abstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria.
{"title":"Moral Legislation behind a Veil of Ignorance: Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino (1607–67) on the Procedure of Natural Law","authors":"R. Schuessler","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0018","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"193 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47130818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus's atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rejected these three sorts of change not only for simples but also for complexes. Furthermore, philosophers since antiquity have claimed that denying truths about present change is incompatible with accepting truths about past change, since each past truth about change corresponds to some present truth about change. I argue that this objection can be overcome. I conclude that Diodorus's arguments against present change are both broader and more successful than is usually maintained.
{"title":"Diodorus Cronus on Present and Past Change","authors":"M. Duncombe","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0017","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus's atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rejected these three sorts of change not only for simples but also for complexes. Furthermore, philosophers since antiquity have claimed that denying truths about present change is incompatible with accepting truths about past change, since each past truth about change corresponds to some present truth about change. I argue that this objection can be overcome. I conclude that Diodorus's arguments against present change are both broader and more successful than is usually maintained.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"167 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44792403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"John Locke's Christianity by Diego Lucci (review)","authors":"B. Hill","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"331 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49022736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Memoriam","authors":"S. Nadler","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"1 - 1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45743966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:According to a common caricature, Nietzsche cuts the figure of an anti-Buddha who advocates a type of life affirmation that is the contrary of Buddhist or Schopenhauerian life negation. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate, through a rigorous study of some of his later works—most notably Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antichrist (1905[1888]), and Ecce Homo (1908[1888])—that Nietzsche does not at all present himself as an anti-Buddha stricto sensu, or as a figure whose teaching is diametrically opposed to that of the Indian master. The late Nietzsche, more precisely, does not conceive of amor fati and nirvāṇa as opposed ethical poles—or negatives of one another. On the contrary, certain texts in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist make it clear that there are significant affinities between amor fati and nirvāṇa as Nietzsche understands it, with respect to both the relationship to the self (seeing oneself "as a fatum") and to the other (overcoming ressentiment) that it implies. This, I conclude, lends credence to Nietzsche's infamous hypothesis according to which, contrary to appearances, all ethical ideals might in fact be "insidiously consanguine, linked up, knotted with that bad thing which seems to be their contrary" (Beyond Good and Evil, §2, KSA 5:17).
{"title":"Nietzsche comme Bouddha de l'Europe, ou De l'Affinité des \"Contraires\"","authors":"Antoine Panaïoti","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0022","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:According to a common caricature, Nietzsche cuts the figure of an anti-Buddha who advocates a type of life affirmation that is the contrary of Buddhist or Schopenhauerian life negation. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate, through a rigorous study of some of his later works—most notably Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antichrist (1905[1888]), and Ecce Homo (1908[1888])—that Nietzsche does not at all present himself as an anti-Buddha stricto sensu, or as a figure whose teaching is diametrically opposed to that of the Indian master. The late Nietzsche, more precisely, does not conceive of amor fati and nirvāṇa as opposed ethical poles—or negatives of one another. On the contrary, certain texts in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist make it clear that there are significant affinities between amor fati and nirvāṇa as Nietzsche understands it, with respect to both the relationship to the self (seeing oneself \"as a fatum\") and to the other (overcoming ressentiment) that it implies. This, I conclude, lends credence to Nietzsche's infamous hypothesis according to which, contrary to appearances, all ethical ideals might in fact be \"insidiously consanguine, linked up, knotted with that bad thing which seems to be their contrary\" (Beyond Good and Evil, §2, KSA 5:17).","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"283 - 296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46068011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:When the writings of Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft surfaced in 2019, having been almost wholly neglected by scholars since their publication in the 1820s, they invited an inevitable and tantalizing comparison with her far more famous sister-in-law, Mary Wollstonecraft, especially since Kingsbury had written an article on "The Natural Rights of Woman." Irrespective of the Wollstonecraft connection, however, Kingsbury's writing stands on its own merits as deserving of serious scholarship by historians of women in philosophy. Nevertheless, reading Kingsbury in the light of her predecessor is highly instructive and helps both bring out what is distinctive about her conclusions and place her in the context of post-Wollstonecraftian thought in the nineteenth century. Kingsbury draws on a similar set of foundational principles as Wollstonecraft, which I place within the republican tradition of political philosophy—freedom, equality, virtue, the common good. Together, these make up an ideal of freedom as independence. Focusing on the issue of education, she argues that increasing women's access to education will do little to improve their intellectual development unless there is an accompanying and extensive restructuring of social and economic norms. In applying the logic of freedom as independence, Kingsbury takes further this aspect of Wollstonecraft's thought and anticipates and prefigures some of the later arguments of feminists and abolitionists writing in the same tradition, including especially Frederick Douglass.
