Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2143820
S. Everett
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Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/0031322x.2022.2146307
Gregory Maertz
The recent collection of essays edited by Christopher Webster, Photography in the Third Reich: Art, Physiognomy and Propaganda (2021), consists of an impressive body of scholarship—fresh, original and endlessly interesting. The six or seven essays (depending on the category to which Pepper Stetler’s contribution belongs)—by Rolf Sachsee, Christopher Webster, Andrés Mario Zervigón, Ulrich Hägele and Amos Morris-Reich—are substantial, replete with rare reproductions, and remarkably readable. The foreword provided by Eric Kurlander is rich and incisive. Moreover, Kurlander offers an essential admonition to those who would cling to the archaic notion of Nazi aesthetics as incompatible with classical modernism:
克里斯托弗·韦伯斯特(Christopher Webster)最近编辑的论文集《第三帝国的摄影:艺术、面相学和宣传》(2021)包含了令人印象深刻的学术成果——新鲜、原创和无穷无尽的有趣。六七篇文章(取决于Pepper Stetler的贡献属于哪一类)由Rolf Sachsee, Christopher Webster, andrastos Mario Zervigón, Ulrich Hägele和Amos morris - reich撰写，内容丰富，充满了罕见的复制品，非常具有可读性。埃里克·库兰德(Eric Kurlander)提供的前言内容丰富而深刻。此外，库兰德对那些坚持纳粹美学与古典现代主义不相容的古老观念的人提出了一个重要的警告:
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Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2077926
R. Wolin
ABSTRACT In this article, Wolin attempts to clarify a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the philosophical grounds of Heidegger’s support for National Socialism. Much of the previous literature has assumed that Heidegger, as an exponent of Existenzphilosophie, opposed Nazism on epistemological grounds. Heidegger’s defenders maintain that, since the Nazi world-view was predicated on ‘biological racism’, and since Heidegger was an inveterate critic of modern science, an unbridgeable gulf separated his Denkhabitus from the Nazi credo. However, careful scrutiny of the basic tenets of Nazi race doctrine indicates that it had very little in common with ‘scientism’. Instead, race thinking was an inherently ideological construct that emerged in polemical opposition to nineteenth-century positivism. As such, it was saturated with mystical and spiritualist elements. The end result was a confused, yet highly potent, amalgam of German romanticism, fin-de-siècle esotericism (Ariosophy), Aryan supremacism and Bismarckian Machtpolitik. At base, Nazi ‘race science’ was a contradictio in adjecto, a paradigmatic instance of modern political myth. As ‘myth’, it was untethered by the customary empirical and disciplinary constraints of the ‘logic of scientific discovery’. Moreover, Heidegger’s views on race thinking were far from unilaterally negative. In the Black Notebooks II–VI, he praised ‘race [as] a necessary and mediate condition of historical Dasein’. Fundamentally, there are very few qualitative differences between Heidegger’s defence of ‘spiritual racism’ and the understanding of race thinking propagated by Nazi ideologues such as Hans F. K. Günther and Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss. According to the philosopher and Heidegger student Karl Löwith, Heidegger ‘was not merely a distinguished representative of the “German revolution”; he was so in a manner much more radical than Ernst Krieck or Alfred Rosenberg.’
{"title":"Heidegger and race","authors":"R. Wolin","doi":"10.1080/0031322X.2022.2077926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2022.2077926","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, Wolin attempts to clarify a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the philosophical grounds of Heidegger’s support for National Socialism. Much of the previous literature has assumed that Heidegger, as an exponent of Existenzphilosophie, opposed Nazism on epistemological grounds. Heidegger’s defenders maintain that, since the Nazi world-view was predicated on ‘biological racism’, and since Heidegger was an inveterate critic of modern science, an unbridgeable gulf separated his Denkhabitus from the Nazi credo. However, careful scrutiny of the basic tenets of Nazi race doctrine indicates that it had very little in common with ‘scientism’. Instead, race thinking was an inherently ideological construct that emerged in polemical opposition to nineteenth-century positivism. As such, it was saturated with mystical and spiritualist elements. The end result was a confused, yet highly potent, amalgam of German romanticism, fin-de-siècle esotericism (Ariosophy), Aryan supremacism and Bismarckian Machtpolitik. At base, Nazi ‘race science’ was a contradictio in adjecto, a paradigmatic instance of modern political myth. As ‘myth’, it was untethered by the customary empirical and disciplinary constraints of the ‘logic of scientific discovery’. Moreover, Heidegger’s views on race thinking were far from unilaterally negative. In the Black Notebooks II–VI, he praised ‘race [as] a necessary and mediate condition of historical Dasein’. Fundamentally, there are very few qualitative differences between Heidegger’s defence of ‘spiritual racism’ and the understanding of race thinking propagated by Nazi ideologues such as Hans F. K. Günther and Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss. According to the philosopher and Heidegger student Karl Löwith, Heidegger ‘was not merely a distinguished representative of the “German revolution”; he was so in a manner much more radical than Ernst Krieck or Alfred Rosenberg.’","PeriodicalId":46766,"journal":{"name":"Patterns of Prejudice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42475804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2071291
Daniel Stockemer, M. Normandin
ABSTRACT In this article, Stockemer and Normandin test whether recent developments in the populist radical right’s messaging, such as the strategic introduction of gender equality in these parties’ political discourse and their evolution towards economic chauvinism, has changed women’s and men’s propensity to vote for the populist radical right. Using data from the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), the authors find that two traditional explanations for the gender gap in voting for the populist radical right have lost their explanatory power. First, their results indicate that the ideological moderation hypothesis no longer applies; that is, anti-immigration sentiment and a rightist ideology are currently as much of a reason to cast their ballot for the populist radical right for female voters as they are for male voters. Second, they no longer find support that economic dissatisfaction is a stronger driver for men than for women to vote for the populist radical right. Rather, their results indicate the contrary. In addition, they find that education is more of a bulwark against supporting the populist radical right for women. Finally, their results illustrate that older men are more likely to vote for the populist radical right than older women.
