D. Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, Stephen M. Saideman
Legislatures vary widely in how they affect democratic civil–military relations. In some countries, legislative oversight plays a critical role in guiding their defense establishment. In others, legislators are largely ignorant and happily so. In this article, we explain the sources of these variations in fifteen democratic states. After discussing the importance of the legislature's role in democratic civil–military relations, we clarify what we mean by oversight. We argue that variations in oversight are explained by the number and scope of legislative committees charged with military oversight and party politics within those committees. After reviewing alternative explanations, we present oversight patterns in fifteen democratic countries across the world. We then briefly examine Germany's Bundestag and Japan's Diet, as the comparison of these cases challenges most existing explanations of legislative oversight and serve as hard cases for our argument. We conclude with implications of legislative oversight for broader debates about civilian control of the military.
{"title":"Some Assembly Required: Explaining Variations in Legislative Oversight over the Armed Forces","authors":"D. Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, Stephen M. Saideman","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Legislatures vary widely in how they affect democratic civil–military relations. In some countries, legislative oversight plays a critical role in guiding their defense establishment. In others, legislators are largely ignorant and happily so. In this article, we explain the sources of these variations in fifteen democratic states. After discussing the importance of the legislature's role in democratic civil–military relations, we clarify what we mean by oversight. We argue that variations in oversight are explained by the number and scope of legislative committees charged with military oversight and party politics within those committees. After reviewing alternative explanations, we present oversight patterns in fifteen democratic countries across the world. We then briefly examine Germany's Bundestag and Japan's Diet, as the comparison of these cases challenges most existing explanations of legislative oversight and serve as hard cases for our argument. We conclude with implications of legislative oversight for broader debates about civilian control of the military.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49077686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Allen, Thomas Campbell, Nicolas Hernandez, Valeryn Shepherd
The foundation of post–WWII US foreign policy is the deployment and maintenance of a vast network of overseas military deployments. While the external security implications of these deployments are better known, scholars have spent little time connecting deployments to the internal stability threat of a coup d’état. The deployment of service members overseas creates multiple pathways to decreasing the likelihood of coup attempts by both supporting the government and its security apparatus and decreasing the benefits of a successful attempt by coup d’état conspirators. Our analysis of coups from 1951 to 2019 demonstrates that the presence of US troops decreases the likelihood of a coup.
{"title":"US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État*","authors":"M. Allen, Thomas Campbell, Nicolas Hernandez, Valeryn Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The foundation of post–WWII US foreign policy is the deployment and maintenance of a vast network of overseas military deployments. While the external security implications of these deployments are better known, scholars have spent little time connecting deployments to the internal stability threat of a coup d’état. The deployment of service members overseas creates multiple pathways to decreasing the likelihood of coup attempts by both supporting the government and its security apparatus and decreasing the benefits of a successful attempt by coup d’état conspirators. Our analysis of coups from 1951 to 2019 demonstrates that the presence of US troops decreases the likelihood of a coup.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49398553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite Beijing's aggression toward Taiwan since 2016, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party remain at odds over cross-strait policy. In contrast, South Korean conservatives and progressives united in response to Chinese economic sanctions over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. I argue that a country is less likely to unite against a foreign threat when a “formative rift” in its history divides political groups over national identity issues and causes them to perceive the threat differently, as in Taiwan but not South Korea. This study is based on a multilingual analysis of Taiwanese and South Korean political parties’ statements on China policy. Its findings contribute to scholarship on how international factors affect domestic politics and our understanding of China's rise.
{"title":"Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea","authors":"Christopher Carothers","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite Beijing's aggression toward Taiwan since 2016, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party remain at odds over cross-strait policy. In contrast, South Korean conservatives and progressives united in response to Chinese economic sanctions over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. I argue that a country is less likely to unite against a foreign threat when a “formative rift” in its history divides political groups over national identity issues and causes them to perceive the threat differently, as in Taiwan but not South Korea. This study is based on a multilingual analysis of Taiwanese and South Korean political parties’ statements on China policy. Its findings contribute to scholarship on how international factors affect domestic politics and our understanding of China's rise.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47850823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article contributes to theoretical integration in foreign policy analysis, by integrating two explanatory concepts that have mainly been used separately, namely the strategic culture of elites and the operational code of individual decision-makers. The explanatory power of using both concepts is illustrated in a case study of Australian foreign policy regarding the multinational coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The main argument is that strategic culture can provide a reasonable explanation for Australia's overall military engagement in the coalition. However, to explain Australia's approach to the coalition, strategic culture must be complemented with the operational code. The article suggests that the character of strategic culture can influence the opportunities for decision-makers to have an individual impact on foreign policy.
