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LIBERAL FREEDOM, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 自由主义的自由,三权分立,以及行政国家
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S026505252100025X
Eric MacGilvray
Abstract Contemporary critiques of the administrative state are closely bound up with the distinctively American doctrine that republican freedom requires that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers be exercised by separate and distinct branches of government. The burden of this essay is to argue that legislative delegation and judicial deference to the administrative state are necessary, or at least highly desirable, features of a democratic separation of powers regime. I begin by examining the historical and conceptual roots of the separation of powers doctrine, paying particular attention to the unique way in which it was adapted to fit the American case. I then examine three concerns that the resulting constitutional system raises about the republican freedom of those who are subject to it—which I call the accountability, legitimacy, and stability concerns—and argue that the administrative state is a useful, albeit imperfect, tool for reducing the unavoidable tension between these concerns. The thrust of this discussion is to push us away from “in principle” objections to the administrative state, and back toward the kinds of prudential considerations that are associated with ordinary liberal politics. More importantly, the aim of the essay is to encourage sober reflection on the real dangers that face the American constitutional system under current circumstances.
当代对行政国家的批评与美国特有的共和自由原则密切相关,即共和自由要求立法权、行政权和司法权由不同的政府部门行使。本文的主旨在于论证立法授权和对行政国家的司法服从是必要的,或者至少是非常可取的,是民主三权分立制度的特征。我首先考察了三权分立理论的历史和概念根源,特别关注了它被改编以适应美国情况的独特方式。然后,我考察了由此产生的宪法体系所引发的关于受其约束的人的共和自由的三个问题——我称之为问责制、合法性和稳定性问题——并认为行政国家是一个有用的工具,尽管不完美,可以减少这些问题之间不可避免的紧张关系。这一讨论的主旨是将我们从对行政国家的“原则上”反对中推离,回到与普通自由主义政治相关的那种审慎考虑。更重要的是,这篇文章的目的是鼓励人们冷静地反思美国宪法制度在当前环境下面临的真正危险。
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引用次数: 0
ECONOMISTS ON PRIVATE INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC MODELS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE CLASH BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND THE SO-CALLED PUBLIC GOOD 私人激励、经济模式和行政国家的经济学家:幸福与所谓的公共利益之间的冲突
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000261
S. Peart
Abstract This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of (private) motivations as actors throughout the economy.
摘要本文将行政状态视为一种普遍存在的现象,其部分原因是激励机制的不匹配。本文以经济学史上的两个戏剧性事件为例,研究了两种类型的错配。然后,它考察了经济学家如何越来越多地支持“普遍利益”作为社会的统一目标,甚至以牺牲个人的希望和欲望为代价。不仅如此,他们的程序和模型让他们有理由设计机制,并倡导立法和法规,以“修复”服务于总体目标的个人的所谓次优选择。尽管哈耶克和布坎南警告说,这种工程方法允许社会目标凌驾于个人偏好之上,但新福利经济学的兴起给个人动机的主权带来了额外的打击。贯穿全文的论点是,重要的是要认识到,在行政国家内部或为行政国家提供建议的人,与整个经济中的行动者一样,受到同样类型的(私人)动机的影响。
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引用次数: 0
FIGHTING POWER WITH POWER: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AS A WEAPON AGAINST CONCENTRATED PRIVATE POWER 以权力对抗权力:行政国家作为对抗集中的私人权力的武器
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000297
Samuel Bagg
Abstract Contemporary critics of the administrative state are right to highlight the dangers of vesting too much power in a centralized bureaucracy removed from popular oversight and accountability. Too often neglected in this literature, however, are the dangers of vesting too little power in a centralized state, which enables dominant groups to further expand their social and economic advantages through decentralized means. This article seeks to synthesize these concerns, understanding them as reflecting the same underlying danger of state capture. It then articulates a set of heuristics for the design of public and administrative institutions, which aim at minimizing the risks of capture from both public and private sources. By following these heuristics, it claims, we can successfully employ the administrative state as a weapon against concentrated private power, rather than allowing it to serve as a tool of dominant groups.