在本文中，Stockemer和Normandin检验了民粹主义极右翼信息传递的最新发展，如在这些政党的政治话语中战略性地引入性别平等及其向经济沙文主义的演变，是否改变了女性和男性投票给民粹主义极右翼的倾向。利用欧洲社会调查(European Social Survey, ESS)第八波的数据，作者发现，对于民粹主义极右翼在投票中的性别差异，两种传统解释已经失去了解释力。首先，他们的研究结果表明，意识形态节制假说不再适用;也就是说，对女性选民来说，反移民情绪和右翼意识形态是支持民粹主义激进右翼的理由，而对男性选民来说也是如此。其次，他们不再认为，对经济的不满是促使男性比女性更倾向于投票支持民粹主义激进右翼的因素。相反，他们的研究结果恰恰相反。此外，他们发现，教育更像是反对支持民粹主义激进女权的堡垒。最后，他们的结果表明，老年男性比老年女性更有可能投票给民粹主义激进右翼。
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Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2115029
Feyda Sayan-Cengiz, Caner Tekin
ABSTRACT Sayan-Cengiz and Tekin explore the visual communication strategies of Western European populist radical-right (PRR) parties in disseminating nativist, anti-migrant and Islamophobic agendas through gendered visual representations. It is widely argued that the PRR homogenizes and dichotomizes both ‘native’ and Muslim migrant cultures through an ostensibly liberal discourse of respect for women’s rights and freedoms in order to mainstream their exclusionary position towards Muslim migrant communities. However, there is a void in the literature in terms of accounting for how visual communication strategies are used in this process. The authors here argue that looking into the visual representations of Muslim migrant and ‘native’ bodies in the PRR parties’ visual communication materials is crucial for understanding the PRR’s gendered cultural constructions of both Muslim migrant ‘outsiders’ and native ‘insiders’. Focusing on the campaign posters for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands using a social semiotic approach, their study suggests that Muslim migrants are represented as alien Others, but that there is also a significant difference between representations of migrant women as ‘victims’ and men as ‘aggressors’. On the other hand, ‘native’ women are represented as the embodiment of authentic national identities, as either reproducers or defenders of the nation. ‘Native’, heterosexual men do not often appear in the posters, pointing to the position of power that they hold in the PRR’s imagination. That is, they are the designated spectators and addressees of visual communication materials, rather than objects of representation.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2021.2014089
Daniel Thiele, Birgit Sauer, Otto Penz
ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the ‘summer of migration’ of 2015, right-wing populist discourses became increasingly commonplace. This article by Thiele, Sauer and Penz investigates the resurgence of nativist and anti-migration attitudes in Austria by focusing on parliamentary debates between 2015 and 2019 concerned with migration, asylum policies and integration measures. Their theoretical approach builds first on Cas Mudde’s conception of right-wing populism—which proceeds from the premise of corrupt ‘elites’ and threatening Others—and then combines it with theories on the politics of emotion and affects. By employing a critical affective frame analysis, the study examines how right-wing populist arguments by political actors are always intertwined with affects, like anger, fear and hope, in order to mobilize followers and voters. They regard these connections as governing strategy aiming at right-wing exclusion, a mode of governing through affects, which tends to change the affective atmosphere in Austria, that is, what is conceivable, speakable and feelable with regard to migration and refugees. As it turns out, not only the notorious Freedom Party (FPÖ) (with a longstanding far-right tradition) but also the refurbished People’s Party (ÖVP) under their new leader Sebastian Kurz, draw on discourses that are exclusionary as well as affective, encouraging the Austrian population rather to fear migrants and to feel anger, in order to mobilize them against threatening ‘migration waves’ and ‘illegal immigration’.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2021.1993579
Hilmar Mjelde
