Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845
Andrew M. Bailey
Abstract Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.
{"title":"Freedom in a Physical World","authors":"Andrew M. Bailey","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"49 1","pages":"31 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43515875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840
K. Kalumba
Abstract An avowed communitarian, Gyekye follows the lead of such African communitarians as Menkiti who believe that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. However, unlike Menkiti and other typical communitarians whom he describes as extreme communitarians, Gyekye rejects the moral subordination of the individual to the community. Describing his position as moderate communitarianism, Gyekye insists on ascribing to the individual and the community ‘the status of an equal moral standing’. I defend Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism against four of its leading contemporary African critiques: Matolino, Famakinwa, Metz, and Oyowe. I argue that the four critiques fail to dislodge it. In addition, I suggest two amendments to the theory which are intended to further entrench it and to increase its competitiveness against other contemporary African political theories with a sub-Saharan pedigree. As a first amendment, I suggest supplementing it with a theory of justice that is well-equipped with guidelines on how to handle clashes among Gyekye’s basic values. As a second amendment, I propose that Gyekye abandon his current stance of ontologically subordinating the individual to the community in favor of according both equal ontological standing.
{"title":"A Defense of Kwame Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism","authors":"K. Kalumba","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An avowed communitarian, Gyekye follows the lead of such African communitarians as Menkiti who believe that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. However, unlike Menkiti and other typical communitarians whom he describes as extreme communitarians, Gyekye rejects the moral subordination of the individual to the community. Describing his position as moderate communitarianism, Gyekye insists on ascribing to the individual and the community ‘the status of an equal moral standing’. I defend Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism against four of its leading contemporary African critiques: Matolino, Famakinwa, Metz, and Oyowe. I argue that the four critiques fail to dislodge it. In addition, I suggest two amendments to the theory which are intended to further entrench it and to increase its competitiveness against other contemporary African political theories with a sub-Saharan pedigree. As a first amendment, I suggest supplementing it with a theory of justice that is well-equipped with guidelines on how to handle clashes among Gyekye’s basic values. As a second amendment, I propose that Gyekye abandon his current stance of ontologically subordinating the individual to the community in favor of according both equal ontological standing.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"49 1","pages":"137 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41356758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1463821
L. Tarasov
Abstract Moderate invariantism is the orthodox semantics for knowledge attributions (i.e., sentences of the form ⌜S knows/doesn’t know that Φ⌝). In recent years it has fallen out of favour, in large part because it fails to explain why ordinary speakers have the intuition that some utterances of knowledge attributions are felicitous and others infelicitous (felicity intuitions) in several types of cases. To address this issue moderate invariantists have developed a variety of what I call non-semantic theories (aka error theories) which they claim account for the relevant felicity intuitions independently of moderate invariantist semantics. Some critics have responded by arguing that these non-semantic theories are implausible for one or more of the following reasons: (i) they do not have a basis in empirical data or established theory; (ii) they do not account for all of the relevant felicity intuitions; (iii) they are ad hoc; or (iv) they in fact explain too many felicity intuitions and thus undermine the case for moderate invariantism. I develop a new non-semantic theory––projective adaptivism––that I argue escapes issues (i) to (iv) above.
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Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310
Megan Wallace
Abstract A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one’s hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted––or extensively explored––until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.
{"title":"The Lump Sum: A Theory of Modal Parts","authors":"Megan Wallace","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one’s hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted––or extensively explored––until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"403 - 435"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47945387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606
Lindsay Kelland
ing intuitions. It is likely clear at this point that I prefer the more externalist route, which allows for the goodness of a reason to play an explanatory role in belief formation. However, Mitova has good arguments on her side, and it may be unpalatable to some to allow that false beliefs and good reasons do not share an ontology: if I believe that it is raining, I’ll take an umbrella whether or not it is actually raining. It is plausible to suppose that the same thing is doing the explanatory work in both cases. This intuition works in Mitova’s favour. However, whether or not you accept her conclusions, this book is well worth reading. It is both rigorous and readable, challenging and accessible. It is a beautiful demonstration of clarity of thought and precise argument, and it carves out a substantial and unique position in the field of the nature of reasons.
{"title":"Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration","authors":"Lindsay Kelland","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","url":null,"abstract":"ing intuitions. It is likely clear at this point that I prefer the more externalist route, which allows for the goodness of a reason to play an explanatory role in belief formation. However, Mitova has good arguments on her side, and it may be unpalatable to some to allow that false beliefs and good reasons do not share an ontology: if I believe that it is raining, I’ll take an umbrella whether or not it is actually raining. It is plausible to suppose that the same thing is doing the explanatory work in both cases. This intuition works in Mitova’s favour. However, whether or not you accept her conclusions, this book is well worth reading. It is both rigorous and readable, challenging and accessible. It is a beautiful demonstration of clarity of thought and precise argument, and it carves out a substantial and unique position in the field of the nature of reasons.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"325 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43071248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1463103
Ben Blumson
Abstract This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A traditional way to justify the thesis would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then it is representable by distance in a metric space. But I will argue that those qualitative conditions which are strong enough to capture the analogy between distance and dissimilarity are not met by either actual or possible particulars.
