moralist soteriology, along with some of his other Christian beliefs, look like Socinian and Arminian doctrines, admits Lucci. But many of his other beliefs did not, especially, Lucci says, those concerning original sin, satisfaction, and atonement (96–105). This was because Locke’s theological beliefs were formed by neither commitment nor opposition to any particular sect, but rather by his careful, plain, and simple reading of the Gospels (50). Locke had no problem with adopting the views of theologians when their positions were revealed through Scripture, and he had no problem turning away from them when their positions were not. But because Locke was not following any sect in arriving at his own theological positions, it is misleading to label him as a sectarian of any stripe—Locke’s views, in other words, may be like a Socinian’s or an Arminian’s, but he himself was neither, as the basis for his Christian beliefs was independent of both sects. Regarding persons, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s thinking about identity at Judgment Day as a result of his commitment to moral soteriology. According to Lucci, two significant consequences follow from this. First, Locke believed that personal identity resided in the union of mind and body rather than solely in the mind or solely in the body. Second, Locke believed that consciousness was only a necessary condition for moral responsibility (conceptualized as damnation or salvation based on behaviors measured against the law of nature). This, Lucci argues, counters common objections raised by Thiel and Strawson against Locke’s moralist soteriology. Concerning toleration, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s “markedly religious conception of life and morality” (175) and argues that Locke’s was a distinctively Christian form of toleration, pace the common conception of it as an expression of his secularism. The motivating factors for Locke were that Christianity is best seen as the true religion when it outshines alternative forms of salvation in a free and open environment and that acceptance of the law of faith is best when it is freely chosen. This entails that religious forms of life are tolerable so long as they do not undermine people’s commitments to the law of nature. Lucci then discusses how Locke’s exceptions to toleration—Catholics and atheists—run afoul of this moral condition for being tolerable, atheists because they reject any divine lawgiver and Catholics because they are committed to certain immoral principles. Thus, Lucci supports Goldie’s position that Locke found Catholic antinomianism intolerable (and not Catholicism as such) because he found antinomianism to be fundamentally intolerable (190). Lucci not only provides an excellent account of Locke’s Christian beliefs but also shows how those beliefs are relevant for interpreting and understanding some of Locke’s philosophical positions. Lucci’s book w","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"332 - 334"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43453362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim.There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems.
{"title":"The Role of Temperament in Philosophical Inquiry: A Pragmatic Approach","authors":"Neil W. Williams","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0023","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim.There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"297 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41938114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:In Morning Hours (1785), Moses Mendelssohn presents a proof for the existence of God from the grounding of possibility. Although Mendelssohn claims that this proof is original, it has not received much attention in the secondary literature. In this paper, I analyze this proof and present its historical context. I show that although it resembles Leibniz's proof from eternal truths and Kant's precritical possibility proof, it has unique characteristics that can be regarded as responses to deficiencies Mendelssohn identified in these earlier proofs. I argue that by analyzing the semantics of judgments about dispositions, Mendelssohn provides a novel explanation for the basic premise shared by these proofs, namely that possibility is grounded in actuality. Additionally, this analysis simplifies the inference to a unique infinite mind grounding all possibility. Thus, the proof is worth studying both for historical reasons and for its original account of modal concepts.
