Levy et al. (2015) propose that inconsistency audience costs are caused in two ways: backing out of military commitment or backing into foreign conflicts. We replicate their experiment in July–August, 2021. Like many other studies, we find evidence for audience costs caused by backing out. However, our findings indicate that, unlike Levy et al., citizens are no less supportive of a leader who backs into a military conflict despite an initial commitment to stay out than one who behaves consistently. This study has significant theoretical and methodological implications. Theoretically, the importance of inconsistency in audience cost literature may be overstated or inconsistency audience costs may be bounded by temporal domains or contexts. Methodologically, our study emphasizes the necessity of replications because major findings can become conventional wisdom without such additional analysis.
Levy et al.(2015)提出，不一致受众成本的产生有两种方式:退出军事承诺或退出对外冲突。我们在2021年7月至8月重复了他们的实验。像许多其他研究一样，我们发现了退缩会造成观众成本的证据。然而，我们的研究结果表明，与Levy等人不同的是，公民对一个最初承诺不参与军事冲突的领导人的支持程度并不低于一个行为一贯的领导人。本研究具有重要的理论和方法意义。从理论上讲，受众成本文献中不一致的重要性可能被夸大了，或者受众成本不一致可能受到时间域或上下文的限制。在方法上，我们的研究强调重复的必要性，因为主要的发现可以在没有额外分析的情况下成为传统智慧。
{"title":"Backing Out but Backing In Audience Costs? A Replication of Levy et al. (2015)","authors":"Makito Takei, Philip Paolino","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Levy et al. (2015) propose that inconsistency audience costs are caused in two ways: backing out of military commitment or backing into foreign conflicts. We replicate their experiment in July–August, 2021. Like many other studies, we find evidence for audience costs caused by backing out. However, our findings indicate that, unlike Levy et al., citizens are no less supportive of a leader who backs into a military conflict despite an initial commitment to stay out than one who behaves consistently. This study has significant theoretical and methodological implications. Theoretically, the importance of inconsistency in audience cost literature may be overstated or inconsistency audience costs may be bounded by temporal domains or contexts. Methodologically, our study emphasizes the necessity of replications because major findings can become conventional wisdom without such additional analysis.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44532601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When do states pursue status enhancement through peacekeeping and how do they go about it? This article argues that states’ contributions to peace operations can be related to attempts at acquiring a positive identity in the international arena through membership in highly ranked groups. Drawing on insights from social identity theory and peacekeeping and burden-sharing research, the article elaborates on how states choose an identity management strategy that involves peacekeeping practices, the factors influencing states’ ability to pursue status through peacekeeping, and the conditions for succeeding in acquiring the desired social identity. Ukraine's significant peacekeeping engagement in the first two decades following independence represents an intriguing case of an emerging state positioning itself in the international and regional systems, which makes it a relevant case study to explore. Therefore, the article discusses how two of Ukraine's formative peacekeeping experiences have fostered, or alternatively undermined, the pursuit of a positive social identity, first as a sovereign state and member of the broader international community and second as an aspiring member of the Western community of states.
{"title":"Status Seeking through Peacekeeping: Ukraine's Quest for a Positive Social Identity in the International System","authors":"M. Dobrescu","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When do states pursue status enhancement through peacekeeping and how do they go about it? This article argues that states’ contributions to peace operations can be related to attempts at acquiring a positive identity in the international arena through membership in highly ranked groups. Drawing on insights from social identity theory and peacekeeping and burden-sharing research, the article elaborates on how states choose an identity management strategy that involves peacekeeping practices, the factors influencing states’ ability to pursue status through peacekeeping, and the conditions for succeeding in acquiring the desired social identity. Ukraine's significant peacekeeping engagement in the first two decades following independence represents an intriguing case of an emerging state positioning itself in the international and regional systems, which makes it a relevant case study to explore. Therefore, the article discusses how two of Ukraine's formative peacekeeping experiences have fostered, or alternatively undermined, the pursuit of a positive social identity, first as a sovereign state and member of the broader international community and second as an aspiring member of the Western community of states.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48818108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is popular support necessary to win counterinsurgency wars? We argue that countries that adopt extralegal frameworks to defeat insurgencies are less likely to win counterinsurgency wars because although greater civilian control helps cut insurgent logistics, it complicates the process of winning hearts and minds among civilians. We test this argument with new data on emergency rule in the post-1918 period. We find that the timing of emergency declarations matters: Counterinsurgents that delay the declaration of such regulations signal their desperation to sift through civilian populations and find insurgents without legal ramifications, reducing civilian support, and decreasing their chances of winning.
