This article analyzes how foreign policymakers legitimize their enactment of role conceptions to play a more active role at the global level toward a potentially reluctant domestic audience. In order to reduce the likelihood of domestic role contestation while at the same time subscribe toward ego and alter expectations, it is necessary for policymakers to legitimize role conceptions and their enactments toward domestic audiences. This article develops the notion of role legitimation to capture this process and puts forward two mechanisms through which role legitimation is performed. The first mechanism is the revival of roles from a specific period in time that is deeply entrenched as an inalienable historical feature of the state. The second one is the reproduction of the international expectations into the domestic political discourse. To illustrate the argument, this article utilizes the case of Indonesia's foreign policy during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Presidency (2004–2014), particularly its engagement at G20, its objective to make the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a global player, and its agenda to promote democracy and moderate Islam at the global level.
{"title":"Role Legitimation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Indonesia as an Emerging Power under Yudhoyono's Presidency (2004–2014)","authors":"M. F. Karim","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes how foreign policymakers legitimize their enactment of role conceptions to play a more active role at the global level toward a potentially reluctant domestic audience. In order to reduce the likelihood of domestic role contestation while at the same time subscribe toward ego and alter expectations, it is necessary for policymakers to legitimize role conceptions and their enactments toward domestic audiences. This article develops the notion of role legitimation to capture this process and puts forward two mechanisms through which role legitimation is performed. The first mechanism is the revival of roles from a specific period in time that is deeply entrenched as an inalienable historical feature of the state. The second one is the reproduction of the international expectations into the domestic political discourse. To illustrate the argument, this article utilizes the case of Indonesia's foreign policy during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Presidency (2004–2014), particularly its engagement at G20, its objective to make the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a global player, and its agenda to promote democracy and moderate Islam at the global level.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43608615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whereas much of the literature on status and domestic audiences analyzes how international achievement helps shore up domestic legitimacy, analyses regarding the opposite direction—how the lack of domestic support undercuts status signaling—remain rare. Mega-events constitute a highly public and visible example of conspicuous consumption as a form of status signaling. However, in rising democracies state elites are obliged to frame the benefits of hosting a World Cup in both instrumental dimensions and expressive virtues. In Brazil, the political fallout from the economic crisis, however, made it very difficult for state elites to rely on the expressive value of Brazil's status as World Cup host to subdue domestic opposition driven by instrumental logics. In contrast, for South Africans, the 2010 World Cup not only became an “exceptional status moment” but also constituted a “nation founding moment,” which meant that the expressive significance of hosting the first World Cup in Africa mitigated similar instrumental criticism.
{"title":"Status Signaling and the Risk of Domestic Opposition: Comparing South Africa and Brazil's Hosting of the 2010 and 2014 World Cups","authors":"Janis van der Westhuizen","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Whereas much of the literature on status and domestic audiences analyzes how international achievement helps shore up domestic legitimacy, analyses regarding the opposite direction—how the lack of domestic support undercuts status signaling—remain rare. Mega-events constitute a highly public and visible example of conspicuous consumption as a form of status signaling. However, in rising democracies state elites are obliged to frame the benefits of hosting a World Cup in both instrumental dimensions and expressive virtues. In Brazil, the political fallout from the economic crisis, however, made it very difficult for state elites to rely on the expressive value of Brazil's status as World Cup host to subdue domestic opposition driven by instrumental logics. In contrast, for South Africans, the 2010 World Cup not only became an “exceptional status moment” but also constituted a “nation founding moment,” which meant that the expressive significance of hosting the first World Cup in Africa mitigated similar instrumental criticism.