Pub Date : 2023-04-18DOI: 10.1177/01914537231170418
Runya Qiaoan
Scholarship on Chinese civil society suffers from a weak theorization of the concept, in which civil society is generally defined as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that exists in the third sector. This article examines the dimension between state and society known as ‘civil sphere’, a concept that is broader and more mysterious than the conventional notion of ‘civil society’. Civil sphere can be understood as a discursive structure that defines what is civil and what is uncivil in a society. Taking the Chinese intellectual debate between the New Lefts and the Liberals as an example, this article shows that in a society that is rapidly changing, the existence of such a public sphere represents a vital source of individual freedom. Even though the civil sphere in China has been contracting lately, there are still intellectual debates on fundamental ideological issues that merit academic attention.
{"title":"From Chinese civil society to Chinese civil sphere: A conceptual reconfiguration of the space between state and society that facilitates intellectual debates","authors":"Runya Qiaoan","doi":"10.1177/01914537231170418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231170418","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarship on Chinese civil society suffers from a weak theorization of the concept, in which civil society is generally defined as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that exists in the third sector. This article examines the dimension between state and society known as ‘civil sphere’, a concept that is broader and more mysterious than the conventional notion of ‘civil society’. Civil sphere can be understood as a discursive structure that defines what is civil and what is uncivil in a society. Taking the Chinese intellectual debate between the New Lefts and the Liberals as an example, this article shows that in a society that is rapidly changing, the existence of such a public sphere represents a vital source of individual freedom. Even though the civil sphere in China has been contracting lately, there are still intellectual debates on fundamental ideological issues that merit academic attention.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"568 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45450128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-13DOI: 10.1177/01914537231170415
M. Calloni
What do we mean when affirming ‘the powerful return of the state’? Do we have in mind the jus ad bellum employed by aggressive states, or are we thinking of the duties that a state has towards its citizens? Starting from these questions, this article aims to reconceptualize the issue of the political legitimacy of a state by reconsidering the relationship between power and violence. Among other forms of emergencies and violence, then, a legitimate state needs to be capable of responding to gender-based (sexual and domestic) violence. To reinforce my suggestion, I will reinterpret some Greek and Roman myths related to the founding of cities (Thebes, Athens and Rome). Through these myths, we will be able to illustrate, in particular, the necessity for a state to be capable of combating both public and private violence, reframing the notion of nemesis (as a fate that can be changed by descendants) and fear (as a status that can be stopped in the present).
{"title":"Legitimizing political power from below. A reinterpretation of the founding myths of Thebes, Athens, and Rome as a critique against private and public violence","authors":"M. Calloni","doi":"10.1177/01914537231170415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231170415","url":null,"abstract":"What do we mean when affirming ‘the powerful return of the state’? Do we have in mind the jus ad bellum employed by aggressive states, or are we thinking of the duties that a state has towards its citizens? Starting from these questions, this article aims to reconceptualize the issue of the political legitimacy of a state by reconsidering the relationship between power and violence. Among other forms of emergencies and violence, then, a legitimate state needs to be capable of responding to gender-based (sexual and domestic) violence. To reinforce my suggestion, I will reinterpret some Greek and Roman myths related to the founding of cities (Thebes, Athens and Rome). Through these myths, we will be able to illustrate, in particular, the necessity for a state to be capable of combating both public and private violence, reframing the notion of nemesis (as a fate that can be changed by descendants) and fear (as a status that can be stopped in the present).","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"581 - 598"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47879673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1177/01914537231166868
G. Amato
In principle, it should be for the Courts, which are not majoritarian institutions, to stand for the rights, even more for the new rights, that are minoritarian by definition. How far can the Courts safely go, when the recognition of such rights raises intense divergencies of opinion, confrontations between different collective identities, that populist movements can support and amplify? When should they leave the decision to the parliaments, which represent the will and the opinions of the citizens?
