Pub Date : 2023-02-08DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-2-42-59
Andrei D. Maidansky, O. Kravtsov
The article is devoted to the study of L.S. Vygotsky’s manuscript “Psychology and Theory of Cognition” in the context of the development of his methodological and psychological ideas. The original version of the work can be dated with high certainty to 1932. The way of presentation and especially of the final revision was influenced by the ideological campaign that had begun against leading child psychologists, including Vygotsky. He tried to build a defence by quoting copiously from the manuscripts of Lenin and Marx, but interpreting their words in a rather peculiar way. Thus, Vygotsky projects the difference between man and animal, as indicated by Marx, onto the process of mental development of the child. Vygotsky makes the general criterion of this development “the stages of separating the child from reality”, starting with the act of self-awareness and the formation of “undifferentiated notions” about individual things in the surrounding world. Vygotsky recognizes the fundamental compliance of the history of the child’s mental development with the history of human cognition, but with an essential reservation regarding the specificity of the psychological forms in which the child assimilates the cultural heritage. Two alternative solutions to the problem of the child’s mental development are criticized – naturalistic (J. Piaget) and subjectivist (H. Volkelt). In Vygotsky’s cultural and historical concept, the development of thinking is the essentially social process. A child does not spend a minute of his life outside of society; all his cognitive activity and mental development, from beginning to end, proceed under the guidance of other people, according to the norms of the culture in which the child is completely absorbed. Natural mental functions are not supplanted by cultural ones, as Piaget believed, but obey them, switching to cultural (sign-symbolic in their means) modes of work. This “instrumental” part of Vygotsky’s theory, as well as his new doctrine of “dynamic semantic systems”, on which he was working at about the same time, remained behind the scenes in his manuscript; meanwhile, they play an important role in his psychological theory of knowledge. The text of “Psychology and Theory of Cognition” with the publisher’s notes was prepared by A.D. Maidansky. The inserts in square brackets belong to the publisher, the author’s punctuation has been preserved.
{"title":"Lev Vygotsky’s Theory of Cognition. Vygotsky, Lev S., Psychology and Theory of Cognition, Maidansky, Andrei D., ed.","authors":"Andrei D. Maidansky, O. Kravtsov","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-2-42-59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-2-42-59","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the study of L.S. Vygotsky’s manuscript “Psychology and Theory of Cognition” in the context of the development of his methodological and psychological ideas. The original version of the work can be dated with high certainty to 1932. The way of presentation and especially of the final revision was influenced by the ideological campaign that had begun against leading child psychologists, including Vygotsky. He tried to build a defence by quoting copiously from the manuscripts of Lenin and Marx, but interpreting their words in a rather peculiar way. Thus, Vygotsky projects the difference between man and animal, as indicated by Marx, onto the process of mental development of the child. Vygotsky makes the general criterion of this development “the stages of separating the child from reality”, starting with the act of self-awareness and the formation of “undifferentiated notions” about individual things in the surrounding world. Vygotsky recognizes the fundamental compliance of the history of the child’s mental development with the history of human cognition, but with an essential reservation regarding the specificity of the psychological forms in which the child assimilates the cultural heritage. Two alternative solutions to the problem of the child’s mental development are criticized – naturalistic (J. Piaget) and subjectivist (H. Volkelt). In Vygotsky’s cultural and historical concept, the development of thinking is the essentially social process. A child does not spend a minute of his life outside of society; all his cognitive activity and mental development, from beginning to end, proceed under the guidance of other people, according to the norms of the culture in which the child is completely absorbed. Natural mental functions are not supplanted by cultural ones, as Piaget believed, but obey them, switching to cultural (sign-symbolic in their means) modes of work. This “instrumental” part of Vygotsky’s theory, as well as his new doctrine of “dynamic semantic systems”, on which he was working at about the same time, remained behind the scenes in his manuscript; meanwhile, they play an important role in his psychological theory of knowledge. The text of “Psychology and Theory of Cognition” with the publisher’s notes was prepared by A.D. Maidansky. The inserts in square brackets belong to the publisher, the author’s punctuation has been preserved.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48657629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-74-77
Irina A. Gerasimova
The devotee of Beauty Nikolai Ivanovich Kiyashchenko believed that the aesthetic should permeate all spheres of life and any work. He thought of Beauty as the basis of a high culture and, accordingly, a worthy development of a person, a harmonious co-evolution of a person, society and nature. Researchers have repeatedly raised the topic of beauty in science in literature, but with a new iteration of scientific, technical and cultural development, the concept took on new meanings. Plato did not think of the ideal of beauty separately from the ideals of goodness and truth, which is reflected in the concept of good. The idea of a synthesis of thought, word and action passes through many cultures. In the ancient Russian mentality, good as an ethical aspect of thought at the level of its origin (thoughts) was conveyed through the concept of justice – “direct knowledge of the truth”, an impulse that originates in the depths of the heart and does not require proof. Modern transitional era proposes a leap in cognitive evolution: from the differentiation of cultural spheres to their convergence on the path of dialogue, interpenetration, and the emergence of synthetic forms of creativity. The aesthetics of life of science returns to the origins of the synthesis of science, art and religion, but on a new basis. The concept of post-non-classical rationality by V.S. Stepin leads to synthesis, which implies a wide dialogue between science and non-scientific forms of cognition and experience, cementing the space of creative contacts. The objective aspects of beauty are embedded in the fundamental categories of natural science. In a technogenic civilization, science aestheticizes its tools. Thought in action is realized in engineering, design, ecodesign.
