This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees associate with the external assurance of CSR reports. Specifically, we consider the presence and effectiveness of CSR committees. Using a sample of Australian firms over the period 2004–2016, we show the mere presence of a CSR committee is not related to the external assurance of CSR. However, CSR committee effectiveness is positively related. In addition, firms with higher CSR committee effectiveness are more likely to seek external assurance provided by the Big4 accountancy firms and acquire financial audit and CSR assurance services from the same provider. Taken together, CSR committee effectiveness plays an active role in CSR assurance services. Our results are particularly relevant to those with interests in understanding the demand and choice of external CSR assurance services, as well as the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on these services.
This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.
This paper investigates the possible nexus between the 'risk-return paradox' and corporate-governance of firms in a cross-country cross-cultural setup. We use corporate governance as well as accounting risk and return data for a large dataset of 45,322 firm-years from 27 countries and show that the firm-level risk-return association may be a non-linear one, contingent on the firm performance. Firms which are below the industry median in terms of operating performance, exhibit an inverse relation in line with Bowman's (1980) ‘paradox' while those above-median exhibit a positive risk-return association. Further, we establish empirically that such risk-return association could be due to the rent-seeking actions of managers and that strong corporate-governance in a firm substantially moderates and reverses these effects. Our results are robust and hold strong through a number of robustness tests.
Extant literature offers mixed evidence on the quality of goodwill after the promulgation of SFAS 141/2 (Li and Sloan, 2017; Lee, 2011; Chen et al., 2008). We reconcile these conflicting findings by examining the role of managerial incentives in determining the efficacy of SFAS 141/2 in improving the quality of goodwill reporting. Using the context of debt contracting, we find that the value-relevance of goodwill is higher for firms that include goodwill in debt covenants in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. We also find that in the post-period, firms that include goodwill in their debt contracts appear to take timelier impairments. In addition, debt contracts in these firms also have tighter covenant thresholds, further corroborating the increased value-relevance of goodwill under the current impairment regime. We also document a relatively higher frequency of covenant violation for firms that use goodwill in their debt contract in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. Taken together, our results inform ongoing discussions regarding the accounting for goodwill and provide new insight into understanding of debt contracting and the role of accounting standards therein.
We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.
Using a sample of Chinese firms, this study examines whether and how managers’ overseas experience affects a firm’s cost of equity capital. We document a negative association between managers’ overseas experience and the cost of equity capital. Mechanism analyses indicate that companies with returnee managers have better information quality and lower systematic risk; more institutional investors, media reports, and analysts following; and higher stock liquidity, all of which lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Further analyses show that chief executive officers (CEOs) with foreign experience have a more significant impact on the cost of capital than non-CEO managers with foreign experience and that managers’ overseas work experience has a more significant impact on the cost of capital than their overseas education. We also find that the impact of managers’ overseas experience is more pronounced when that experience is gained in common law countries compared to code law countries but weaker for state-owned enterprises and firms that are cross-listed or have foreign institutional investors. Overall, the results suggest that managers’ knowledge, skills, and ethical values imprinted from overseas experience, plus eyeball effects from media and analyst attention, can reduce the cost of equity capital.
Using a sample of listed Chinese companies during 2010–2019, we examine whether corporate renaming is associated with fraudulent financial reporting. We find that companies that change their corporate names without making underlying changes to business fundamentals are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud. The positive association between corporate renaming and financial reporting fraud is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and companies with a lower ownership concentration. There is further evidence that corporate renaming is more likely to be associated with disclosure-related fraud (e.g., failure to disclose or delayed disclosure) and that the likelihood of fraudulent behavior increases with the frequency of corporate renaming. Overall, the findings of this study provide evidence of a new red flag for regulators and investors investigating financial fraud. This study is timely and has policy implications for market regulators hoping to establish and improve emerging capital markets in which the information environment is generally considered weak and opaque.