Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2015425
Jamie Hardy
Abstract I argue that the use of the separateness of persons in the debate between the priority view and the competing claims view is deeply flawed. In making the case, I argue for three points. First, that the actual argument against the priority view relies on intuitions about the worse off that has no connection to the separateness of persons. Second, that the competing claims view is derivative of Thomas Nagel’s pairwise comparison view. However, Nagel’s justification for pairwise comparisons is based on an interpretation of equality and not the separateness of persons. Third, I offer various interpretations of the separateness of persons and conclude that that the competing claims view violates most interpretations of the separateness of persons. Further, the one that is compatible with the competing claims view leads to the tyranny of the worst off.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1984981
Mary Carman
Abstract Anger has potential epistemic value in the way that it can facilitate a process of our coming to have knowledge and understanding regarding the issue about which we are angry. The nature of anger, however, may nevertheless be such that it ultimately undermines this very process. Common non-philosophical complaints about anger, for instance, often target the angry person as being somehow irrational, where an unformulated assumption is that her anger undermines her capacity to rationally engage with the issue about which she is angry. Call this assumption the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger. Such a charge is pernicious when levelled at the anger of those in positions of marginalisation or oppression, where it can threaten to silence voices on the very issue of the injustices that they face. In this paper I thus provide a much-needed interrogation of this charge. Firstly, and drawing on empirical literature on the effects of anger on decision-making, I flesh out the charge and why it poses a threat to how the epistemic value of anger has been defended. Secondly, I argue that the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger can nevertheless be unwarranted, at least within a common context of political anger.
{"title":"Unpacking a Charge of Emotional Irrationality: An Exploration of the Value of Anger in Thought","authors":"Mary Carman","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1984981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1984981","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Anger has potential epistemic value in the way that it can facilitate a process of our coming to have knowledge and understanding regarding the issue about which we are angry. The nature of anger, however, may nevertheless be such that it ultimately undermines this very process. Common non-philosophical complaints about anger, for instance, often target the angry person as being somehow irrational, where an unformulated assumption is that her anger undermines her capacity to rationally engage with the issue about which she is angry. Call this assumption the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger. Such a charge is pernicious when levelled at the anger of those in positions of marginalisation or oppression, where it can threaten to silence voices on the very issue of the injustices that they face. In this paper I thus provide a much-needed interrogation of this charge. Firstly, and drawing on empirical literature on the effects of anger on decision-making, I flesh out the charge and why it poses a threat to how the epistemic value of anger has been defended. Secondly, I argue that the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger can nevertheless be unwarranted, at least within a common context of political anger.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"45 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43506572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2056072
P. Msimang
I. The Structure of the Book What is Race? is one of the latest notable instalments in the metaphysics of race debate. In the first half of the book, each author presents their respective answers to the question ‘What is race?’. The second half of the book comprises of each author responding to their co-authors and defending their own views. This format is highly engaging. Seeing each author make their arguments, respond to their co-authors, and try meet the challenges set by their co-authors against their respective positions makes this work a great pedagogical tool and an exemplar of contemporary philosophical argumentation in the analytic tradition. The authors draw out the presuppositions that frame the race debate in ways that make apparent general semantic issues of reference and the challenges about which interpretive traditions contemporary accounts of race should follow. Despite these challenges, the text is not bogged down in a tangle of semantic disputes but rather tackles the metaphysical question of race using a range of argumentative strategies.
{"title":"What Is Race? Four Philosophers, Six Views","authors":"P. Msimang","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2056072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2056072","url":null,"abstract":"I. The Structure of the Book What is Race? is one of the latest notable instalments in the metaphysics of race debate. In the first half of the book, each author presents their respective answers to the question ‘What is race?’. The second half of the book comprises of each author responding to their co-authors and defending their own views. This format is highly engaging. Seeing each author make their arguments, respond to their co-authors, and try meet the challenges set by their co-authors against their respective positions makes this work a great pedagogical tool and an exemplar of contemporary philosophical argumentation in the analytic tradition. The authors draw out the presuppositions that frame the race debate in ways that make apparent general semantic issues of reference and the challenges about which interpretive traditions contemporary accounts of race should follow. Despite these challenges, the text is not bogged down in a tangle of semantic disputes but rather tackles the metaphysical question of race using a range of argumentative strategies.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"51 1","pages":"115 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42544028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2046494
A. Kallhoff
Abstract In the context of economics, the distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has been paralleled with the distinction of ‘public policy’ on the one hand and the ‘private market’ on the other hand. Even though both spheres intermingle at some point, the first is the domain of government, the second is the domain of market laws. This contribution argues that public goods do not only undermine that distinction, but they also support an alternative interpretation of the private-public line. A thorough discussion of public goods redefines the relationship of public and private and portrays public goods as bridges between both spheres. The contribution starts with the classical definition of public goods as items that are non-excludable and non-rival with respect to potential profiteers. The paper then shifts the focus to the normative side of public goods. Precisely because of their characteristics as non-exclusive goods, these items are able to fulfil promises of the constitutional state. They enhance social inclusion, they serve the public by generating spaces of civilized interaction, and they even enhance the sense of shared citizenship. A focus on what has been termed ‘central public goods’ reveals that public goods serve important claims of social justice. After having explained why public goods should also be regarded as an important ingredient in the economic performance of the nation state, three bridging functions of public goods are apparent.
