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STRICT MORAL LIABILITY 严格的道德责任
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000220
Justin A. Capes
Abstract: Strict liability in tort law is thought by some to have a moral counterpart. In this essay I attempt to determine whether there is, in fact, strict liability in the moral domain. I argue that there is, and I critically evaluate several accounts of its normative foundations before suggesting one of my own.
摘要:侵权法中的严格责任被认为具有道德对应物。在这篇文章中,我试图确定在道德领域是否存在严格责任。我认为有,在提出我自己的观点之前,我批判性地评估了几个关于其规范基础的说法。
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引用次数: 2
CONTRIBUTORS 贡献者
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0265052519000347
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引用次数: 0
BOUNDARY PROBLEMS AND SELF-OWNERSHIP 边界问题和自我所有权
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000451
Jessica Flanigan
Abstract: Self-ownership theorists argue that many of our most morally urgent and enforceable rights stem from the fact that we own ourselves. Critics of self-ownership argue that the claim that people own their bodies commits self-ownership theorists to several implausible conclusions because self-ownership theory relies on several vague moral predicates, and any precisification of the required predicates is seemingly too permissive (because it allows people to impose deadly risks on innocent bystanders for no reason) or too restrictive (because it prohibits people from polluting or even interacting with others at all). I argue that this line of criticism does not undermine the case for self-ownership theory because self-ownership theory does not require precisification of each moral concept that it is based on and, even if it did, the theory’s alleged extensional inadequacy does not undermine its justification.
摘要:自我所有权理论家认为,我们许多在道德上最紧迫和可执行的权利源于我们拥有自己的事实。自我所有权的批评者认为,人们拥有自己身体的说法使自我所有权理论家得出了几个难以置信的结论,因为自我所有权理论依赖于几个模糊的道德谓词,而对所需谓词的任何精确化似乎都过于纵容(因为它允许人们毫无理由地对无辜的旁观者施加致命的风险)或过于限制(因为它禁止人们污染甚至与他人互动)。我认为,这一批评路线并没有削弱自我所有权理论的理由,因为自我所有权理论并不需要对其所基于的每个道德概念进行精确化,即使需要,该理论所谓的外延不足也不会削弱其正当性。
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引用次数: 2
WHEN SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS ARE JUST CLAIMS AND THIS IS UNJUST 当生存权是正当的要求,这是不公正的
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000475
A. Mancilla
Abstract: Most of the liberal moral and political debate concerning global poverty has focused on the duties of justice or assistance that the well-off have toward the needy. In this essay, I show how rights-based theories in particular have unanimously understood subsistence rights just (and only) as claims, where all it means to have a claim—following Hohfeld—is that others have a duty toward us. This narrow interpretation of subsistence rights has led to a glaring omission; namely, there has been no careful examination of what the rights-holders themselves may do to realize the object of their rights. Furthermore, in the few cases where this question gets posed, rights are again understood just (and only) as claims, but this time of an Austinian kind: rights-holders are limited to the performance of speech-acts like demanding, pleading, and entreating to make noncompliers fulfill their duties. I suggest that this approach betrays the original spirit of subsistence rights as individual moral powers delineating a sovereign sphere of action. More seriously, it is unjust to the rights-holders themselves, to the extent that many of the actions they undertake to realize the objects of their rights fall off the radar of moral analysis.
