Latin American Politics and Society最新文献

Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral support to specific politicians, who in return shield their operations by influencing bureaucratic appointments and law enforcement priorities. Using original geospatial and electoral data, we show that milícia entry into a new area increases electoral concentration and disproportionately benefits milícia-aligned candidates in adjacent territories. We further demonstrate that this electoral capital is converted into political power through key bureaucratic appointments that facilitate further expansion and institutional impunity. Our findings support a theoretical framework in which elections reinforce, rather than constrain, criminal governance in democratic settings.

This article explores the underlying causes of vigilantism, moving beyond existing explanations to propose a novel perspective: state absenteeism. Drawing upon an original dataset collected at the subnational level in Guatemala, the study utilizes police station data as a proxy measure of state presence. This research article sheds light on the intricate dynamics driving vigilantism by analyzing the interplay between state actions, security provision, and the emergence of extralegal justice mechanisms. Empirical findings suggest that existing theories do not fully explain the surge in vigilantism, underscoring the importance of considering state provision of security at the subnational level. This theoretical and empirical contribution highlights the role of uneven state presence in shaping responses to insecurity and calls for more equitable and locally responsive security provision to address the root causes of extralegal justice.

The transition to democracy in Chile, which took place under the rules established in the authoritarian constitution, led political parties and voters to align along an authoritarian/democratic divide. In the campaign for the constitutional plebiscite in 2022, some of those in favor of a new constitution linked their position to democratic values and labeled those opposed to the new draft as lacking democratic values. Many of those opposed to the new constitution purposely distanced themselves from the authoritarian legacy. We rely on a pre-electoral poll to explore democratic values in the vote choice in the plebiscite. When factoring for economic perceptions, ideological identification, and sociodemographic traits, while holding authoritarian values was positively associated with voting Reject, expressing democratic values had a weak association with voting Approve. The authoritarian/democratic divide in the party system in the early 1990s was not a relevant determinant of vote choice in the 2022 plebiscite.

This study introduces a novel approach to measuring the evolution of union power in Latin America. Using an original dataset covering ten dimensions of union activity across 17 countries from 1990 to 2020, it addresses shortcomings in prior research based on overly broad indicators or narrow case studies. In line with the specialized literature, factor analysis identifies four distinct dimensions of union power—associational, structural, institutional, and societal—each showing unique variation across countries. Hierarchical cluster analysis reveals four ideal types: (1) strongly embedded unionism, with robust associational and institutional strength (Argentina, Uruguay); (2) social movement unionism, marked by strong societal alliances but limited institutional access (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador); (3) bureaucratic and isolated unionism, with institutional integration but weak societal mobilization (Brazil, Chile, Mexico); and (4) low-intensity unionism, prevalent in Central America. Correlation analyses reveal complex interactions among these dimensions. The study provides new empirical and conceptual tools to advance comparative research on labor movements in the region.

The traditional narrative of Europe’s first wave of democratization is that elites extended the franchise in response to revolutionary threats and reformed majoritarian electoral systems to limit rising working-class parties. This stylized account does not fit early twentieth-century South America, where democratization was driven by internal competition within incumbent parties, without strong working-class parties to contain. I study Argentina’s 1912 electoral reform that introduced elements of democracy (secret and compulsory voting) and simultaneously changed the electoral system from multi-member plurality to the limited vote. To study the motivations behind the electoral system change component of the reform package, I analyze expert surveys, legislative debates, and a 1911 public opinion poll. Granting representation to political minorities was regarded not as an electoral containment strategy to benefit incumbents, but a progressive measure to make opposition parties more competitive. An analysis of roll-call votes shows that legislators who supported the reform were those expecting to not be adversely affected.

The enforcement of labor informality is subject to electoral motivations, and political parties on the left and right have different incentives to do so. While leftist governments are more lenient not to harm their informal electorate, right-wing incumbents face an electoral dilemma: the part of its constituency that benefits from informal work is in favor of a permissive attitude, but another section demands a tough hand to deal with the unfair competition that informal work represents. Taking Chile as a case study and drawing on panel data on labor inspections, this article explores the electoral drivers behind enforcement. Our estimations, robust to fixed-effect and panel event-study approach, reveal that the left does not forbear, but the right carries out selective enforcement, concentrating inspections in competitive districts and accelerating the pace of control as presidential polls approach. The article concludes with policy recommendations to limit the electoral bias.

The article examines the patterns of turnover of Latin American legislators. It contributes (1) by introducing a large original dataset of turnover rates in 204 elections between 1985 and 2023 based on manually coded lists of all Latin American legislators elected since 1985, (2) by describing the cross-national and temporal patterns of turnover in Latin America, and (3) by examining empirically the relationship between turnover rates and temporal institutional arrangements designed to regulate the time horizons of legislators. The data reveals that turnover rates in Latin America are extremely high on average (around 70%) compared to democracies in other regions, although with significant variation. Institutional determinants governing time horizons of politicians are associated with turnover, with term limits, the presence of staggered elections and term length being positively associated with elevated turnover rates.

The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, and the demobilization of the latter, dismantled the governance structures in regions formerly under rebel control. Drawing from a relational security framework, this article explores how, across three case-studies, communities use their former experience of rebel governance as a framework through which they could express expectations and dissatisfaction with new types of order. This blueprint is also used to make specific demands to new or reconstituted armed groups and to take direct action to address governance gaps, reproducing and co-constructing order post-demobilization. However, we observe that both the organization of the community and the capacity and ideology of armed groups could also be limiting factors to the community’s reproduction of order post-demobilization. From a peacebuilding perspective, this means that there can be pressure from below in favor of remobilization, as a predictable insurgent order may be preferable to uncertainty.