{"title":"Defending rights. Between parliaments and courts","authors":"G. Amato","doi":"10.1177/01914537231166868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231166868","url":null,"abstract":"In principle, it should be for the Courts, which are not majoritarian institutions, to stand for the rights, even more for the new rights, that are minoritarian by definition. How far can the Courts safely go, when the recognition of such rights raises intense divergencies of opinion, confrontations between different collective identities, that populist movements can support and amplify? When should they leave the decision to the parliaments, which represent the will and the opinions of the citizens?","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"533 - 537"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46401132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.1177/01914537231164186
Mengmeng Cui, Daniele Brombal
Standing in front of perhaps the most crucial decade of the future to come, when mankind has just experienced three years of global pandemic, a raging war, extreme climate events and mass extinction of animals and plants, we have arrived at a crossroads. Decisions must be made on whether we charge at full speed to explore alternative social-ecological systems that lead to human well-being and regeneration of nature; or continue down a pathway built on resource extraction, unsustainable and unethical urbanization and destruction of nature and lives. Recently, as countries seek to recover from the pandemic, many are contemplating large-scale infrastructure schemes and projects, which have been tried and proven means to drive extraction-based economic growth. This highlights the importance of environmental justice and resistance – an area from which voices are not often heard loud enough, yet offers fertile ground where radical, sustainable alternatives may emerge among people and communities that refuse to comply with the unjust development imposed on them. Our work seeks to contribute to research studying the potential of such phenomena, by designing a framework to capture key organizational, political and ethical features that make resistance a transformative practice. The outcome of this effort is a Resistance-Based Transformative Alternative (ReBasTA) Framework, which can be employed to inform both desktop-based data collection and analysis on resistance practices, as well as in-depth field research on deep drivers and leverage points for transformation. Moreover, the framework makes longitude study of transformative practice possible, by using a consistent set of criteria. This paper introduces the conceptual and methodological approach underlying our framework and the collaborative process employed in designing it and its key criteria. In the final section, we also discuss possible applications, with particular reference to resistance movements triggered by large-scale infrastructures.
{"title":"From resistance to transformation – The journey to develop a framework to explore the transformative potential of environmental resistance practices","authors":"Mengmeng Cui, Daniele Brombal","doi":"10.1177/01914537231164186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231164186","url":null,"abstract":"Standing in front of perhaps the most crucial decade of the future to come, when mankind has just experienced three years of global pandemic, a raging war, extreme climate events and mass extinction of animals and plants, we have arrived at a crossroads. Decisions must be made on whether we charge at full speed to explore alternative social-ecological systems that lead to human well-being and regeneration of nature; or continue down a pathway built on resource extraction, unsustainable and unethical urbanization and destruction of nature and lives. Recently, as countries seek to recover from the pandemic, many are contemplating large-scale infrastructure schemes and projects, which have been tried and proven means to drive extraction-based economic growth. This highlights the importance of environmental justice and resistance – an area from which voices are not often heard loud enough, yet offers fertile ground where radical, sustainable alternatives may emerge among people and communities that refuse to comply with the unjust development imposed on them. Our work seeks to contribute to research studying the potential of such phenomena, by designing a framework to capture key organizational, political and ethical features that make resistance a transformative practice. The outcome of this effort is a Resistance-Based Transformative Alternative (ReBasTA) Framework, which can be employed to inform both desktop-based data collection and analysis on resistance practices, as well as in-depth field research on deep drivers and leverage points for transformation. Moreover, the framework makes longitude study of transformative practice possible, by using a consistent set of criteria. This paper introduces the conceptual and methodological approach underlying our framework and the collaborative process employed in designing it and its key criteria. In the final section, we also discuss possible applications, with particular reference to resistance movements triggered by large-scale infrastructures.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"599 - 620"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48132746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-21DOI: 10.1177/01914537231164626
S. Cristiano
Confronted by answering a complex question such as ‘What are the Limit(s) of Compromise?’ when ‘unpacking State-Society Relations in the Urban Space’, some problematising thoughts are offered to further elaborate urban studies by resorting to systems thinking and its leverage points concept. Both social and ecological issues are addressed, and specific references to Venice, Italy, are offered, including recent grassroot experiences. The dissertation includes some epistemological dilemmas and some initial projections to start to measure ourselves with a new epoch, able to interact with all of the above: social, ecological, urban, and power/governance dimensions.