ABSTRACT Existing literature tends to analyse the long-term evolution of the far right’s world-view rather than how it responds to short-term events. This exploratory study, however, analyses how the far right in Norway framed the unprecedented global crisis of COVID-19. The data encompasses 149 Facebook posts, online op-eds, columns, letters to the editor and YouTube videos about COVID-19 published between 1 January and 31 May 2020 by two radical-right parties, three anti-immigration/anti-Islam groups, one neo-Nazi social movement, one long-time neo-Nazi solo activist and a leading alternative media website in Norway. They represent the full range of established and new, minor and leading, and radical and extreme far-right actors from the last four decades. Based on the material analysed, Mjelde identifies four overarching frames related to the world order, governance, immigration and conspiracies, as well as nine subframes. A main finding is that conspiratorial distrust of the government constitutes a master frame that both the radical and the extreme right combine with other frames that reflect key tenets of their world-view. The findings underscore, first, the rigidity of the far right’s world-view; second, contradictory views within the far right about the remedy for the pandemic and the state’s role; and, finally, that China is emerging as a bogeyman on the US/Trump-friendly far right.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2054620
K. Neumann
ABSTRACT Germany’s Covid-19 protesters and members of the far right have tried to appropriate two key historical figures associated with the German anti-Nazi resistance, Sophie Scholl (1921–1943), who distributed anti-government leaflets, and Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg (1907–1944), the mastermind of the failed coup of 20 July 1944. Neumann places these attempts in the context of the afterlives of Scholl, Stauffenberg and aspiring Hitler assassin Georg Elser (1903–1945). First, he argues that the far right’s attempt to claim Stauffenberg should not be read as a move to deny the Holocaust, nor to reject Germany’s responsibility for it, but rather to distance itself from Holocaust deniers and shift public discourses about German identity and history. Second, he argues that Covid-19 protesters have identified with Scholl because she has been considered the quintessential ‘good German’, she cannot be located on a left–right political spectrum and she represents German resistance as well as victimhood. Finally, he suggests that the success of these attempts to appropriate historical figures points to a lack of knowledge not about Nazi Germany’s victims, or about Scholl and Stauffenberg themselves, but rather about the nature of the Nazi regime.
摘要德国新冠肺炎抗议者和极右翼成员试图抓住与德国反纳粹抵抗有关的两位关键历史人物，即散发反政府传单的Sophie Scholl（1921–1943）和1944年7月20日失败政变的主谋Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg（1907–1944）。诺依曼将这些尝试置于朔尔、施陶芬贝格和有抱负的希特勒暗杀者格奥尔格·埃尔瑟（1903-1945）的余生背景下。首先，他认为，极右翼试图宣称施陶芬贝格不应被解读为否认大屠杀，也不应拒绝德国对大屠杀的责任，而应与否认大屠杀的人保持距离，并改变公众对德国身份和历史的讨论。其次，他认为，新冠肺炎抗议者之所以认同Scholl，是因为她被认为是典型的“好德国人”，她不属于左右政治光谱，她代表了德国的抵抗和受害者身份。最后，他认为，这些试图塑造历史人物的成功表明，人们并不了解纳粹德国的受害者，也不了解朔尔和施陶芬贝格本人，而是对纳粹政权的性质缺乏了解。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2022.2054549
Nicola D’Elia
ABSTRACT D’Elia’s article casts new light on the controversial issue of Giuseppe Bottai’s approach to the so-called ‘Jewish question’. It is known that Bottai, serving as Fascist Italy’s Minister of National Education when the 1938 Racial Laws were enacted, worked determinedly for them to be rigorously implemented in the education sector. However, there is no consensus among scholars on the reasons that drove him to approve the racial policy of Italian Fascism, considering that he had never declared himself in favour of antisemitism before 1938. Was his approach dictated by opportunism and self-interest, that is, by the concern not to be politically sidelined? Or was it influenced by the rumours circulating in Nazi circles intending to discredit him as an opponent of the racial campaign, or even as being of Jewish descent? Bottai’s support of the Rome–Berlin Axis raises similar questions since he was not a Nazi sympathizer. Was such a decision made merely due to political calculation? Based on unpublished documents, this article shows, first, that Nazi officials regarded Bottai as a valuable partner and were keen to silence the rumours about his alleged Jewish ancestry; and, second, that Bottai, for his part, was not reluctant to cooperate with representatives of Italy’s German ally on racial issues and, since 1938, began considering racism a key factor in strengthening Italian-German relations. Moreover, this article argues that Bottai’s acceptance of the Axis alliance and the Fascist racial policy can reasonably be explained by taking into account his leftist Fascist ideology, marked by strong anti-bourgeois beliefs. He saw both the antisemitic turn of Mussolini’s regime and Italy’s alignment with Germany as opportunities to revitalize Fascism, driving it to embrace a revolutionary and totalitarian course.