{"title":"The Ideal of Beauty in the Life of Science (Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow)","authors":"Irina A. Gerasimova","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-74-77","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-74-77","url":null,"abstract":"The devotee of Beauty Nikolai Ivanovich Kiyashchenko believed that the aesthetic should permeate all spheres of life and any work. He thought of Beauty as the basis of a high culture and, accordingly, a worthy development of a person, a harmonious co-evolution of a person, society and nature. Researchers have repeatedly raised the topic of beauty in science in literature, but with a new iteration of scientific, technical and cultural development, the concept took on new meanings. Plato did not think of the ideal of beauty separately from the ideals of goodness and truth, which is reflected in the concept of good. The idea of a synthesis of thought, word and action passes through many cultures. In the ancient Russian mentality, good as an ethical aspect of thought at the level of its origin (thoughts) was conveyed through the concept of justice – “direct knowledge of the truth”, an impulse that originates in the depths of the heart and does not require proof. Modern transitional era proposes a leap in cognitive evolution: from the differentiation of cultural spheres to their convergence on the path of dialogue, interpenetration, and the emergence of synthetic forms of creativity. The aesthetics of life of science returns to the origins of the synthesis of science, art and religion, but on a new basis. The concept of post-non-classical rationality by V.S. Stepin leads to synthesis, which implies a wide dialogue between science and non-scientific forms of cognition and experience, cementing the space of creative contacts. The objective aspects of beauty are embedded in the fundamental categories of natural science. In a technogenic civilization, science aestheticizes its tools. Thought in action is realized in engineering, design, ecodesign.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"264 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134887417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-197-204
Ekaterina B. Kriukova, Oxana A. Koval
The article draws parallels between the linguistic theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the origin of language and its transformations in our world today. Wittgenstein shows in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” the world as a whole, which is ordered in accordance with the grammatical structures of language. At the same time, it allows him to draw a certain border, beyond which is the “inexpressible”, namely, the sphere of ethical values inaccessible to language. Benjamin’s approach to understanding language, on the contrary, seems completely illogical and irrational. The initial impulse here is the biblical myth of the creation of the world by the Word and the idea of language as a God-given gift to human. In the course of historical development, the power of language is gradually running out and moves further away from its sacred source. However, even in current language practices, it is still possible to recognize this prototype, which is present in speech in the form of the inexpressible. The religious connotations of the “inexpressible” don’t prevent Benjamin from associating it with the same area of moral reference that Wittgenstein characterized with the term “mystical”. The comparative analysis of the theories of Benjamin and Wittgenstein demonstrates that behind the different strategies of philosophical understanding there is a common intention to catch the sphere of ethics that escapes direct expression. During the reconstruction of the teachings of two iconic figures of Western thought, important points of intersection are revealed: the tendency to ontologize language, the inability to express value meanings in normative statements, the incorporation of an ethical dimension into everyday practices of speech.