{"title":"Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft and the Logic of Freedom as Independence","authors":"Alan M. S. J. Coffee","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0021","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:When the writings of Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft surfaced in 2019, having been almost wholly neglected by scholars since their publication in the 1820s, they invited an inevitable and tantalizing comparison with her far more famous sister-in-law, Mary Wollstonecraft, especially since Kingsbury had written an article on \"The Natural Rights of Woman.\" Irrespective of the Wollstonecraft connection, however, Kingsbury's writing stands on its own merits as deserving of serious scholarship by historians of women in philosophy. Nevertheless, reading Kingsbury in the light of her predecessor is highly instructive and helps both bring out what is distinctive about her conclusions and place her in the context of post-Wollstonecraftian thought in the nineteenth century. Kingsbury draws on a similar set of foundational principles as Wollstonecraft, which I place within the republican tradition of political philosophy—freedom, equality, virtue, the common good. Together, these make up an ideal of freedom as independence. Focusing on the issue of education, she argues that increasing women's access to education will do little to improve their intellectual development unless there is an accompanying and extensive restructuring of social and economic norms. In applying the logic of freedom as independence, Kingsbury takes further this aspect of Wollstonecraft's thought and anticipates and prefigures some of the later arguments of feminists and abolitionists writing in the same tradition, including especially Frederick Douglass.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"257 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42303707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
engage in legitimate, meaningful debate (145). Such topics lead to her concluding claim in the final chapter, namely that philosophical systematicity is fundamentally analogous to legal systematicity (168). Though the arguments lodged against Møller’s interlocutors are persuasive, and the result is a convincing case for the centrality and fruitfulness of the legal system metaphor, it at times becomes apparent that the restrictive focus of the book limits its capacity to shed light on Kant’s view. Møller herself repeatedly acknowledges that legal metaphors can only take us so far, concluding chapter 4 with the admission that “the transcendental deduction shows that the categories of the understanding are constitutive of the objects of experience, and that they produce the regularity that they stipulate. This aspect of the argument is not captured by the quid juris metaphor, and the validity of this reasoning cannot be evaluated by referring to legal reasoning” (80). For many of Kant’s readers, however, it is precisely this constitutive activity that a helpful interpretation of his text must account for. Moreover, some of the broader interpretive implications pertaining to Møller’s account of reason remain opaque, such as the true nature of the relationship between reason and law. Perhaps the most important objection to her account—that the legal system is not a metaphor, but “an example of a systematic application of reason which should serve as a model for other applications” (172)—is only directly confronted in the second to last paragraph of the book. Møller’s response is that “we encounter legal institutions in the world, while reason remains an abstract concept of which we can have no direct experience” (173), concluding that we only gain something like insight into the nature of reason through the legal system as a concrete symbol. This arguably sidesteps the issue, especially given Kant’s characteristic insistence that the empirical is only intelligible through reason’s a priori structure, which must be separated from the former if we are to achieve philosophical self-knowledge. Despite such limitations, however, Møller’s book delivers on many of its central claims and should have considerable influence on those interested in Kant’s legal metaphors. J e s s i c a T i z z a r d University of Tübingen
参与合法、有意义的辩论(145)。这些话题导致了她在最后一章的结论，即哲学的系统性从根本上类似于法律的系统性(168)。尽管反对m . ller的对话者的论点是有说服力的，结果是一个令人信服的案例，证明了法律体系隐喻的中心地位和成果，但有时很明显，这本书的限制性焦点限制了它阐明康德观点的能力。m . ller本人反复承认，法律隐喻只能带我们走这么远，在第四章结束时，她承认“先验演绎表明，知性的范畴是经验对象的组成部分，它们产生了它们规定的规律性。”论证的这一方面并没有被quid juris隐喻所捕捉，而且这种推理的有效性不能通过参考法律推理来评估”(80)。然而，对于康德的许多读者来说，对康德文本的有益解释必须考虑的正是这种构成活动。此外，与Møller的理性描述有关的一些更广泛的解释含义仍然不透明，例如理性与法律之间关系的真实本质。也许对她的描述最重要的反对意见——法律体系不是一个隐喻，而是“理性系统应用的一个例子，应该作为其他应用的典范”(172)——只在本书的第二到最后一段中直接面对。Møller的回应是，“我们在世界上遇到法律制度，而理性仍然是一个抽象的概念，我们不能有直接的经验”(173)，得出的结论是，我们只能通过作为具体符号的法律制度来获得对理性本质的洞察力。这可以说是回避了这个问题，特别是考虑到康德坚持认为经验只能通过理性的先验结构来理解，如果我们要实现哲学的自我认识，就必须将先验结构与经验分离。然而，尽管存在这些局限性，Møller的书传达了许多核心主张，并且应该对那些对康德的法律隐喻感兴趣的人产生相当大的影响。J . e . s . s . c . T . z . s . d .宾根大学