{"title":"“Unpacking state-society relations in the urban space: What are the Limit(s) of compromise?”. The dilemma about answering such a question and some recent Venetian experiences","authors":"S. Cristiano","doi":"10.1177/01914537231164626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231164626","url":null,"abstract":"Confronted by answering a complex question such as ‘What are the Limit(s) of Compromise?’ when ‘unpacking State-Society Relations in the Urban Space’, some problematising thoughts are offered to further elaborate urban studies by resorting to systems thinking and its leverage points concept. Both social and ecological issues are addressed, and specific references to Venice, Italy, are offered, including recent grassroot experiences. The dissertation includes some epistemological dilemmas and some initial projections to start to measure ourselves with a new epoch, able to interact with all of the above: social, ecological, urban, and power/governance dimensions.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"621 - 628"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48000352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-17DOI: 10.1177/01914537231164657
A. Feenberg
Marcuse was the face of the Frankfurt School during the 1960s and '70s. His eclipse led, among other unfortunate consequences, to the disappearance of his critique of science and technology. That critique is based on an experiential ontology that derives in part from Marcuse’s background in phenomenology. In this paper I trace the roots of that ontology in his early interpretation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. One-Dimensional Man takes up the phenomenological critique in a Marxist vein. This critique is newly relevant now that we face impending environmental catastrophe due to climate change. Thus the study of Marcuse today is not simply academic, but once again politically significant.
{"title":"Marcuse’s critique of technology today","authors":"A. Feenberg","doi":"10.1177/01914537231164657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231164657","url":null,"abstract":"Marcuse was the face of the Frankfurt School during the 1960s and '70s. His eclipse led, among other unfortunate consequences, to the disappearance of his critique of science and technology. That critique is based on an experiential ontology that derives in part from Marcuse’s background in phenomenology. In this paper I trace the roots of that ontology in his early interpretation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. One-Dimensional Man takes up the phenomenological critique in a Marxist vein. This critique is newly relevant now that we face impending environmental catastrophe due to climate change. Thus the study of Marcuse today is not simply academic, but once again politically significant.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"672 - 685"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44224790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1177/01914537231154946
S. Mitra
The welfare state, once seen as the best institutional response to people in need, has steadily come under pressure, as much from shrinking state capacities as from neo-liberal advocates of individual responsibility. Still, despite decline of the post-war consensus on the efficacy of the welfare state, social ‘vulnerability’ still remains the key focus of public policy. However, though much in use in contemporary political discourse, the logical and practical implications of social vulnerability remain unclear. Its essential subjectivity – it is the ‘feeling of vulnerability’ which makes one vulnerable – turns the concept into a catch-all variable, impeding rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis. I respond to this problem with a ‘vulnerability-responsibility’, model. Its parameters include a ‘responsive’ state, an active civil society and a participatory political environment, bolstered by the assertion of agency of the vulnerable. With India as an empirical exemplar, the essay shows how ‘nested’ vulnerability – a community of pro-active citizens in need of urgent and vital assistance - in the backdrop of a responsive state and competitive, robust and resilient political participation, can generate a sustainable, context-relevant process to cope with the problem of social vulnerability. The model, currently aimed at vulnerable citizens in a democratic state, has the potential of being extended to non-democracies as well as vulnerable non-citizens into its domain.
