Health Care Analysis最新文献

This article provides a critical comparative analysis of the substantive and procedural values and ethical concepts articulated in guidelines for allocating scarce resources in the COVID-19 pandemic. We identified 21 local and national guidelines written in English, Spanish, German and French; applicable to specific and identifiable jurisdictions; and providing guidance to clinicians for decision making when allocating critical care resources during the COVID-19 pandemic. US guidelines were not included, as these had recently been reviewed elsewhere. Information was extracted from each guideline on: 1) the development process; 2) the presence and nature of ethical, medical and social criteria for allocating critical care resources; and 3) the membership of and decision-making procedure of any triage committees. Results of our analysis show the majority appealed primarily to consequentialist reasoning in making allocation decisions, tempered by a largely pluralistic approach to other substantive and procedural values and ethical concepts. Medical and social criteria included medical need, co-morbidities, prognosis, age, disability and other factors, with a focus on seemingly objective medical criteria. There was little or no guidance on how to reconcile competing criteria, and little attention to internal contradictions within individual guidelines. Our analysis reveals the challenges in developing sound ethical guidance for allocating scarce medical resources, highlighting problems in operationalising ethical concepts and principles, divergence between guidelines, unresolved contradictions within the same guideline, and use of naïve objectivism in employing widely used medical criteria for allocating ICU resources.

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is the UK's primary healthcare priority-setting body, responsible for advising the National Health Service in England on which technologies to fund and which to reject. Until recently, the normative approach underlying this advice was described in a 2008 document entitled 'Social value judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance' (SVJ). In January 2020, however, NICE replaced SVJ with a new articulation of its guiding principles. Given the significant evolution of NICE's methods between 2008 and 2020, this study examines whether this new document ('Principles') offers a transparent account of NICE's current normative approach. It finds that it does not, deriving much of its content directly from SVJ and failing to fully acknowledge or explain how and why NICE's approach has since changed. In particular, Principles is found to offer a largely procedural account of NICE decision-making, despite evidence of the increasing reliance of NICE's methods on substantive decision-rules and 'modifiers' that cannot be justified in purely procedural terms. Thus, while Principles tells NICE's stakeholders much about how the organisation goes about the process of decision-making, it tells them little about the substantive grounds on which its decisions are now based. It is therefore argued that Principles does not offer a transparent account of NICE's normative approach (either alone, or alongside other documents) and that, given NICE's reliance on transparency as a requirement of procedural justice, NICE does not in this respect satisfy its own specification of a just decision-maker.

Current and past pandemics have several aspects in common. It is expected that all members of society contribute to beat it. But it is also clear that the risks associated with the pandemic are different for different groups. This makes that appeals to solidarity based on technocratic risk calculations are only partially successful. Objective 'risks of transmission' may, for example, be trumped by risks of letting down people in need of help or by missing out certain opportunities in life. In this paper we argue that a rapprochement of the insights of standpoint epistemology with pandemic science and pandemic policy making may be an important step toward making pandemic science more accurate and pandemic calls for solidarity more effective.

Patients with advanced dementia are less likely than those with other terminal illnesses to receive palliative care. Due to the nature and course of dementia, there may be a failure to recognize the terminal stage of the disease. A possible and under-investigated explanation for this healthcare disparity is the healthcare practitioner who plays a primary role in end-of-life decision-making. Two potential areas that might impact provider decision-making are cognitive biases and moral considerations. In this analysis, we demonstrate how the cognitive biases and moral considerations of practitioners related to clinical decision-making are inherent in clinical practice and may impact on providers' accuracy related to diagnostic and treatment related decision-making associated with patients with advanced dementia. Anchoring, default, availability, representativeness and framing biases are cognitive biases based on the "Two System Model" that relate to decision-making in end-of-life care. In patients with advanced dementia, those biases may result in a tendency to adhere to traditional mandatory care, involving an aggressive approach to care, which values saving lives at all costs, without taking into account the possible suffering and long-term consequences. Aspects such as moral sensitivity and moral courage play an important role in ethical decision-making related to advanced dementia. Investigations of clinical decision-making that include the cognitive biases and ethical considerations of practitioners might advance the comprehensive understanding of the clinical decision-making process related to care of patients with advanced dementia and promote the quality of care given to this population.

Pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) are one of the most frequently used drug information sources for physicians in both the United States and China. During face-to-face interactions, PSRs use various promotional strategies to impact the prescribing behavior. In the United States, PSRs provide physicians small gifts, free drug samples, and "sincere friendships", whereas in China, they played an indispensable role in medical corruption over the past three decades. To cope with the undue influence of PSRs, both these countries have taken positive but insufficient measures to eliminate the effect thus far. By comparing the strategies of American and Chinese PSRs, it was found that building a friendly personal relationship with physicians in a relatively closed private environment (such as physician's office) is a key factor to exert an individualized influence on physicians, even in different social backgrounds and healthcare contexts. Therefore, this essay suggests that it is necessary to limit the establishment of personal relationships and maintain a more professional interaction to reduce the personalized psychological and emotional influences on physicians' professional judgment. To achieve this goal, it is proposed to transfer the physician-PSR interaction to a professional public space as a supplement to current countermeasures and suggestions. The presence of others and the possibility of third party participation will stimulate more ethical and reputational concerns. It is hoped that the increased transparency of the interaction will promote participants to consider more professional norms and mitigate the undue influence of PSRs' individualized strategies.

Access to abortion care has been hugely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has prompted several governments to permit the use of telemedicine for fully remote care pathways, thereby ensuring pregnant people are still able to access services. One such government is that of England, where these new care pathways have been publicly scrutinised. Those opposed to telemedical early medical abortion care have raised myriad concerns, though they largely centre on matters of patient safeguarding. It is argued that healthcare professionals cannot adequately carry out their safeguarding duties if the patient is not in the room with them. These concerns lack empirical support. Emerging evidence suggests that safeguarding processes may, in fact, be more effective within telemedical abortion care pathways. In this article, we address two specific safeguarding concerns: (1) that a remote consultation prevents a healthcare professional from identifying instances of abuse, and (2) that healthcare professionals cannot reliably confirm the absence of coercion during a remote consultation. We demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced, and that safeguarding may actually be improved in telemedical care pathways as victims of abuse may find it easier to engage with services. It is inevitable that some individuals will fall through the net, but this is unavoidable even with in-person care and thus does not constitute a strong critique of the use of telemedicine in abortion care. These safeguarding concerns set aside, then, we argue that the current approval that enables telemedical early medical abortion should be afforded permanence.

A particularly strong reason to vaccinate against transmittable diseases, based on considerations of harm, is to contribute to the realization of population-level herd immunity. We argue, however, that herd immunity alone is insufficient for deriving a strong harm-based moral obligation to vaccinate in all circumstances, since the obligation significantly weakens well above and well below the herd immunity threshold. The paper offers two additional harm-based arguments that, together with the herd immunity argument, consolidates our moral obligation. First, we argue that individuals should themselves aim not to expose others to risk of harm, and that this consideration becomes stronger the more non-vaccinated people there are, i.e., the further we are below herd immunity. Second, we elaborate on two pragmatic reasons to vaccinate beyond the realization of herd immunity, pertaining to instability of vaccination rates and population heterogeneity, and argue that vaccinating above the threshold should serve as a precautionary measure for buttressing herd immunity. We also show that considerations of harm have normative primacy in establishing this obligation over considerations of fairness. Although perfectly sound, considerations of fairness are, at worst secondary, or at best complementary to considerations of harm.

Information is clearly vital to public health, but the acquisition and use of public health data elicit serious privacy concerns. One strategy for navigating this dilemma is to build 'trust' in institutions responsible for health information, thereby reducing privacy concerns and increasing willingness to contribute personal data. This strategy, as currently presented in public health literature, has serious shortcomings. But it can be augmented by appealing to the philosophical analysis of the concept of trust. Philosophers distinguish trust and trustworthiness from cognate attitudes, such as confident reliance. Central to this is value congruence: trust is grounded in the perception of shared values. So, the way to build trust in institutions responsible for health data is for those institutions to develop and display values shared by the public. We defend this approach from objections, such as that trust is an interpersonal attitude inappropriate to the way people relate to organisations. The paper then moves on to the practical application of our strategy. Trust and trustworthiness can reduce privacy concerns and increase willingness to share health data, notably, in the context of internal and external threats to data privacy. We end by appealing for the sort of empirical work our proposal requires.

Maternal-fetal surgery (MFS) encompasses a range of innovative procedures aiming to treat fetal illnesses and anomalies during pregnancy. Their development and gradual introduction into healthcare raise important ethical issues concerning respect for pregnant women's bodily integrity and autonomy. This paper asks what kind of ethical framework should be employed to best regulate the practice of MFS without eroding the hard-won rights of pregnant women. I examine some existing models conceptualising the relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus to determine what kind of framework is the most adequate for MFS, and conclude that an ecosystem or maternal-fetal dyad model is best suited for upholding women's autonomy. However, I suggest that an appropriate framework needs to incorporate some notion of fetal patienthood, albeit a very limited one, in order to be consistent with the views of healthcare providers and their pregnant patients. I argue that such an ethical framework is both theoretically sound and fundamentally respectful of women's autonomy, and is thus best suited to protect women from coercion or undue paternalism when deciding whether to undergo MFS.