当代对行政国家的批评者强调,将过多权力赋予一个脱离大众监督和问责制的中央官僚机构是危险的,这是正确的。然而,在这些文献中经常被忽视的是,中央集权国家权力过少的危险,这使得统治群体能够通过分散的手段进一步扩大他们的社会和经济优势。本文试图综合这些问题,将它们理解为反映了同样的潜在的国家捕获危险。然后,它阐明了公共和行政机构设计的一套启发法,其目的是尽量减少从公共和私人来源捕获的风险。它声称,通过遵循这些启发式,我们可以成功地将行政国家作为对抗集中的私人权力的武器,而不是让它成为统治集团的工具。
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引用次数: 7
WHAT DO EXPERTS KNOW? 专家们都知道些什么?
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S026505252200005X
Iskra Fileva
Abstract Reasonable people agree that whenever possible, we ought to rely on experts to tell us what is true or what the best course of action is. But which experts should we rely on and with regard to what issues? Here, I discuss several dangers that accompany reliance on experts, the most important one of which is this: positions that are offered as expert opinion frequently contain elements outside an expert’s domain of expertise, for instance, values not intrinsic to the given domain. I also talk about the practical implications of accepting my view.
通情达理的人都同意,只要有可能,我们就应该依靠专家来告诉我们什么是真实的,什么是最佳的行动方案。但是我们应该依靠哪些专家,针对哪些问题?在这里,我讨论了依赖专家的几个危险,其中最重要的一个是:作为专家意见提供的立场经常包含专家专业领域之外的元素,例如,不是给定领域固有的价值观。我还谈到了接受我的观点的实际意义。
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引用次数: 1
THE FOG OF DEBATE 辩论的迷雾
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000061
N. Ballantyne
Abstract The fog of war—poor intelligence about the enemy—can frustrate even a well-prepared military force. Something similar can happen in intellectual debate. What I call the fog of debate is a useful metaphor for grappling with failures and dysfunctions of argumentative persuasion that stem from poor information about our opponents. It is distressingly easy to make mistakes about our opponents’ thinking, as well as to fail to comprehend their understanding of and reactions to our arguments. After describing the fog of debate and outlining its sources in cognition and communication, I consider a few policies we might adopt upon learning we are in this fog.
战争的迷雾——缺乏关于敌人的情报——甚至可以挫败一支准备充分的军队。类似的事情也可能发生在智力辩论中。我所说的“辩论之雾”是一个很有用的比喻,可以用来解释辩论说服的失败和功能失调,这些失败和功能失调源于对对手信息的缺乏。我们很容易对对手的想法犯错误,也很容易无法理解他们对我们论点的理解和反应。在描述了辩论的迷雾并概述了其在认知和交流中的来源之后,我考虑了一些我们在得知自己处于这种迷雾中时可能采取的策略。
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引用次数: 0
THE TECHNOLOGY OF PUBLIC SHAMING 公开羞辱的技术
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000085
Harrison Frye
Abstract This essay argues that online public shaming can be productively understood as a problem of technology. In particular, the technology of public shaming is ambiguous between two senses. On the one hand, public shaming depends on various technologies, such as social media posts or, more historically, pillories. These are the artifacts of shame. On the other hand, public shaming itself is a social technology. In particular, public shaming is a way for communities to promote cooperation. Ultimately, I claim there is a mismatch between the artifacts of shame and this important social technology of shame. Social media drifts toward disintegrative shame, which tends to corrode cooperation. This suggests that we must either realign the technology of public shame or reject shame as a legitimate option.