{"title":"The Ethical Meaning of the “Inexpressible” of Wittgenstein and Benjamin","authors":"Ekaterina B. Kriukova, Oxana A. Koval","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-197-204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-8-197-204","url":null,"abstract":"The article draws parallels between the linguistic theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the origin of language and its transformations in our world today. Wittgenstein shows in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” the world as a whole, which is ordered in accordance with the grammatical structures of language. At the same time, it allows him to draw a certain border, beyond which is the “inexpressible”, namely, the sphere of ethical values inaccessible to language. Benjamin’s approach to understanding language, on the contrary, seems completely illogical and irrational. The initial impulse here is the biblical myth of the creation of the world by the Word and the idea of language as a God-given gift to human. In the course of historical development, the power of language is gradually running out and moves further away from its sacred source. However, even in current language practices, it is still possible to recognize this prototype, which is present in speech in the form of the inexpressible. The religious connotations of the “inexpressible” don’t prevent Benjamin from associating it with the same area of moral reference that Wittgenstein characterized with the term “mystical”. The comparative analysis of the theories of Benjamin and Wittgenstein demonstrates that behind the different strategies of philosophical understanding there is a common intention to catch the sphere of ethics that escapes direct expression. During the reconstruction of the teachings of two iconic figures of Western thought, important points of intersection are revealed: the tendency to ontologize language, the inability to express value meanings in normative statements, the incorporation of an ethical dimension into everyday practices of speech.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"279 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134887418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-10-141-145
Olga E. Stoliarova
The article deals with the problem of circular proof, which arises in the philosophical discussions about rationality, its ideals and standards. Trying to define what rationality is, we are forced to refer to its ideals and criteria, the rationality of which must be established in advance with the help of rational procedures. This situation is characterized as an epistemic circular dependence of the instrument and the result and is compared with the situation of experimenter’s regress. The experimenter’s regress is a circular reasoning in which it is possible to judge the correctness of the scientific results obtained only on the basis of the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them, and it is impossible to judge the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them without reference to the obtained results. Thus, the proponents of the objectivity of the result and their opponents have no rational grounds for choosing one of the alternatives. The epistemological problematization of the experimenter’s regress indirectly problematizes the theories of rationality, since science and the criteria of rational choice adopted in it act as standards of rationality in itself. It is shown that the epistemological justification of overcoming the experimenter’s regress is carried out by referring to “external factors” that are rationalized by the epistemologist. Although these external factors are declared “irrational,” they are rationalized in the epistemologist’s “laboratory,” add to the baggage of the grounds of rational consent, and enrich the notion of rationality. This allows us to qualify the circle described by rationality in defining itself as virtuous.
{"title":"The Сircular Understanding of Rationality and the Experimenter’s Regress","authors":"Olga E. Stoliarova","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-10-141-145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-10-141-145","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the problem of circular proof, which arises in the philosophical discussions about rationality, its ideals and standards. Trying to define what rationality is, we are forced to refer to its ideals and criteria, the rationality of which must be established in advance with the help of rational procedures. This situation is characterized as an epistemic circular dependence of the instrument and the result and is compared with the situation of experimenter’s regress. The experimenter’s regress is a circular reasoning in which it is possible to judge the correctness of the scientific results obtained only on the basis of the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them, and it is impossible to judge the correctness of the procedure for obtaining them without reference to the obtained results. Thus, the proponents of the objectivity of the result and their opponents have no rational grounds for choosing one of the alternatives. The epistemological problematization of the experimenter’s regress indirectly problematizes the theories of rationality, since science and the criteria of rational choice adopted in it act as standards of rationality in itself. It is shown that the epistemological justification of overcoming the experimenter’s regress is carried out by referring to “external factors” that are rationalized by the epistemologist. Although these external factors are declared “irrational,” they are rationalized in the epistemologist’s “laboratory,” add to the baggage of the grounds of rational consent, and enrich the notion of rationality. This allows us to qualify the circle described by rationality in defining itself as virtuous.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134887516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-212-216
Vitaly Yu. Ivlev, Mikhail B. Oseledchik
{"title":"LEBEDEV, Sergei A. (2022) Modern Philosophy of Science: Monograph","authors":"Vitaly Yu. Ivlev, Mikhail B. Oseledchik","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-212-216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-212-216","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134887764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-32-44
Vladimir K. Shokhin
The author interprets such an important regularity that while “philosophies of whatever one likes” (up to philosophies of work and recreation, dance and sport, sex and covenants, etc.) are acquiring unlimited “legalization”, self-reflexion of philosophy survives the profoundest crisis these days. He calls it the paradox of the obstinate growth of trees as simultaneous with felling. Incremental deterioration of the very interest for mapping philosophy which had been regarded as a very important vocation of a philosopher from Antiquity up to later Moderniy is regarded as the mostly brute indication on this state of affairs, and various modes of irrationality in its division into the main fields (both in analytic and continental milieux) are demonstrated. While acknowledging that it is already impossible to offer a good general classification of philosophical disciplines whose overall scope of subjects approaches to infinity the author believes it possible to escape at least practical philosophy (the correlate of theoretical philosophy) which has had a sufficienty concentrated list of the main disciplines from Aristotle’s epoch. He suggests a renovation of its list as well as also the substitution of the Aristotelean “governing science” (ἀρχιτεκτονική) as practical judiciousness (φρόνησις πρακτική) by agathological teleology whose subject could be human goal-setting in the context of good-setting. As a support from the outside the author attaches Indian scheme of human goals (puruşārthāḥ) and an opinion of the Dharmaśāstras that human goals themselves can be justified by their participation in the good.
