{"title":"Violent crime and the expansion of executive power in Latin America","authors":"Gustavo Flores-Macías","doi":"10.1111/psq.12832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12832","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41806949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive politics in an era of democratic crisis","authors":"D. Kriner","doi":"10.1111/psq.12838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12838","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41423623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the fi rst, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well ‐ being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the fi rst, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency — and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.
{"title":"The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power","authors":"William G. Howell, T. Moe","doi":"10.1111/psq.12830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12830","url":null,"abstract":"The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the fi rst, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well ‐ being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the fi rst, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency — and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44536277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Congress has long exercised its power to oversee the executive branch. Important research has examined empirical patterns in congressional investigations, fi nding institutional, individual, policy, and partisan incentives motivate legislative inquiry. Yet, scholars largely have overlooked one fundamental question: what is oversight? We use new quantitative and qualitative data to highlight the importance of considering oversight as a series of actions designed to serve both as a symbol and signal in the American separation of powers system. Our exploratory analysis suggests that Congress oversees the executive branch much more frequently and in more ways than previously considered by scholars.
{"title":"Keeping tabs on the executive","authors":"Jennifer L. Selin, G. Moore","doi":"10.1111/psq.12829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12829","url":null,"abstract":"Congress has long exercised its power to oversee the executive branch. Important research has examined empirical patterns in congressional investigations, fi nding institutional, individual, policy, and partisan incentives motivate legislative inquiry. Yet, scholars largely have overlooked one fundamental question: what is oversight? We use new quantitative and qualitative data to highlight the importance of considering oversight as a series of actions designed to serve both as a symbol and signal in the American separation of powers system. Our exploratory analysis suggests that Congress oversees the executive branch much more frequently and in more ways than previously considered by scholars.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48870964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creating the executive budget process: What was Congress thinking?","authors":"J. Douglas, R. Kravchuk","doi":"10.1111/psq.12828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12828","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63643626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparing the impact of Joe Biden and Donald Trump on popular attitudes toward their parties","authors":"G. Jacobson","doi":"10.1111/psq.12825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12825","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46410905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Transparency is essential for public awareness of government activity and in holding officials accountable for their behavior and decisions. However, executives understandably have a desire to maintain autonomy over the flow of information outside of the executive branch, which can sometimes lead to a clash between government openness and executive control over information. This article investigates executive branch transparency along two specific dimensions: threats to the preservation of government information, and the judicial monitoring of executive branch transparency. Federal law directs executive branch actors to preserve government information. Statutes and regulations detail governing policies as well as guidelines that apply to every presidential administration. However, we consider each rule and recommendation through the lens of the Trump administration to gain greater clarity and precision. The Trump administration proves a useful focus for our empirical analysis because of its recency as well as multiple reports of its improper handling and preservation of records. We lay out and develop a typology of threats to record preservation. Preservation conflicts have emerged across multiple presidential administrations and have become increasingly common and visible. Judicial monitoring of executive branch transparency has become a crucial tool to address the withholding of records. We show that federal judges can play a vital role in defining the boundaries of government transparency through their decisions in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation. The U.S. Department of Justice oversees and often leads the government's defense against FOIA actions. We find that federal judges are most likely to require executive branch responsiveness and disclosure when the judges' underlying policy preferences are most distant from that of the administration. Our findings should inform reforms to protect government transparency.
透明度对于公众了解政府活动和让官员对其行为和决策负责至关重要。然而，可以理解的是，高管们希望保持对行政部门以外信息流动的自主权，这有时会导致政府公开与行政对信息的控制之间的冲突。本文从两个具体维度考察行政部门的透明度:对政府信息保存的威胁，以及对行政部门透明度的司法监督。联邦法律指示行政部门行为者保护政府信息。法规和规章详细说明了适用于每届总统政府的管理政策和指导方针。然而，我们从特朗普政府的角度来考虑每一条规则和建议，以获得更大的清晰度和准确性。事实证明，特朗普政府是我们实证分析的一个有用焦点，因为它最近出现，而且有多篇关于其处理和保存记录不当的报道。我们列出并发展了对记录保存威胁的类型。保护冲突在多届总统执政期间出现，并变得越来越普遍和明显。对行政部门透明度的司法监督已成为解决扣留记录问题的重要工具。我们表明，联邦法官可以通过他们在《信息自由法》(Freedom of Information Act)诉讼中的裁决，在界定政府透明度的界限方面发挥至关重要的作用。美国司法部负责监督并经常领导政府对《信息自由法》的辩护。我们发现，当法官的潜在政策偏好与政府的政策偏好相差最大时，联邦法官最有可能要求行政部门做出回应和披露。我们的研究结果应该为保护政府透明度的改革提供参考。
{"title":"To preserve, release, and litigate: Dimensions of executive branch transparency","authors":"Gbemende E. Johnson, Tracey E. George","doi":"10.1111/psq.12824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12824","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Transparency is essential for public awareness of government activity and in holding officials accountable for their behavior and decisions. However, executives understandably have a desire to maintain autonomy over the flow of information outside of the executive branch, which can sometimes lead to a clash between government openness and executive control over information. This article investigates executive branch transparency along two specific dimensions: threats to the preservation of government information, and the judicial monitoring of executive branch transparency. Federal law directs executive branch actors to preserve government information. Statutes and regulations detail governing policies as well as guidelines that apply to every presidential administration. However, we consider each rule and recommendation through the lens of the Trump administration to gain greater clarity and precision. The Trump administration proves a useful focus for our empirical analysis because of its recency as well as multiple reports of its improper handling and preservation of records. We lay out and develop a typology of threats to record preservation. Preservation conflicts have emerged across multiple presidential administrations and have become increasingly common and visible. Judicial monitoring of executive branch transparency has become a crucial tool to address the withholding of records. We show that federal judges can play a vital role in defining the boundaries of government transparency through their decisions in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation. The U.S. Department of Justice oversees and often leads the government's defense against FOIA actions. We find that federal judges are most likely to require executive branch responsiveness and disclosure when the judges' underlying policy preferences are most distant from that of the administration. Our findings should inform reforms to protect government transparency.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135721371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fighting the last war: Is presidential hindsight 20‐20?","authors":"Bryan N. Groves","doi":"10.1111/psq.12821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12821","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46266728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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