{"title":"Distance and Dissimilarity","authors":"Ben Blumson","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2018.1463103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1463103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A traditional way to justify the thesis would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then it is representable by distance in a metric space. But I will argue that those qualitative conditions which are strong enough to capture the analogy between distance and dissimilarity are not met by either actual or possible particulars.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"211 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2018.1463103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49621640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199334872.003.0001
P. Humphreys
During a summer break in college, I set out to solo hike the Pennine Way, a 267-mile footpath snaking across the moors of northern England. One day, my first goal was Stoodley Pike, a hill topped by a 121-foot stone folly. That morning, the Pike was covered in a dense fog, with visibility down to about ten yards. I lost the trail, and for about an hour, I had no idea where I was or whether I was hiking toward or away from the monument. I seemed destined to spend the rest of my holiday on the Pike, but suddenly the mist parted and right in front of me was the folly. When doing philosophy I am often reminded of that morning....
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"P. Humphreys","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199334872.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199334872.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"During a summer break in college, I set out to solo hike the Pennine Way, a 267-mile footpath snaking across the moors of northern England. One day, my first goal was Stoodley Pike, a hill topped by a 121-foot stone folly. That morning, the Pike was covered in a dense fog, with visibility down to about ten yards. I lost the trail, and for about an hour, I had no idea where I was or whether I was hiking toward or away from the monument. I seemed destined to spend the rest of my holiday on the Pike, but suddenly the mist parted and right in front of me was the folly. When doing philosophy I am often reminded of that morning....","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44102294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0020
P. Humphreys
Retrospective reflections are provided on the papers “Aleatory Explanations,” “Analytic versus Synthetic Understanding,” “Scientific and Speculative Ontology,” and “Endogenous Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Constraints” by Paul Humphreys. Arguments are given for restricting probabilistic causation to situations in which single case propensities are present and for keeping the pragmatics of explanation as a secondary, rather than a primary, feature of explanations. A finite representation schema for ceteris paribus conditions is provided and some suggestions for how to deal with the pessimistic induction are floated. Some reasons why traditional empiricism should not place constraints on the ontologies we use are given. Motivations for a previously unpublished paper that identifies situations in which individual utility maximization strategies perform worse at the society level than do some common individual strategies are provided and the appropriate role for encouraging certain types of constraints on self-interest is discussed.
{"title":"Explanation, Understanding, Ontology, and Social Dynamics","authors":"P. Humphreys","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"Retrospective reflections are provided on the papers “Aleatory Explanations,” “Analytic versus Synthetic Understanding,” “Scientific and Speculative Ontology,” and “Endogenous Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Constraints” by Paul Humphreys. Arguments are given for restricting probabilistic causation to situations in which single case propensities are present and for keeping the pragmatics of explanation as a secondary, rather than a primary, feature of explanations. A finite representation schema for ceteris paribus conditions is provided and some suggestions for how to deal with the pessimistic induction are floated. Some reasons why traditional empiricism should not place constraints on the ontologies we use are given. Motivations for a previously unpublished paper that identifies situations in which individual utility maximization strategies perform worse at the society level than do some common individual strategies are provided and the appropriate role for encouraging certain types of constraints on self-interest is discussed.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47015072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0019
P. Humphreys
An agent- based model of social dynamics is introduced using a deformable fitness landscape, and it is shown that in certain clearly specifiable situations, strategies that are different from utility maximization outperform utility maximizers. Simulation results are presented and intuitive interpretations of the results provided. The situations considered occur when individuals' actions affect the outcomes for other agents and endogenous effects are dominant. The Tragedy of the Commons is merely a special case of this. Arguments are given that constraints are to be encouraged in some circumstances. The appropriate role of constraints in various types of society is assessed and their use justified in identifiable types of situations.
{"title":"Endogenous Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Constraints","authors":"P. Humphreys","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"An agent- based model of social dynamics is introduced using a deformable fitness landscape, and it is shown that in certain clearly specifiable situations, strategies that are different from utility maximization outperform utility maximizers. Simulation results are presented and intuitive interpretations of the results provided. The situations considered occur when individuals' actions affect the outcomes for other agents and endogenous effects are dominant. The Tragedy of the Commons is merely a special case of this. Arguments are given that constraints are to be encouraged in some circumstances. The appropriate role of constraints in various types of society is assessed and their use justified in identifiable types of situations.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61548622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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