{"title":"Molly Dewson, the women's division, and grassroots presidential campaigning during the New Deal","authors":"M. Blair","doi":"10.1111/psq.12844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12844","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41690568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr.† George A. Krause‡ University of Pittsburgh University of Georgia Abstract How do the prospects for executive branch coordination affect legislatures’ willingness to delegate budget authority? A theory is advanced predicting that Congress entrusts its budget authority to executive agencies headed by reliably strong presidential loyalists vis-à-vis reliably low weak presidential loyalists when its policy and electoral interests are aligned with the president, while engaging in mean-reversion budgetary behavior when these interests are opposed to the president. The theory also posits that Congress’s budget authority exhibits relatively lower volatility in response to unreliable executive agency heads when they do not have shared policy and electoral interests with the president compared to when they do so. The evidence offers compelling, albeit mixed support for the theory’s testable predictions, while gleaning novel empirical insights for understanding how the prospects for executive branch coordination via leadership appointees affects the contingent nature of Congress’s decisions to grant discretionary budget authority to executive agencies.
Gary E.Hollibaugh，Jr.†George A.Krause†匹兹堡大学佐治亚大学摘要行政部门协调的前景如何影响立法机构下放预算权力的意愿？有人提出了一种理论，预测当国会的政策和选举利益与总统一致时，国会将其预算权力委托给由可靠的强大总统忠诚者领导的行政机构，而当这些利益与总统对立时，国会则会采取均值回归的预算行为。该理论还认为，与当时相比，当行政机构负责人与总统没有共同的政策和选举利益时，国会的预算权力在应对不可靠的行政机构负责时表现出相对较低的波动性，同时收集新的经验见解，以了解通过领导层任命的人进行行政部门协调的前景如何影响国会授予行政机构自由裁量预算权的决定的偶然性。
{"title":"Legislative responses to shared executive authority: How the prospects for executive branch coordination affect congressional budgetary authority under separated powers","authors":"Gary E. Hollibaugh, George A. Krause","doi":"10.1111/psq.12841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12841","url":null,"abstract":"Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr.† George A. Krause‡ University of Pittsburgh University of Georgia Abstract How do the prospects for executive branch coordination affect legislatures’ willingness to delegate budget authority? A theory is advanced predicting that Congress entrusts its budget authority to executive agencies headed by reliably strong presidential loyalists vis-à-vis reliably low weak presidential loyalists when its policy and electoral interests are aligned with the president, while engaging in mean-reversion budgetary behavior when these interests are opposed to the president. The theory also posits that Congress’s budget authority exhibits relatively lower volatility in response to unreliable executive agency heads when they do not have shared policy and electoral interests with the president compared to when they do so. The evidence offers compelling, albeit mixed support for the theory’s testable predictions, while gleaning novel empirical insights for understanding how the prospects for executive branch coordination via leadership appointees affects the contingent nature of Congress’s decisions to grant discretionary budget authority to executive agencies.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46373984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Colby D. Green, Douglas A. Schuler, A. Zavyalova, R. Swartz, Kristen Nault, Asiya K. Kazi
{"title":"Stock market reactions to firm visits by presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush through Donald J. Trump","authors":"Colby D. Green, Douglas A. Schuler, A. Zavyalova, R. Swartz, Kristen Nault, Asiya K. Kazi","doi":"10.1111/psq.12842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12842","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44622044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Attempts by elected executives to consolidate power have generated alarm and raised concern about democratic backsliding. In contrast with scholarship on public approval ratings of elected executives, we study the nature of mass attitudes toward the institutional power of the office of the presidency. We investigate the potential for mass publics to constrain antidemocratic behavior and argue that individuals’ democratic values shape views of executive power. Using data from twenty-six countries in the Americas and thirty-seven countries in Africa, we find support for our perspective. Individuals who express stronger commitments to democracy are less supportive of institutional arrangements that favor the executive. Our findings suggest that citizens’ democratic commitments may constrain the ambitions of power-seeking executives and the erosion of democratic practices. their Cronbach’s alpha is .4 indicating that they are not each reliable measuring the same underlying concept. Conducting a principal component analysis yields similar finding. The first dimension explains just 38 percent of the variance with each additional dimension explaining between 18 and 24 percent of the variance. These concepts appear to be measuring somewhat different conceptions of executive power and so we analyze them separately. these country-level sources of variation. Future research could evaluate
{"title":"Democratic values and support for executive power","authors":"Andrew Reeves, Jon C. Rogowski","doi":"10.1111/psq.12837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12837","url":null,"abstract":"Attempts by elected executives to consolidate power have generated alarm and raised concern about democratic backsliding. In contrast with scholarship on public approval ratings of elected executives, we study the nature of mass attitudes toward the institutional power of the office of the presidency. We investigate the potential for mass publics to constrain antidemocratic behavior and argue that individuals’ democratic values shape views of executive power. Using data from twenty-six countries in the Americas and thirty-seven countries in Africa, we find support for our perspective. Individuals who express stronger commitments to democracy are less supportive of institutional arrangements that favor the executive. Our findings suggest that citizens’ democratic commitments may constrain the ambitions of power-seeking executives and the erosion of democratic practices. their Cronbach’s alpha is .4 indicating that they are not each reliable measuring the same underlying concept. Conducting a principal component analysis yields similar finding. The first dimension explains just 38 percent of the variance with each additional dimension explaining between 18 and 24 percent of the variance. These concepts appear to be measuring somewhat different conceptions of executive power and so we analyze them separately. these country-level sources of variation. Future research could evaluate","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49075277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Roberts Court has been called the most “___” Court in history, with many different adjectives being offered. Surprisingly, our study of voting data from Supreme Court Terms 1937-2021 shows that the Roberts Court is the most “anti-President” Court in that period: it has ruled against the President at a greater rate than any other Court. Should we take this to mean that the Court will be there to protect democracy if an overreaching President tries to trample constitutional limits? Not necessarily. Additional analysis and a deep dive into the cases and reasoning reveal a more complicated picture, of a Court exhibiting historic levels of partisan and loyalty bias as well as a strong penchant for judicial supremacy.
{"title":"Is the US Supreme Court a reliable backstop for an overreaching US president? Maybe, but is an overreaching (partisan) court worse?","authors":"Rebecca L. Brown, L. Epstein","doi":"10.1111/psq.12831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12831","url":null,"abstract":"The Roberts Court has been called the most “___” Court in history, with many different adjectives being offered. Surprisingly, our study of voting data from Supreme Court Terms 1937-2021 shows that the Roberts Court is the most “anti-President” Court in that period: it has ruled against the President at a greater rate than any other Court. Should we take this to mean that the Court will be there to protect democracy if an overreaching President tries to trample constitutional limits? Not necessarily. Additional analysis and a deep dive into the cases and reasoning reveal a more complicated picture, of a Court exhibiting historic levels of partisan and loyalty bias as well as a strong penchant for judicial supremacy.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47510155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Violent crime and the expansion of executive power in Latin America","authors":"Gustavo Flores-Macías","doi":"10.1111/psq.12832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12832","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41806949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive politics in an era of democratic crisis","authors":"D. Kriner","doi":"10.1111/psq.12838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12838","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41423623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the fi rst, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well ‐ being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the fi rst, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency — and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.
{"title":"The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power","authors":"William G. Howell, T. Moe","doi":"10.1111/psq.12830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12830","url":null,"abstract":"The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the fi rst, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well ‐ being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the fi rst, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency — and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44536277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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