METAPHILOSOPHY最新文献

This paper aims to answer several epistemological questions raised by the use of computers in mathematical practice; for this purpose, it uses the template for a conceptual engineering project proposed in Isaac, Koch, and Nedft 2022. Some interesting theoretical questions raised by this change in the methodology of mathematics are whether proofs continue to be accessible to human mathematicians, whether computers are reliable and therefore should be trusted by mathematicians, and whether proof is still an a priori methodology even though the use of computers is essential for some of them. The paper begins by introducing the project, which is to assess the “functionality” of the notion of proof and apriority in relation to the novelty that the use of computers in proof has brought to mathematical practice. The paper suggests that there has been a development of the methodology that conveys an “improvement of the functionality” and enforces reasons to adopt a certain notion of apriority.

Conceptual engineering has emerged in recent times as a significant topic in current philosophical literature. The now vast list of references includes works on more general or conceptual issues, such as describing the nature of conceptual engineering, how we may respond to the different objections to it, how it is related to philosophical analysis or empirical philosophy, or toward which target conceptual engineering should be directed, among others. But research on the topic also includes applications of conceptual engineering to many different areas. This Introduction opens with a short overview of the state of the art on conceptual engineering, aiming to clarify the most important features associated with it. The Introduction moves on to introduce and discuss the eight articles collected here, whose topics range from the nature and the functionality of conceptual engineering to reconstructing the entire conceptual engineering practice. Taken as a whole, this special issue is meant to provide enlightening, informative, and thought-provoking views on the topic, its functions, targets, and challenges.

A central issue in conceptual engineering is the “implementation challenge”: the problem of how—or whether—conceptual revisions can be brought about, given our lack of control over the factors that determine meaning. Social externalism, which holds that semantic meaning is determined by the usage of experts within a linguistic community, seems to offer a path to controlled implementation. This paper argues that this route encounters serious obstacles in politically and socially significant cases. Drawing on Ball's (2020) distinction between Power Metasemantics and Virtue Metasemantics, the paper presents challenges for both perspectives. Power Metasemantics makes it very difficult for marginalized groups to bring about meaning change, as it is sensitive to how structural inequalities affect distributions of credibility and authority—though implementation remains possible. Virtue Metasemantics, on the other hand, faces epistemic and structural problems that may lend support to Cappelen's (2018) skepticism about implementation.

Conceptual engineering projects have been targeted by what is known as the “implementation challenge,” which calls for an account of how it is possible to change meanings, given that we have no control over the complex ways in which meaning supervenes (for example) on patterns of use. In the first part of this paper, this supervenience-based formulation of the challenge is questioned, and a new formulation is proposed, which strives to be as metasemantically neutral as possible. The new challenge is called “the uptake challenge,” and its theoretical advantages are defended over those of the supervenience-based version. In the second part of the paper, a response to the uptake challenge is outlined. This involves reflecting on the notion of control, especially on aspects that pertain to its gradability and relativity to an agent's goals. The aim is to put into proper perspective, and ultimately question, the threat posed by (this version of) the implementation challenge.

According to many so-called anti-representationalists, once one gives up on the idea that language functions by standing in genuine semantic relations to bits of the world, many of the traditional projects of metaphysics lapse (see, e.g., Price 2004). Amie Thomasson also subscribes to anti-representationalism but has her own take on metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics is certainly suspect, but many questions of ontology can be resolved by what Thomasson calls the “easy” approach, which sees questions about existence as following from the understanding of our own language plus relevant empirical input. Thomasson argues further that we should construe what appear to remain contentious metaphysical issues not as concerning inquiries into hidden truths but as instead veiled “metalinguistic negotiations” (Plunkett and Sundell 2013) with pragmatic aims in mind. The present paper takes the view that this line threatens to render philosophy largely irrelevant to culture: to reduce the philosopher to a kind of political activist. But nor, it argues, is Thomasson's way of holding open the door for contentious metaphysical debate the only one for anti-representationalists.

Can you change sex? Can you change the meaning of the concept “sex”? Does changing “sex” make changing sex possible? Would changing “sex” to make changing sex not only possible but also easy be a good thing? Might it, as some argue, help us bring about a new way of thinking and of acting that liberates us from the logic of heteronormativity and colonialism? This paper takes the coincidence of socio-cultural and theoretical interest in what are sometimes called “trans rights” as an invitation to reflect on what is involved in “re-engineering” concepts in general, and to inquire if the change to the episteme represented by a revision of the concept “sex” is progressive in the way envisaged by those who advocate for it.

Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp (2020) have recently challenged the traditional conceptual engineering project. They defend a reorientation of this project that moves away from correcting conceptual shortcomings and emphasizes conceptual innovation instead. Central to their proposal is the role played by etiological functions. The present paper argues that this approach leaves them without a specific mechanism for conceptual innovation. It then proposes one such mechanism, which operates independently of functions, by identifying the crucial role of conceptual refinement. After developing the refinement-based approach, it illustrates how this approach works by considering instances of refined conceptual change from mathematics and logic as well as the sciences, and argues that the approach avoids the challenges faced by the function-based view.

This paper argues that for reasons of epistemic justice and academic rigour alike, methodologies will benefit from allowing themselves to remain open to the unexpected. A well-documented reason for this is the fact of our capacity for understanding stretching only to verisimilitude rather than to omniscience: we cannot anticipate all relevant questions even about an existing, unfamiliar state of affairs, as initially surprising questions may come into view as our process of familiarisation unfolds. Frequently overlooked, an additional dynamic requires accommodation once the issue is considered from within a participationalist paradigm: we cannot anticipate all that we may be involved in co-creating. These points are argued first and foremost from the work of contemporary Indigenous philosophers. Aspects of contemporary Western science and philosophy are presented as initial aids to Western familiarisation with these, subsequently to be left behind in favour of engagement with Indigenous paradigms on their own terms.

What values and goals should guide conceptual engineering projects? In this paper, we propose that insights from responsible design, specifically Value Sensitive Design (VSD), can enrich current approaches to conceptual ethics. Philosophers of technology have long employed VSD as a structured way to create technologies that address real-world problems while accommodating stakeholder values. Meanwhile, conceptual engineers have focused on how best to revise, introduce, or eliminate concepts in response to theoretical or practical needs. By bringing these two literatures together, this paper offers a systematic, empirically informed way to assess and design concepts. The approach uses VSD-inspired methods to identify and weigh stakeholder values, goals, and concerns. To illustrate how this works in practice, the paper examines the technologically disrupted concept “colleague.” When advanced technologies, like robots or chatbots, begin performing roles similar to those of human workers, can they be considered colleagues?

This paper argues that the methods for distinguishing right actions from wrong actions presented in the moral philosophies of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill converge to a remarkable degree. Kant, like Mill, classifies moral actions as those leading to the greatest happiness, for he thinks moral actions approximate (to the extent circumstances are under an agent's control) the kingdom of ends, which is the state of the greatest possible happiness. Meanwhile, Mill tells us to always pursue the greatest possible happiness; accordingly, the principle justifying any particular action that Mill would recommend in particular circumstances will always be universalizable according to Version 1 of Kant's Categorical Imperative.