Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2046493
Thozamile Zolisa Mtyalela, C. Allsobrook
Abstract Many anticipated that the formal demise of public apartheid would free black citizens of South Africa from systematic racial oppression; but apartheid was privatized and carries on, with the aid of ‘Black governmentality’. The brutality of the apartheid regime gave rise to a common misunderstanding of White settler coloniality as a public, sovereign, and repressive mode of power imposed on and against Black subjects and African culture. But power is not just repressive. It is complex and productive. Public apartheid was formally signed off, but its features are reproduced by citizens in private lives, often without our knowing it. Our account of Black governmentality explains such self-defeating subjective agency in the post-apartheid context with reference to Biko’s writing on Black shame, wherein Black South African subjects are secondary agents of apartheid. We demonstrate how and why apartheid is perpetuated in private by Black governmentality, as cultivated in subject-formation, drawing on Biko’s insights into the structure of this relationship. In so doing we correct a misunderstanding of freedom from apartheid, common in scholarly receptions of Biko’s writing, as a negation of the White face of public representation. With reference to Foucault’s theory of power, we offer an alternative account of Biko’s insights into subjective and national liberation, to explain how he sees colonial power as a facticity-inducing force for Black subjectivity. Where these misreadings miss this critical point of traction, our productive reading of the power of Black governmentality and freedom in Black consciousness better informs effective public resistance against private modes of apartheid.
{"title":"Freedom from Black Governmentality under Privatized Apartheid","authors":"Thozamile Zolisa Mtyalela, C. Allsobrook","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2046493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2046493","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many anticipated that the formal demise of public apartheid would free black citizens of South Africa from systematic racial oppression; but apartheid was privatized and carries on, with the aid of ‘Black governmentality’. The brutality of the apartheid regime gave rise to a common misunderstanding of White settler coloniality as a public, sovereign, and repressive mode of power imposed on and against Black subjects and African culture. But power is not just repressive. It is complex and productive. Public apartheid was formally signed off, but its features are reproduced by citizens in private lives, often without our knowing it. Our account of Black governmentality explains such self-defeating subjective agency in the post-apartheid context with reference to Biko’s writing on Black shame, wherein Black South African subjects are secondary agents of apartheid. We demonstrate how and why apartheid is perpetuated in private by Black governmentality, as cultivated in subject-formation, drawing on Biko’s insights into the structure of this relationship. In so doing we correct a misunderstanding of freedom from apartheid, common in scholarly receptions of Biko’s writing, as a negation of the White face of public representation. With reference to Foucault’s theory of power, we offer an alternative account of Biko’s insights into subjective and national liberation, to explain how he sees colonial power as a facticity-inducing force for Black subjectivity. Where these misreadings miss this critical point of traction, our productive reading of the power of Black governmentality and freedom in Black consciousness better informs effective public resistance against private modes of apartheid.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41787625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2022.2046495
C. Allsobrook
The arrival of Covid-19 in 2020 brought severe disruption to our public and our private lives, and also to ordinary normative boundaries we maintain between the two which we had previously taken for granted, although they were already taking strain. In most areas of our lives, many of us were hastened to retreat from public, physical interpersonal interaction, confined to work and to socialize online from private spaces. This private retreat forced by communicable disease has been imposed by drastic public intervention, putting a severe strain on state finances and private economic activity, and harming innumerable private businesses, while the private wealth of the wealthiest few has soared. Since the 2008 financial crisis, rich governments have unloaded untold billions on the free market, stimulating recovery with unusual fiscal stimulus measures bailing out financial institutions, buying up toxic assets, urging record low interest rates, and now issuing pandemic relief measures. At the same time, extreme weather patterns have burned or flooded many parts of the world as critical effects of the climate crisis begin to heat up, yet states at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference agreed on few curbs to the harmful private profit-making that costs environmental wellbeing. The branding of private wealth as a public good, which Ronald Reagan introduced with modest appeal to the family values of workingand middleclass American citizens in the 1980s, ultimately came to be represented by
{"title":"Introduction: Public and Private Disruption in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"C. Allsobrook","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2022.2046495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2022.2046495","url":null,"abstract":"The arrival of Covid-19 in 2020 brought severe disruption to our public and our private lives, and also to ordinary normative boundaries we maintain between the two which we had previously taken for granted, although they were already taking strain. In most areas of our lives, many of us were hastened to retreat from public, physical interpersonal interaction, confined to work and to socialize online from private spaces. This private retreat forced by communicable disease has been imposed by drastic public intervention, putting a severe strain on state finances and private economic activity, and harming innumerable private businesses, while the private wealth of the wealthiest few has soared. Since the 2008 financial crisis, rich governments have unloaded untold billions on the free market, stimulating recovery with unusual fiscal stimulus measures bailing out financial institutions, buying up toxic assets, urging record low interest rates, and now issuing pandemic relief measures. At the same time, extreme weather patterns have burned or flooded many parts of the world as critical effects of the climate crisis begin to heat up, yet states at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference agreed on few curbs to the harmful private profit-making that costs environmental wellbeing. The branding of private wealth as a public good, which Ronald Reagan introduced with modest appeal to the family values of workingand middleclass American citizens in the 1980s, ultimately came to be represented by","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45558373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682
Jonas H. Aaron
Abstract Recognizing yourself in literature can not only help you to get a clearer grasp of what you already think and feel. It can also deeply unsettle your vision of yourself. This article examines a hitherto neglected mechanism to this effect: learning by way of seeing yourself in others’ blindness. I show that In Search of Lost Time epitomizes this phenomenon. Confronting characters oblivious to their old age makes the protagonist realize that he, too, has aged without noticing it, and invites readers to analogous insights. The paper contributes to the discussion on how you can learn from literature and adds a twist to Marcel Proust’s claim that the purpose of literature is that readers recognize themselves in it.