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43312635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When advising civilian leaders on the use of force, are nonelected officials swayed by public opinion? Scholars have long debated whether public preferences affect foreign policy, but most studies focus on elected politicians, overlooking the nonelected officials who formulate policies and advise leaders. Bureaucrats and nonelected officials are expected to provide advice based on technical expertise, yet they may have institutional incentives and civic-minded reasons to recommend actions that align with popular preferences. This potentially creates additional channels through which public opinion influences policy decisions. An original survey experiment fielded on US military officers reveals that public opposition makes military leaders less likely to recommend the use of force. This article contributes to debates on the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking, integrates research on public opinion and civil–military relations, and yields broader insights for scholars studying the behavior of officials who are not subject to electoral incentives. Al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza, los funcionarios no electos ¿se dejan influir por la opinión pública? Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior, pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos, pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes. Se espera que los burócratas y los funcionarios no electos ofrezcan un asesoramiento basado en la experiencia técnica, pero que puedan tener incentivos institucionales y razones de carácter cívico para recomendar acciones que se alineen con las preferencias populares. Potencialmente, esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas. Una original encuesta realizada a oficiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza. Este trabajo contribuye a los debates sobre el papel de la opinión pública en la construcción de la política exterior, integra la investigación sobre la opinión pública y las relaciones cívico–militares, y aporta una visión más amplia para los estudiosos que evalúan el comportamiento de los funcionarios que no son objeto de incentivos electorales. Les officiels non élus sont-ils influencés par l'opinion publique lorsqu'ils conseillent des dirigeants civils sur le recours à la force? Des chercheurs ont longuement débattu pour déterminer si les préférences publiques affectaient la politique étrangère, mais la plupart des études se concentrent sur les politiciens élus en négligeant les officiels non élus qui formulent les politiques et conseillent les dirigeants. Les bureaucrates et officiels non élus sont supposés prodiguer des conseils reposant sur une expertise technique, mais ils peuvent toutefois avoir des motiva
当就使用武力问题向平民领导人提供咨询时，未经选举的官员是否受到公众舆论的压制？学者们长期以来一直在争论公众偏好是否影响外交政策，但大多数研究都集中在民选政治家身上，重点是制定政策和向领导人提供建议的非民选官员。预计官员和非选举官员将根据技术专长提供咨询意见，但他们可能有体制激励和考虑公民的理由，建议采取符合群众偏好的行动。这可能会创造更多的渠道，公众舆论通过这些渠道影响政策决策。一项针对美国军官的初步调查实验表明，公众反对派使军事领导人不太可能建议使用武力。本文有助于讨论舆论在外交政策制定中的作用，整合舆论和军民关系的研究，并为研究不受选举激励的官员行为的学者提供更广泛的见解。al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza，los funcionarios no electos？se dejan influir por la opinión pública？Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior，pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos，pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes。我们希望，我们的工作和功能没有选举，我们的经验基础，我们希望激励机构和机构，我们希望与人民的偏好保持一致。。Potencialmente，esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas。一个原始的encuesta realizada a officiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza。Este Trabajo为外部政治建设中的公共舆论辩论做出了贡献，整合了公共舆论和军事关系的调查，并为选举激励目标提供了更大的愿景。非选举产生的官员在向文职领导人提供使用武力的建议时是否受到公众舆论的影响？研究人员长期以来一直在争论公众偏好是否影响外交政策，但大多数研究集中于民选政治家，而忽略了制定政策和向领导人提供建议的非民选官员。非选举产生的官僚和官员本应根据技术专长提供建议，但他们可能有机构动机和公民理由建议符合大众偏好的措施。这可能会创造公众舆论影响政治决策的额外渠道。一项针对美国军官的原始调查经验表明，公众反对使军事领导人不太可能建议使用武力。本文有助于讨论公众舆论在外交政策制定中的作用，包括对公众舆论和军民关系的研究，并为研究非选举动机官员行为的研究人员提供更广泛的信息。
{"title":"Soldiers, Pollsters, and International Crises: Public Opinion and the Military's Advice on the Use of Force","authors":"Erik Lin-Greenberg","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When advising civilian leaders on the use of force, are nonelected officials swayed by public opinion? Scholars have long debated whether public preferences affect foreign policy, but most studies focus on elected politicians, overlooking the nonelected officials who formulate policies and advise leaders. Bureaucrats and nonelected officials are expected to provide advice based on technical expertise, yet they may have institutional incentives and civic-minded reasons to recommend actions that align with popular preferences. This potentially creates additional channels through which public opinion influences policy decisions. An original survey experiment fielded on US military officers reveals that public opposition makes military leaders less likely to recommend the use of force. This article contributes to debates on the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking, integrates research on public opinion and civil–military relations, and yields broader insights for scholars studying the behavior of officials who are not subject to electoral incentives.\u0000 Al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza, los funcionarios no electos ¿se dejan influir por la opinión pública? Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior, pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos, pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes. Se espera que los burócratas y los funcionarios no electos ofrezcan un asesoramiento basado en la experiencia técnica, pero que puedan tener incentivos institucionales y razones de carácter cívico para recomendar acciones que se alineen con las preferencias populares. Potencialmente, esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas. Una original encuesta realizada a oficiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza. Este trabajo contribuye a los debates sobre el papel de la opinión pública en la construcción de la política exterior, integra la investigación sobre la opinión pública y las relaciones cívico–militares, y aporta una visión más amplia para los estudiosos que evalúan el comportamiento de los funcionarios que no son objeto de incentivos electorales.\u0000 Les officiels non élus sont-ils influencés par l'opinion publique lorsqu'ils conseillent des dirigeants civils sur le recours à la force? Des chercheurs ont longuement débattu pour déterminer si les préférences publiques affectaient la politique étrangère, mais la plupart des études se concentrent sur les politiciens élus en négligeant les officiels non élus qui formulent les politiques et conseillent les dirigeants. Les bureaucrates et officiels non élus sont supposés prodiguer des conseils reposant sur une expertise technique, mais ils peuvent toutefois avoir des motiva","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46556899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diversionary theories of interstate conflict suggest that domestic problems push leaders to initiate hostilities against foreign foes in order to garner support. However, the empirical support for this proposition is mixed as critics point out that leaders should not start conflicts that can be extremely costly for them, potentially even removing them from office. We propose that while leaders may not initiate new conflicts, they do tap into existing territorial disputes when facing internal disapproval. That is, they engage in material acts of foreign policy showing domestic audiences that they defend or emphasize their country's claim while being unlikely to result in full-scale armed confrontations. To test this claim, we use monthly data, covering the period 2013–2020, on leader approval and incursions into contested airspace from Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with Greece. Results from time-series models offer support for our expectation.
{"title":"Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes: Evidence from Turkish Airspace Incursions","authors":"Marius Mehrl, Ioannis Choulis","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB007","url":null,"abstract":"Diversionary theories of interstate conflict suggest that domestic problems push leaders to initiate hostilities against foreign foes in order to garner support. However, the empirical support for this proposition is mixed as critics point out that leaders should not start conflicts that can be extremely costly for them, potentially even removing them from office. We propose that while leaders may not initiate new conflicts, they do tap into existing territorial disputes when facing internal disapproval. That is, they engage in material acts of foreign policy showing domestic audiences that they defend or emphasize their country's claim while being unlikely to result in full-scale armed confrontations. To test this claim, we use monthly data, covering the period 2013–2020, on leader approval and incursions into contested airspace from Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with Greece. Results from time-series models offer support for our expectation.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48778064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corrigendum to: China's “Major Country Diplomacy”: Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change","authors":"Stephen N Smith","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46239187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does energy securitization promote or hinder regional cooperation over energy resources? This paper argues that policymakers frame energy issues as existential threats to facilitate both outcomes, depending on how they perceive the reliability of their country's energy supply. When countries are confident in their supply, they begin to seek regional cooperation opportunities that they had previously rejected. Rather than abandon existential rhetoric that served to prevent cooperation when supply was vulnerable, policymakers adopt opposing constructs of security and direct them toward different audiences to gain their support. When addressing the international community, policymakers employ neoliberal concepts of security as a mutually beneficial result of trade and cooperation. When addressing domestic audiences, policymakers employ realist paradigms of security as competition toward self-preservation and dominance. Israel serves as a case study to test this argument. This paper examines how major natural gas discoveries in 2009 shifted longstanding Israeli isolationism and encouraged it to seek deeper economic ties with its neighbors. To promote its new policy, the Israeli government argued before its domestic audience that gas exports are essential for creating leverage against the EU and preventing terrorism on its borders, while simultaneously arguing toward foreign audiences that the exports serve to promote regional unity.
