{"title":"Épicure aux Enfers: Hérésie, athéisme et hédonisme au Moyen Âge by Aurélien Robert (review)","authors":"John Monfasani","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0062","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"693 - 695"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46730875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Kant's treatment of infinity seems to be plagued by two contradictions. First, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that space is an infinite given magnitude, whereas the First Antinomy argues that the spatial world cannot be infinite. Second, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that the representation of infinite space belongs to sensibility, but the third Critique seems to argue, instead, that infinity is an Idea of reason. This paper resolves these apparent contradictions by noting that Kant groups his various conceptions of space into three kinds: (1) merely subjectively given space, (2) objectively given space, and (3) objective space as a mere Idea. Attending to these three conceptions of space illustrates that the Transcendental Aesthetic, First Antinomy, and third Critique refer to different conceptions of infinite space and thus do not contradict one another, illuminating the importance of Kant's various conceptions of space for his critical project.
{"title":"Kant's Three Conceptions of Infinite Space","authors":"Reed Winegar","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0056","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Kant's treatment of infinity seems to be plagued by two contradictions. First, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that space is an infinite given magnitude, whereas the First Antinomy argues that the spatial world cannot be infinite. Second, the Transcendental Aesthetic claims that the representation of infinite space belongs to sensibility, but the third Critique seems to argue, instead, that infinity is an Idea of reason. This paper resolves these apparent contradictions by noting that Kant groups his various conceptions of space into three kinds: (1) merely subjectively given space, (2) objectively given space, and (3) objective space as a mere Idea. Attending to these three conceptions of space illustrates that the Transcendental Aesthetic, First Antinomy, and third Critique refer to different conceptions of infinite space and thus do not contradict one another, illuminating the importance of Kant's various conceptions of space for his critical project.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"635 - 659"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44647164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
philosophers’ broader philosophical views. Chapter 8 reintroduces a prominent example of this phenomenon from chapter 3—the difficulties that constitutive relativity creates for the theory of the Forms—and persuasively reconstructs one of Aristotle’s arguments against the Forms in On Ideas as a valid reductio, based only on assumptions about the nature of relativity that are shared by Aristotle and his Platonist targets. Chapters 9 and 10 take up the Stoic treatment of relatives. Chapter 9 provides a constitutive reading of two kinds of relatives that the Stoics distinguished. “Relatively disposed things,” like “father,” are directly constituted by a relation, whereas “differentiated relatives,” like knowledge and perception, are directly constituted by a power that is, in turn, constituted by a relation to its correlative. Chapter 10 then surveys the philosophical uses the Stoics may have made of these notions. For instance, Duncombe finds a role for differentiated relatives in the Stoic account of mixture and makes illuminating use of his account of relatively disposed things in reconstructing a debate between Aristo and Chrysippus about the unity of virtue. The study concludes with Sextus Empiricus, who, according to Duncombe, operates with a “conceptual” view of relativity in his arguments against his dogmatic opponents. The conceptual view modifies the standard constitutive view by introducing the qualification that a relative “is constituted by being conceived relative to something” (244). Duncombe suggests that Sextus moves to the conceptual level because the standard constitutive views involve claims about the natures of relatives—claims that Sextus, as a Pyrrhonian Skeptic, cannot endorse (245). This is an intriguing example of Duncombe’s third major thesis in the book, that philosophers’ larger philosophical outlooks affected their views of relativity (249), but I found myself wondering whether this explanation for Sextus’s innovation is consistent with the idea that skeptics speak without endorsing the claims they make (PH I,13; 192–93), which Duncombe invokes in claiming that Sextus’s commitment to conceptual relativity is purely dialectical (233, 237). If Sextus’s remarks about relativity are purely dialectical, considerations about what Sextus, as a skeptic, can and cannot endorse should be irrelevant. This book is a rare kind of achievement in ancient scholarship, dealing as it does with a subject that is understudied and yet, as Duncombe convincingly shows, indispensable for properly understanding ancient philosophical thought on many key topics. Given the range of problems on which the book makes new progress, it will be a rewarding read for just about anyone working on Greek philosophy. I a n J . C a m p b e l l Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