{"title":"Giuseppe Bottai, the Racial Laws of 1938 and Italian–German relations","authors":"Nicola D’Elia","doi":"10.1080/0031322X.2022.2054549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2022.2054549","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT D’Elia’s article casts new light on the controversial issue of Giuseppe Bottai’s approach to the so-called ‘Jewish question’. It is known that Bottai, serving as Fascist Italy’s Minister of National Education when the 1938 Racial Laws were enacted, worked determinedly for them to be rigorously implemented in the education sector. However, there is no consensus among scholars on the reasons that drove him to approve the racial policy of Italian Fascism, considering that he had never declared himself in favour of antisemitism before 1938. Was his approach dictated by opportunism and self-interest, that is, by the concern not to be politically sidelined? Or was it influenced by the rumours circulating in Nazi circles intending to discredit him as an opponent of the racial campaign, or even as being of Jewish descent? Bottai’s support of the Rome–Berlin Axis raises similar questions since he was not a Nazi sympathizer. Was such a decision made merely due to political calculation? Based on unpublished documents, this article shows, first, that Nazi officials regarded Bottai as a valuable partner and were keen to silence the rumours about his alleged Jewish ancestry; and, second, that Bottai, for his part, was not reluctant to cooperate with representatives of Italy’s German ally on racial issues and, since 1938, began considering racism a key factor in strengthening Italian-German relations. Moreover, this article argues that Bottai’s acceptance of the Axis alliance and the Fascist racial policy can reasonably be explained by taking into account his leftist Fascist ideology, marked by strong anti-bourgeois beliefs. He saw both the antisemitic turn of Mussolini’s regime and Italy’s alignment with Germany as opportunities to revitalize Fascism, driving it to embrace a revolutionary and totalitarian course.","PeriodicalId":46766,"journal":{"name":"Patterns of Prejudice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44315131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-08DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2021.1909933
C. Døving, Terje Emberland
ABSTRACT What is the appeal of joining online communities obsessed with images of enemies and filled with threatening narratives? Døving and Emberland’s article introduces the term ‘conspiracy talk’ as a useful analytical concept for answering this question. The activities of radical and populist right-wing groups in Europe have increased in recent years; in particular, they use the Internet to propagate, discuss and enhance their ideological message. On Facebook and in comments on ‘alternative’ news sites, individuals share narratives about how an invasion of Muslims will lead to the imminent downfall of European civilization unless it is not rescued by the introduction of authoritarian, ethnic nationalism. The ideology of the far right is a growing field for research but there are few studies on how the ideology is spread and rendered meaningful via discussions and comments among Internet-based communities. This article, based on analyses of the content of various websites and Facebook pages that are part of the far-right landscape of Norway, seeks to explore the role conspiracy claims play in conversations taking place within these virtual communities. It attempts to identify patterns of communication and ways of talking that make conspiratorial notions seem reasonable. Døving and Emberland argue that radical-right and right-wing populist ideas are made relevant and gain a sense of immediacy through conspiracy talk. Conspiracy talk renders conspiracy narratives meaningful by linking them to the local contexts of the participants.
{"title":"Bringing the enemy closer to home: ‘conspiracy talk’ and the Norwegian far right","authors":"C. Døving, Terje Emberland","doi":"10.1080/0031322X.2021.1909933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2021.1909933","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What is the appeal of joining online communities obsessed with images of enemies and filled with threatening narratives? Døving and Emberland’s article introduces the term ‘conspiracy talk’ as a useful analytical concept for answering this question. The activities of radical and populist right-wing groups in Europe have increased in recent years; in particular, they use the Internet to propagate, discuss and enhance their ideological message. On Facebook and in comments on ‘alternative’ news sites, individuals share narratives about how an invasion of Muslims will lead to the imminent downfall of European civilization unless it is not rescued by the introduction of authoritarian, ethnic nationalism. The ideology of the far right is a growing field for research but there are few studies on how the ideology is spread and rendered meaningful via discussions and comments among Internet-based communities. This article, based on analyses of the content of various websites and Facebook pages that are part of the far-right landscape of Norway, seeks to explore the role conspiracy claims play in conversations taking place within these virtual communities. It attempts to identify patterns of communication and ways of talking that make conspiratorial notions seem reasonable. Døving and Emberland argue that radical-right and right-wing populist ideas are made relevant and gain a sense of immediacy through conspiracy talk. Conspiracy talk renders conspiracy narratives meaningful by linking them to the local contexts of the participants.","PeriodicalId":46766,"journal":{"name":"Patterns of Prejudice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45908101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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