This paper examines mass public opinion in three small states of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to understand why some individuals in these states prefer a pro-Western foreign policy orientation–pursuing membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), while others do not. We draw on social identity theory to hypothesize the potential affinity some individuals feel toward the West. Using public data from the South Caucasus region where Russia has strongly attempted to block Western penetration, the paper demonstrates that the commitment to democratic values is central to the understanding of mass opinion over foreign alliances in small states: individuals who demonstrate pro-democracy attitudes and support democratic values are more likely to approve of pro-Western foreign policy orientation. These findings suggest that the study of foreign policy preferences in small states is important for our understanding of great power politics and alliance competition.
{"title":"Between the West and Russia: Explaining Individual Foreign Policy Preferences in the Small States","authors":"N. Abbasov, Cameron G. Thies","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines mass public opinion in three small states of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to understand why some individuals in these states prefer a pro-Western foreign policy orientation–pursuing membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), while others do not. We draw on social identity theory to hypothesize the potential affinity some individuals feel toward the West. Using public data from the South Caucasus region where Russia has strongly attempted to block Western penetration, the paper demonstrates that the commitment to democratic values is central to the understanding of mass opinion over foreign alliances in small states: individuals who demonstrate pro-democracy attitudes and support democratic values are more likely to approve of pro-Western foreign policy orientation. These findings suggest that the study of foreign policy preferences in small states is important for our understanding of great power politics and alliance competition.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48829599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well established that state reputations impact international politics, but less is known about how these reputations change. We investigate one form of change by examining how individuals process new information. Using a logic of discordant learning, we expect good reputations to survive new and incongruent information that counters expectations. Good reputations can help states “weather the storm” in times of crisis. Such buffers have their limits, however, as strong incongruent signals can trigger large corrections in a state’s reputation. To analyze these expectations, we focus on alliance reliability. Using a pair of survey experiments, we find that individuals alter their perceptions of a state’s reputation when observing signals that deviate from the state’s prior reputation, and that good reputations are able to “weather the storm”. We also find that strongly incongruent signals affect good reputations more than others, suggesting “the bigger they are, the harder they fall” may also apply. Even in these large corrections, however, a reputation for reliability has lasting benefits. The analysis helps us understand when to expect changes in reputations for alliance reliability, which in turn may inform when reputation loss can influence alliance politics.
{"title":"Weathering the Storm: Discordant Learning about Reputations for Reliability","authors":"Bailee Donahue, Mark J C Crescenzi","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is well established that state reputations impact international politics, but less is known about how these reputations change. We investigate one form of change by examining how individuals process new information. Using a logic of discordant learning, we expect good reputations to survive new and incongruent information that counters expectations. Good reputations can help states “weather the storm” in times of crisis. Such buffers have their limits, however, as strong incongruent signals can trigger large corrections in a state’s reputation. To analyze these expectations, we focus on alliance reliability. Using a pair of survey experiments, we find that individuals alter their perceptions of a state’s reputation when observing signals that deviate from the state’s prior reputation, and that good reputations are able to “weather the storm”. We also find that strongly incongruent signals affect good reputations more than others, suggesting “the bigger they are, the harder they fall” may also apply. Even in these large corrections, however, a reputation for reliability has lasting benefits. The analysis helps us understand when to expect changes in reputations for alliance reliability, which in turn may inform when reputation loss can influence alliance politics.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47763869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars of international relations disagree whether trade in natural gas between Europe and Russia provides the latter with a source of foreign policy power. Because a reduction in trade of natural gas is costly for importers, the potential economic power of Russia's energy weapon could alter strategic calculations about diplomatic conflict with Russia. Consequently, we hypothesize that increases in dependence on Russian natural gas will lead to more foreign policy convergence with Russia. Using a panel of European states from 1995 to 2013 and a time series of Germany from 1979 to 2013, we find support for our argument that greater dependence on Russian natural gas correlates with more similarity in voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly. Our research suggests that Russian natural gas imports to Europe shape broader political alignments, adding to the growing body of research on the potential ramifications of Russia's energy weapon.
