The combination of partisan polarization and controversial military engagements has produced contentious debates over US foreign policy in Congress. Who has been winning these debates and exerting greater influence over the development of security and defense bills, hawkish or dovish legislators? The literature offers competing answers—on the one hand, arguing that hawks enjoy policy advantages because of Congress’s commitment to US hegemony and, on the other, claiming that doves gain policy openings because of shifting partisan and security conditions. To determine the influence of hawkish versus dovish legislators, we examine congressional actions on all defense spending bills from 1971 to 2016. Specifically, we track roll call votes to see which legislators enjoy the greatest support for their measures. We find that hawks have disproportionate influence over the content of defense bills, whether Republicans or Democrats are in control, and whether the United States is at war or enjoying relative peace.
{"title":"Hawks versus Doves: Who Leads American Foreign Policy in the US Congress?","authors":"W. Bendix, Gyung-Ho Jeong","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The combination of partisan polarization and controversial military engagements has produced contentious debates over US foreign policy in Congress. Who has been winning these debates and exerting greater influence over the development of security and defense bills, hawkish or dovish legislators? The literature offers competing answers—on the one hand, arguing that hawks enjoy policy advantages because of Congress’s commitment to US hegemony and, on the other, claiming that doves gain policy openings because of shifting partisan and security conditions. To determine the influence of hawkish versus dovish legislators, we examine congressional actions on all defense spending bills from 1971 to 2016. Specifically, we track roll call votes to see which legislators enjoy the greatest support for their measures. We find that hawks have disproportionate influence over the content of defense bills, whether Republicans or Democrats are in control, and whether the United States is at war or enjoying relative peace.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43524045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do China’s growing foreign economic ties translate into political influence abroad? We identify issues about which China cares deeply, and assess whether increased economic ties correlate with greater expressed support for Chinese activities on these issues. We collect new data to measure how countries have responded to China’s implementation of a National Security Law for Hong Kong, and recent policies in Xinjiang. We find that countries with closer economic linkages to China were less likely to criticize—and in some cases more likely to support—China’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but the strength and significance of this effect vary considerably depending on the context and type of economic ties. Interestingly, the effects of China’s foreign economic ties are substantively smaller than levels of democracy and development. The findings call into question simple assumptions about the translation of economic ties into political influence, and suggest directions for future study.
{"title":"Do China’s Foreign Economic Ties Lead to Influence Abroad? New Evidence from Recent Events","authors":"Guan Wang, M. Pearson, Scott L. Kastner","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do China’s growing foreign economic ties translate into political influence abroad? We identify issues about which China cares deeply, and assess whether increased economic ties correlate with greater expressed support for Chinese activities on these issues. We collect new data to measure how countries have responded to China’s implementation of a National Security Law for Hong Kong, and recent policies in Xinjiang. We find that countries with closer economic linkages to China were less likely to criticize—and in some cases more likely to support—China’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but the strength and significance of this effect vary considerably depending on the context and type of economic ties. Interestingly, the effects of China’s foreign economic ties are substantively smaller than levels of democracy and development. The findings call into question simple assumptions about the translation of economic ties into political influence, and suggest directions for future study.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60884413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What effects does participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) have on the participating countries’ civil–military resource allocation? Answering this question can widen our understanding of state motivations to contribute to the United Nations PKOs by incorporating the civil–military dynamic. We argue that contributing states can substitute part of their domestic military expenditures with external resources. Governments act as brokers between domestic military interests and international sources of rent, a process which we call civil–military resource substitution through international brokerage. By doing so, governments can (i) reduce part of the bottom-up demands for increased military spending (i.e., salaries and allowances) and (ii) outsource critical resources to meet military organizational priorities (i.e., training, weapons, perks for the military elite, and so on). Using cross-national statistical analysis, we find that the UN PKO contributing states allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the non-contributing states, and higher troop-contributing states are likely to allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the lower-contributing or non-contributing states. The implications point to a much wider role of the UN peacekeeping missions than what is previously understood and demonstrate their impacts beyond the host countries.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Civil–Military Resource Substitution through International Brokerage","authors":"N. Sakib, Md Muhibbur Rahman","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What effects does participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) have on the participating countries’ civil–military resource allocation? Answering this question can widen our understanding of state motivations to contribute to the United Nations PKOs by incorporating the civil–military dynamic. We argue that contributing states can substitute part of their domestic military expenditures with external resources. Governments act as brokers between domestic military interests and international sources of rent, a process which we call civil–military resource substitution through international brokerage. By doing so, governments can (i) reduce part of the bottom-up demands for increased military spending (i.e., salaries and allowances) and (ii) outsource critical resources to meet military organizational priorities (i.e., training, weapons, perks for the military elite, and so on). Using cross-national statistical analysis, we find that the UN PKO contributing states allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the non-contributing states, and higher troop-contributing states are likely to allocate fewer resources to the defense sector than the lower-contributing or non-contributing states. The implications point to a much wider role of the UN peacekeeping missions than what is previously understood and demonstrate their impacts beyond the host countries.