Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2057351
G. Graf
Patrick Lenta’s Corporal Punishment: A Philosophical Assessment provides a thorough, well-researched, accessible, and philosophically convincing examination of the normative status of the corporal punishment of children and a brief discussion of some implications of the main arguments on two related themes, namely the corporal punishment of animals and judicial corporal punishment of adults. Departing from the premise that all punishments need justification, Lenta first shows that, both on consequentialist and deontologist accounts, no convincing arguments have been provided in favor of the corporal punishment of children. On the contrary, investigating the available empirical evidence and relating it to the normative discussion, he concludes that the costs of corporal punishment of children clearly outweigh its benefits and that there are no convincing reasons to suggest that children are better off on balance because of corporal punishment (e.g., because it is necessary to form their moral character), let alone that they indeed deserve to be corporally punished (mainly because as children they do not possess full moral agency). Lenta then goes on to build his own account of why the corporal punishment of children is a moral wrong, based on different fundamental rights all human beings, including all children, possess: the right to security of the person and the rights to protection from degrading, cruel, or torturous punishment. While all corporal punishment violates the rights to security of the person and the rights to protection from degrading punishments, Lenta contents that the terms “cruel” and “torturous” should only be applied if a certain threshold of severity is overstepped. Subsequently, he assesses the question of how a state should regulate the (in his conclusion immoral) practice of corporal punishment. He is clear that the relevant rights of children have to be secured and that the corporal punishment of children has to be proscribed legally. Extending his arguments to the corporal punishment of animals and the judicial corporal punishment of adults and investigating analogies and disanalogies, Lenta comes to the conclusion that these practices ought to be eschewed as well. Philosophical Papers
{"title":"Corporal Punishment: A Philosophical Assessment","authors":"G. Graf","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2057351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2057351","url":null,"abstract":"Patrick Lenta’s Corporal Punishment: A Philosophical Assessment provides a thorough, well-researched, accessible, and philosophically convincing examination of the normative status of the corporal punishment of children and a brief discussion of some implications of the main arguments on two related themes, namely the corporal punishment of animals and judicial corporal punishment of adults. Departing from the premise that all punishments need justification, Lenta first shows that, both on consequentialist and deontologist accounts, no convincing arguments have been provided in favor of the corporal punishment of children. On the contrary, investigating the available empirical evidence and relating it to the normative discussion, he concludes that the costs of corporal punishment of children clearly outweigh its benefits and that there are no convincing reasons to suggest that children are better off on balance because of corporal punishment (e.g., because it is necessary to form their moral character), let alone that they indeed deserve to be corporally punished (mainly because as children they do not possess full moral agency). Lenta then goes on to build his own account of why the corporal punishment of children is a moral wrong, based on different fundamental rights all human beings, including all children, possess: the right to security of the person and the rights to protection from degrading, cruel, or torturous punishment. While all corporal punishment violates the rights to security of the person and the rights to protection from degrading punishments, Lenta contents that the terms “cruel” and “torturous” should only be applied if a certain threshold of severity is overstepped. Subsequently, he assesses the question of how a state should regulate the (in his conclusion immoral) practice of corporal punishment. He is clear that the relevant rights of children have to be secured and that the corporal punishment of children has to be proscribed legally. Extending his arguments to the corporal punishment of animals and the judicial corporal punishment of adults and investigating analogies and disanalogies, Lenta comes to the conclusion that these practices ought to be eschewed as well. Philosophical Papers","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"351 - 355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48095744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2076726
Katarzyna Eliasz, W. Załuski
Abstract Liberal democracy is often considered to be unstable, consisting of two markedly different ideals (i.e., liberalism and democracy) that remain in tension. Yet the thesis regarding the alleged instability of liberal democracy is itself ambiguous, for it may refer to two senses of instability: empirical or conceptual. After introducing this, in our view, important distinction (though overlooked in the relevant literature where both senses of ‘stability’ are usually mixed up) we argue that while liberal democracy is indeed empirically unstable, it is, contrary to the implicitly assumed dominant opinion, conceptually stable. In the first part of the paper, we introduce several arguments supporting the thesis about the conceptual stability of liberal democracy; the arguments appeal to the ideas of the (constitutional) precommitment, intrinsic equality, and liberty. In the second part, we provide arguments for the claim about the empirical instability of liberal democracy, identifying its main causes, viz. several anthropological-psychological propensities, in particular the weakness of the propensity for freedom, hierarchical proclivities, and inclinations to adopt extreme normative convictions.
