Latin American Politics and Society最新文献

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Partisan Stereotyping and Polarization in Brazil 巴西的党派成见与两极分化

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.38

David Samuels, Fernando Mello, Cesar Zucco

In recent decades, Brazilian voters have grown polarized between supporters of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), known as petistas, and its opponents, known as antipetistas. What explains this animosity? One potential source of polarization is partisan stereotyping, a tendency for partisans to misperceive the social composition of both their own side’s bases of support as well as their opponents’. We show that most Brazilians overestimate the extent to which petistas and antipetistas belong to party-stereotypical groups such as Afro-Brazilians, evangelical Christians, or poor or rich people. We then show that stereotyping is associated with polarization: the greater the bias in perceived partisan group composition, the greater the perceptions of partisan political extremism and feelings of social distance toward the partisan out-group.

近几十年来，巴西选民在工人党(Partido dos Trabalhadores)和反工人党(antipetistas)的支持者和反对者之间出现了两极分化。如何解释这种敌意?两极分化的一个潜在来源是党派刻板印象，即党派倾向于误解自己和对手的支持基础的社会构成。我们的研究表明，大多数巴西人都高估了“亲民者”和“反亲民者”属于党派刻板印象群体的程度，比如非裔巴西人、福音派基督徒、穷人或富人。然后，我们发现刻板印象与两极分化有关:对党派群体构成的偏见越大，对党派政治极端主义的看法越大，对党派外群体的社会距离感也越大。

引用次数: 0

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018 总统部分否决与行政立法谈判：智利，1990-2018 年

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.33

Jorge Belmar Soto, Patricio Navia, Rodrigo Osorio

Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargaining process. After a discussion of whether partial vetoes are a proactive legislative tool or a bargaining tool to induce executive–legislative cooperation, we test four hypotheses using the 2,346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage. We identified 97 partial vetoes (4.2 percent) and one total veto. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more complex legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one chamber, but more popular presidents do not veto more bills. As most presidential vetoes in Chile are partial, they are an additional executive–legislative bargaining step in the lawmaking process rather than evidence of hyperpresidentialism.

总统否决权被定义为一种可信的威胁，可以加强行政部门的谈判地位，但广泛未得到充分研究，它带有国家权力之间对抗的污名。但在一些机构设置下，部分否决可能是行政-立法谈判过程中的一个额外步骤。在讨论了部分否决是一种积极的立法工具还是一种诱导行政-立法合作的讨价还价工具之后，我们使用1990年至2018年期间在智利提出的2346项法案来检验四种假设。我们确定了97个部分否决(4.2%)和一个完全否决。总统更有可能否决具有更复杂立法程序的法案，如果他们在至少一个议院中获得更强大的支持，但更受欢迎的总统不会否决更多的法案。由于智利的大多数总统否决权都是部分的，它们是立法过程中额外的行政立法谈判步骤，而不是超级总统主义的证据。

引用次数: 0

The Bureaucratic Politics of Urban Land Rights: (Non)Programmatic Distribution in São Paulo’s Land Regularization Policy 城市土地权利的官僚政治:圣保罗土地正规化政策中的(非)规划分配

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-12-04 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.35

Marcela Alonso Ferreira

How do bureaucrats implement public policy when faced with political intermediation? This article examines this issue in the distribution of land rights to informal settlements in the municipality of São Paulo, Brazil. Land regularization is a policy established over three decades, where politicians’ requests for land titles to their constituencies play a relevant role. Based on interviews and documents, this study finds that bureaucrats adopt a twofold approach to regulate distribution: they document informal settlements, enacting eligibility criteria; then, they manage and prioritize beneficiaries, accommodating qualifying political demands. In this process, they enforce eligibility rules consistently across cases, constraining political intermediation to a rational scheme. Therefore, bureaucrats reconcile nonprogrammatic politics and policy rules by separating eligibility assessment from beneficiary selection. This paper bridges urban distributive politics and street-level bureaucracy literature by revealing that policy implementers may use technical expertise to curb political influence and negotiate conflicting interests and constraints.