摘要本文认为,网络公开羞辱可以有效地理解为一个技术问题。特别是,公开羞辱的技术在两种意义上是模糊的。一方面,公开羞辱依赖于各种技术,比如社交媒体帖子,或者更历史地说,羞辱。这些都是羞耻的产物。另一方面,公开羞辱本身就是一种社会技术。特别是,公开羞辱是社区促进合作的一种方式。最后,我认为羞耻感的人工制品和羞耻感这种重要的社会技术之间存在着不匹配。社交媒体倾向于瓦解性羞耻感,这往往会侵蚀合作。这表明,我们要么重新调整公众羞辱的技术,要么拒绝将羞辱作为一种合法的选择。
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引用次数: 1
WHEN ARE MARKETS ILLEGITIMATE? 什么时候市场是非法的?
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052519000426
A. Greene
Abstract: In this essay I defend an alternative account of why markets are legitimate. I argue that markets have a raison d’être—a potential to be valuable that, if fulfilled, would justify their existence. I characterize this potential in terms of the goods that are promoted by the legal protection of economic agency: resource discretion, contribution esteem, wealth, diffusion of power, and freedom of association. I argue that market institutions deliver these goods without requiring the participants to have shared ends, or shared deliberation about joint ends—indeed, this feature is the source of the market’s distinctive contribution to well-being. I suggest that when markets lack legitimacy, this is because they fail to fulfill their raison d’être, or fail to be recognized as doing so. Thus, the contours of legal protection must be drawn so that these goods are realized together in a recognizable way, without sacrificing one good for the sake of others. Finally, I argue that this account is appealing because it allows regulators to consider a plurality of goods, and because it makes room for the essential role of rhetoric in securing market legitimacy.
摘要:在这篇文章中,我为市场为何合法的另一种解释辩护。我认为,市场有潜力发挥价值的理由être-a,如果这个理由得到满足,它们就有理由存在。我用经济机构的法律保护所促进的商品来描述这种潜力:资源自由裁量权、贡献尊重、财富、权力扩散和结社自由。我认为,市场制度在提供这些商品时,并不要求参与者有共同的目的,或者对共同的目的有共同的考虑——事实上,这一特征正是市场对福祉的独特贡献的来源。我认为,当市场缺乏合法性时,这是因为它们没有实现自己être的理由,或者没有被认为是这样做的。因此,必须画出法律保护的轮廓,以便以一种可识别的方式实现这些利益,而不是为了其他利益而牺牲一种利益。最后,我认为这种解释之所以有吸引力,是因为它允许监管机构考虑多种商品,而且它为修辞在确保市场合法性方面发挥的重要作用腾出了空间。
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引用次数: 2
Agonistic Liberalism 论争的自由主义
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2020-05-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052500004581
Agonistic Liberalism, J. Rawls, J. Gray
In all of its varieties, traditional liberalism is a universalist political theory. Its content is a set of principles which prescribe the best regime, the ideally best institutions, for all mankind. It may be acknowledged — as it is, by a proto-liberal such as Spinoza — that the best regime can be attained only rarely, and cannot be expected to endure for long; and that the forms its central institutions will assume in different historical and cultural milieux may vary significantly. It will then be accepted that the liberal regime's role in political thought is as a regulative ideal, which political practice can hope only to approximate, subject to all the vagaries and exigencies of circumstance. Nonetheless, the content of traditional liberalism is a system of principles which function as universal norms for the critical appraisal of human institutions. In this regard, traditional liberalism — the liberalism of Locke and Kant, for example — represents a continuation of classical political rationalism, as it is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, where it also issues in principles having the attribute of universality, in that they apply ideally to all human beings.
