Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1779602
Abraham Tobi
Abstract Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of epistemic injustice. Hence, we should take different epistemic perspectives as having equal epistemic authority. A problem with this rationale is that its relativist implications undermine the call for decolonisation, which is premised on the objectivity of the moral claim that ‘epistemic colonisation is wrong’. In this paper, I aim to provide a rationale for epistemic decolonisation that avoids the shortfalls of this relativist rationale. I develop a distinctly epistemic rationale for epistemic decolonisation that positions the imperative to decolonise knowledge as an epistemic virtue.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1779606
Veli Mitova
Abstract The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice. I first sketch what I take to be the core features of epistemic decolonisation. I then philosophically situate the topic. Finally, I map it in relation to key epistemic-injustice concepts and to the contributions in this special issue.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1780148
Nora Berenstain
Abstract Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement.
{"title":"‘Civility’ and the Civilizing Project","authors":"Nora Berenstain","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2020.1780148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2020.1780148","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"49 1","pages":"305 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2020.1780148","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48730933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1780149
Gaile M. Pohlhaus
Abstract The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonetheless, a good deal of this literature is oriented toward those in a position to perpetrate injustices, rather than those who historically have been harmed by them. This orientation, I argue, is ill-suited to the work of epistemic decolonization. In this essay, I call and hold attention to the epistemic interests of those who are epistemically marginalized on account of relations of dominance and oppression. To do so, I draw on Kristie Dotson’s work, which uses a systems approach focused on epistemic agency. I develop Dotson’s insights further to argue that epistemic inclusions may be just as pernicious as epistemic exclusions Specifically, I highlight some of the ways in which epistemic agents can be included in epistemic systems in a manner that is epistemically exploitative—extracting epistemic labor coercively or in ways that are distinctly non-reciprocal. I then turn to María Lugones’ distinction between horizontal and vertical practices to discuss avenues of resisting both exclusions and inclusions that thwart the epistemic agency of marginalized knowers.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2020.1779605
B. Matolino
Abstract Epistemic decolonization, in its various conceptual formulations and presentations, could be taken to hold promise for either the completion of the anti-colonial struggle or the self-re-discovery of the formerly colonized and oppressed. In Africa this project has had a long history as both a counter to hegemonic histories of claimed Western epistemological superiority as well as theories of racism and racist practices against black people of African descent. What is not entirely clear are the precise achievements of decolonial thought and practice. I interrogate the relevance, use and continuation of decoloniality as a genre of thought and practice on the African continent against the background of the perennial problems of material underdevelopment and stifled political spaces that render the supposed beneficiaries of decolonization hopeless subjects who continue to be disempowered and oppressed in their own home. This interrogation is to be carried alongside another inquiry aimed at evaluating the achievements of African philosophy as a form of epistemic decolonization. If African philosophy is a form of decolonization, as it should be, it should be able to clearly demonstrate its achievements and how they have had an effect on broader goals of decolonizing and empowering inhabitants of the African continent.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1605844
S. H. Klausen
Abstract The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness (PC)—shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental states, yet at the same time attributes to it both a qualitative and a subjective character (or a phenomenal content and an aspect of subjective awareness). I argue that these two allegedly constitutive elements of PC do not go together as harmoniously as is usually assumed. The standard view introduces a complexity into the notion of PC which gives rise to problems of the sort traditionally associated with higher-order views (i.e., regress and redundancy problems). Finding the tension more or less inescapable, and rejecting a simplistic view like Dainton’s, which dispenses altogether with subjective awareness—and arguing that there is a special problem with accounting for the particularity of conscious states—I explore some speculative suggestions as to how subjective awareness could be understood as a distinctive factor that cannot be assimilated to phenomenal content, while maintaining that the two elements are intimately related.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1664317
E. Ani
Abstract Prevailing literature argues that arguing is the only appropriate mode of deliberation. The literature acknowledges bargaining, storytelling, and other forms of communication, but is unwilling to describe these as deliberation, properly speaking. The claim is that describing them as such would amount to concept stretching. My first thesis is that arguing exhausts neither the legitimate modes of deliberation nor the modes for effective deliberation. To do this I further develop a two-type categorization of issues I have employed elsewhere to show that argument alone is sufficient for bringing closure to issues in the first category, but bargaining is needed to reach agreements on issues in the second category. I observe that the more agreeable variant of the second category of issues constitutes a great deal of issues deliberated outside the purely theoretical classroom. Progressing from these observations, my second thesis is that bargaining is in fact the preeminent way of reaching agreements in political deliberation. To illustrate this, I demonstrate that normative differences and distributive consequences are inherent features of political issues.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1563499
Jon Garthoff
Abstract In this essay I distinguish categories of animals by their mental capacities. I then discuss whether punishment can be appropriate for animals of each category, and if so what form punishment may appropriately take for animals of each category. The aim is to illuminate each type of punishment through comparison and contrast with the others. This both forestalls the overintellectualization of punishment which arises from viewing humans as the only paradigm case and forestalls the underintellectualization of human punishment which results from making no essential reference, in an account of human punishment, to the human capacity for specifically critical reasoning.
{"title":"Animal Punishment and the Conditions of Responsibility","authors":"Jon Garthoff","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2018.1563499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1563499","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this essay I distinguish categories of animals by their mental capacities. I then discuss whether punishment can be appropriate for animals of each category, and if so what form punishment may appropriately take for animals of each category. The aim is to illuminate each type of punishment through comparison and contrast with the others. This both forestalls the overintellectualization of punishment which arises from viewing humans as the only paradigm case and forestalls the underintellectualization of human punishment which results from making no essential reference, in an account of human punishment, to the human capacity for specifically critical reasoning.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"49 1","pages":"105 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2018.1563499","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44864997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1610334
R. Halwani
Abstract This paper defends the ‘sexual pleasure view’ of sexual desire—that sexual desire is for sexual pleasure. It does so by explaining the various aspects of the view, especially that of ‘sexual pleasure’ on which it relies, by explaining its important implications, by responding to various objections against it (that it relies on an impoverished notion of pleasure, e.g.), and by arguing against some of its main contenders (that sexual desire is for sexual activity, e.g.).
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1571938
A. Fisher
Abstract Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects.
摘要修辞理论是分析本体论中一个重要的形而上学理论。唐纳德·c·威廉姆斯(Donald C. Williams)的作品中有一个经典的说法，他认为比喻是抽象的细节，是存在的字母表。抽象的特殊性的概念在文献中一再受到攻击。比喻理论的反对者和支持者都对比喻的抽象性和相关的抽象行为提出了批评。在这篇论文中，我通过反驳那些试图证明比喻不应该被理解为抽象的论点，并通过论证比喻的抽象性在我们对共相和具体对象的更有前途的比喻理论分析中发挥着不可或缺的作用，来捍卫比喻作为抽象特殊的概念。
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