{"title":"Some Reflections on the Stability of Liberal Democracy","authors":"Katarzyna Eliasz, W. Załuski","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2076726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2076726","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Liberal democracy is often considered to be unstable, consisting of two markedly different ideals (i.e., liberalism and democracy) that remain in tension. Yet the thesis regarding the alleged instability of liberal democracy is itself ambiguous, for it may refer to two senses of instability: empirical or conceptual. After introducing this, in our view, important distinction (though overlooked in the relevant literature where both senses of ‘stability’ are usually mixed up) we argue that while liberal democracy is indeed empirically unstable, it is, contrary to the implicitly assumed dominant opinion, conceptually stable. In the first part of the paper, we introduce several arguments supporting the thesis about the conceptual stability of liberal democracy; the arguments appeal to the ideas of the (constitutional) precommitment, intrinsic equality, and liberty. In the second part, we provide arguments for the claim about the empirical instability of liberal democracy, identifying its main causes, viz. several anthropological-psychological propensities, in particular the weakness of the propensity for freedom, hierarchical proclivities, and inclinations to adopt extreme normative convictions.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"239 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42209644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2077813
Brian Zamulinski
Abstract There is an alternative to the type of moral standing that hypothetically supervenes on other, base or subvenient, properties. Attributed moral standing results when people who have a naturally selected belief that they are worthy of moral consideration negotiate with others with the aim of being acknowledged as having moral standing and are successful. They could successfully negotiate with people who possessed supervenient moral standing. In a hypothetical evolutionary competition with the latter, they would replace them entirely. The result would be a moral community that excludes animals but that includes human infants. Membership in the moral community ends up being what it would be if moral standing supervened on the property of being human. The supervenience doctrine is also criticized on other grounds.
{"title":"The Evolution of Moral Standing Without Supervenience","authors":"Brian Zamulinski","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2077813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2077813","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is an alternative to the type of moral standing that hypothetically supervenes on other, base or subvenient, properties. Attributed moral standing results when people who have a naturally selected belief that they are worthy of moral consideration negotiate with others with the aim of being acknowledged as having moral standing and are successful. They could successfully negotiate with people who possessed supervenient moral standing. In a hypothetical evolutionary competition with the latter, they would replace them entirely. The result would be a moral community that excludes animals but that includes human infants. Membership in the moral community ends up being what it would be if moral standing supervened on the property of being human. The supervenience doctrine is also criticized on other grounds.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"333 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44663314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2073464
Michael Omoge
Abstract The history of the methodology of African philosophy can be divided into two periods: the nascent stage that’s characterized by a rigor-demand, and the contemporary stage that’s characterized by a relevance-demand. In this, paper, I argue for one way to strike the appropriate balance between relevance and rigor in African philosophy. Specifically, I argue that the unconscious rejection of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method by contemporary African philosophers played a major role in how African philosophy came to be characterized by a relevance-demand. Consequently, I submit that even though being only or excessively relevance-oriented is not bad, African philosophy would become rich enough to compete with other regional philosophies—Western, Chinese, and so on—if it re-installs conceptual analysis as part of its methodology.
{"title":"Conceptual Analysis and African Philosophy","authors":"Michael Omoge","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2073464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2073464","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The history of the methodology of African philosophy can be divided into two periods: the nascent stage that’s characterized by a rigor-demand, and the contemporary stage that’s characterized by a relevance-demand. In this, paper, I argue for one way to strike the appropriate balance between relevance and rigor in African philosophy. Specifically, I argue that the unconscious rejection of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method by contemporary African philosophers played a major role in how African philosophy came to be characterized by a relevance-demand. Consequently, I submit that even though being only or excessively relevance-oriented is not bad, African philosophy would become rich enough to compete with other regional philosophies—Western, Chinese, and so on—if it re-installs conceptual analysis as part of its methodology.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"295 - 318"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49375577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2059548
Lucy Allais
Abstract In this paper I present a critique of some aspects of Thad Metz’s attempt to develop an African moral theory grounded on the value of ubuntu. I question the sense in which this theory is African, as well as his attempt to ground human rights on his single value theory of ubuntu. In a number of publications Thad Metz has given a clear, analytic account of what ubuntu is. Metz’s work on ubuntu does two things: 1) explains the content of ubuntu: what the value/virtue is; 2) presents a moral theory according to which appealing to ubuntu as a basic value enables us to explain what makes all actions right or wrong. He calls this an African moral theory. It is the second part I am skeptical about. He makes it plausible that ubuntu is an important value. And he shows how we can give it some clear content. However, I argue that he does not make plausible a single-value ethical theory based on ubuntu; it is not plausible as an ethical theory, and it is not plausible that such a theory is African in any significant sense.
