Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1610334
R. Halwani
Abstract This paper defends the ‘sexual pleasure view’ of sexual desire—that sexual desire is for sexual pleasure. It does so by explaining the various aspects of the view, especially that of ‘sexual pleasure’ on which it relies, by explaining its important implications, by responding to various objections against it (that it relies on an impoverished notion of pleasure, e.g.), and by arguing against some of its main contenders (that sexual desire is for sexual activity, e.g.).
{"title":"The Sexual Pleasure View of Sexual Desire","authors":"R. Halwani","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1610334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1610334","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper defends the ‘sexual pleasure view’ of sexual desire—that sexual desire is for sexual pleasure. It does so by explaining the various aspects of the view, especially that of ‘sexual pleasure’ on which it relies, by explaining its important implications, by responding to various objections against it (that it relies on an impoverished notion of pleasure, e.g.), and by arguing against some of its main contenders (that sexual desire is for sexual activity, e.g.).","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1610334","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44717634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1571938
A. Fisher
Abstract Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects.
摘要修辞理论是分析本体论中一个重要的形而上学理论。唐纳德·c·威廉姆斯(Donald C. Williams)的作品中有一个经典的说法，他认为比喻是抽象的细节，是存在的字母表。抽象的特殊性的概念在文献中一再受到攻击。比喻理论的反对者和支持者都对比喻的抽象性和相关的抽象行为提出了批评。在这篇论文中，我通过反驳那些试图证明比喻不应该被理解为抽象的论点，并通过论证比喻的抽象性在我们对共相和具体对象的更有前途的比喻理论分析中发挥着不可或缺的作用，来捍卫比喻作为抽象特殊的概念。
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845
Andrew M. Bailey
Abstract Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.
{"title":"Freedom in a Physical World","authors":"Andrew M. Bailey","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1608845","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43515875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840
K. Kalumba
Abstract An avowed communitarian, Gyekye follows the lead of such African communitarians as Menkiti who believe that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. However, unlike Menkiti and other typical communitarians whom he describes as extreme communitarians, Gyekye rejects the moral subordination of the individual to the community. Describing his position as moderate communitarianism, Gyekye insists on ascribing to the individual and the community ‘the status of an equal moral standing’. I defend Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism against four of its leading contemporary African critiques: Matolino, Famakinwa, Metz, and Oyowe. I argue that the four critiques fail to dislodge it. In addition, I suggest two amendments to the theory which are intended to further entrench it and to increase its competitiveness against other contemporary African political theories with a sub-Saharan pedigree. As a first amendment, I suggest supplementing it with a theory of justice that is well-equipped with guidelines on how to handle clashes among Gyekye’s basic values. As a second amendment, I propose that Gyekye abandon his current stance of ontologically subordinating the individual to the community in favor of according both equal ontological standing.
{"title":"A Defense of Kwame Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism","authors":"K. Kalumba","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An avowed communitarian, Gyekye follows the lead of such African communitarians as Menkiti who believe that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. However, unlike Menkiti and other typical communitarians whom he describes as extreme communitarians, Gyekye rejects the moral subordination of the individual to the community. Describing his position as moderate communitarianism, Gyekye insists on ascribing to the individual and the community ‘the status of an equal moral standing’. I defend Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism against four of its leading contemporary African critiques: Matolino, Famakinwa, Metz, and Oyowe. I argue that the four critiques fail to dislodge it. In addition, I suggest two amendments to the theory which are intended to further entrench it and to increase its competitiveness against other contemporary African political theories with a sub-Saharan pedigree. As a first amendment, I suggest supplementing it with a theory of justice that is well-equipped with guidelines on how to handle clashes among Gyekye’s basic values. As a second amendment, I propose that Gyekye abandon his current stance of ontologically subordinating the individual to the community in favor of according both equal ontological standing.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1684840","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41356758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1463821
L. Tarasov
Abstract Moderate invariantism is the orthodox semantics for knowledge attributions (i.e., sentences of the form ⌜S knows/doesn’t know that Φ⌝). In recent years it has fallen out of favour, in large part because it fails to explain why ordinary speakers have the intuition that some utterances of knowledge attributions are felicitous and others infelicitous (felicity intuitions) in several types of cases. To address this issue moderate invariantists have developed a variety of what I call non-semantic theories (aka error theories) which they claim account for the relevant felicity intuitions independently of moderate invariantist semantics. Some critics have responded by arguing that these non-semantic theories are implausible for one or more of the following reasons: (i) they do not have a basis in empirical data or established theory; (ii) they do not account for all of the relevant felicity intuitions; (iii) they are ad hoc; or (iv) they in fact explain too many felicity intuitions and thus undermine the case for moderate invariantism. I develop a new non-semantic theory––projective adaptivism––that I argue escapes issues (i) to (iv) above.