{"title":"The Invention of Duty: Stoicism as Deontology by Jack Visnjic (review)","authors":"W. Stephens","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0060","url":null,"abstract":"philosophers’ broader philosophical views. Chapter 8 reintroduces a prominent example of this phenomenon from chapter 3—the difficulties that constitutive relativity creates for the theory of the Forms—and persuasively reconstructs one of Aristotle’s arguments against the Forms in On Ideas as a valid reductio, based only on assumptions about the nature of relativity that are shared by Aristotle and his Platonist targets. Chapters 9 and 10 take up the Stoic treatment of relatives. Chapter 9 provides a constitutive reading of two kinds of relatives that the Stoics distinguished. “Relatively disposed things,” like “father,” are directly constituted by a relation, whereas “differentiated relatives,” like knowledge and perception, are directly constituted by a power that is, in turn, constituted by a relation to its correlative. Chapter 10 then surveys the philosophical uses the Stoics may have made of these notions. For instance, Duncombe finds a role for differentiated relatives in the Stoic account of mixture and makes illuminating use of his account of relatively disposed things in reconstructing a debate between Aristo and Chrysippus about the unity of virtue. The study concludes with Sextus Empiricus, who, according to Duncombe, operates with a “conceptual” view of relativity in his arguments against his dogmatic opponents. The conceptual view modifies the standard constitutive view by introducing the qualification that a relative “is constituted by being conceived relative to something” (244). Duncombe suggests that Sextus moves to the conceptual level because the standard constitutive views involve claims about the natures of relatives—claims that Sextus, as a Pyrrhonian Skeptic, cannot endorse (245). This is an intriguing example of Duncombe’s third major thesis in the book, that philosophers’ larger philosophical outlooks affected their views of relativity (249), but I found myself wondering whether this explanation for Sextus’s innovation is consistent with the idea that skeptics speak without endorsing the claims they make (PH I,13; 192–93), which Duncombe invokes in claiming that Sextus’s commitment to conceptual relativity is purely dialectical (233, 237). If Sextus’s remarks about relativity are purely dialectical, considerations about what Sextus, as a skeptic, can and cannot endorse should be irrelevant. This book is a rare kind of achievement in ancient scholarship, dealing as it does with a subject that is understudied and yet, as Duncombe convincingly shows, indispensable for properly understanding ancient philosophical thought on many key topics. Given the range of problems on which the book makes new progress, it will be a rewarding read for just about anyone working on Greek philosophy. I a n J . C a m p b e l l Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"690 - 692"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46810693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contents for Volume LX (2022)","authors":"","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0071","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45074756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:This article argues for an interpretation of doctrine 7 of universal faith in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise—that God pardons the sins of those who repent—that renders it true in the terms set by Spinoza's Ethics. Though categorized in the Ethics as a vice, repentance nevertheless has a positive political function as the lesser of two evils, supplanting the greater evils of unrepentant pride and shamelessness. The philosopher can understand God's pardon as the natural advantage conferred by repentance itself insofar as it supplants those greater evils. This pardon arises through the laws of Nature (God's mercy and grace), which are equally responsible for that very repentance. The philosophical truth of the doctrines of universal faith ensures that freedom of philosophizing can be granted without harm to the peace or piety of the Republic and cannot be denied without destroying the same.