传统自由主义是一种普遍主义的政治理论。它的内容是一套原则,这些原则规定了全人类最好的制度,最理想的制度。像斯宾诺莎这样的原始自由主义者也许会承认,最好的制度很少能实现,也不能指望它长久存在;在不同的历史和文化环境中,其中心机构的形式可能会有很大的不同。人们将会接受,自由主义制度在政治思想中的作用是作为一种规范的理想,政治实践只能希望接近这种理想,受制于环境的所有变幻莫测和紧急情况。尽管如此,传统自由主义的内容是一个原则体系,作为对人类制度进行批判性评价的普遍规范。在这方面,传统自由主义——例如洛克和康德的自由主义——代表了古典政治理性主义的延续,正如在亚里士多德和阿奎那所发现的那样,它也提出了具有普遍性属性的原则,因为它们理想地适用于所有人类。
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引用次数: 13
“ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM”: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DECISION-MAKING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT “行政宪政”:论美国宪政发展中的机构决策作用
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2020-05-04 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000248
D. Bernstein
Abstract The last decade or so has seen an explosion of scholarship by American law professors on what has become known as administrative constitutionalism. Administrative constitutionalism is a catchphrase for the role of administrative agencies in influencing, creating, and establishing constitutional rules and norms, and governing based on those rules and norms. Though courts traditionally get far more attention in the scholarly literature and the popular imagination, administrative constitutionalism scholars show that administrative agencies have been extremely important participants in American constitutional development. Section I of this essay identifies three different versions of administrative constitutionalism—(1) Engagement with Existing Constitutional Doctrine; (2) Resolving Questions of Statutory Meaning that Implicate Constitutional Questions; and (3) Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism—and provides examples from the scholarly literature to illustrate these distinct manifestations of administrative constitutionalism. Section II of this essay discusses the normative turn in administrative constitutionalism scholarship. Much of this normative literature is implicitly or explicitly premised on the notion that agencies are more likely to pursue progressive goals than are other government actors. Section III of this essay disputes the notion that agency constitutional decision-making is “democratic” and that agencies are naturally inclined to serve progressive goals. Finally, Section IV of this essay notes that scholars who support broad agency autonomy to work out and enforce their own constitutional visions have failed to consider how their work fits in with the economic and political science literature on agency behavior. One can predict, based on that literature, that agencies given broad autonomy under the guise of administrative constitutionalism will primarily be inclined to expand their scope and authority at the expense of countervailing considerations.
在过去十年左右的时间里,美国法学教授对所谓行政宪政的研究出现了爆炸式增长。行政宪政是行政机关影响、创造和确立宪法规则和规范,并根据这些规则和规范进行治理的一个流行语。虽然法院传统上在学术文献和大众想象中受到更多的关注,但行政宪政学者表明,行政机构在美国宪法发展中一直是极其重要的参与者。本文第一节确定了行政宪政的三种不同版本:(1)与现有宪法主义的接触;(2)解决涉及宪法问题的法定意义问题;(3)影子行政宪政——并从学术文献中举例说明行政宪政的这些不同表现。本文第二部分论述了行政宪政学术的规范性转向。许多规范性文献或隐或明地以这样一种观念为前提,即机构比其他政府行为者更有可能追求进步目标。本文第三节对机构宪法决策是“民主的”以及机构自然倾向于服务于进步目标的概念提出了异议。最后,本文第四节指出,支持广泛的机构自治以制定和执行自己的宪法愿景的学者没有考虑到他们的工作如何与关于机构行为的经济和政治科学文献相适应。根据这些文献,人们可以预测,在行政宪政的幌子下被赋予广泛自主权的机构将主要倾向于扩大其范围和权力,而牺牲反补贴考虑。
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引用次数: 0
SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 自治、健全的政治经济和公共行政改革
IF 0.4 4区 哲学 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2020-04-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000273
Vlad Tarko
Abstract This essay explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers’ knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (and should in most cases either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).
摘要本文解释了如何使用同意框架的演算来更严格地思考自治问题,并将该框架应用于评估联邦监管机构的问题。稳健的政治经济学认为,即使在有关决策者的知识和仁慈的薄弱假设下,制度也应该设计得运转良好。我展示了如何使用同意的演算来分析动机和知识问题。微积分既是一种自治理论,也是一种强有力的政治经济分析工具。将这一框架应用于公共行政的情况,可以得出这样的结论:私人物品(如药品)往往监管过度,公共物品往往监管不足(如造成过多污染),监管机构往往过于集中(在大多数情况下,要么用认证市场取代,要么转移到州一级)。
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引用次数: 0
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Social Philosophy & Policy
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