{"title":"Seeing Yourself in Others’ Blindness: Learning from Literature as Epitomized in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time","authors":"Jonas H. Aaron","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1937682","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recognizing yourself in literature can not only help you to get a clearer grasp of what you already think and feel. It can also deeply unsettle your vision of yourself. This article examines a hitherto neglected mechanism to this effect: learning by way of seeing yourself in others’ blindness. I show that In Search of Lost Time epitomizes this phenomenon. Confronting characters oblivious to their old age makes the protagonist realize that he, too, has aged without noticing it, and invites readers to analogous insights. The paper contributes to the discussion on how you can learn from literature and adds a twist to Marcel Proust’s claim that the purpose of literature is that readers recognize themselves in it.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44767757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602
Aarón Álvarez-González
Abstract Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel’s phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.
{"title":"An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology","authors":"Aarón Álvarez-González","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1961602","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel’s phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46167095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290
M. Hunt
Abstract Most people desire to have a romantic relationship, and most people desire to have a child. The paper suggests one respect in which it is more desirable to have a child with a romantic partner rather than with someone other than a romantic partner, as platonic parents do. The first premise claims that the romantic relationship, and only this relationship, has a certain desire as a constitutive part. This is the desire to be as related to someone as one can be. That this ‘desire for relatedness’ is a constitutive part of the romantic relationship explains why those related by a romantic relationship tend to become related in other ways and explains why romantic partners tend to desire to have relationships with those to whom their romantic partner is otherwise related. The second premise is that by having a child together romantic partners become related in an important and unique way, satisfying their desire for relatedness. Since platonic parents do not have the desire for relatedness toward one another they do not satisfy such a desire in having a child together. A brief review of the sociological literature on platonic parenting is included and eight objections are answered.
{"title":"What is Desirable About Having a Child with a Romantic Partner?","authors":"M. Hunt","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1961290","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most people desire to have a romantic relationship, and most people desire to have a child. The paper suggests one respect in which it is more desirable to have a child with a romantic partner rather than with someone other than a romantic partner, as platonic parents do. The first premise claims that the romantic relationship, and only this relationship, has a certain desire as a constitutive part. This is the desire to be as related to someone as one can be. That this ‘desire for relatedness’ is a constitutive part of the romantic relationship explains why those related by a romantic relationship tend to become related in other ways and explains why romantic partners tend to desire to have relationships with those to whom their romantic partner is otherwise related. The second premise is that by having a child together romantic partners become related in an important and unique way, satisfying their desire for relatedness. Since platonic parents do not have the desire for relatedness toward one another they do not satisfy such a desire in having a child together. A brief review of the sociological literature on platonic parenting is included and eight objections are answered.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44676235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649
V. O. Özen
Abstract Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.
{"title":"Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy","authors":"V. O. Özen","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1938649","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48930447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601
László Bernáth
Abstract This article defends indirect libertarianism against those arguments which attempt to show that blameworthiness cannot be traced back to earlier blameworthy acts in most cases. More precisely, I focus on those arguments according to which responsibility cannot be traced back in most cases because agents are unable to foresee the distant consequences of their acts . Since indirect libertarianism claims that we are responsible for many actions, omissions, beliefs, attitudes because they can be traced back to earlier free acts, the success of the arguments against tracing would be fatal to indirect libertarianism. In the literature, there are some answers to the problem of tracing, but they are either implausible or unacceptable for indirect libertarians who hold that indeterministic free decisions are the ultimate sources of moral responsibility. On the basis of works by Björnsson, Persson, Robichaud, and Wieland, I provide a solution to the problem of tracing that preserves the crucial role of indeterministic decisions. In other words, I provide a libertarian solution to the problem of tracing.
{"title":"Defending Libertarianism through Rethinking Responsibility for Consequences","authors":"László Bernáth","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article defends indirect libertarianism against those arguments which attempt to show that blameworthiness cannot be traced back to earlier blameworthy acts in most cases. More precisely, I focus on those arguments according to which responsibility cannot be traced back in most cases because agents are unable to foresee the distant consequences of their acts . Since indirect libertarianism claims that we are responsible for many actions, omissions, beliefs, attitudes because they can be traced back to earlier free acts, the success of the arguments against tracing would be fatal to indirect libertarianism. In the literature, there are some answers to the problem of tracing, but they are either implausible or unacceptable for indirect libertarians who hold that indeterministic free decisions are the ultimate sources of moral responsibility. On the basis of works by Björnsson, Persson, Robichaud, and Wieland, I provide a solution to the problem of tracing that preserves the crucial role of indeterministic decisions. In other words, I provide a libertarian solution to the problem of tracing.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2021.1901601","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47646038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29
P. Kielanowski, A. Odzijewicz, E. Previato
{"title":"Correction","authors":"P. Kielanowski, A. Odzijewicz, E. Previato","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34072-8_29","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48895093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288
I. Landau
Abstract Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view.
{"title":"Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility?","authors":"I. Landau","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2021.1898288","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42816958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989
K. Büttner
Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.
{"title":"Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered","authors":"K. Büttner","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44432027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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