{"title":"Public Goods as Obligatory Bridges between the Public and the Private","authors":"A. Kallhoff","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2046494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2046494","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the context of economics, the distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has been paralleled with the distinction of ‘public policy’ on the one hand and the ‘private market’ on the other hand. Even though both spheres intermingle at some point, the first is the domain of government, the second is the domain of market laws. This contribution argues that public goods do not only undermine that distinction, but they also support an alternative interpretation of the private-public line. A thorough discussion of public goods redefines the relationship of public and private and portrays public goods as bridges between both spheres. The contribution starts with the classical definition of public goods as items that are non-excludable and non-rival with respect to potential profiteers. The paper then shifts the focus to the normative side of public goods. Precisely because of their characteristics as non-exclusive goods, these items are able to fulfil promises of the constitutional state. They enhance social inclusion, they serve the public by generating spaces of civilized interaction, and they even enhance the sense of shared citizenship. A focus on what has been termed ‘central public goods’ reveals that public goods serve important claims of social justice. After having explained why public goods should also be regarded as an important ingredient in the economic performance of the nation state, three bridging functions of public goods are apparent.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"387 - 405"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47755137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2019094
A. Vedder, Anastasia Siapka, Ilaria Buri, Erik Kamenjašević
Abstract In this paper, we attempt to provide starting points for a discussion on immediate and longer term consequences of COVID-19-induced uses of digital technologies for the distinction of the public and the private spheres. We start with clarifying definitions of the public and the private spheres in relation to the concept of privacy. What is considered private is at least in part contextually determined by conventions and social, political, economic and technological developments. From this perspective, we set out to critically evaluate the COVID-19-induced large-scale introduction of new digital tools in two essential areas of life: the workplace and education. We discuss the role of technology and its immediate concomitant legal or ethical challenges. The paper concludes with reflections on the possible longer-term normative effects of the use of digital tools in the context of the COVID-19 containment on the demarcation of the public and private spheres.
{"title":"Digital Tools and COVID-19: Shifting Public–Private Boundaries","authors":"A. Vedder, Anastasia Siapka, Ilaria Buri, Erik Kamenjašević","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.2019094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.2019094","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we attempt to provide starting points for a discussion on immediate and longer term consequences of COVID-19-induced uses of digital technologies for the distinction of the public and the private spheres. We start with clarifying definitions of the public and the private spheres in relation to the concept of privacy. What is considered private is at least in part contextually determined by conventions and social, political, economic and technological developments. From this perspective, we set out to critically evaluate the COVID-19-induced large-scale introduction of new digital tools in two essential areas of life: the workplace and education. We discuss the role of technology and its immediate concomitant legal or ethical challenges. The paper concludes with reflections on the possible longer-term normative effects of the use of digital tools in the context of the COVID-19 containment on the demarcation of the public and private spheres.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"435 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49043603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.2020684
Michael S. Springer
Abstract Alongside the public and private, the sacred can represent a third social-political dispensation, as Raymond Geuss notes. The modern liberal public/private divide represents a historical anomaly, with the sacred putatively consigned to the private realm. However, recent empirical research into disgust and its influences on moral psychology casts doubt on the extent to which such schemes have in fact removed phenomena connected with the sacred from the public realm. In this paper, I argue for the continuity between disgust and the idea of ritual pollution, demonstrating how an understanding of the moral psychology of the latter phenomenon helps account for certain aspects of our ostensibly secular public realm. Of these aspects, I focus primarily on racism, and specifically individuals’ avowals of disgust in response to racism in the contemporary USA and UK. I argue that the idea of ritual pollution shows that such a response indicates a number of potential drawbacks to the socio-moral scheme underpinning the disgust, which in turn have the potential to limit social efforts to eradicate racism. I conclude that such socio-moral disgust is itself morally questionable in important ways, in addition to having the aforementioned instrumental shortcomings.