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47619424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On July 14, 2015, under the leadership of the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed. After 35 years of diplomatic isolation, the agreement marked a watershed moment in the United States–Iran relations and achieved a key US national security objective regarding nuclear non-proliferation. However, the agreement faced significant domestic opposition grounded in concerns that Iran was untrustworthy. Yet, the prospect of withdrawal generated a sense of insecurity that the United States’s status as a “responsible world leader” would be undermined, despite ongoing anxieties around Iran’s compliance. What explains such a paradox in foreign policy preferences? By incorporating discursive institutionalist approaches with ontological security perspectives, I work to show how President Obama’s entry into the agreement generated ontological insecurities as he struggled to displace existing narratives around Iran as a hostile, untrustworthy actor. Yet, Iran’s compliance with the agreement made it equally difficult for Trump to justify withdrawal; instead, his efforts raised additional concerns that America’s international standing would be undermined. Theoretically, this paper incorporates discursive institutionalist insights with ontological security to disaggregate how different conceptions of the “Self” are contested and activated in policy debates in ways that lead to instability and variation in US foreign policy.
{"title":"Ontological (in)Security and the Iran Nuclear Deal—Explaining Instability in US Foreign Policy Interests","authors":"M. T. Rees","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 On July 14, 2015, under the leadership of the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed. After 35 years of diplomatic isolation, the agreement marked a watershed moment in the United States–Iran relations and achieved a key US national security objective regarding nuclear non-proliferation. However, the agreement faced significant domestic opposition grounded in concerns that Iran was untrustworthy. Yet, the prospect of withdrawal generated a sense of insecurity that the United States’s status as a “responsible world leader” would be undermined, despite ongoing anxieties around Iran’s compliance. What explains such a paradox in foreign policy preferences? By incorporating discursive institutionalist approaches with ontological security perspectives, I work to show how President Obama’s entry into the agreement generated ontological insecurities as he struggled to displace existing narratives around Iran as a hostile, untrustworthy actor. Yet, Iran’s compliance with the agreement made it equally difficult for Trump to justify withdrawal; instead, his efforts raised additional concerns that America’s international standing would be undermined. Theoretically, this paper incorporates discursive institutionalist insights with ontological security to disaggregate how different conceptions of the “Self” are contested and activated in policy debates in ways that lead to instability and variation in US foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48411524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should politicians, technocrats, or the free market guide the economic development of a developing country? The historical development paths of countries vary widely. Public opinion concerning development models also differs across space and over time. Using Chinese aid data from AidData and the second round Afrobarometer survey, we study how Chinese aid affects local preferences for economic leadership in sixteen African countries, 2000–2005. Our causal identification strategy is to compare the preferences of respondents who lived near an aid project site where a Chinese project had been implemented at the time of the interview (treated group) to individuals who lived close to a site where a Chinese project would be initiated shortly after the interview (control group). We find that Chinese aid increases the local population's support for economic experts to run the economy. World Bank aid, on the other hand, has no impact on local preferences for economic leadership.
{"title":"The Lure of Technocracy? Chinese Aid and Local Preferences for Development Leadership in Africa","authors":"Zhenqian Huang, Xun Cao","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Should politicians, technocrats, or the free market guide the economic development of a developing country? The historical development paths of countries vary widely. Public opinion concerning development models also differs across space and over time. Using Chinese aid data from AidData and the second round Afrobarometer survey, we study how Chinese aid affects local preferences for economic leadership in sixteen African countries, 2000–2005. Our causal identification strategy is to compare the preferences of respondents who lived near an aid project site where a Chinese project had been implemented at the time of the interview (treated group) to individuals who lived close to a site where a Chinese project would be initiated shortly after the interview (control group). We find that Chinese aid increases the local population's support for economic experts to run the economy. World Bank aid, on the other hand, has no impact on local preferences for economic leadership.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46913423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yerin Kim, Byungjun Kim, Min Hyung Park, Woomin Nam, Jangil Kim
The Chinese government's rigorous efforts to enhance its soft power have confronted a major challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study aimed to look at how the Chinese soft power changed throughout the pandemic using English news articles that covered China. The research took a data science approach to investigate the contents of articles using machine-learning-based sentiment analysis and Dirichlet-Multinomial Regression (DMR) analysis. The results show a gradual downturn in overall sentiment and that the topics related to political issues made the most significant impact. Nevertheless, the major increase in referencing Chinese social media implied that the sources of Chinese soft power have been diversified throughout the pandemic. In addition, this research has aimed to engage in major debates around soft power theory. Providing a multi-disciplinary approach for analyzing soft power, this research has tackled the difficulties in the quantitative conceptualization of soft power.