{"title":"Integrating Strategic Culture and the Operational Code in Foreign Policy Analysis","authors":"Joakim Eidenfalk, Fredrik Doeser","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article contributes to theoretical integration in foreign policy analysis, by integrating two explanatory concepts that have mainly been used separately, namely the strategic culture of elites and the operational code of individual decision-makers. The explanatory power of using both concepts is illustrated in a case study of Australian foreign policy regarding the multinational coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The main argument is that strategic culture can provide a reasonable explanation for Australia's overall military engagement in the coalition. However, to explain Australia's approach to the coalition, strategic culture must be complemented with the operational code. The article suggests that the character of strategic culture can influence the opportunities for decision-makers to have an individual impact on foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48921801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does partisan ideology influence whether Europeans are willing to use nuclear weapons, and if so, how? The US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe have been at the core of European security since the Cold War, but we have still yet to learn what would make Europeans be willing to support their use. In this paper, we present the results of a survey, in which we asked citizens in Germany and the Netherlands about their views on the use of the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory in four distinct scenarios. Our results indicate that voters of right-wing parties are more likely to approve of the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. There are, however, important differences between the two countries in terms of the degree to which the participants oppose the use of nuclear weapons. These results have implications for NATO's nuclear deterrence posture.
{"title":"Ideology and the Red Button: How Ideology Shapes Nuclear Weapons’ Use Preferences in Europe","authors":"M. Onderco, Tom Etienne, Michal Smetana","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Does partisan ideology influence whether Europeans are willing to use nuclear weapons, and if so, how? The US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe have been at the core of European security since the Cold War, but we have still yet to learn what would make Europeans be willing to support their use. In this paper, we present the results of a survey, in which we asked citizens in Germany and the Netherlands about their views on the use of the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory in four distinct scenarios. Our results indicate that voters of right-wing parties are more likely to approve of the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. There are, however, important differences between the two countries in terms of the degree to which the participants oppose the use of nuclear weapons. These results have implications for NATO's nuclear deterrence posture.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43601267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
More than 20 years after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), the United States is still in the process of institutionalizing its strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). While the Women, Peace, and Security Act (2017) established a legal mandate by which federal agencies are obligated to demonstrate efforts to mainstream gender in foreign policy, timely implementation has been hindered by confusion and disagreement over the aims of WPS. Drawing on elite interviews with 35 stakeholders working on WPS implementation across relevant institutions, I argue that implementation efforts in the United States have resulted in understandings of WPS that parse the agenda as an extension of familiar issues like the War on Terror, debates over reproductive rights, and issues of sexual harassment and equal opportunity. I demonstrate how feminist security studies and cognitive approaches to foreign policy analysis explain these outcomes.
{"title":"“Women, Men, Boys, and Girls”: Analyzing the Implementation of Women, Peace, and Security in the United States","authors":"Alexis Henshaw","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 More than 20 years after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), the United States is still in the process of institutionalizing its strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). While the Women, Peace, and Security Act (2017) established a legal mandate by which federal agencies are obligated to demonstrate efforts to mainstream gender in foreign policy, timely implementation has been hindered by confusion and disagreement over the aims of WPS. Drawing on elite interviews with 35 stakeholders working on WPS implementation across relevant institutions, I argue that implementation efforts in the United States have resulted in understandings of WPS that parse the agenda as an extension of familiar issues like the War on Terror, debates over reproductive rights, and issues of sexual harassment and equal opportunity. I demonstrate how feminist security studies and cognitive approaches to foreign policy analysis explain these outcomes.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46568439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper, using examples from Turkish foreign policy between 2002 and 2014, argues that the fragmentation in foreign policymaking due to adopting different foreign policy ideas, that is, ideas of the elected leadership and the bureaucracy, is likely to generate competition between the state agencies that constitute the foreign policy bureaucracy. If there is backlash in the bureaucracy to realize the government's revisionist foreign policy goals, then the government aims to transform the bureaucracy by empowering certain small bureaucratic units, that is, missionary agencies. Once the degree of conflict between the government and the bureaucracy becomes severe, then the elected officials opt to work with the established bureaucratic agencies to speed up the decision-making processes. The analysis based on a series of interviews conducted with sixty-one Turkish foreign policymakers shows that the turf war in the foreign policy bureaucracy is a conceptual framework for comprehending how elected officials use bureaucratic tactics to undermine the involvement of bureaucrats in decision-making processes. Finally, the study contributes to current debates on populism and the presidentialization of foreign policy by showing that the foreign policy bureaucracy is not immune from the anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric of governments.