{"title":"The Private Cosmology of Public Disgust","authors":"Michael S. Springer","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.2020684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.2020684","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Alongside the public and private, the sacred can represent a third social-political dispensation, as Raymond Geuss notes. The modern liberal public/private divide represents a historical anomaly, with the sacred putatively consigned to the private realm. However, recent empirical research into disgust and its influences on moral psychology casts doubt on the extent to which such schemes have in fact removed phenomena connected with the sacred from the public realm. In this paper, I argue for the continuity between disgust and the idea of ritual pollution, demonstrating how an understanding of the moral psychology of the latter phenomenon helps account for certain aspects of our ostensibly secular public realm. Of these aspects, I focus primarily on racism, and specifically individuals’ avowals of disgust in response to racism in the contemporary USA and UK. I argue that the idea of ritual pollution shows that such a response indicates a number of potential drawbacks to the socio-moral scheme underpinning the disgust, which in turn have the potential to limit social efforts to eradicate racism. I conclude that such socio-moral disgust is itself morally questionable in important ways, in addition to having the aforementioned instrumental shortcomings.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"50 1","pages":"465 - 503"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46924094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2026246
C. Hobden, Heidi Matisonn
Abstract The tension between the public and the private spheres is not new: while feminists (among others) have long called for public protection to be extended to the private sphere, liberals argue for the need for the ‘defence of the “private sphere” from encroachment by the public’ (Geuss 2001: 114). Although we acknowledge the problematic nature of the distinction, we nevertheless recognize its utility in delineating who we are engaging with and what, therefore, we owe them. Traditionally, citizenship, when seen as a role (rather than a status), belongs to the public sphere. We are citizens when we walk into the voting booth, when we attend a ward council meeting, or write to the paper. At home, we might think, we are not citizens but, stripped of our roles in society, we assume the most fundamental roles in our lives—as family and friends—with freedom to pursue and express our interests and desires. It may appear then, that the citizen and the person, or the public and the private, co-exist only insofar as they are understood to be enacted in different spaces, each with their own norms and rules. Drawing upon Christine Hobden’s account of citizenship, we challenge this stark divide between the public citizen and private person. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced us to retreat (physically) to the private sphere, yet the rise of social media has provided us with greater opportunities to engage (virtually) with public challenges; this article analyses this reality through the lens of Hobden’s account of citizenship, exploring our civic responsibilities within the blurry public-private realm of social media. We examine some of the implications of this ‘citizenship from the couch’ and suggest that one possibly fruitful way to navigate the blurry line between these roles is to return to the fundamentals of political society: the social contract—the project of living together.
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Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2046495
C. Allsobrook
The arrival of Covid-19 in 2020 brought severe disruption to our public and our private lives, and also to ordinary normative boundaries we maintain between the two which we had previously taken for granted, although they were already taking strain. In most areas of our lives, many of us were hastened to retreat from public, physical interpersonal interaction, confined to work and to socialize online from private spaces. This private retreat forced by communicable disease has been imposed by drastic public intervention, putting a severe strain on state finances and private economic activity, and harming innumerable private businesses, while the private wealth of the wealthiest few has soared. Since the 2008 financial crisis, rich governments have unloaded untold billions on the free market, stimulating recovery with unusual fiscal stimulus measures bailing out financial institutions, buying up toxic assets, urging record low interest rates, and now issuing pandemic relief measures. At the same time, extreme weather patterns have burned or flooded many parts of the world as critical effects of the climate crisis begin to heat up, yet states at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference agreed on few curbs to the harmful private profit-making that costs environmental wellbeing. The branding of private wealth as a public good, which Ronald Reagan introduced with modest appeal to the family values of workingand middleclass American citizens in the 1980s, ultimately came to be represented by
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Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2046493
Thozamile Zolisa Mtyalela, C. Allsobrook
Abstract Many anticipated that the formal demise of public apartheid would free black citizens of South Africa from systematic racial oppression; but apartheid was privatized and carries on, with the aid of ‘Black governmentality’. The brutality of the apartheid regime gave rise to a common misunderstanding of White settler coloniality as a public, sovereign, and repressive mode of power imposed on and against Black subjects and African culture. But power is not just repressive. It is complex and productive. Public apartheid was formally signed off, but its features are reproduced by citizens in private lives, often without our knowing it. Our account of Black governmentality explains such self-defeating subjective agency in the post-apartheid context with reference to Biko’s writing on Black shame, wherein Black South African subjects are secondary agents of apartheid. We demonstrate how and why apartheid is perpetuated in private by Black governmentality, as cultivated in subject-formation, drawing on Biko’s insights into the structure of this relationship. In so doing we correct a misunderstanding of freedom from apartheid, common in scholarly receptions of Biko’s writing, as a negation of the White face of public representation. With reference to Foucault’s theory of power, we offer an alternative account of Biko’s insights into subjective and national liberation, to explain how he sees colonial power as a facticity-inducing force for Black subjectivity. Where these misreadings miss this critical point of traction, our productive reading of the power of Black governmentality and freedom in Black consciousness better informs effective public resistance against private modes of apartheid.
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