{"title":"Does Emergency Rule Help Counterinsurgents? Testing the Hearts and Minds Theories","authors":"Aysegul Aydin, Anna Marie Gray","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Is popular support necessary to win counterinsurgency wars? We argue that countries that adopt extralegal frameworks to defeat insurgencies are less likely to win counterinsurgency wars because although greater civilian control helps cut insurgent logistics, it complicates the process of winning hearts and minds among civilians. We test this argument with new data on emergency rule in the post-1918 period. We find that the timing of emergency declarations matters: Counterinsurgents that delay the declaration of such regulations signal their desperation to sift through civilian populations and find insurgents without legal ramifications, reducing civilian support, and decreasing their chances of winning.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42224702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have imposed a wide variety of entry restrictions on international travel. Historical cases illustrate that public health concerns based on entrenched prejudices toward immigrant communities have led to restrictive measures against migration from foreign countries. Using our new dataset, COVID-19 Travel Restrictions and Categories, we examine whether Chinese migrant networks around the world have driven government decisions to bar the entry of Chinese nationals and travelers from China in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our survival analysis of China-specific travel restrictions from January to March 2020 shows that not all Chinese migrant networks were important determinants. We find that entry bans on travel from China emerged more quickly in countries where a large number of temporary Chinese migrants work in clustered sites of Chinese contracted projects.
{"title":"Severing the Belt and Road: Overseas Chinese Networks and COVID-19 Travel Restrictions","authors":"S. Kim, Adrian J. Shin, Yujeong Yang","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac038","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have imposed a wide variety of entry restrictions on international travel. Historical cases illustrate that public health concerns based on entrenched prejudices toward immigrant communities have led to restrictive measures against migration from foreign countries. Using our new dataset, COVID-19 Travel Restrictions and Categories, we examine whether Chinese migrant networks around the world have driven government decisions to bar the entry of Chinese nationals and travelers from China in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our survival analysis of China-specific travel restrictions from January to March 2020 shows that not all Chinese migrant networks were important determinants. We find that entry bans on travel from China emerged more quickly in countries where a large number of temporary Chinese migrants work in clustered sites of Chinese contracted projects.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42344068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are strong national identities in the public an impediment to cooperative foreign policy attitudes? Researchers have proposed the promotion of universalism—and, accordingly, the submergence of existing national identities—as a viable path toward cooperative international relations. Conversely, I suggest that strong national identities can actually encourage public support for cooperative foreign policy. Evidence from field experiments in Japan that integrates psychological affirmation theory and a game measuring social preferences indicates that Japanese who were affirmed of the positive aspects of their national identity held more prosocial attitudes toward their Chinese counterpart in the game, which in turn led to cooperative foreign policy preferences. In contrast, participants who were not affirmed of their national identity exhibited more proself tendencies in the game, which predicted support for militaristic foreign policy. Finally, in contrast to national identity affirmation, national chauvinism, or perceived superiority over other countries, was associated with militant internationalist attitudes.
{"title":"National Identity, Social Preferences, and Foreign Policy Attitudes: Experimental Evidence from Japan","authors":"E. Chung","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Are strong national identities in the public an impediment to cooperative foreign policy attitudes? Researchers have proposed the promotion of universalism—and, accordingly, the submergence of existing national identities—as a viable path toward cooperative international relations. Conversely, I suggest that strong national identities can actually encourage public support for cooperative foreign policy. Evidence from field experiments in Japan that integrates psychological affirmation theory and a game measuring social preferences indicates that Japanese who were affirmed of the positive aspects of their national identity held more prosocial attitudes toward their Chinese counterpart in the game, which in turn led to cooperative foreign policy preferences. In contrast, participants who were not affirmed of their national identity exhibited more proself tendencies in the game, which predicted support for militaristic foreign policy. Finally, in contrast to national identity affirmation, national chauvinism, or perceived superiority over other countries, was associated with militant internationalist attitudes.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41850484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Challenging visions of the US national security “Establishment” as either hamstrung by ideological homogeneity bordering on groupthink, or riven by irreconcilable party political divisions, we deploy multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to uncover empirically the structure of the China segment of the US national security community. MCA—a form of geometric data analysis—finds latent structures in categorical datasets. Using an original dataset of organizations with a strong presence on China issues, we show that the China organizational field is far from homogenous, but is split less between left and right than over degree of political engagement, separating older think tanks and cultural organizations from business-focused research and consulting firms, and academic/research institutions outside from politically oriented groups located primarily within the Beltway. We explore our findings using the Trump and Obama administrations’ choice of locations to give speeches and remarks on US–China relations.