{"title":"“For whom the bell tolls”? A ‘vulnerability-responsibility’ model based on democratic and ‘dignified’ transactions”","authors":"S. Mitra","doi":"10.1177/01914537231154946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231154946","url":null,"abstract":"The welfare state, once seen as the best institutional response to people in need, has steadily come under pressure, as much from shrinking state capacities as from neo-liberal advocates of individual responsibility. Still, despite decline of the post-war consensus on the efficacy of the welfare state, social ‘vulnerability’ still remains the key focus of public policy. However, though much in use in contemporary political discourse, the logical and practical implications of social vulnerability remain unclear. Its essential subjectivity – it is the ‘feeling of vulnerability’ which makes one vulnerable – turns the concept into a catch-all variable, impeding rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis. I respond to this problem with a ‘vulnerability-responsibility’, model. Its parameters include a ‘responsive’ state, an active civil society and a participatory political environment, bolstered by the assertion of agency of the vulnerable. With India as an empirical exemplar, the essay shows how ‘nested’ vulnerability – a community of pro-active citizens in need of urgent and vital assistance - in the backdrop of a responsive state and competitive, robust and resilient political participation, can generate a sustainable, context-relevant process to cope with the problem of social vulnerability. The model, currently aimed at vulnerable citizens in a democratic state, has the potential of being extended to non-democracies as well as vulnerable non-citizens into its domain.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"538 - 553"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43317997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-06DOI: 10.1177/01914537231156466
S. Golden
Who protects individual liberties and human dignity from domination by the State, by Civil Society or by individuals is a question under debate in China as well as the West, not from the point of view of Liberalism, but from the point of view of ‘Relationality’. Liberalism posits the individual as the measure of these matters but the ‘individual’ in question is an abstraction. Relationality posits social relations as the measure of these matters. Persons are not abstractions. They combine several different social ‘roles’, and each role includes obligations as well as rights. These roles limit the individual’s freedom of action. There are no unipersonal societies. Liberalism also posits rights as an abstraction: ‘All men are created equal’. Relationality posits rights in a context of mutual recognition of rights and responsibilities. Rights only exist if they can in fact be exercised. From the point of view of Relationality, therefore, a person’s ability to exercise her or his rights must be seen in the light of a concept of Justice and there must be an agency that can guarantee this Justice, the exercise of these rights, while it guarantees the fulfilment of social obligations. Is this the role of the State? of Civil Society? of the Market? To truly discuss these matters in a transcultural context, we would need to look for common ground, not take as ‘self-evident’ the classical Liberal perception of the individual. Understanding the underlying political philosophy of China’s concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ does not mean endorsing it. But understanding this idea and its ramifications does provide room for amplifying the basic question of who protects individual liberties and human dignity.
{"title":"Roles and rights in the context of just governance and just social mores","authors":"S. Golden","doi":"10.1177/01914537231156466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231156466","url":null,"abstract":"Who protects individual liberties and human dignity from domination by the State, by Civil Society or by individuals is a question under debate in China as well as the West, not from the point of view of Liberalism, but from the point of view of ‘Relationality’. Liberalism posits the individual as the measure of these matters but the ‘individual’ in question is an abstraction. Relationality posits social relations as the measure of these matters. Persons are not abstractions. They combine several different social ‘roles’, and each role includes obligations as well as rights. These roles limit the individual’s freedom of action. There are no unipersonal societies. Liberalism also posits rights as an abstraction: ‘All men are created equal’. Relationality posits rights in a context of mutual recognition of rights and responsibilities. Rights only exist if they can in fact be exercised. From the point of view of Relationality, therefore, a person’s ability to exercise her or his rights must be seen in the light of a concept of Justice and there must be an agency that can guarantee this Justice, the exercise of these rights, while it guarantees the fulfilment of social obligations. Is this the role of the State? of Civil Society? of the Market? To truly discuss these matters in a transcultural context, we would need to look for common ground, not take as ‘self-evident’ the classical Liberal perception of the individual. Understanding the underlying political philosophy of China’s concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ does not mean endorsing it. But understanding this idea and its ramifications does provide room for amplifying the basic question of who protects individual liberties and human dignity.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"554 - 567"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44967699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1177/01914537221147852
M. Wehrle
In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one’s longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for “what (really) is” related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the “real world” stand its ground again.