{"title":"Securitizing Energy Cooperation: Israel's Regional Shift in the East-Mediterranean","authors":"Elai Rettig","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Does energy securitization promote or hinder regional cooperation over energy resources? This paper argues that policymakers frame energy issues as existential threats to facilitate both outcomes, depending on how they perceive the reliability of their country's energy supply. When countries are confident in their supply, they begin to seek regional cooperation opportunities that they had previously rejected. Rather than abandon existential rhetoric that served to prevent cooperation when supply was vulnerable, policymakers adopt opposing constructs of security and direct them toward different audiences to gain their support. When addressing the international community, policymakers employ neoliberal concepts of security as a mutually beneficial result of trade and cooperation. When addressing domestic audiences, policymakers employ realist paradigms of security as competition toward self-preservation and dominance. Israel serves as a case study to test this argument. This paper examines how major natural gas discoveries in 2009 shifted longstanding Israeli isolationism and encouraged it to seek deeper economic ties with its neighbors. To promote its new policy, the Israeli government argued before its domestic audience that gas exports are essential for creating leverage against the EU and preventing terrorism on its borders, while simultaneously arguing toward foreign audiences that the exports serve to promote regional unity.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42278876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research note reports views on nuclear deterrence, coercion, and non-use norms from surveys of 320 current and former US national security officials and 1,303 US-based international relations scholars. It finds that both groups hold relatively optimistic views on these key issues. Majorities express confidence that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, but are skeptical that a nuclear arsenal can translate into coercive foreign policy success. Respondents are also confident that the nuclear taboo constrains countries from using nuclear weapons in a first strike, but the intensity varies by the country in question. Although limited, the results demonstrate overlap between academics and policymakers on key nuclear concepts. To the extent that experts hold these topline nuclear views that can influence their decision-making, teaching, and research. The results also point to a common tension in thinking about deterrence against conventional attack and norms constraining nuclear first use.
{"title":"MAD and Taboo: US Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion, and Non-Use Norms","authors":"Paul C. Avey","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAA019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAA019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This research note reports views on nuclear deterrence, coercion, and non-use norms from surveys of 320 current and former US national security officials and 1,303 US-based international relations scholars. It finds that both groups hold relatively optimistic views on these key issues. Majorities express confidence that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence, but are skeptical that a nuclear arsenal can translate into coercive foreign policy success. Respondents are also confident that the nuclear taboo constrains countries from using nuclear weapons in a first strike, but the intensity varies by the country in question. Although limited, the results demonstrate overlap between academics and policymakers on key nuclear concepts. To the extent that experts hold these topline nuclear views that can influence their decision-making, teaching, and research. The results also point to a common tension in thinking about deterrence against conventional attack and norms constraining nuclear first use.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46314156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates the emergence and puzzling termination of the Turkish–Israeli alliance (1996–2011). While a litany of studies has offered changing material circumstances, the conservative agenda of Turkey's AKP government, and other exogenous factors as possible explanations, these fail to capture the complexity of the situation. Instead, this article applies a modified neoclassical realist framework of analysis that longitudinally recontextualizes the alliance. Specifically, in both its inception and collapse, Turkey's elite decision-makers faced no apparent external threats and were free to pursue their favored foreign policy. Domestically, however, Turkey's elite structure was decisive. In the 1990s, the old elite used their institutional power to restrain emerging elites and used their alliance with Israel as a pretext to do so. A decade later, a new elite seized institutional power. No longer restrained domestically, and absent external enemies, the new elites targeted Israel as a menace to win further domestic support, but this eventuated in a series of events that led to the termination of the alliance. Overall, the article concludes that alliance policy can become erratic at the intersection of permissive international environments and elite-induced domestic conflicts.
