Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000036
C. Wolf
Abstract Regulatory agencies aim to protect the public by moderating risks associated with innovation, but a good regulatory regime should also promote justified public trust. After introducing the USDA 2020 SECURE Rule for regulation of biotech innovation as a case study, this essay develops a theory of justified public trust in regulation. On the theory advanced here, to be trustworthy, a regulatory regime must (1) fairly and effectively manage risk, must be (2) “science based” in the relevant sense, and must in addition be (3) truthful, (4) transparent, and (5) responsive to public input. Evaluated with these norms, the USDA SECURE Rule is shown to be deeply flawed, since it fails appropriately to manage risk, and similarly fails to satisfy other normative requirements for justified trust. The argument identifies ways in which the SECURE Rule itself might be improved, but more broadly provides a normative framework for the evaluation of trustworthy regulatory policy-making.
{"title":"PUBLIC TRUST AND BIOTECH INNOVATION: A THEORY OF TRUSTWORTHY REGULATION OF (SCARY!) TECHNOLOGY","authors":"C. Wolf","doi":"10.1017/S0265052522000036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052522000036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Regulatory agencies aim to protect the public by moderating risks associated with innovation, but a good regulatory regime should also promote justified public trust. After introducing the USDA 2020 SECURE Rule for regulation of biotech innovation as a case study, this essay develops a theory of justified public trust in regulation. On the theory advanced here, to be trustworthy, a regulatory regime must (1) fairly and effectively manage risk, must be (2) “science based” in the relevant sense, and must in addition be (3) truthful, (4) transparent, and (5) responsive to public input. Evaluated with these norms, the USDA SECURE Rule is shown to be deeply flawed, since it fails appropriately to manage risk, and similarly fails to satisfy other normative requirements for justified trust. The argument identifies ways in which the SECURE Rule itself might be improved, but more broadly provides a normative framework for the evaluation of trustworthy regulatory policy-making.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"29 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000073
Deborah G. Johnson
Abstract Algorithms are now routinely used in decision-making; they are potent components in decisions that affect the lives of individuals and the activities of public and private institutions. Although use of algorithms has many benefits, a number of problems have been identified with their use in certain domains, most notably in domains where safety and fairness are important. Awareness of these problems has generated public discourse calling for algorithmic accountability. However, the current discourse focuses largely on algorithms and their opacity. I argue that this reflects a narrow and inadequate understanding of accountability. I sketch an account of accountability that takes accountability to be a social practice constituted by actors, forums, shared beliefs and norms, performativity, and sanctions, and aimed at putting constraints on the exercise of power. On this account, algorithmic accountability is not yet constituted; it is in the making. The account brings to light a set of questions that must be addressed to establish it.
{"title":"ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MAKING","authors":"Deborah G. Johnson","doi":"10.1017/S0265052522000073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052522000073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Algorithms are now routinely used in decision-making; they are potent components in decisions that affect the lives of individuals and the activities of public and private institutions. Although use of algorithms has many benefits, a number of problems have been identified with their use in certain domains, most notably in domains where safety and fairness are important. Awareness of these problems has generated public discourse calling for algorithmic accountability. However, the current discourse focuses largely on algorithms and their opacity. I argue that this reflects a narrow and inadequate understanding of accountability. I sketch an account of accountability that takes accountability to be a social practice constituted by actors, forums, shared beliefs and norms, performativity, and sanctions, and aimed at putting constraints on the exercise of power. On this account, algorithmic accountability is not yet constituted; it is in the making. The account brings to light a set of questions that must be addressed to establish it.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"111 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000303
Emily C. Skarbek
Abstract Fiscal equivalence in the public administration of justice requires local police and courts to be financed exclusively by the populations that benefit from their services. Within a polycentric framework, broad based taxation to achieve fiscal equivalence is a desirable principle of public finance because it conceptually allows for the provision of justice to be determined by constituent’s preferences, and increases the political accountability of service providers to constituents. However, the overproduction of justice services can readily occur when the benefits of the justice system are not enjoyed equally. Paradoxically, the same properties that make fiscal equivalence desirable by imposing restraint and control between constituents and local government also create internal pressures for agents of the state to engage in predatory, revenue-generating behavior.