{"title":"How Is the American Foreign Policy Establishment Structured? A Multiple Correspondence Analysis of the US China Field","authors":"David M. McCourt, G. Ruley","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Challenging visions of the US national security “Establishment” as either hamstrung by ideological homogeneity bordering on groupthink, or riven by irreconcilable party political divisions, we deploy multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to uncover empirically the structure of the China segment of the US national security community. MCA—a form of geometric data analysis—finds latent structures in categorical datasets. Using an original dataset of organizations with a strong presence on China issues, we show that the China organizational field is far from homogenous, but is split less between left and right than over degree of political engagement, separating older think tanks and cultural organizations from business-focused research and consulting firms, and academic/research institutions outside from politically oriented groups located primarily within the Beltway. We explore our findings using the Trump and Obama administrations’ choice of locations to give speeches and remarks on US–China relations.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45936710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that strong-state restraint is more likely to occur when lesser powers articulate their security preferences with a strong consensus. Why? Adherence to the consensus clarifies the dominant state's cooperative intentions, institutionalizes defensive military postures to mitigate security dilemma, and provides the concomitant benefit of recognition as a credible leader. If external validation matters in identity formation, then the acceptance of strong group consensus becomes an incentivizing legitimation strategy. This observation is evident in the interactions and authority relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South China Sea. ASEAN members’ ability to develop security norms aimed at defusing tension shows that they are not as vulnerable as many believe. The finding draws on empirical evidence to show how small states induce change in a large power's behavior, and thus a positive theoretical advance with a testable argument about the causes for strong-state restraint.
{"title":"Strong-State Restraint as a Legitimation Strategy: Evidence from the South China Sea","authors":"Chin-Hao Huang","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article argues that strong-state restraint is more likely to occur when lesser powers articulate their security preferences with a strong consensus. Why? Adherence to the consensus clarifies the dominant state's cooperative intentions, institutionalizes defensive military postures to mitigate security dilemma, and provides the concomitant benefit of recognition as a credible leader. If external validation matters in identity formation, then the acceptance of strong group consensus becomes an incentivizing legitimation strategy. This observation is evident in the interactions and authority relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South China Sea. ASEAN members’ ability to develop security norms aimed at defusing tension shows that they are not as vulnerable as many believe. The finding draws on empirical evidence to show how small states induce change in a large power's behavior, and thus a positive theoretical advance with a testable argument about the causes for strong-state restraint.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48977140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars of international relations have long recognized the importance of soft power in great powers’ hegemonic designs. In contrast, we know little of middle powers’ employment of noncoercive strategies of attraction and, in particular, how soft power operates in the context of middle-power antagonism. We suggest that, first, soft power enhances coalition-building strategies for middle powers. Contrary to expectations that states join forces against a shared threat, the use of soft power via development aid produces an “Us” versus “Them” distinction in target states that unites them in the absence of a common enemy. Second, middle states’ soft-power strategies are likely to support coalition maintenance so long as it does not challenge target states’ national interests. Utilizing extensive archival and interview-based data, we examine how soft power featured in Egyptian–Israeli competition across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1957 to 1974. We demonstrate how soft power operates beyond the context of great power agenda setting, therefore providing novel evidence for the importance of soft power in the interplay between interstate antagonism and noncoercion in world politics.
{"title":"Middle Powers and Soft-Power Rivalry: Egyptian–Israeli Competition in Africa","authors":"Asaf Siniver, G. Tsourapas","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac041","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scholars of international relations have long recognized the importance of soft power in great powers’ hegemonic designs. In contrast, we know little of middle powers’ employment of noncoercive strategies of attraction and, in particular, how soft power operates in the context of middle-power antagonism. We suggest that, first, soft power enhances coalition-building strategies for middle powers. Contrary to expectations that states join forces against a shared threat, the use of soft power via development aid produces an “Us” versus “Them” distinction in target states that unites them in the absence of a common enemy. Second, middle states’ soft-power strategies are likely to support coalition maintenance so long as it does not challenge target states’ national interests. Utilizing extensive archival and interview-based data, we examine how soft power featured in Egyptian–Israeli competition across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1957 to 1974. We demonstrate how soft power operates beyond the context of great power agenda setting, therefore providing novel evidence for the importance of soft power in the interplay between interstate antagonism and noncoercion in world politics.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44667231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study asks how two typically observed empirical manifestations across cases of international populist agency—issue-specific mass mobilization and personalistic decision-making—operate within politicized decision contexts to produce foreign policy outputs. Integrating a political-strategic conceptualization of populism with poliheuristic theory (PH), it is argued that the definitional components of populist leadership imply a particular inclination toward opportunistic decision-making. While PH suggests that most chief executives rely on heuristic option rejection but finally switch to more analytic option selection, the logic of political-strategic populism could enable and compel leaders to make entirely heuristic choices with a non-compensatory focus on domestic political constraints and opportunities. The plausibility of this proposition is probed with a theory-testing process-tracing of the Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's decision to defy holdout creditors in a polarizing sovereign debt litigation. The results indicate more potential to analyze within-case mechanisms through which populism influences decision-making processes and outcomes.