摘要:关于全球贫困的自由主义道德和政治辩论大多集中在富人对穷人的正义或援助义务上。在这篇文章中,我展示了以权利为基础的理论是如何一致地将生存权理解为仅仅(并且仅仅)是一种要求,在这种情况下,拥有一种要求——遵循hohfeld的观点——意味着其他人对我们有义务。这种对生存权的狭隘解释导致了一个明显的遗漏;也就是说,没有仔细审查权利持有人自己可以做些什么来实现其权利的目标。此外,在提出这个问题的少数情况下,权利再次被理解为只是(并且仅仅)作为主张,但这一次是一种奥地利式的:权利持有人仅限于要求、恳求和恳求等言论行为的表现,以使不服从者履行其义务。我认为,这种方法背叛了生存权作为个人道德力量描绘主权行动领域的原始精神。更严重的是,这对权利持有人本身来说是不公正的,因为他们为实现权利目标而采取的许多行动都没有受到道德分析的关注。
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引用次数: 1
FORGIVING THE DEAD 宽恕死者
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000281
Macalester Bell
Abstract: Resentment and other hard feelings may outlive their targets, and people often express a desire to overcome these feelings through forgiveness. While some see forgiving the dead as an important moral accomplishment, others deny that genuine forgiveness of the dead is coherent, let alone desirable or valuable. According to one line of thought, forgiveness is something we do for certain reasons, such as the offender’s expressed contrition. Given that the dead cannot express remorse, forgiveness of the dead is impossible. Others see the apparent coherence and moral importance of forgiving the dead as a reason to give up on the idea that forgiveness is conditional upon the offender’s remorse. According to these philosophers, forgiveness of the dead poses no special problems; forgiveness of the dead, like forgiveness of the living, is not contingent upon the offender’s contrition. I steer a path between these two positions in such a way as to bring out an important aspect of forgiveness that is not adequately addressed in the literature: I argue that forgiving the dead may be perfectly coherent and morally valuable even though the dead cannot ask for forgiveness or engage in reparative activities. A full appreciation of the relational character of forgiveness allows us to make sense of forgiving the dead.
摘要:怨恨和其他痛苦的感觉可能比它们的目标存在得更久,人们经常表达通过宽恕来克服这些感觉的愿望。虽然有些人认为宽恕死者是一项重要的道德成就,但其他人否认真正的宽恕死者是连贯的,更不用说可取或有价值了。根据一种思路,宽恕是我们出于某些原因而做的事情,比如冒犯者表达了忏悔。鉴于死者无法表达悔恨,宽恕死者是不可能的。另一些人则认为,宽恕死者的明显连贯性和道德重要性,是放弃宽恕以冒犯者的悔恨为条件这一观点的理由。根据这些哲学家的观点,对死者的宽恕并没有什么特别的问题;对死者的宽恕,就像对生者的宽恕一样,并不取决于犯罪者的悔悟。我以这样一种方式在这两种立场之间走一条路,以揭示宽恕的一个重要方面,这在文献中没有得到充分的解决:我认为,宽恕死者可能是完全连贯的,在道德上是有价值的,即使死者不能请求宽恕或参与修复活动。对宽恕的关系特性的充分理解使我们理解宽恕死者的意义。
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引用次数: 1
THE FALLIBILITY PARADOX 易错性悖论
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000293
C. Sripada
Abstract: Reasons-responsiveness theories of moral responsibility are currently among the most popular. Here, I present the fallibility paradox, a novel challenge to these views. The paradox involves an agent who is performing a somewhat demanding psychological task across an extended sequence of trials and who is deeply committed to doing her very best at this task. Her action-issuing psychological processes are outstandingly reliable, so she meets the criterion of being reasons-responsive on every single trial. But she is human after all, so it is inevitable that she will make rare errors. The reasons-responsiveness view, it is claimed, is forced to reach a highly counterintuitive conclusion: she is morally responsible for these rare errors, even though making rare errors is something she is powerless to prevent. I review various replies that a reasons-responsiveness theorist might offer, arguing that none of these replies adequately addresses the challenge.
摘要:道德责任的理性-反应理论是目前最为流行的理论之一。在这里,我提出了易错性悖论,这是对这些观点的一个新的挑战。这个悖论涉及到一个行为人在一系列的试验中执行一项要求很高的心理任务,并且她坚定地承诺尽自己最大的努力完成这项任务。她发出行动的心理过程非常可靠,所以她在每一次试验中都符合理性反应的标准。但她毕竟是人,所以难免会犯一些罕见的错误。有人声称,理性-反应观点被迫得出了一个非常违反直觉的结论:她对这些罕见的错误负有道德责任,尽管她无力阻止这些罕见的错误。我回顾了理性反应理论家可能给出的各种回答,认为这些回答都没有充分解决这个挑战。
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引用次数: 1
SOY volume 36 issue 1 Cover and Front matter 大豆杂志第36卷第1期封面和封面
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0265052519000323
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引用次数: 0
THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM: AN ABDUCTIVE APPROACH 自由意志和决定论的问题:一种溯因方法
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000207
Kristin M. Mickelson
Abstract: This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of free will and determinism into a “correlation” problem and an “explanation” problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive reasoning (that is, inference to the best explanation) may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of free will. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, each implies a unique solution to the explanationproblem. For example, all libertarian-friendly accounts of free will imply that it is impossible to act freely when determinism is true. However, only a narrow subset of libertarians have the theoretical resources to defend the incompatibilist claim that deterministic laws (qua deterministic) undermine free will, while other libertarians must reject this traditional incompatibilist view.
