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Naturalizing skepticism 怀疑论的自然化
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12696
Marc Jiménez-Rolland

Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms of skepticism. To that end, it outlines some assumptions underlying many attempts to naturalize epistemology. It contrasts these approaches to traditional epistemology and identifies the reasons offered by naturalistic epistemologists to dismiss traditional skeptical challenges. Next, it argues that the problem of skepticism can be sensibly stated within a naturalistic setting. Finally, it contends that there are distinctively naturalistic strategies to argue for skepticism and diagnoses the prospects of naturalism vis-à-vis these kinds of skeptical challenges.

自然主义是一种极具影响力的观点,它被理解为哲学应与科学保持连续性。然而,它对认识论的影响却相当奇怪。许多人认为,自然主义认识论可以避开传统的怀疑论挑战。这通常被视为一种优势,但也让人质疑它是否属于对知识的哲学探究。本文认为,在自然化认识论中,怀疑论挑战可以说是对认识论乐观主义的蔑视,而且存在着独特的自然主义怀疑论形式。为此,本文概述了许多将认识论自然化的尝试所依据的一些假设。它将这些方法与传统认识论进行了对比,并指出了自然主义认识论学者提出的驳回传统怀疑论挑战的理由。接下来,它论证了怀疑论的问题可以在自然主义的背景下得到合理的阐述。最后,它认为有一些独特的自然主义策略来论证怀疑论,并诊断了自然主义面对这些怀疑论挑战的前景。
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引用次数: 0
A speculative turn in science and philosophy of science 科学和科学哲学的投机转向
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12697
Slobodan Perović, Milan Ćirković

This paper describes the main features and goals of the speculative work in modern sciences that has greatly accelerated since World War II due to the exponential increase in computing power and newly available theoretical and conceptual tools. It points to the long historical strand of speculative philosophical work in symbiosis with the sciences, suggests the reasons for its unexpected neglect in contemporary professional philosophy of science, why it should be a major approach, and why such pursuit is not inevitable. Finally, the paper outlines potential topics, fields, and tools for such collaborative work and argues it is likelier to be more fruitful today than at any point in the past hundred years.

本文描述了现代科学中推测性工作的主要特点和目标,自第二次世界大战以来,由于计算能力的指数级增长以及新出现的理论和概念工具,推测性工作的发展速度大大加快。它指出了与科学共生的推测性哲学工作的悠久历史,提出了其在当代专业科学哲学中意外被忽视的原因,为什么它应该成为一种主要方法,以及为什么这种追求并非不可避免。最后,本文概述了此类合作工作的潜在主题、领域和工具,并认为今天的合作工作可能比过去一百年中的任何时候都更富有成效。
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引用次数: 0
African philosophy cannot be a thing 非洲哲学不可能是一种东西
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12693
Idowu Odeyemi

This essay unpacks several arguments about the metaphilosophic nature of African philosophy and charts a way through the problems these arguments encounter. It argues that we must be careful in our attempt to define African philosophy conceptually. Because to define it is to limit it—and to limit it is to conserve it and lead it to a cesspool. It also argues that finding a single meaning for African philosophy is not a rich endeavour, because, just like Western philosophy, African philosophy should not be a thing but be a vast array of things. The argument, one hopes, is taken as a normative rather than a merely prescriptive enterprise.

本文解读了有关非洲哲学的形而上学性质的几个论点,并为解决这些论点所遇到的问题指明了道路。文章认为,我们在试图从概念上定义非洲哲学时必须小心谨慎。因为定义它就是限制它--而限制它就是保护它,并将它引向粪坑。它还认为,为非洲哲学寻找一个单一的含义并不是一项丰富的工作,因为就像西方哲学一样,非洲哲学不应该是一个东西,而应该是各种各样的东西。我们希望,这一论点是作为一种规范性的事业,而不仅仅是一种规定性的事业。
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引用次数: 0
Philosophy and biography 哲学和传记
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12691
Paul O'Grady

Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the approach of the text in three ways: in its socio-historical context, its philosophical context, and its personal context in the life of the philosopher. Such a strategy offers new ways of comparing very different texts and assessing them in terms of the aims of the philosopher writing them.

哲学家的传记对评估其哲学有任何意义吗?在考虑并否定了对这一问题的三种不同论述之后,本文提出了一个不同的答案。本文将哲学文本的内容与方法区分开来,认为传记在三个方面与评估文本的方法相关:社会历史背景、哲学背景以及哲学家生活中的个人背景。这种策略提供了新的方法来比较截然不同的文本,并根据哲学家的写作目的对其进行评估。
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引用次数: 0
The evolving hierarchy of naturalized philosophy: A metaphilosophical sketch 归化哲学不断演变的层次结构:形而上学素描
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12690
Luca Rivelli

Some scholars claim that epistemology of science and machine learning are actually overlapping disciplines studying induction, respectively affected by Hume's problem of induction and its formal machine-learning counterpart, the “no-free-lunch” (NFL) theorems, to which even advanced AI systems such as LLMs are not immune. Extending Kevin Korb's view, this paper envisions a hierarchy of disciplines where the lowermost is a basic science, and, recursively, the metascience at each level inductively learns which methods work best at the immediately lower level. Due to Hume's dictum and NFL theorems, no exact metanorms for the good performance of each object science can be obtained after just a finite number of levels up the hierarchy, and the progressive abstractness of each metadiscipline and consequent ill-definability of its methods and objects makes science—as defined by a minimal standard of scientificity—cease to exist above a certain metalevel, allowing for a still rational style of inquiry into science that can be called “philosophical.” Philosophical levels, transitively reflecting on science, peculiarly manifest a non–empirically learned urge to self-reflection constituting the properly normative aspect of philosophy of science.