本研究探讨了在国际民粹主义机构案例中，两种典型的观察到的经验表现——特定问题的大规模动员和个人主义决策——如何在政治化决策背景下运作，以产生外交政策产出。将民粹主义的政治战略概念化与政治启发式理论(PH)相结合，认为民粹主义领导的定义成分暗示了机会主义决策的特定倾向。虽然PH建议，大多数首席执行官依赖于启发式选择拒绝，但最终转向更多的分析性选择，政治战略民粹主义的逻辑可以使并迫使领导人做出完全启发式的选择，并非补偿性地关注国内政治约束和机会。这一主张的合理性是通过理论检验过程来探讨的——追溯阿根廷总统克里斯蒂娜Fernández德基什内尔(Cristina de Kirchner)在一场两极分化的主权债务诉讼中拒绝拒绝债权人的决定。结果表明，更有可能分析民粹主义影响决策过程和结果的个案机制。
{"title":"Populist Leadership, Opportunistic Decision-Making, and Poliheuristic Theory: Cristina Kirchner's Decision to Defy “The Vultures”","authors":"Stephan Fouquet","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study asks how two typically observed empirical manifestations across cases of international populist agency—issue-specific mass mobilization and personalistic decision-making—operate within politicized decision contexts to produce foreign policy outputs. Integrating a political-strategic conceptualization of populism with poliheuristic theory (PH), it is argued that the definitional components of populist leadership imply a particular inclination toward opportunistic decision-making. While PH suggests that most chief executives rely on heuristic option rejection but finally switch to more analytic option selection, the logic of political-strategic populism could enable and compel leaders to make entirely heuristic choices with a non-compensatory focus on domestic political constraints and opportunities. The plausibility of this proposition is probed with a theory-testing process-tracing of the Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's decision to defy holdout creditors in a polarizing sovereign debt litigation. The results indicate more potential to analyze within-case mechanisms through which populism influences decision-making processes and outcomes.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42772240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can imposers of sanctions end economic coercion without the fear of strengthening their targets’ capabilities? Senders may prefer to end sanctions given its ex post inefficiency, yet doing so might provide the target greater access to resources and contribute to its offensive behavior. Targets’ inability to credibly commit to reversing their policies while enjoying the gains from sanctions relief, coupled with the difficulty of perfectly observing their compliance behavior, creates an obstacle for ending sanctions and resuming profitable economic transactions. Using a game-theoretic model of sanctions removal under uncertainty about targets’ intentions and compliance behavior, I formally demonstrate and empirically find that sanctions are more likely to end if senders can successfully detect targets’ compliance, but only if the target considers the promised sanctions relief attractive. Targets that offset the costs of sanctions will not value the promised sanctions relief and choose not to negotiate over sanctions removal.
{"title":"Ending Economic Sanctions in the Shadow of Bargaining Problems","authors":"Menevis Cilizoglu","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Can imposers of sanctions end economic coercion without the fear of strengthening their targets’ capabilities? Senders may prefer to end sanctions given its ex post inefficiency, yet doing so might provide the target greater access to resources and contribute to its offensive behavior. Targets’ inability to credibly commit to reversing their policies while enjoying the gains from sanctions relief, coupled with the difficulty of perfectly observing their compliance behavior, creates an obstacle for ending sanctions and resuming profitable economic transactions. Using a game-theoretic model of sanctions removal under uncertainty about targets’ intentions and compliance behavior, I formally demonstrate and empirically find that sanctions are more likely to end if senders can successfully detect targets’ compliance, but only if the target considers the promised sanctions relief attractive. Targets that offset the costs of sanctions will not value the promised sanctions relief and choose not to negotiate over sanctions removal.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41721015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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