This study measures the intergenerational persistence of education attainment, using internationally comparable data for parents’ and children’s education levels by age cohort for 30 countries, and identifies its determinants. The estimated intergenerational regression coefficients show that educational mobility worsened over generations in most countries, but its degrees varies considerably across countries and over time. The country-cohort panel regressions show that intergenerational educational mobility decreases with educational expansion, income inequality and credit constraints, and increases with per-capita GDP. The results also highlight the importance of progressive public expenditure on education for improving intergenerational educational mobility.
{"title":"Patterns and determinants of intergenerational educational mobility: Evidence across countries","authors":"Hanol Lee, Jong‐Wha Lee","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12342","url":null,"abstract":"This study measures the intergenerational persistence of education attainment, using internationally comparable data for parents’ and children’s education levels by age cohort for 30 countries, and identifies its determinants. The estimated intergenerational regression coefficients show that educational mobility worsened over generations in most countries, but its degrees varies considerably across countries and over time. The country-cohort panel regressions show that intergenerational educational mobility decreases with educational expansion, income inequality and credit constraints, and increases with per-capita GDP. The results also highlight the importance of progressive public expenditure on education for improving intergenerational educational mobility.","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":"26 1","pages":"70-90"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12342","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41522128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hong Kong's New Keynesian Phillips Curve\u0000 : Sticky information or sticky price?","authors":"Tsz H. Hung, Yum K. Kwan","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12354","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41343630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of government bond purchases by the central banks in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom","authors":"M. Nakazawa","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12350","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45269236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Shoji, Keitaro Aoyagi, Ryuji Kasahara, Y. Sawada
We tested four alternative hypotheses concerning the motivations behind the participation by rural households in community work: public goods investment, production network formation, risk‐sharing network formation, and pure altruism. We used a unique dataset from an irrigation project in Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where a significant portion of irrigated land was allocated through a lottery mechanism. In addition, we elicited the level of altruism using the dictator game. By combining these data, we showed that community participation patterns fit the motive to form risk‐sharing networks better than the other major motives. Only a few studies have empirically investigated the process of risk‐sharing network formation, and our analysis fills the gap in the literature.
{"title":"Motives behind community participation: Evidence from natural and artefactual field experiments in Sri Lanka","authors":"M. Shoji, Keitaro Aoyagi, Ryuji Kasahara, Y. Sawada","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12352","url":null,"abstract":"We tested four alternative hypotheses concerning the motivations behind the participation by rural households in community work: public goods investment, production network formation, risk‐sharing network formation, and pure altruism. We used a unique dataset from an irrigation project in Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where a significant portion of irrigated land was allocated through a lottery mechanism. In addition, we elicited the level of altruism using the dictator game. By combining these data, we showed that community participation patterns fit the motive to form risk‐sharing networks better than the other major motives. Only a few studies have empirically investigated the process of risk‐sharing network formation, and our analysis fills the gap in the literature.","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":"25 1","pages":"577-600"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47912300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If institutions are essential for long-run performance, why don’t developing countries adopt institutions in developed countries to become rich? In this dynamic model, culture affects a ruler’s institutional choice, while culture itself evolves endogenously. Multiple stable steady states are possible, and even similar initial conditions can lead to dramatically different steady states. The state of Qin’s unification of China in 221 BC is used to illustrate the model. In one steady state, consistent with what happened in the state of Qin, individuals value material incentives. Qin did not strictly practice the patriarchal clan system advocated by Confucianism. Qin adopted Legalist institutions under which government officials were chosen by merit, and Qin culture was further shaped by Legalism. In another steady state, consistent with what happened in states other than Qin, individuals value loyalty and family values. Those states chose not to adopt Legalist institutions comprehensively for fearing that inconsistencies between culture and institutions could lead to internal rebellions even though institutional reforms would increase their military power. Other cases of how the interdependence between culture and institutions affects performance are also discussed.
{"title":"Culture, institutions, and long‐run performance","authors":"Haiwen Zhou","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12351","url":null,"abstract":"If institutions are essential for long-run performance, why don’t developing countries adopt institutions in developed countries to become rich? In this dynamic model, culture affects a ruler’s institutional choice, while culture itself evolves endogenously. Multiple stable steady states are possible, and even similar initial conditions can lead to dramatically different steady states. The state of Qin’s unification of China in 221 BC is used to illustrate the model. In one steady state, consistent with what happened in the state of Qin, individuals value material incentives. Qin did not strictly practice the patriarchal clan system advocated by Confucianism. Qin adopted Legalist institutions under which government officials were chosen by merit, and Qin culture was further shaped by Legalism. In another steady state, consistent with what happened in states other than Qin, individuals value loyalty and family values. Those states chose not to adopt Legalist institutions comprehensively for fearing that inconsistencies between culture and institutions could lead to internal rebellions even though institutional reforms would increase their military power. Other cases of how the interdependence between culture and institutions affects performance are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12351","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46549580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Determinants of Taiwan's outward investment in Southeast Asia: Economic factors and institutional issues","authors":"Thu-Ha Thi An, K. Yeh","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12348","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46516,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Economic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1468-0106.12348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45199902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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