{"title":"Repentance and God's Pardon in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise: On the Truth of Doctrine 7 of Universal Faith","authors":"D. Shaul","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0054","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:This article argues for an interpretation of doctrine 7 of universal faith in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise—that God pardons the sins of those who repent—that renders it true in the terms set by Spinoza's Ethics. Though categorized in the Ethics as a vice, repentance nevertheless has a positive political function as the lesser of two evils, supplanting the greater evils of unrepentant pride and shamelessness. The philosopher can understand God's pardon as the natural advantage conferred by repentance itself insofar as it supplants those greater evils. This pardon arises through the laws of Nature (God's mercy and grace), which are equally responsible for that very repentance. The philosophical truth of the doctrines of universal faith ensures that freedom of philosophizing can be granted without harm to the peace or piety of the Republic and cannot be denied without destroying the same.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"591 - 608"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41745118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:I argue that Baumgarten's rich and once influential Metaphysica contains an ontology that pushes him toward a Spinozistic conclusion, one that he fiercely sought to avoid. After examining Baumgarten's distinctive account of the core of Spinozism, I present his path as a series of independently motivated steps, focusing on his general ontology and his accounts of the world and God. Baumgarten himself would not be happy with these results, and I concede that some of his efforts to thwart Spinozism look promising. But there is one route to Spinozism that he fails to block, and at a key juncture, he inadvertently aids the Spinozist's cause. I conclude with an epilogue on how Baumgarten's path also foreshadows the next Spinozism flare-up heading into the German pantheism controversy.
{"title":"Baumgarten's Steps toward Spinozism","authors":"Samuel J Newlands","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0055","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:I argue that Baumgarten's rich and once influential Metaphysica contains an ontology that pushes him toward a Spinozistic conclusion, one that he fiercely sought to avoid. After examining Baumgarten's distinctive account of the core of Spinozism, I present his path as a series of independently motivated steps, focusing on his general ontology and his accounts of the world and God. Baumgarten himself would not be happy with these results, and I concede that some of his efforts to thwart Spinozism look promising. But there is one route to Spinozism that he fails to block, and at a key juncture, he inadvertently aids the Spinozist's cause. I conclude with an epilogue on how Baumgarten's path also foreshadows the next Spinozism flare-up heading into the German pantheism controversy.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"609 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42133792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Al-Rāzī by Peter Adamson (review)","authors":"T. Druart","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0061","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"692 - 693"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44430279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locke on Persons and Personal Identity by Ruth Boeker (review)","authors":"M. Jacovides","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0064","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"697 - 698"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48384484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:W. V. Quine calls some general methods of science maxims: general defeasible principles that call on us to approximate, maximize, or minimize a state and that are interpreted and weighed in context-sensitive ways. On my reading, his empiricism asks us to maximize accepting overall theories empirically equivalent to ours but to minimize accepting sentences that both do not affect the empirical content of our overall theory and do not simplify our overall theory. His naturalism asks us to maximize accepting sentences that are solely supported by standards that support our best current scientific theory. Drawing on the Quine archive at Houghton Library at Harvard, I support and apply these interpretations by investigating his rapidly evolving later work on empirical content and empirical equivalence, including some of his views on translation in this later work and his vacillation between what he calls the ecumenical and sectarian attitudes.
{"title":"Methodology Maximized: Quine on Empiricism, Naturalism, and Empirical Content","authors":"J. A. Smith","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0057","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:W. V. Quine calls some general methods of science maxims: general defeasible principles that call on us to approximate, maximize, or minimize a state and that are interpreted and weighed in context-sensitive ways. On my reading, his empiricism asks us to maximize accepting overall theories empirically equivalent to ours but to minimize accepting sentences that both do not affect the empirical content of our overall theory and do not simplify our overall theory. His naturalism asks us to maximize accepting sentences that are solely supported by standards that support our best current scientific theory. Drawing on the Quine archive at Houghton Library at Harvard, I support and apply these interpretations by investigating his rapidly evolving later work on empirical content and empirical equivalence, including some of his views on translation in this later work and his vacillation between what he calls the ecumenical and sectarian attitudes.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"661 - 686"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49026058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant by Paul Guyer (review)","authors":"K. Sweet","doi":"10.1353/hph.2022.0067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0067","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"60 1","pages":"702 - 703"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47176553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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