面对政治中介，官僚如何执行公共政策?本文考察了巴西圣保罗市非正规住区土地权利分配中的这一问题。土地正规化是一项建立了30多年的政策，其中政治家对其选区土地所有权的要求发挥了相关作用。基于访谈和文献资料，本研究发现，官僚们采用了双重方法来规范分配:他们记录非正式住区，制定资格标准;然后，他们管理和优先考虑受益人，满足合格的政治要求。在这个过程中，他们在各个案件中一致地执行资格规则，将政治调解限制在一个合理的方案中。因此，官僚们通过将资格评估与受益人选择分开来协调非规划政治和政策规则。本文通过揭示政策执行者可能使用技术专长来抑制政治影响并协商冲突的利益和约束，将城市分配政治和街头官僚主义文献联系起来。

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引用次数: 0

Who Gets Credit? Citizen Responses to Local Public Goods 谁有功劳?市民对地方公共物品的反应

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.25

Katherine McKiernan

In decentralized systems, citizens struggle to identify which level of government provides local goods. This problem is particularly salient in weakly institutionalized party environments, where politicians at different levels of government are less likely to benefit from partisan coattail effects. This article asks how citizens attribute credit for local public goods. I argue that citizens have a strong tendency to attribute credit to local politicians. As a result, citizens will respond differently to credit-claiming behavior by local and national politicians. Local politicians experience a ceiling effect, in which credit claiming has no effect on how citizens attribute credit. However, national politicians have no such ceiling and can claim credit to increase the likelihood that citizens will attribute credit to them. As a result, both political actors can receive credit for the same local goods. The article tests and supports these theoretical predictions using a vignette survey experiment in Colombia.

在分权体制中，公民很难确定哪一级政府提供本地产品。这个问题在制度化程度较弱的政党环境中尤为突出，在这种环境中，各级政府的政治家不太可能从党派连带效应中受益。这篇文章探讨了公民如何为地方公共产品赋予信用。我认为，市民有一种强烈的倾向，把功劳归功于当地的政治家。因此，公民对地方和国家政客的信用索取行为会有不同的反应。地方政客经历了一种天花板效应，即信用申请对公民如何评价信用没有影响。然而，国家政治家没有这样的上限，他们可以声称自己的功劳，以增加公民将功劳归于他们的可能性。因此，两个政治角色都可以从同样的当地商品中获得信用。文章测试和支持这些理论预测使用小插曲调查实验在哥伦比亚。

引用次数: 0

Los nadies y las nadies: The Effect of Peacebuilding on Political Behavior in Colombia 失去的女人和失去的女人:建设和平对哥伦比亚政治行为的影响

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.34

Juan David Gelvez, Marcus Johnson

How do peacebuilding institutions affect political behavior? This article studies the historic victory of the Colombian left in the 2022 presidential elections in light of the implementation of local peacebuilding programs through the 2016 Peace Accords. Using a quasi-experimental design, we show that the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET), a central component of the 2016 Peace Accords between the government and the FARC, increased the vote share for the leftist coalition, Pacto Histórico, in the 2022 elections by increasing voter turnout in PDET regions. In a departure from existing literature, we find that the explanatory effect of violence on vote share is significantly reduced when we include an indicator for PDET implementation and additional covariates. While there is a substantial body of work examining the effects of conflict violence and the presence of armed actors on elections, there has been relatively little focus on how the peacebuilding has affected vote choice and political behavior. We see our project as a bridge to fill this gap in the literature.

建设和平机构如何影响政治行为?本文研究了哥伦比亚左翼在2022年总统选举中取得的历史性胜利，并通过2016年和平协定实施了地方建设和平方案。使用准实验设计，我们表明，2016年政府与哥伦比亚革命武装力量之间的和平协定的核心组成部分——以领土为重点的发展计划(PDET)，通过增加PDET地区的选民投票率，在2022年的选举中增加了左翼联盟Pacto Histórico的选票份额。与现有文献不同，我们发现当我们纳入PDET实施指标和其他协变量时，暴力对投票份额的解释作用显着降低。虽然有大量工作审查冲突暴力和武装行为者的存在对选举的影响，但对建设和平如何影响投票选择和政治行为的关注相对较少。我们认为我们的项目是填补这一文献空白的桥梁。

引用次数: 0

LAP volume 65 issue 4 Cover and Front matter LAP 第 65 卷第 4 期封面和封底

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.26

引用次数: 0

The Losing Battle Against Neoliberal Trade Agreements in Latin America: Social Resistance Against the MTA Between Ecuador, Peru, and the European Union 拉丁美洲反对新自由主义贸易协定的失败之战：厄瓜多尔、秘鲁和欧盟对MTA的社会抵抗

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.32

Manuel Preusser

This article studies the influence of the antineoliberal social movements in Peru and Ecuador in the face of the Multiparty Trade Agreement (MTA) between both countries and the European Union (EU). To identify and analyze this influence, a transdisciplinary theoretical framework was created, integrating debates and concepts from social movement theory and critical international political economy. In Peru, the movement used European allies to establish their demands on the EU’s agenda, which resulted in increased pressure on the government to enforce labor rights and environmental standards. In Ecuador, the movement was able to establish food sovereignty and the rejection of free trade in the national constitution. As a result, the negotiations with the EU were delayed and Ecuador achieved certain exceptions in its adhesion protocol. Nevertheless, both movements were unable to maintain their influence, due to political and socioeconomic dynamics on the domestic and global levels.