{"title":"FISCAL EQUIVALENCE: PRINCIPLE AND PREDATION IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE","authors":"Emily C. Skarbek","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000303","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fiscal equivalence in the public administration of justice requires local police and courts to be financed exclusively by the populations that benefit from their services. Within a polycentric framework, broad based taxation to achieve fiscal equivalence is a desirable principle of public finance because it conceptually allows for the provision of justice to be determined by constituent’s preferences, and increases the political accountability of service providers to constituents. However, the overproduction of justice services can readily occur when the benefits of the justice system are not enjoyed equally. Paradoxically, the same properties that make fiscal equivalence desirable by imposing restraint and control between constituents and local government also create internal pressures for agents of the state to engage in predatory, revenue-generating behavior.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"244 - 265"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000103
C. Murphy
Abstract Transitional justice refers to the process of dealing with widespread wrongdoing characteristically committed during the course of conflict and/or repression. Examples of such processes include criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations, and memorials. Technology is altering the forms that widespread wrongdoing takes. Technology is also altering the form of processes of transitional justice themselves. This essay provides a map of these changes and their normative implications.
{"title":"TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE","authors":"C. Murphy","doi":"10.1017/S0265052522000103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052522000103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Transitional justice refers to the process of dealing with widespread wrongdoing characteristically committed during the course of conflict and/or repression. Examples of such processes include criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations, and memorials. Technology is altering the forms that widespread wrongdoing takes. Technology is also altering the form of processes of transitional justice themselves. This essay provides a map of these changes and their normative implications.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"170 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s0265052521000194
Mario I. Juarez-Garcia, D. Schmidtz
Abstract There has always been a tension, in theory, between the public accountability and the professional efficiency of the agencies of the administrative state. How has that tension been handled? What would it be like for it to be well handled?
{"title":"THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE","authors":"Mario I. Juarez-Garcia, D. Schmidtz","doi":"10.1017/s0265052521000194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000194","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There has always been a tension, in theory, between the public accountability and the professional efficiency of the agencies of the administrative state. How has that tension been handled? What would it be like for it to be well handled?","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052522000012
D. Schmidtz
Abstract Technological innovations and scientific discoveries do not occur in a vacuum but instead leave us needing to reimagine what we thought we knew about the human condition.
技术创新和科学发现不是凭空出现的，而是让我们需要重新想象我们对人类状况的认识。
{"title":"SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND VALUE","authors":"D. Schmidtz","doi":"10.1017/S0265052522000012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052522000012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Technological innovations and scientific discoveries do not occur in a vacuum but instead leave us needing to reimagine what we thought we knew about the human condition.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000212
Gary Lawson
Abstract The United States Constitution is, in form and fact, a kind of fiduciary instrument, and government officials acting pursuant to that document are subject to the background rules of fiduciary obligation that underlie all such documents. One of the most basic eighteenth-century fiduciary rules was the presumptive rule against subdelegation of discretionary authority. The rule was presumptive only; there were recognized exceptions that permitted subdelegation when it was specifically authorized by the instrument of agency, when it was validated by custom or tradition, and when it was necessary for accomplishment of the agent’s authorized purposes. To what extent might that third exception justify broad subdelegation of legislative authority by Congress to administrative agencies? Part of the answer, which is beyond the aims of this essay, depends on ascertaining the nature of the job entrusted to Congress under the Constitution, which means ascertaining the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. Another part of the answer depends on the extent to which expertise can and may serve as justification for entrusting others with tasks with which one has previously been entrusted. What would a responsible fiduciary approach to expertise—whether for purposes of advice or subdelegation—look like in the modern administrative state? The answer requires a careful examination of the idea of expertise and how it can be applied, and misapplied, in modern governance. This essay offers only the briefest introduction to that problem by trying to frame the questions that responsible fiduciaries need to ask before subdelegating authority. Such questions include: (1) What are the limits of the principal’s own knowledge? (2) What reason is there to think that gaps in that knowledge can, even in principle, be filled by experts? (3) Will application of expert knowledge lead in any particular instance lead to better decisions, given the ubiquitous problem of second-best? and (4) Have you picked the right experts, and will they actually apply expertise rather than using their claim to expertise as a cover for pursuing other goals? These questions in the context of the modern administrative state are just one aspect of a broader problem of nonexperts trying to evaluate—both before and after the fact—the work product of experts.