{"title":"J. G. Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794–95 by J. G. Fichte (review)","authors":"Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0030","url":null,"abstract":"engage in legitimate, meaningful debate (145). Such topics lead to her concluding claim in the final chapter, namely that philosophical systematicity is fundamentally analogous to legal systematicity (168). Though the arguments lodged against Møller’s interlocutors are persuasive, and the result is a convincing case for the centrality and fruitfulness of the legal system metaphor, it at times becomes apparent that the restrictive focus of the book limits its capacity to shed light on Kant’s view. Møller herself repeatedly acknowledges that legal metaphors can only take us so far, concluding chapter 4 with the admission that “the transcendental deduction shows that the categories of the understanding are constitutive of the objects of experience, and that they produce the regularity that they stipulate. This aspect of the argument is not captured by the quid juris metaphor, and the validity of this reasoning cannot be evaluated by referring to legal reasoning” (80). For many of Kant’s readers, however, it is precisely this constitutive activity that a helpful interpretation of his text must account for. Moreover, some of the broader interpretive implications pertaining to Møller’s account of reason remain opaque, such as the true nature of the relationship between reason and law. Perhaps the most important objection to her account—that the legal system is not a metaphor, but “an example of a systematic application of reason which should serve as a model for other applications” (172)—is only directly confronted in the second to last paragraph of the book. Møller’s response is that “we encounter legal institutions in the world, while reason remains an abstract concept of which we can have no direct experience” (173), concluding that we only gain something like insight into the nature of reason through the legal system as a concrete symbol. This arguably sidesteps the issue, especially given Kant’s characteristic insistence that the empirical is only intelligible through reason’s a priori structure, which must be separated from the former if we are to achieve philosophical self-knowledge. Despite such limitations, however, Møller’s book delivers on many of its central claims and should have considerable influence on those interested in Kant’s legal metaphors. J e s s i c a T i z z a r d University of Tübingen","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"334 - 336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44552872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone by Bruno Centrone (review)","authors":"Rafael Ferber","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"325 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43904045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract:There are two ways of hearing Philo's unexpected endorsement of a version of the design hypothesis in the final part of Hume's Dialogues. We might register it in accordance with Cleanthes's descriptivist approach to religious speech, taking Philo to be reasoning with Cleanthes in Cleanthes's own way. Or we might hear Philo's words in accordance with his own expressivist account of religious speech, an account that Philo appears to have borrowed from Hobbes. I argue that Hume intended this double layering of meanings, presenting us with two distinct ways we might understand Philo's closing remarks. Each possible reading reveals a distinct Humean lesson about the limitations of natural theology.
{"title":"The Meaning of Philo's Reversal","authors":"T. Holden","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0019","url":null,"abstract":"abstract:There are two ways of hearing Philo's unexpected endorsement of a version of the design hypothesis in the final part of Hume's Dialogues. We might register it in accordance with Cleanthes's descriptivist approach to religious speech, taking Philo to be reasoning with Cleanthes in Cleanthes's own way. Or we might hear Philo's words in accordance with his own expressivist account of religious speech, an account that Philo appears to have borrowed from Hobbes. I argue that Hume intended this double layering of meanings, presenting us with two distinct ways we might understand Philo's closing remarks. Each possible reading reveals a distinct Humean lesson about the limitations of natural theology.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"215 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45049128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spinoza's Epistemology through a Geometrical Lens by Matthew Homan (review)","authors":"Y. Melamed","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"329 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42183227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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