{"title":"Elite Change and the Inception, Duration, and Demise of the Turkish–Israeli Alliance","authors":"E. Aydinli, Onur Erpul","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAA021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAA021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the emergence and puzzling termination of the Turkish–Israeli alliance (1996–2011). While a litany of studies has offered changing material circumstances, the conservative agenda of Turkey's AKP government, and other exogenous factors as possible explanations, these fail to capture the complexity of the situation. Instead, this article applies a modified neoclassical realist framework of analysis that longitudinally recontextualizes the alliance. Specifically, in both its inception and collapse, Turkey's elite decision-makers faced no apparent external threats and were free to pursue their favored foreign policy. Domestically, however, Turkey's elite structure was decisive. In the 1990s, the old elite used their institutional power to restrain emerging elites and used their alliance with Israel as a pretext to do so. A decade later, a new elite seized institutional power. No longer restrained domestically, and absent external enemies, the new elites targeted Israel as a menace to win further domestic support, but this eventuated in a series of events that led to the termination of the alliance. Overall, the article concludes that alliance policy can become erratic at the intersection of permissive international environments and elite-induced domestic conflicts.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAA021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42301914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does intrastate conflict termination increase foreign direct investment (FDI)? Why do some countries receive rapid FDI inflows after an internal armed conflict ends, while others do not? As a key explanation, we focus on the different types of conflict termination that send different signals to foreign investors. We argue that post-conflict countries receive more FDI when an intrastate conflict ends in a decisive manner because decisive termination lowers the risk of conflict resumption that creates precarious investment climates. Using the UCDP armed conflict termination data from 1970 to 2009, we empirically find that countries emerging from an intrastate conflict that ends in one side's victory, in particular government victory, and that ends in a peace agreement with major power involvement attract more FDI over the course of post-conflict years.
{"title":"Intrastate Armed Conflict Termination and Foreign Direct Investment","authors":"Daehee Bak, Hoon Lee","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAA027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAA027","url":null,"abstract":"Does intrastate conflict termination increase foreign direct investment (FDI)? Why do some countries receive rapid FDI inflows after an internal armed conflict ends, while others do not? As a key explanation, we focus on the different types of conflict termination that send different signals to foreign investors. We argue that post-conflict countries receive more FDI when an intrastate conflict ends in a decisive manner because decisive termination lowers the risk of conflict resumption that creates precarious investment climates. Using the UCDP armed conflict termination data from 1970 to 2009, we empirically find that countries emerging from an intrastate conflict that ends in one side's victory, in particular government victory, and that ends in a peace agreement with major power involvement attract more FDI over the course of post-conflict years.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAA027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47047188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper probes China's official political concept of “Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” to argue that the boundaries of legitimate state action have been dramatically expanded since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Building on Patrick Jackson's transactional social constructivism, I place the causal mechanism in China's new assertiveness in seminal changes to how Chinese elites legitimize their country's role in global politics. Drawing upon elite speeches, Party documents, and Chinese-language scholarship between 2013 and 2019, I show how new legitimation strategies are used to justify China's effort to proactively reform international order, engage in ideological competition with the West, and assume greater responsibility for global affairs in accordance with its elevated power and status. The boundaries of action sanctioned by this new discourse are likely to persist in the short to medium term, with implications for regional order in Asia and beyond.
{"title":"China's “Major Country Diplomacy”: Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change","authors":"Stephen N Smith","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper probes China's official political concept of “Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” to argue that the boundaries of legitimate state action have been dramatically expanded since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Building on Patrick Jackson's transactional social constructivism, I place the causal mechanism in China's new assertiveness in seminal changes to how Chinese elites legitimize their country's role in global politics. Drawing upon elite speeches, Party documents, and Chinese-language scholarship between 2013 and 2019, I show how new legitimation strategies are used to justify China's effort to proactively reform international order, engage in ideological competition with the West, and assume greater responsibility for global affairs in accordance with its elevated power and status. The boundaries of action sanctioned by this new discourse are likely to persist in the short to medium term, with implications for regional order in Asia and beyond.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42554916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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