{"title":"Humanness and Harmony: Thad Metz on Ubuntu","authors":"Lucy Allais","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2059548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2059548","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I present a critique of some aspects of Thad Metz’s attempt to develop an African moral theory grounded on the value of ubuntu. I question the sense in which this theory is African, as well as his attempt to ground human rights on his single value theory of ubuntu. In a number of publications Thad Metz has given a clear, analytic account of what ubuntu is. Metz’s work on ubuntu does two things: 1) explains the content of ubuntu: what the value/virtue is; 2) presents a moral theory according to which appealing to ubuntu as a basic value enables us to explain what makes all actions right or wrong. He calls this an African moral theory. It is the second part I am skeptical about. He makes it plausible that ubuntu is an important value. And he shows how we can give it some clear content. However, I argue that he does not make plausible a single-value ethical theory based on ubuntu; it is not plausible as an ethical theory, and it is not plausible that such a theory is African in any significant sense.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"203 - 237"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47234326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2077230
Amirali Mohseni
Abstract Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural, social, and symbolic capital have not only enriched sociological theory; they have also clearly established themselves in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research in the human sciences. Against this background, there is a widespread notion that his concept of capital can be understood as a fruitful extension of Karl Marx’s concept of capital. By comparing the essential features of Bourdieu’s and of Marx’s concept, this article refutes the extension thesis, and explains the different methodological standpoints to which their concepts of capital can be traced back.
{"title":"The Idea of Capital in Bourdieu and Marx","authors":"Amirali Mohseni","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2077230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2077230","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural, social, and symbolic capital have not only enriched sociological theory; they have also clearly established themselves in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research in the human sciences. Against this background, there is a widespread notion that his concept of capital can be understood as a fruitful extension of Karl Marx’s concept of capital. By comparing the essential features of Bourdieu’s and of Marx’s concept, this article refutes the extension thesis, and explains the different methodological standpoints to which their concepts of capital can be traced back.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"265 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45574127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2082514
S. Ryan
Abstract This paper analyses regret. On the basis of a number of examples, the case is made that regret is a negative affective state that has a perceived past choice as its object. More precisely, S regrets φ-ing, iff, and because (i) S has a negative affective state regarding φ-ing (Negative Affect State Requirement), the experience of which is explained by (ii) S perceiving that an alternative choice that was available to her would have been preferable to φ-ing (Perceived Forking Path Requirement). The resulting account is differentiated from Williams’ agent-regret and shown to avoid problems faced by Zeelenberg’s definition of regret.
{"title":"Regret Is Born Where Choice Dies","authors":"S. Ryan","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2082514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2082514","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyses regret. On the basis of a number of examples, the case is made that regret is a negative affective state that has a perceived past choice as its object. More precisely, S regrets φ-ing, iff, and because (i) S has a negative affective state regarding φ-ing (Negative Affect State Requirement), the experience of which is explained by (ii) S perceiving that an alternative choice that was available to her would have been preferable to φ-ing (Perceived Forking Path Requirement). The resulting account is differentiated from Williams’ agent-regret and shown to avoid problems faced by Zeelenberg’s definition of regret.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"319 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42558694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2035248
M. Ajei
Abstract Discussion of sexuality in African cultures has a long history, but since the 1990s ethical reflections on homosexuality on the continent have often degenerated into furors and provoked a spate of anti-gay legislation in several countries. Refutations of homophobic dispositions encounter as barrier a pervasive belief in African cultures, that childbearing for community replenishment is a cherished moral duty. Several philosophers consider these to be exaggerated inhibitions that unjustifiably impede social acceptance of homosexuality, and have proposed as a solution what they consider to be self-justifying political-moral principles, that terminate in value-pluralistic ideas such as the acceptance of the equality of sexual orientations and vindication of the right to the freedom to choose and satisfy sexual desire. I question the adequacy of such self-justificatory normative principles and consider the solutions they proffer as depreciating the moral point of the African pro-natalist position. Consequently, I develop a moral argument grounded in the ontology of Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarian theory of personhood as the most persuasive justification for homosexuality.