{"title":"Philosophical Disintegration and a Chance of Practical Philosophy","authors":"Vladimir K. Shokhin","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-32-44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-32-44","url":null,"abstract":"The author interprets such an important regularity that while “philosophies of whatever one likes” (up to philosophies of work and recreation, dance and sport, sex and covenants, etc.) are acquiring unlimited “legalization”, self-reflexion of philosophy survives the profoundest crisis these days. He calls it the paradox of the obstinate growth of trees as simultaneous with felling. Incremental deterioration of the very interest for mapping philosophy which had been regarded as a very important vocation of a philosopher from Antiquity up to later Moderniy is regarded as the mostly brute indication on this state of affairs, and various modes of irrationality in its division into the main fields (both in analytic and continental milieux) are demonstrated. While acknowledging that it is already impossible to offer a good general classification of philosophical disciplines whose overall scope of subjects approaches to infinity the author believes it possible to escape at least practical philosophy (the correlate of theoretical philosophy) which has had a sufficienty concentrated list of the main disciplines from Aristotle’s epoch. He suggests a renovation of its list as well as also the substitution of the Aristotelean “governing science” (ἀρχιτεκτονική) as practical judiciousness (φρόνησις πρακτική) by agathological teleology whose subject could be human goal-setting in the context of good-setting. As a support from the outside the author attaches Indian scheme of human goals (puruşārthāḥ) and an opinion of the Dharmaśāstras that human goals themselves can be justified by their participation in the good.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134888004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-103-113
Stanislava A. Filipenok
It has been demonstrated that human corporality specifies tacit knowledge, which belongs to natural intelligence, by contrast to artificial intelligence. Corporal experience endows a person with creative potential that technical devices lack. It has been revealed that a computer cannot have the material basis that a human being as a biological organism possesses. This imposes limitations on artificial intelligence cognitive capabilities. The objectification of the tacit components of corporal experience in language can be considered as an important factor of creativity and cognition. It is the meaningful connections between implicit components of the subjective inner world that specify new knowledge content and underlie individual creativity. The use of natural language by a person differs from the use of sign systems by artificial intelligence. The difference is that natural language is meaningful in the subjective experience context. It would be more correct to speak of sign structure transformation by a computer as information processing rather than knowledge production. AI information becomes knowledge by virtue of interpretation, endowing it with human meaning. Unlike digital devices, human intelligence is analogue since it expresses a continuous stream of consciousness, an ongoing process of subjective meanings modification. The modern 4E-Cognition approach elicited the specifics of artificial intelligence and its cognitive limitations. It has been demonstrated that characteristics described within this approach are only partially applicable to artificial intelligence.