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Pub Date : 2019-05-28DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310
Megan Wallace
Abstract A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one’s hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted––or extensively explored––until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.
{"title":"The Lump Sum: A Theory of Modal Parts","authors":"Megan Wallace","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A lump theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds, much like many of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the lump theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one’s hand is. We are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound parts. We are lump sums of modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In this paper, I explore lump theory and investigate five arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why lump theory (as envisioned here) has not been widely accepted––or extensively explored––until now. I maintain that these arguments can be answered, and moreover, that accepting lump theory has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2018.1562310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47945387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606
Lindsay Kelland
ing intuitions. It is likely clear at this point that I prefer the more externalist route, which allows for the goodness of a reason to play an explanatory role in belief formation. However, Mitova has good arguments on her side, and it may be unpalatable to some to allow that false beliefs and good reasons do not share an ontology: if I believe that it is raining, I’ll take an umbrella whether or not it is actually raining. It is plausible to suppose that the same thing is doing the explanatory work in both cases. This intuition works in Mitova’s favour. However, whether or not you accept her conclusions, this book is well worth reading. It is both rigorous and readable, challenging and accessible. It is a beautiful demonstration of clarity of thought and precise argument, and it carves out a substantial and unique position in the field of the nature of reasons.
{"title":"Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration","authors":"Lindsay Kelland","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","url":null,"abstract":"ing intuitions. It is likely clear at this point that I prefer the more externalist route, which allows for the goodness of a reason to play an explanatory role in belief formation. However, Mitova has good arguments on her side, and it may be unpalatable to some to allow that false beliefs and good reasons do not share an ontology: if I believe that it is raining, I’ll take an umbrella whether or not it is actually raining. It is plausible to suppose that the same thing is doing the explanatory work in both cases. This intuition works in Mitova’s favour. However, whether or not you accept her conclusions, this book is well worth reading. It is both rigorous and readable, challenging and accessible. It is a beautiful demonstration of clarity of thought and precise argument, and it carves out a substantial and unique position in the field of the nature of reasons.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1616606","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43071248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1463103
Ben Blumson
Abstract This paper considers whether an analogy between distance and dissimilarity supports the thesis that degree of dissimilarity is distance in a metric space. A traditional way to justify the thesis would be to prove representation and uniqueness theorems, according to which if comparative dissimilarity meets certain qualitative conditions, then it is representable by distance in a metric space. But I will argue that those qualitative conditions which are strong enough to capture the analogy between distance and dissimilarity are not met by either actual or possible particulars.
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Pub Date : 2019-03-21DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780199334872.003.0020
P. Humphreys
Retrospective reflections are provided on the papers “Aleatory Explanations,” “Analytic versus Synthetic Understanding,” “Scientific and Speculative Ontology,” and “Endogenous Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Constraints” by Paul Humphreys. Arguments are given for restricting probabilistic causation to situations in which single case propensities are present and for keeping the pragmatics of explanation as a secondary, rather than a primary, feature of explanations. A finite representation schema for ceteris paribus conditions is provided and some suggestions for how to deal with the pessimistic induction are floated. Some reasons why traditional empiricism should not place constraints on the ontologies we use are given. Motivations for a previously unpublished paper that identifies situations in which individual utility maximization strategies perform worse at the society level than do some common individual strategies are provided and the appropriate role for encouraging certain types of constraints on self-interest is discussed.
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