{"title":"Moses Mendelssohn's Original Modal Proof for the Existence of God","authors":"Noam Hoffer","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0020","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In Morning Hours (1785), Moses Mendelssohn presents a proof for the existence of God from the grounding of possibility. Although Mendelssohn claims that this proof is original, it has not received much attention in the secondary literature. In this paper, I analyze this proof and present its historical context. I show that although it resembles Leibniz's proof from eternal truths and Kant's precritical possibility proof, it has unique characteristics that can be regarded as responses to deficiencies Mendelssohn identified in these earlier proofs. I argue that by analyzing the semantics of judgments about dispositions, Mendelssohn provides a novel explanation for the basic premise shared by these proofs, namely that possibility is grounded in actuality. Additionally, this analysis simplifies the inference to a unique infinite mind grounding all possibility. Thus, the proof is worth studying both for historical reasons and for its original account of modal concepts.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"237 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49427142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr. ed. by Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry (review)","authors":"Erin R. Pineda","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"339 - 341"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42051131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
text is so rich and complex. A simple but careful look at this map confirms what Strobino makes clear and insists upon: Avicenna greatly develops, enriches, completes, and even outgrows some of Aristotle’s views. The Book of Demonstration is far more than a commentary on the Posterior Analytics ; it is a complete reworking of it. Strobino shows that Avicenna grounds his theory of demonstration and science on two basic notions—conception (tasawwur) and assertion (tasdı̄q, which some other scholars translate as “assent”)—and so gives a unified approach to his theory. Scientific conceptions require better understanding of definition and description. Avicenna builds definitions and descriptions on essentialism and, therefore, grounds them in metaphysics. As for scientific assertions, in contradistinction to nonscientific ones, they must be necessary and give the cause. Therefore, Avicenna places great importance on modality and develops modal syllogisms, whereas Aristotle focused on categorical syllogisms and neglected hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. Avicenna also elaborates a sophisticated account of modality and its metaphysical implications. Furthermore, he broadens and enriches the appreciation of causality and explanation. These developments, according to Strobino, lead Avicenna to set forth an intricate division and hierarchy of the sciences under metaphysics, which provides their ultimate principles and allows for a unified understanding of the sciences while respecting their particularities. According to Strobino, Avicenna is keen to develop a theory of science that gives a good account of science as it is practiced. Strobino carefully shows how Avicenna’s theory better reflects this practice than does Aristotle’s. Strobino does not simply highlight how much Avicenna distances himself from Aristotle and goes far beyond what the Posterior Analytics yields, but also shows how much Avicenna relies on points adumbrated by his predecessor al-Fārābı̄ in his own Book of Demonstration. The way Strobino through his analysis of demonstration links Avicenna’s understanding of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics underscores the coherence and unity of Avicenna’s philosophy. Scholars were aware of the importance of demonstration for Avicenna in various philosophical fields, but until the release of this book, they seemed not to have fully grasped the centrality and essential role played by the Avicennian understanding and focus on demonstration. Of course, Strobino does not limit himself to an analysis of passages in the Book of Demonstration. He has an encompassing knowledge of Avicenna’s texts and uses them well to flesh out and enrich what remains terse in the Book of Demonstration. He even takes into account the way one of his successors, al-Tūsı̄, reads him. He also shows an extensive and wide-ranging knowledge of Aristotle’s texts and of Aristotelian scholarship, as well as an interest in the Greek commentators and Galen and their relevance
{"title":"Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard by Irene Binini (review)","authors":"Wolfgang Lenzen","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0026","url":null,"abstract":"text is so rich and complex. A simple but careful look at this map confirms what Strobino makes clear and insists upon: Avicenna greatly develops, enriches, completes, and even outgrows some of Aristotle’s views. The Book of Demonstration is far more than a commentary on the Posterior Analytics ; it is a complete reworking of it. Strobino shows that Avicenna grounds his theory of demonstration and science on two basic notions—conception (tasawwur) and assertion (tasdı̄q, which some other scholars translate as “assent”)—and so gives a unified approach to his theory. Scientific conceptions require better understanding of definition and description. Avicenna builds definitions and descriptions on essentialism and, therefore, grounds them in metaphysics. As for scientific assertions, in contradistinction to nonscientific ones, they must be necessary and give the cause. Therefore, Avicenna places great importance on modality and develops modal syllogisms, whereas Aristotle focused on categorical syllogisms and neglected hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. Avicenna also elaborates a sophisticated account of modality and its metaphysical implications. Furthermore, he broadens and enriches the appreciation of causality and explanation. These developments, according to Strobino, lead Avicenna to set forth an intricate division and hierarchy of the sciences under metaphysics, which provides their ultimate principles and allows for a unified understanding of the sciences while respecting their particularities. According to Strobino, Avicenna is keen to develop a theory of science that gives a good account of science as it is practiced. Strobino carefully shows how Avicenna’s theory better reflects this practice than does Aristotle’s. Strobino does not simply highlight how much Avicenna distances himself from Aristotle and goes far beyond what the Posterior Analytics yields, but also shows how much Avicenna relies on points adumbrated by his predecessor al-Fārābı̄ in his own Book of Demonstration. The way Strobino through his analysis of demonstration links Avicenna’s understanding of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics underscores the coherence and unity of Avicenna’s philosophy. Scholars were aware of the importance of demonstration for Avicenna in various philosophical fields, but until the release of this book, they seemed not to have fully grasped the centrality and essential role played by the Avicennian understanding and focus on demonstration. Of course, Strobino does not limit himself to an analysis of passages in the Book of Demonstration. He has an encompassing knowledge of Avicenna’s texts and uses them well to flesh out and enrich what remains terse in the Book of Demonstration. He even takes into account the way one of his successors, al-Tūsı̄, reads him. He also shows an extensive and wide-ranging knowledge of Aristotle’s texts and of Aristotelian scholarship, as well as an interest in the Greek commentators and Galen and their relevance","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"327 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42082795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：