本文研究了在秘鲁和厄瓜多尔与欧盟签订的《多方贸易协定》（MTA）面前，秘鲁和厄瓜多尔反自由社会运动的影响。为了识别和分析这种影响，建立了一个跨学科的理论框架，整合了社会运动理论和批判性国际政治经济学的辩论和概念。在秘鲁，该运动利用欧洲盟友确立了他们对欧盟议程的要求，这导致政府在执行劳工权利和环境标准方面面临更大的压力。在厄瓜多尔，该运动确立了粮食主权，并在国家宪法中拒绝自由贸易。因此，与欧盟的谈判被推迟，厄瓜多尔在其加入议定书中实现了某些例外。然而，由于国内和全球层面的政治和社会经济动态，这两个运动都无法保持其影响力。

引用次数: 0

The National Legislatures in the Enlargement of Mercosur: Paraguay’s Acceptance of Venezuela and Bolivia 南方共同市场扩大中的国家立法机构：巴拉圭接受委内瑞拉和玻利维亚

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.23

André Leite Araujo

Regional integration blocs are subject to the admission of new members, which must be approved by domestic institutions. This article analyzes how the incorporation of Venezuela and Bolivia into Mercosur passed in the Paraguayan Congress. While the first case lasted from 2007 to 2013, demonstrating parliamentary opposition, the second episode took place between 2015 and 2016, suggesting convergence between the executive and legislative branches on the issue. Using process tracing, the unveiled mechanism shows how government and opposition forces act to alter the duration of the bill in Congress and that political parties have a pendular behavior according to political cleavages. Moreover, the findings of this study suggest the existence of a parliamentary veto power in foreign affairs and the importance of having homogeneous coalitions to achieve faster approvals.

区域一体化集团必须接纳新成员，这必须得到国内机构的批准。本文分析了巴拉圭国会如何通过委内瑞拉和玻利维亚加入南方共同市场。虽然第一起案件从2007年持续到2013年，表明议会反对，但第二起案件发生在2015年至2016年之间，表明行政和立法部门在这个问题上存在分歧。通过过程追踪，公布的机制显示了政府和反对派力量如何改变法案在国会的持续时间，以及政党根据政治分歧有着摇摆不定的行为。此外，这项研究的结果表明，议会在外交事务中存在否决权，以及建立同质联盟以更快获得批准的重要性。

引用次数: 0

LAP volume 65 issue 4 Cover and Back matter LAP 第 65 卷第 4 期封面和封底资料

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.27

引用次数: 0

Surges vs. Waves: Presidents, Popularity, and the Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America 浪潮与浪潮：拉丁美洲总统、民众和有条件现金转移的扩散

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Latin American Politics and Society

Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1017/lap.2023.30

Diego Vega

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are a striking case of policy diffusion in Latin America. Almost all countries in the region adopted the model within one decade. While most theories of diffusion focus on the international transference of ideas, this article explains that surge of adoptions by analyzing presidents’ expectations. Out of all ideas transmitted into a country, only a few find their way into enactment and implementation, and the executive has a key role in selecting which ones. Policies expected to boost presidents’ popularity grab their attention. They rapidly enact and implement these models. A process-tracing analysis comparing CCTs and public-private partnerships (PPPs) shows that presidents fast-tracked CCTs hoping for an increase in popular support. Adoptions of PPPs, however, followed normal procedures and careful deliberations because the policy was not expected to quickly affect popularity—which, in the aggregate, leads to a slower diffusion wave.

有条件现金转移（CCTs）是拉丁美洲政策扩散的一个引人注目的案例。该地区几乎所有国家都在十年内采用了这一模式。虽然大多数扩散理论都关注思想的国际转移，但本文通过分析总统的期望来解释收养人数的激增。在传播到一个国家的所有想法中，只有少数能够付诸实施，而行政部门在选择哪些想法方面发挥着关键作用。旨在提高总统声望的政策吸引了他们的注意力。他们迅速制定并实施这些模式。一项比较CCTs和公私伙伴关系（PPP）的过程跟踪分析显示，总统们快速跟踪CCTs，希望增加民众支持。然而，购买力平价的采用遵循了正常的程序和仔细的审议，因为该政策预计不会迅速影响受欢迎程度——总的来说，这会导致传播浪潮放缓。

引用次数: 0

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