{"title":"A Soft Power Challenge, or an Opportunity? A Big Data Analysis on Chinese Soft Power during COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Yerin Kim, Byungjun Kim, Min Hyung Park, Woomin Nam, Jangil Kim","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Chinese government's rigorous efforts to enhance its soft power have confronted a major challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study aimed to look at how the Chinese soft power changed throughout the pandemic using English news articles that covered China. The research took a data science approach to investigate the contents of articles using machine-learning-based sentiment analysis and Dirichlet-Multinomial Regression (DMR) analysis. The results show a gradual downturn in overall sentiment and that the topics related to political issues made the most significant impact. Nevertheless, the major increase in referencing Chinese social media implied that the sources of Chinese soft power have been diversified throughout the pandemic. In addition, this research has aimed to engage in major debates around soft power theory. Providing a multi-disciplinary approach for analyzing soft power, this research has tackled the difficulties in the quantitative conceptualization of soft power.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44567455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What determines people's preferences regarding trade policy? Existing studies have assumed that people consider trade policy merely trade politics; accordingly, these studies have focused on economic factors, such as benefits to individual or national welfare; ideational factors, such as xenophobia; or domestic political factors. This paper reveals that the international political factor of national security influences ordinary people's preferences for trade policy. While several studies have addressed the effect of the national security factor, they did not persuasively reveal the causal mechanism of the relationship between the national security factor and people's trade preferences. The present study conducted a factorial survey experiment to investigate the causal effect and the causal mechanism of the security factor on people's preferences regarding free trade agreements (FTAs). The results of the experiment conducted in Japan reveal that ordinary people consider the national security factor along the so-called realism path in forming their opinions regarding FTAs.
{"title":"Is a Free Trade Agreement More than Merely a Trade Policy? People's Preferences for Free Trade Agreements and the Security Factor","authors":"Taisuke Fujita","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What determines people's preferences regarding trade policy? Existing studies have assumed that people consider trade policy merely trade politics; accordingly, these studies have focused on economic factors, such as benefits to individual or national welfare; ideational factors, such as xenophobia; or domestic political factors. This paper reveals that the international political factor of national security influences ordinary people's preferences for trade policy. While several studies have addressed the effect of the national security factor, they did not persuasively reveal the causal mechanism of the relationship between the national security factor and people's trade preferences. The present study conducted a factorial survey experiment to investigate the causal effect and the causal mechanism of the security factor on people's preferences regarding free trade agreements (FTAs). The results of the experiment conducted in Japan reveal that ordinary people consider the national security factor along the so-called realism path in forming their opinions regarding FTAs.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49527551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, Yuanxin Li, Samuel Brazys, Alexander Alexander Dukalskis
Abstract China’s renewed prominence is the most important development in international relations in the 21st century. Despite longstanding rhetoric of its own “peaceful rise”, China is increasingly viewed as a long-term strategic competitor, especially in the United States. Foreign aid is one arena where this competition may be playing out. While Western foreign aid principles have emphasized coordination and harmonization, the rise of China as a development partner has raised the specter of a return to competitive foreign aid practices. Most notably, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has received a wary reception by those who view it primarily as a geostrategic effort, but our knowledge of responses to the BRI is often anecdotal and fragmentary. To remedy this, we test if the BRI is inducing a competitive foreign aid response by evaluating if countries involved in this initiative are more likely to receive US support for loan packages from the major, Western, multilateral development banks (MDBs). Using an instrumental variable approach, covering 7,850 project/loan packages in 10 MDBs from 162 countries during 2013–2018 period, we find that the United States was more likely to vote for MDB packages to countries that have signed on to the BRI, but predominantly when the actual amount of Chinese aid flowing to those countries is still low, suggesting the United States is competing for “hedging” countries.