{"title":"Can the “real world” please stand up? The struggle for normality as a claim to reality","authors":"M. Wehrle","doi":"10.1177/01914537221147852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537221147852","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one’s longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for “what (really) is” related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the “real world” stand its ground again.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"151 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44197841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1177/01914537231152779
Catherine Koekoek, E. Zakin
This volume argues that feminist theory can provide distinctive and potent resources to confront and take on post-truth. By ‘post-truth’, we refer to a variety of discourses and practices that subvert the sense that we share a common world. Because post-truth undermines the norms and conditions that make possible shared political practices and institutions, post-truth politics is fundamentally anti-democratic. The most common response to post-truth has, however, come from those who call for reinstating truth and rationality, with special emphasis on returning to the facts and fact-checking. From a feminist perspective, this approach is worrisome as it risks idealizing the connection between democracy and truth, disowning the tensions within and between them, and suppressing contestation tout court. Diagnosing the post-truth moment we face two challenges: on the one hand, there is too much contestation (of the post-truth variety); on the other hand, there is too much depoliticization (of the technocratic or rationalist variety). This binary effectively limits the space within which critiques of post-truth can meaningfully intervene. Feminist takes on post-truth must take seriously this dual challenge at the crossroads of depoliticization and hyper-politicization, acknowledging the anti-democratic dangers of post-truth while keeping open the possibility and necessity of contestation. Our gambit is that effective rejoinders to post-truth can be found in practices that affirm rather than repudiate a plural world. Rather than simply condemning or dismissing post-truth as mad or irrational, the feminist theorists in this volume move closer to what we’re up against in order to see how encounters with reality provide opportunities to radicalize and politicize our relation to it in ways that do not undermine the conditions for others to do the same. This volume is an attempt to open new, and emphasize existing, feminist modes of response that might break the deadlock in the post-truth discourse.
{"title":"Feminist takes on post-truth","authors":"Catherine Koekoek, E. Zakin","doi":"10.1177/01914537231152779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231152779","url":null,"abstract":"This volume argues that feminist theory can provide distinctive and potent resources to confront and take on post-truth. By ‘post-truth’, we refer to a variety of discourses and practices that subvert the sense that we share a common world. Because post-truth undermines the norms and conditions that make possible shared political practices and institutions, post-truth politics is fundamentally anti-democratic. The most common response to post-truth has, however, come from those who call for reinstating truth and rationality, with special emphasis on returning to the facts and fact-checking. From a feminist perspective, this approach is worrisome as it risks idealizing the connection between democracy and truth, disowning the tensions within and between them, and suppressing contestation tout court. Diagnosing the post-truth moment we face two challenges: on the one hand, there is too much contestation (of the post-truth variety); on the other hand, there is too much depoliticization (of the technocratic or rationalist variety). This binary effectively limits the space within which critiques of post-truth can meaningfully intervene. Feminist takes on post-truth must take seriously this dual challenge at the crossroads of depoliticization and hyper-politicization, acknowledging the anti-democratic dangers of post-truth while keeping open the possibility and necessity of contestation. Our gambit is that effective rejoinders to post-truth can be found in practices that affirm rather than repudiate a plural world. Rather than simply condemning or dismissing post-truth as mad or irrational, the feminist theorists in this volume move closer to what we’re up against in order to see how encounters with reality provide opportunities to radicalize and politicize our relation to it in ways that do not undermine the conditions for others to do the same. This volume is an attempt to open new, and emphasize existing, feminist modes of response that might break the deadlock in the post-truth discourse.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":"49 1","pages":"125 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43458754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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