摘要:本文首先将自由意志与决定论的传统问题划分为“关联”问题和“解释”问题。然后,我将重点放在解释问题上,并论证一种标准形式的溯因推理(即对最佳解释的推断)可能有助于解决这一问题。为了证明溯因法的丰富性,我将其应用于三个关于自由意志的标准解释。虽然每种解释都意味着对相关性问题的相同解决方案,但每种解释都意味着对解释问题的唯一解决方案。例如,所有对自由意志友好的自由意志理论都暗示,当决定论是正确的时候,自由行动是不可能的。然而,只有一小部分自由意志主义者有理论资源来捍卫决定论法则(准决定论)破坏自由意志的不相容论主张,而其他自由意志主义者必须拒绝这种传统的不相容论观点。
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引用次数: 6
NARRATIVE CAPACITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 叙述能力和道德责任
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S026505251900030X
M. Griffith
Abstract: My main aim in this essay is to argue that “narrative capacity” is a genuine feature of our mental lives and a skill that enables us to become full-fledged morally responsible agents. I approach the issue from the standpoint of reasons-responsiveness. Reasons-responsiveness theories center on the idea that moral responsibility requires sufficient sensitivity to reasons. I argue that our capacity to understand and tell stories has an important role to play in this sensitivity. Without such skill we would be cut off from the full range of reasons to which moral agents need access and/or we would be deficient in the ability to weigh the reasons that we recognize. After arguing for the relevance of narrative skill, I argue that understanding the connection between reasons-sensitivity and narrative confers additional benefits. It illuminates important psychological structures (sometimes said to be missing from reasons-responsive accounts) and helps to explain some cases of diminished blame.
摘要:本文的主要目的是论证“叙事能力”是我们精神生活的真实特征,是一种使我们成为成熟的道德负责的行为者的技能。我从理性——回应的角度来处理这个问题。理性-回应理论的核心思想是,道德责任要求对理性有足够的敏感性。我认为,我们理解和讲述故事的能力在这种敏感性中起着重要作用。如果没有这样的技能,我们将无法获得道德行为者需要获得的全部理由,并且/或者我们将缺乏衡量我们认识到的理由的能力。在论证了叙述技巧的相关性之后,我认为理解理性敏感性和叙述之间的联系会带来额外的好处。它阐明了重要的心理结构(有时被认为是在原因反应的叙述中缺失的),并有助于解释一些减少责备的案例。
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引用次数: 0
ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM 自由的强烈闪烁
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000244
Michael Robinson
Abstract: This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.
摘要:本文提出了一种可选可能性原则(PAP)的闪烁自由辩护版本,并表明它对该辩护版本面临的主要反对意见是无懈可击的。闪变辩护的支持者认为,法兰克福式的案件不能削弱PAP,因为这些案件中的代理人仍然拥有替代的可能性。对闪变策略持批评态度的人认为,在这些情况下,对代理人开放的其他选择无法拒绝法兰克福式的攻击,理由是它们不够强大(也就是说,在某种程度上,道德意义可能会以道德责任的归因为基础)。一旦我们看到遗漏能够构成稳健的选择,即使他们不是故意的,很明显,在这些情况下,代理人确实拥有稳健的选择可能性——从这类情况中不可消除的选择。其结果是,法兰克福式的案例在理论上无法为我们提供拒绝PAP的充分理由。
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引用次数: 7
期刊
Social Philosophy & Policy
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