{"title":"Being Gay and African: A Contradiction in Being?","authors":"M. Ajei","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2035248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2035248","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Discussion of sexuality in African cultures has a long history, but since the 1990s ethical reflections on homosexuality on the continent have often degenerated into furors and provoked a spate of anti-gay legislation in several countries. Refutations of homophobic dispositions encounter as barrier a pervasive belief in African cultures, that childbearing for community replenishment is a cherished moral duty. Several philosophers consider these to be exaggerated inhibitions that unjustifiably impede social acceptance of homosexuality, and have proposed as a solution what they consider to be self-justifying political-moral principles, that terminate in value-pluralistic ideas such as the acceptance of the equality of sexual orientations and vindication of the right to the freedom to choose and satisfy sexual desire. I question the adequacy of such self-justificatory normative principles and consider the solutions they proffer as depreciating the moral point of the African pro-natalist position. Consequently, I develop a moral argument grounded in the ontology of Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarian theory of personhood as the most persuasive justification for homosexuality.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"179 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47803259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2014351
Krystian Bogucki
Abstract In the paper, I propose a novel approach to Frege’s view on the principle of compositionality, its relation to the propositional holism and the formation of concepts. The main idea is to distinguish three stages of constructing a logically perfect language. At the first stage, only a sentence as a whole expresses a Thought. It is impossible to assign meaning to less complex units. This is the stage of an ordinary language. The second phase concerns the proper level of construction of a logically perfect language. We are forced to discriminate syntactic and semantic parts of sentences to account for the inference relations. We can distinguish senses and references of parts of sentences. Furthermore, it is possible here to choose between different ways of analysing the given Thought. Finally, at the third stage, every expression of the language has an unambiguous sense and this sense determines a unique reference. The logically perfect language is ready. We may view Thoughts as composed from primitive elements. Moreover, the senses of parts of a sentence correspond to the parts of a Thought, so that the structure of the sentence serves as the image of the structure of the Thought. The principle of compositionality is met and we can discern how understanding of the infinite numbers of Thoughts is possible and how languages are learnable. The main advantage of the presented view is that it allows accommodating some aspects of Frege’s philosophy that are often seen as mutually incompatible. Furthermore, I submit extensive textual data in favour of the discussed views and conceptions.
{"title":"An Essay on Compositionality of Thoughts in Frege’s Philosophy","authors":"Krystian Bogucki","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.2014351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.2014351","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the paper, I propose a novel approach to Frege’s view on the principle of compositionality, its relation to the propositional holism and the formation of concepts. The main idea is to distinguish three stages of constructing a logically perfect language. At the first stage, only a sentence as a whole expresses a Thought. It is impossible to assign meaning to less complex units. This is the stage of an ordinary language. The second phase concerns the proper level of construction of a logically perfect language. We are forced to discriminate syntactic and semantic parts of sentences to account for the inference relations. We can distinguish senses and references of parts of sentences. Furthermore, it is possible here to choose between different ways of analysing the given Thought. Finally, at the third stage, every expression of the language has an unambiguous sense and this sense determines a unique reference. The logically perfect language is ready. We may view Thoughts as composed from primitive elements. Moreover, the senses of parts of a sentence correspond to the parts of a Thought, so that the structure of the sentence serves as the image of the structure of the Thought. The principle of compositionality is met and we can discern how understanding of the infinite numbers of Thoughts is possible and how languages are learnable. The main advantage of the presented view is that it allows accommodating some aspects of Frege’s philosophy that are often seen as mutually incompatible. Furthermore, I submit extensive textual data in favour of the discussed views and conceptions.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"1 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47214823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2012241
M. Cull
Abstract Where lies the boundary between the natural and social worlds? For the local constructionist, who wants to say that whilst global constructionism is false, nonetheless there remains a domain of socially constructed phenomena, there is going to be a demarcation question. In this paper I explore two initially plausible accounts of the boundary, based on mind-dependence and constructive mechanisms, and show that each is bound to fail. After further rejecting an explanatory account drawn from the work of Ásta, I look at Hume’s account of the artificial to develop a distinctly Humean account of the boundary, improving it with a necessity condition to deal with potentially pernicious counter-examples, and suggesting that it provides our best answer to the local constructionist’s demarcation question.
{"title":"Demarcating the Social World with Hume","authors":"M. Cull","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.2012241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.2012241","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Where lies the boundary between the natural and social worlds? For the local constructionist, who wants to say that whilst global constructionism is false, nonetheless there remains a domain of socially constructed phenomena, there is going to be a demarcation question. In this paper I explore two initially plausible accounts of the boundary, based on mind-dependence and constructive mechanisms, and show that each is bound to fail. After further rejecting an explanatory account drawn from the work of Ásta, I look at Hume’s account of the artificial to develop a distinctly Humean account of the boundary, improving it with a necessity condition to deal with potentially pernicious counter-examples, and suggesting that it provides our best answer to the local constructionist’s demarcation question.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"69 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46788629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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