一些学者声称,科学认识论和机器学习实际上是研究归纳法的重叠学科,分别受到休谟归纳法问题及其形式化机器学习对应理论 "无免费午餐"(NFL)定理的影响,即使是 LLM 等先进的人工智能系统也不能幸免。本文扩展了凯文-科布的观点,设想了一个学科层次结构,其中最底层是基础科学,递归地,每个层次的元科学都会归纳出哪些方法在紧接其后的低层次最有效。由于休谟的箴言和 NFL 定理,在层级上升到一定数量之后,就无法获得每门对象科学良好表现的精确元规范,而每门元学科的渐进抽象性以及随之而来的方法和对象的不可定义性,使得科学--按照科学性的最低标准来定义--在某一元层级之上就不复存在了,这使得对科学的探究有了一种仍然理性的风格,可以称之为 "哲学"。哲学层面对科学的反思,特殊地表现出一种非经验性的自我反思冲动,构成了科学哲学应有的规范性。
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引用次数: 0
The emergence of value: Human norms in a natural world By Lawrence Cahoone. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2023. 340 pp. 价值的出现:自然世界中的人类规范 LawrenceCahoone 著。奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,2023 年。340 页。
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12692
Sami Pihlström
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引用次数: 0
On the philosophical proofs of absolute death by schizophrenia 关于精神分裂症绝对死亡的哲学证明
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12689
Kuo Li, 李阔

This paper begins by elucidating two common features in the application from spirit to the material world of objective idealism: first, all main representatives take the Absolute as the way to think about the inner negative foundation of spirit and, second, the Absolute has a self-negation processual structure, which exits itself and then returns to itself. The paper points out that the exit-return model can explain the objective world very well and meanwhile maintain the integrity of the spiritual ontology, in which the return to the Absolute is crucial. After the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and two world wars, however, followed by the development of irrational thinking, positivism, and practical philosophy, the Absolute ceased to be the foundation of spiritual functioning. The return to the Absolute points to emptiness, and exit without return creates persistent schizophrenia, while subverting the ontological foundation of concepts and language, objects and humankind.

本文首先阐明了客观唯心主义从精神到物质世界的应用中的两个共同特点:第一,所有主要代表人物都把绝对性作为思考精神内在否定基础的方式;第二,绝对性具有自我否定的过程性结构,它退出自身,然后又返回自身。本文指出,退出-回归模式可以很好地解释客观世界,同时保持精神本体论的完整性,而在精神本体论中,回归绝对是至关重要的。然而,在科学革命、启蒙运动和两次世界大战之后,随着非理性思维、实证主义和实用哲学的发展,绝对不再是精神运作的基础。回归绝对指向空虚,而没有回归的退出则会造成持续的精神分裂,同时颠覆概念和语言、对象和人类的本体论基础。
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引用次数: 0
Amartya Sen's social justice 阿马蒂亚-森的社会正义
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12671
Jane Duran

This paper uses lines of argument drawn from Amartya Sen's Idea of Justice to support the notion that NGO efforts, far from being oppressive, are helpful and progressive. It cites the work of Lairap-Fonderson and Chen, and alludes to specific projects. Contrast is made with Rawls, and the paper suggests that more formal theories of justice may not enable us to grapple with our intuitive sense that justice for the poverty stricken involves, at a minimum, both financial progress and forward movement with respect to internal growth. Examples of work done by NGOs in Bangladesh and other places help us to realize that women in these areas often have their own sense of what a more just situation would require—and NGOs and others can work from these conceptions as a point of departure. Part of the conclusion here is that Sen's concept of the just is a step in the right direction.

本文从阿马蒂亚-森的 "正义观 "出发,论证了非政府组织的工作非但不是压迫性的,反而是有益的、进步的。本文引用了 Lairap-Fonderson 和 Chen 的著作,并提到了一些具体项目。本文与罗尔斯进行了对比,并指出,更正式的正义理论可能无法让我们解决我们的直觉问题,即贫困人口的正义至少包括经济进步和内部增长方面的进步。非政府组织在孟加拉和其他地方所做工作的实例帮助我们认识到,这些地区的妇女往往对更公正的状况有自己的理解,非政府组织和其他组织可以从这些理念出发开展工作。这里的部分结论是,森的公正概念是朝着正确方向迈出的一步。
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引用次数: 0
The testimony challenge against the possibility of philosophical knowledge 证言对哲学知识可能性的挑战
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12683
Octavio García

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self-defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges.

我们最珍视的大多数信念都是通过见证获得的。哲学也不例外。我们将口头和书面的哲学证词视为哲学主张的证据。然而,本文认为哲学证言无法证明哲学信仰的正确性。如果证言是我们证明哲学信仰的唯一证据,这就意味着我们对哲学持怀疑态度。我们称之为 "证言挑战"。首先,本文认为哲学证言不符合证据能够证明我们的信念的条件。其次,它表明哲学证言不能像科学和数学那样提供先发制人的认识论理由。最后,本文回答了自相矛盾的反对意见和一系列旨在阻止哲学证言不能证明哲学信仰的论点的反对意见。本文旨在重新思考哲学证言在哲学中的作用,并强化方法论和分歧挑战所引发的怀疑忧虑。
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引用次数: 0
Philosophy of education: Thinking and learning through history and practice By John Ryder. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022. Pp. x + 275 教育哲学:通过历史和实践思考与学习 JohnRyder 著。Lanham:罗曼与利特菲尔德出版社,2022 年。页码 x + 275
IF 0.4 3区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12682
Avi I. Mintz
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引用次数: 0
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METAPHILOSOPHY
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