{"title":"Tacit Knowledge in Digital Humanitaristics","authors":"Stanislava A. Filipenok","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-103-113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-103-113","url":null,"abstract":"It has been demonstrated that human corporality specifies tacit knowledge, which belongs to natural intelligence, by contrast to artificial intelligence. Corporal experience endows a person with creative potential that technical devices lack. It has been revealed that a computer cannot have the material basis that a human being as a biological organism possesses. This imposes limitations on artificial intelligence cognitive capabilities. The objectification of the tacit components of corporal experience in language can be considered as an important factor of creativity and cognition. It is the meaningful connections between implicit components of the subjective inner world that specify new knowledge content and underlie individual creativity. The use of natural language by a person differs from the use of sign systems by artificial intelligence. The difference is that natural language is meaningful in the subjective experience context. It would be more correct to speak of sign structure transformation by a computer as information processing rather than knowledge production. AI information becomes knowledge by virtue of interpretation, endowing it with human meaning. Unlike digital devices, human intelligence is analogue since it expresses a continuous stream of consciousness, an ongoing process of subjective meanings modification. The modern 4E-Cognition approach elicited the specifics of artificial intelligence and its cognitive limitations. It has been demonstrated that characteristics described within this approach are only partially applicable to artificial intelligence.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"265 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134888015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-141-150
Irina V. Gravina
The purpose of this article is to initiate a virtual dialogue between the ideas of two twentieth-century philosophers who turned their interest to the concept of the apophatic unity – A.F. Losev and Jacques Derrida. This thopic, as well as the interest in the concepts of Neo-Platonism in general, one of the basic ones in the works of Losev, turns out to be in the focus of modern European philosophy, generating an independent intellectual current – Henology. As Losev remarked, European scholarship for a long time have been ignored the Neoplatonists’ interpretations of Plato, while his philosophical system is based precisely on the Christian version of Neoplatonism. It will be noted that both thinkers draw the idea of apophaticism from the texts of the Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum, but have understood it differently. Losev’s system implies that the one is expressed symbolically and in name, suggesting Christian overtones, while Jacques Derrida has a radical apophatic, an unattainable supersubstantial reality, designated by him as negative theology. But his deconstruction project, however, is not Christian. It will be concluded that the topic requires a comparative analysis of the ideas of the neo-platonist Losev with his variant of apophatic henology, which he presents as onomatology and symbolism (the expressed unity) and a completely different variant of the topic in Jacques Derrida’s works, who deconstructaed antique-medieval term of the one and looked for ways to “avoid talking” about it.
{"title":"The Return to Apophaticism: Neo-Platonism of Alexey Losev and Jacques Derrida","authors":"Irina V. Gravina","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-141-150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-9-141-150","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to initiate a virtual dialogue between the ideas of two twentieth-century philosophers who turned their interest to the concept of the apophatic unity – A.F. Losev and Jacques Derrida. This thopic, as well as the interest in the concepts of Neo-Platonism in general, one of the basic ones in the works of Losev, turns out to be in the focus of modern European philosophy, generating an independent intellectual current – Henology. As Losev remarked, European scholarship for a long time have been ignored the Neoplatonists’ interpretations of Plato, while his philosophical system is based precisely on the Christian version of Neoplatonism. It will be noted that both thinkers draw the idea of apophaticism from the texts of the Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum, but have understood it differently. Losev’s system implies that the one is expressed symbolically and in name, suggesting Christian overtones, while Jacques Derrida has a radical apophatic, an unattainable supersubstantial reality, designated by him as negative theology. But his deconstruction project, however, is not Christian. It will be concluded that the topic requires a comparative analysis of the ideas of the neo-platonist Losev with his variant of apophatic henology, which he presents as onomatology and symbolism (the expressed unity) and a completely different variant of the topic in Jacques Derrida’s works, who deconstructaed antique-medieval term of the one and looked for ways to “avoid talking” about it.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134888282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-171-181
Sergey A. Vorontsov
The article considers the problem of unity and variety of the contemporary theories of tradition that appear in different fields of scholarship. It is argued that the unity of these theories is mainly a discursive one. This theoretical discourse, which starts with the famous essays of T.S. Eliot, M. Oakeshott, and K. Popper, ascribes to the tradition rationality, flexibility, the active participation of the individual in the functioning of tradition and non-authoritative character. The concept of ‘invented tradition’, which describes tradition as rigid and unchangeable, presupposes its deliberative and rational character. The theories are more or less unanimously challenge the opposition between tradition and rationality. At the same time the term ‘tradition’ possesses various meanings and functions not only in different theories, but also within a single theory. The unity of the problems and ‘puzzles’ that the concept of tradition should solve is weak and is getting weaker. The article puts forward a hypothesis that the discourse about tradition reflects the situation, in which the epistemological paradigm of Cartesian subject is felt to be insecure. The methodological reflection grows, but still cannot change the model, because it mere ascribes to the tradition the qualities of its opposite, and mere leads to the blurring of the concept of tradition.