{"title":"Building Bridges or Breaking Bonds? The Belt and Road Initiative and Foreign Aid Competition","authors":"Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, Yuanxin Li, Samuel Brazys, Alexander Alexander Dukalskis","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China’s renewed prominence is the most important development in international relations in the 21st century. Despite longstanding rhetoric of its own “peaceful rise”, China is increasingly viewed as a long-term strategic competitor, especially in the United States. Foreign aid is one arena where this competition may be playing out. While Western foreign aid principles have emphasized coordination and harmonization, the rise of China as a development partner has raised the specter of a return to competitive foreign aid practices. Most notably, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has received a wary reception by those who view it primarily as a geostrategic effort, but our knowledge of responses to the BRI is often anecdotal and fragmentary. To remedy this, we test if the BRI is inducing a competitive foreign aid response by evaluating if countries involved in this initiative are more likely to receive US support for loan packages from the major, Western, multilateral development banks (MDBs). Using an instrumental variable approach, covering 7,850 project/loan packages in 10 MDBs from 162 countries during 2013–2018 period, we find that the United States was more likely to vote for MDB packages to countries that have signed on to the BRI, but predominantly when the actual amount of Chinese aid flowing to those countries is still low, suggesting the United States is competing for “hedging” countries.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136265845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do reports of sexual violence by state forces influence foreign direct investment? While studies have examined the impact of government human rights performance on FDI, how investors react to civilian victimization during wartime remains understudied. We investigate this with a focus on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). We argue that sexual violence by state governments results in the loss of FDI during conflict due to reputational and economic costs faced by foreign investors. With increasing international developments on CRSV, ties to governments that perpetrate sexual violence can be harmful to how the global community perceives foreign corporations. Moreover, government sexual violence signals that the government is relatively weaker than its opponent, creating uncertainties for foreign corporations regarding future investment opportunities in the host state. Analyzing sexual violence by government forces for all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2008, our findings show a decline in FDI as government sexual violence increases.
{"title":"Economic Actors as Human Rights Watchers: The Effects of Government Sexual Violence on Foreign Direct Investment","authors":"S. O. Adelaiye, Chhandosi Roy, Mehwish Sarwari","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do reports of sexual violence by state forces influence foreign direct investment? While studies have examined the impact of government human rights performance on FDI, how investors react to civilian victimization during wartime remains understudied. We investigate this with a focus on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). We argue that sexual violence by state governments results in the loss of FDI during conflict due to reputational and economic costs faced by foreign investors. With increasing international developments on CRSV, ties to governments that perpetrate sexual violence can be harmful to how the global community perceives foreign corporations. Moreover, government sexual violence signals that the government is relatively weaker than its opponent, creating uncertainties for foreign corporations regarding future investment opportunities in the host state. Analyzing sexual violence by government forces for all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2008, our findings show a decline in FDI as government sexual violence increases.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42895949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The popular yet ambiguous idea of moderate Islam has been treated with either interest or indifference in international relations. The interest hinges on hopes of Islamic reformism, whereas the indifference originates from a cynical view that sees moderate Islam campaigns as driven by political opportunism. These viewpoints conceptualize the idea of “moderate Islam” as exegetically rooted and seek to measure state actions based on that. This article argues that “Islamic” signifiers in the foreign policy narratives of Muslim states are better understood from the postcolonial subjectivities of their producers, who are most aware of uneven global cultural hierarchies. It demonstrates that elite Muslim narratives of moderate Islam are less about religious reformation as they are about ontological security seeking. This need for ontological security seeking by Muslim state elites stems from the historical stigmatization of Islam that is exacerbated by the Global War on Terror. Using the case of Malaysia, I highlight how discourses about moderate Islam in foreign policy operate through two mutually reinforcing discursive strategies: image building and image differentiation. Through historical and discourse analysis, I argue that both strategies contain a stigma-correction motive as they worked to craft this image of Malaysia being an exemplary “moderate” Muslim state.
{"title":"What (Who) Is Moderate Islam for? Malaysia's Ontological Security Seeking in the Post-September 11 Global Order","authors":"Nicholas Chan","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The popular yet ambiguous idea of moderate Islam has been treated with either interest or indifference in international relations. The interest hinges on hopes of Islamic reformism, whereas the indifference originates from a cynical view that sees moderate Islam campaigns as driven by political opportunism. These viewpoints conceptualize the idea of “moderate Islam” as exegetically rooted and seek to measure state actions based on that. This article argues that “Islamic” signifiers in the foreign policy narratives of Muslim states are better understood from the postcolonial subjectivities of their producers, who are most aware of uneven global cultural hierarchies. It demonstrates that elite Muslim narratives of moderate Islam are less about religious reformation as they are about ontological security seeking. This need for ontological security seeking by Muslim state elites stems from the historical stigmatization of Islam that is exacerbated by the Global War on Terror. Using the case of Malaysia, I highlight how discourses about moderate Islam in foreign policy operate through two mutually reinforcing discursive strategies: image building and image differentiation. Through historical and discourse analysis, I argue that both strategies contain a stigma-correction motive as they worked to craft this image of Malaysia being an exemplary “moderate” Muslim state.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41523136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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