{"title":"Turf Wars in Foreign Policy Bureaucracy: Rivalry between the Government and the Bureaucracy in Turkish Foreign Policy","authors":"Berkay Gülen","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper, using examples from Turkish foreign policy between 2002 and 2014, argues that the fragmentation in foreign policymaking due to adopting different foreign policy ideas, that is, ideas of the elected leadership and the bureaucracy, is likely to generate competition between the state agencies that constitute the foreign policy bureaucracy. If there is backlash in the bureaucracy to realize the government's revisionist foreign policy goals, then the government aims to transform the bureaucracy by empowering certain small bureaucratic units, that is, missionary agencies. Once the degree of conflict between the government and the bureaucracy becomes severe, then the elected officials opt to work with the established bureaucratic agencies to speed up the decision-making processes. The analysis based on a series of interviews conducted with sixty-one Turkish foreign policymakers shows that the turf war in the foreign policy bureaucracy is a conceptual framework for comprehending how elected officials use bureaucratic tactics to undermine the involvement of bureaucrats in decision-making processes. Finally, the study contributes to current debates on populism and the presidentialization of foreign policy by showing that the foreign policy bureaucracy is not immune from the anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric of governments.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60884354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Presidents cite many reasons to justify their decisions to use military force. Regardless of the explanation provided, putting soldiers in harm's way entails a high degree of risk. Some presidents are more willing than others to undertake risky policies, and psychological dispositions help to account for their willingness. According to evolutionary psychology theories of conflict, facial characteristics serve as important cues of aggression, and a substantial body of empirical evidence supports the association between the facial width-to-height ratio (FWHR) and conflict behavior. All else equal, individuals with greater FWHRs are more likely to choose aggressive foreign policies. Empirical analyses of 1953–2000 show that US presidents with higher FWHRs are four times more likely than those with lower FWHRs to use military force. The results hold independent of traditional explanations such as power, ongoing war, elections, the misery index, and alternative measures of leader psychology.
{"title":"Facial Metrics, Aggression, and the Use of Military Force","authors":"Ross A. Miller","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Presidents cite many reasons to justify their decisions to use military force. Regardless of the explanation provided, putting soldiers in harm's way entails a high degree of risk. Some presidents are more willing than others to undertake risky policies, and psychological dispositions help to account for their willingness. According to evolutionary psychology theories of conflict, facial characteristics serve as important cues of aggression, and a substantial body of empirical evidence supports the association between the facial width-to-height ratio (FWHR) and conflict behavior. All else equal, individuals with greater FWHRs are more likely to choose aggressive foreign policies. Empirical analyses of 1953–2000 show that US presidents with higher FWHRs are four times more likely than those with lower FWHRs to use military force. The results hold independent of traditional explanations such as power, ongoing war, elections, the misery index, and alternative measures of leader psychology.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45163610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article assesses the international conflict propensity of leaders that come to power through revolutions. I argue that when revolutions result in the overthrow of governments perceived as enabling the interference of outside powers in internal affairs, the leaders that assume office afterward are especially inclined to provoke international conflict. I code these revolutions as “external” and juxtapose them against “internal” revolutions motivated by domestic grievances rather than animus against foreign meddling. Regression analysis and survival analysis suggest that leaders assuming office following external revolutions are more prone to conflict than leaders that assume office through internal revolutions. To illustrate the relationship between external revolution and international aggression, the paper utilizes a case study to examine Iranian foreign policy under Ayatollah Khomeini.
{"title":"Revolutionary Ideals and International Aggression","authors":"M. Timmerman","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article assesses the international conflict propensity of leaders that come to power through revolutions. I argue that when revolutions result in the overthrow of governments perceived as enabling the interference of outside powers in internal affairs, the leaders that assume office afterward are especially inclined to provoke international conflict. I code these revolutions as “external” and juxtapose them against “internal” revolutions motivated by domestic grievances rather than animus against foreign meddling. Regression analysis and survival analysis suggest that leaders assuming office following external revolutions are more prone to conflict than leaders that assume office through internal revolutions. To illustrate the relationship between external revolution and international aggression, the paper utilizes a case study to examine Iranian foreign policy under Ayatollah Khomeini.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47284044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1840s, Britain engaged in a series of trade liberalizations, with important consequences for itself and the international system. Many have tried to explain the central piece, Repeal of the Corn Laws, using liberal arguments from international political economy. Few find these arguments persuasive. Applying defensive neoclassical realism, I demonstrate how fluctuations in external threats to Britain—in particular posed by France—drove reassessments of trade policy. British leaders judged both the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts in terms of their contributions to security. Reassessments were also shaped by new information, such as the potato blight in Ireland. While defensive neoclassical realism highlights when a state may seek change to attain greater security, liberalism indicates how strongly constituents may defend existing policies. I use both to explain why tariffs remained popular, but Cabinets overrode protectionism's domestic supporters in this decade.
{"title":"Britain's Trade Liberalization in the 1840s: A Defensive Neoclassical Realist Explanation","authors":"M. Brawley","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the 1840s, Britain engaged in a series of trade liberalizations, with important consequences for itself and the international system. Many have tried to explain the central piece, Repeal of the Corn Laws, using liberal arguments from international political economy. Few find these arguments persuasive. Applying defensive neoclassical realism, I demonstrate how fluctuations in external threats to Britain—in particular posed by France—drove reassessments of trade policy. British leaders judged both the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts in terms of their contributions to security. Reassessments were also shaped by new information, such as the potato blight in Ireland. While defensive neoclassical realism highlights when a state may seek change to attain greater security, liberalism indicates how strongly constituents may defend existing policies. I use both to explain why tariffs remained popular, but Cabinets overrode protectionism's domestic supporters in this decade.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47024656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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