{"title":"Contemporary Theories of Tradition: The Unity of Discourse and the Variety of Meanings","authors":"Sergey A. Vorontsov","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-171-181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-171-181","url":null,"abstract":"The article considers the problem of unity and variety of the contemporary theories of tradition that appear in different fields of scholarship. It is argued that the unity of these theories is mainly a discursive one. This theoretical discourse, which starts with the famous essays of T.S. Eliot, M. Oakeshott, and K. Popper, ascribes to the tradition rationality, flexibility, the active participation of the individual in the functioning of tradition and non-authoritative character. The concept of ‘invented tradition’, which describes tradition as rigid and unchangeable, presupposes its deliberative and rational character. The theories are more or less unanimously challenge the opposition between tradition and rationality. At the same time the term ‘tradition’ possesses various meanings and functions not only in different theories, but also within a single theory. The unity of the problems and ‘puzzles’ that the concept of tradition should solve is weak and is getting weaker. The article puts forward a hypothesis that the discourse about tradition reflects the situation, in which the epistemological paradigm of Cartesian subject is felt to be insecure. The methodological reflection grows, but still cannot change the model, because it mere ascribes to the tradition the qualities of its opposite, and mere leads to the blurring of the concept of tradition.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134888925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-130-141
Yuriy V. Puschaev
The article raises the problem of re-evaluation of the personality of the radical revolutionary S.G. Nechaev in a positive way in the early Soviet historiography and literary studies of the 1920s. It is stated that as an introduction and necessary background to the issue, it is necessary to consider how Nechaev was treated in the Russian revolutionary underground, as well as how his personality and activities were perceived by the classics of Marxism – K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. The latter should be a kind of tuning fork and a mandatory reference point for Soviet researchers. It is established that with a general negative attitude towards Nechaev in the radical underground, he was also characterized by a certain ambivalence: many Russian revolutionaries positively assessed Nechaev’s energy and will, his dedication to the revolutionary cause. At the same time, Marx and Engels assessed Nechaev extremely negatively, which is largely explained by the fact that they were then fighting with M.A. Bakunin in the International and perceived Nechaev as his closest associate. They conducted their polemics with Bakunism and Nechaevism mainly not on moral grounds, but from the point of view of organizational issues and the effectiveness of political tactics. Their approach to the problem of morality and morality in general is briefly analyzed. The author also analyzes the only surviving evidence about the attitude of V.I. Lenin to Nechaev, which has come down to us through V.D. Bonch-Bruevich. He notes the weak points of this testimony, which do not allow us to treat it with absolute certainty. At the same time, he says that it is also not worth dismissing them as obviously doubtful and unreliable, and the question of Lenin’s real attitude to Nechaev remains open.
{"title":"The Attempt to Re-evaluate the Personality of S.G. Nechaev in Soviet Historiography in the 1920s. Background and Context","authors":"Yuriy V. Puschaev","doi":"10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-130-141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2023-5-130-141","url":null,"abstract":"The article raises the problem of re-evaluation of the personality of the radical revolutionary S.G. Nechaev in a positive way in the early Soviet historiography and literary studies of the 1920s. It is stated that as an introduction and necessary background to the issue, it is necessary to consider how Nechaev was treated in the Russian revolutionary underground, as well as how his personality and activities were perceived by the classics of Marxism – K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. The latter should be a kind of tuning fork and a mandatory reference point for Soviet researchers. It is established that with a general negative attitude towards Nechaev in the radical underground, he was also characterized by a certain ambivalence: many Russian revolutionaries positively assessed Nechaev’s energy and will, his dedication to the revolutionary cause. At the same time, Marx and Engels assessed Nechaev extremely negatively, which is largely explained by the fact that they were then fighting with M.A. Bakunin in the International and perceived Nechaev as his closest associate. They conducted their polemics with Bakunism and Nechaevism mainly not on moral grounds, but from the point of view of organizational issues and the effectiveness of political tactics. Their approach to the problem of morality and morality in general is briefly analyzed. The author also analyzes the only surviving evidence about the attitude of V.I. Lenin to Nechaev, which has come down to us through V.D. Bonch-Bruevich. He notes the weak points of this testimony, which do not allow us to treat it with absolute certainty. At the same time, he says that it is also not worth dismissing them as obviously doubtful and unreliable, and the question of Lenin’s real attitude to Nechaev remains open.","PeriodicalId":46795,"journal":{"name":"VOPROSY FILOSOFII","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134888930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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