METAPHILOSOPHY最新文献

How to write a philosophy paper? This paper seeks to answer that question. It proposes a progressive six-stage methodology for developing philosophical research, each step building in more rigorous forms of peer scrutiny: (1) independent ideation; (2) conceptualization and casual discussion; (3) short abstract and work-in-progress seminars; (4) referenced abstract and conference presentations; (5) first draft and written peer feedback; and (6) second draft and formal peer review. This framework shows why current trends, such as requiring complete papers for conference submissions or presenting already published work, distort the purpose of academic mechanisms, reducing their effectiveness in strengthening philosophical arguments. By moving forwards rather than backwards through the research process, philosophers can make full use of collaborative structures like seminars, conferences, and peer review. The result is a more methodologically rigorous approach to writing philosophy papers that preserves the integrity of academic practice.

How can philosophers determine when they should conclude their research process? This paper introduces the saturation principle to philosophical methodology. The idea of saturation, first formulated by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, has become an influential quality criterion for qualitative research in the hermeneutical and pragmatist traditions in the social sciences. By taking a pluralist and gradualist approach, this paper explores how different types of saturation may guide philosophers in deciding when to conclude their research activities. It identifies five core activities that are central to philosophical research projects and describes which type of saturation is most relevant to each of them. It also introduces two new forms of saturation: namely, perspectival and reflective saturation. While the paper concludes that saturation is a valuable methodological principle for philosophical research, it does not provide strict rules, let alone checklists. Saturation should be understood as a gradual process rather than one cut-off point.

A surge of contemporary rethinking in practising philosophy has helped diversify and pluralize the field, radically paving other ways of being, knowing, and conceiving aside from those of the dominant Eurocentric and other Western-centric philosophical orientations. One concern that has recently been elevated is the issue of philosophical virtues. What constitutes virtues is a contentious matter, as philosophers from different schools of thought are often at odds. Two strands of thinkers stand out in this regard: those who view the pursuit of virtues as highly formulaic, akin to doing algorithms, and those who depart from this vantage point and instead adopt an emancipatory or liberatory approach. This article takes up the liberatory viewpoint and expands the conversation by proposing an ethnophilosophy framed under the concept of what are called epistemologies of the South (de Sousa Santos 2018). In doing so, it contributes to the existing debates about the notion of philosophical virtues.

This paper examines the epistemic value of two critical thinking strategies when employed by nonexperts to address technical and scientific questions. The first strategy, autonomous critical thinking, involves assessing arguments and evidence independently, without relying on expert authority. Previous discussions (including Huemer 2005, Grundmann 2021, and Matheson 2023) have concluded that this strategy is unreliable or, in any case, less reliable than deference to experts. Building on insights from Informal Logic, the paper argues that autonomous critical thinking has a deeper problem: it is practically unfeasible. This paves the way for developing, in the second part of the paper, a hybrid model of critical thinking that incorporates epistemic reliance on experts while maintaining a role for individual reasoning. The paper argues that this strategy is practically feasible, and proposes two conditions that the strategy must meet to be epistemically reliable.

This paper critically examines how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. Initially, it analyses the most prominent definitions and theories of deep disagreements and assesses their capacity to capture the phenomenon. It argues that although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, the paper contends that these imprecisions motivate the need for a more exhaustive meta-epistemological reflection regarding how epistemologists should go about defining and/or theorising about deep disagreements. It ends by briefly outlining the options available. We can either continue to defend a given account of deep disagreement and adapt it to address the criticism or argue that “deep disagreement” does not represent an epistemologically interesting class. A third option, the one favoured in the paper, is to defend a pluralistic conception of deep disagreements. A thorough development of pluralism, however, is left to future research.

Can we rationally choose between philosophical hinge commitments if they resist argument and evidence? At first glance, such choices seem arbitrary. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) and Coliva and Doulas (2022) argue, however, that adopting a constitutivist account of hinges allows for rational choice through what Coliva terms ‘extended rationality’. They claim that accepting the hinge ‘there are physical objects’ is constitutive of epistemic rationality. This paper challenges that view, arguing that the idealist hinge is misrepresented in their work and that this particular hinge may not ground rational belief. The paper shows that constitutivism, though promising, faces a criterion problem in philosophical hinge disagreements. It concludes that while constitutivism and extended rationality can explain belief rationality, they must be supported by independent criteria for selecting between competing hinges.

Emmanuel Levinas introduced a radical rethinking of subjectivity that challenges the foundational assumptions of Western philosophy and conventional ethics. He contends that traditional moral frameworks are rooted in egoism, privileging autonomy, self-interest, and self-actualization while marginalizing the ethical significance of the Other. Levinas reorients philosophy away from a self-centered conception of the subject toward one grounded in ethical responsibility and relationality. He argues that our responsibility toward the Other is infinite, asymmetrical, and inescapable—it is not chosen but imposed by the mere presence of the Other. Drawing on the catastrophic failures of modernity, including genocide, war, and systemic injustice, Levinas critiques the insufficiency of traditional rationalism to confront such violence. His work offers a profound shift from ontology to ethics, from being to responsibility. This article critically explores these arguments and examines their implications for rethinking ethical relations and the foundations of social and political structures.

‘Conceptual engineering’ is the new buzzword in the world of philosophical methods. Yet, on some accounts, it is hard to see what is distinctively new about it—if anything. This article tackles this hallmark problem for conceptual engineering. It starts by spelling out the requirements that result from using the engineering label through an analysis of its associated connotations. It next maps the logical space of available options to make sense of the engineering label in the context of conceptual engineering and evaluates each in turn for how it squares with these requirements. Having selected the most promising option with regard to said requirements, the article then reconstructs it by combining compatible extant accounts. Finally, it sketches on this basis a model of the engineering process for conceptual engineering as a staged and parametrized method for designing functionally improved representational devices. In this model, conceptual engineering becomes a radically novel philosophical method.

The question “What's the use of philosophy?” presupposes a practical attitude such that, whether one answers it by enumerating philosophy's benefits or by declaring outright that it has none, philosophy is expected to be a tool applicable to or removable from situations in the world. Challenging this, the present paper develops an account of an alternative view: philosophy is useless because it is not of the order of practicality. This alternative view may answer the question negatively, but infer that philosophy remains valuable, and also affirmatively, but qualify that philosophy's use is not immediate. The account offers a clarification of the essence of philosophy, which entails three interrelated insights: (1) philosophy is a way of life whereby theory and practice are intertwined, (2) philosophy is an endless search for knowledge that begins in wonder, and (3) philosophy is investigative by nature and finds its value in prioritizing questions over answers.

This article argues that Chinese Confucianism affirms the primacy of the mind (heart-mind, xin, 心) over the body while achieving mind–body integration through dynamic interpenetration. The Confucian engagement of the mind–body relationship focuses on cultivating individual equilibrium, fostering moral excellence, realizing ideal governance, and attaining social harmony. Unlike Western epistemological approaches to mind–body duality, Confucianism functions as a form of moral praxis—one that situates human beings within cosmic correspondences, interweaving somatic discipline, heart-mind refinement, and cosmological patterning. Within the Confucian framework, the central concern lies in realizing the moral ideal of the junzi (morally cultivated gentleman, 君子) or sage and achieving the vision of a harmonious society.