{"title":"THE FIDUCIARY SOCIAL CONTRACT","authors":"Gary Lawson","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000212","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States Constitution is, in form and fact, a kind of fiduciary instrument, and government officials acting pursuant to that document are subject to the background rules of fiduciary obligation that underlie all such documents. One of the most basic eighteenth-century fiduciary rules was the presumptive rule against subdelegation of discretionary authority. The rule was presumptive only; there were recognized exceptions that permitted subdelegation when it was specifically authorized by the instrument of agency, when it was validated by custom or tradition, and when it was necessary for accomplishment of the agent’s authorized purposes. To what extent might that third exception justify broad subdelegation of legislative authority by Congress to administrative agencies? Part of the answer, which is beyond the aims of this essay, depends on ascertaining the nature of the job entrusted to Congress under the Constitution, which means ascertaining the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. Another part of the answer depends on the extent to which expertise can and may serve as justification for entrusting others with tasks with which one has previously been entrusted. What would a responsible fiduciary approach to expertise—whether for purposes of advice or subdelegation—look like in the modern administrative state? The answer requires a careful examination of the idea of expertise and how it can be applied, and misapplied, in modern governance. This essay offers only the briefest introduction to that problem by trying to frame the questions that responsible fiduciaries need to ask before subdelegating authority. Such questions include: (1) What are the limits of the principal’s own knowledge? (2) What reason is there to think that gaps in that knowledge can, even in principle, be filled by experts? (3) Will application of expert knowledge lead in any particular instance lead to better decisions, given the ubiquitous problem of second-best? and (4) Have you picked the right experts, and will they actually apply expertise rather than using their claim to expertise as a cover for pursuing other goals? These questions in the context of the modern administrative state are just one aspect of a broader problem of nonexperts trying to evaluate—both before and after the fact—the work product of experts.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"25 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000224
T. J. Miller
Abstract Richard T. Ely was one of the most important architects of the administrative welfare state in the United States. His astonishingly influential career was the product of a fundamental re-thinking of the origin and nature of the state. Repudiating the social compact theory of the American founding in favor of a self-consciously “new,” “German,” and frankly “social” conception of the state ordered toward the realization of a collective vision of human perfection, Ely conceived the task of social reform as extending social control over the hereditary and environmental determinants of human character. In the early 1930s, Ely’s vision of social reform would inspire some of his boldest students, especially M. L. Wilson, to formulate a sweeping vision of social planning that would not only inform his little known and rather coyly named Division of Subsistence Homesteads, but also his efforts at the National Resources Board (NRB)—the nation’s first ever agency for comprehensive national planning.
{"title":"RICHARD T. ELY, THE GERMAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, AND THE “SOCIO-TELEOLOGICAL” ASPIRATION OF THE NEW DEAL PLANNERS","authors":"T. J. Miller","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000224","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Richard T. Ely was one of the most important architects of the administrative welfare state in the United States. His astonishingly influential career was the product of a fundamental re-thinking of the origin and nature of the state. Repudiating the social compact theory of the American founding in favor of a self-consciously “new,” “German,” and frankly “social” conception of the state ordered toward the realization of a collective vision of human perfection, Ely conceived the task of social reform as extending social control over the hereditary and environmental determinants of human character. In the early 1930s, Ely’s vision of social reform would inspire some of his boldest students, especially M. L. Wilson, to formulate a sweeping vision of social planning that would not only inform his little known and rather coyly named Division of Subsistence Homesteads, but also his efforts at the National Resources Board (NRB)—the nation’s first ever agency for comprehensive national planning.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"52 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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