{"title":"Foreign Policy Alignment and Russia's Energy Weapon","authors":"Christina M Stoelzel Chadwick, A. Long","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scholars of international relations disagree whether trade in natural gas between Europe and Russia provides the latter with a source of foreign policy power. Because a reduction in trade of natural gas is costly for importers, the potential economic power of Russia's energy weapon could alter strategic calculations about diplomatic conflict with Russia. Consequently, we hypothesize that increases in dependence on Russian natural gas will lead to more foreign policy convergence with Russia. Using a panel of European states from 1995 to 2013 and a time series of Germany from 1979 to 2013, we find support for our argument that greater dependence on Russian natural gas correlates with more similarity in voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly. Our research suggests that Russian natural gas imports to Europe shape broader political alignments, adding to the growing body of research on the potential ramifications of Russia's energy weapon.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48000217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To what extent do arms embargoes curtail the embargoed state's ability to get conventional weapons? We argue that arms embargoes rarely prevent states from receiving conventional weapons, and are one of the few events that push states to switch their supplier base. Using a new dataset on the place of origin of conventional weapons, we provide a more full and complete picture of the effects of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations and European Union. We show that middlemen, a previously obscured category of states who sell, but do not produce arms, are crucial to skirting embargoes. This article suggests that arms embargoes are a more complicated foreign policy tool than scholars have previously appreciated, and that policymakers need to be cautious in imposing them.
{"title":"The Unintended Consequences of Arms Embargoes","authors":"R. Kuo, J. Spindel","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac030","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent do arms embargoes curtail the embargoed state's ability to get conventional weapons? We argue that arms embargoes rarely prevent states from receiving conventional weapons, and are one of the few events that push states to switch their supplier base. Using a new dataset on the place of origin of conventional weapons, we provide a more full and complete picture of the effects of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations and European Union. We show that middlemen, a previously obscured category of states who sell, but do not produce arms, are crucial to skirting embargoes. This article suggests that arms embargoes are a more complicated foreign policy tool than scholars have previously appreciated, and that policymakers need to be cautious in imposing them.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47972957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nazli Avdan, B. Early, Ryan Yu-Lin Liou, Amanda M. Murdie, Dursun Peksen
What effects do economic sanctions have on the volume of domestic terrorism within target states and transnational terrorism directed toward Americans by targeted nationals? In this article, we theorize that sanctions imposed by the United States increase the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism, but the suggested effect is conditioned by the freedom of expression in sanctioned states. When media freedom and other information freedoms are high, we posit that citizens are more likely to direct their grievances against their own government, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism as time under economic sanction increases. When freedom of expression is low, however, leaders of sanctioned states may be able to exploit sanctions to channel hostility away from the home regime via transnational terrorism exported from the sanctioned state. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis lend support to our argument on domestic terrorism in the sanctioned state while showing no statistical support for the hypothesis concerning transnational terrorism.
{"title":"The Blame Game: Public Outcry and Terrorism within and Exported from the Sanctioned State","authors":"Nazli Avdan, B. Early, Ryan Yu-Lin Liou, Amanda M. Murdie, Dursun Peksen","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What effects do economic sanctions have on the volume of domestic terrorism within target states and transnational terrorism directed toward Americans by targeted nationals? In this article, we theorize that sanctions imposed by the United States increase the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism, but the suggested effect is conditioned by the freedom of expression in sanctioned states. When media freedom and other information freedoms are high, we posit that citizens are more likely to direct their grievances against their own government, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism as time under economic sanction increases. When freedom of expression is low, however, leaders of sanctioned states may be able to exploit sanctions to channel hostility away from the home regime via transnational terrorism exported from the sanctioned state. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis lend support to our argument on domestic terrorism in the sanctioned state while showing no statistical support for the hypothesis concerning transnational terrorism.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49341672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On September 2, 2020, the United States sanctioned two International Criminal Court (ICC) officials, under an executive order issued 3 months previously. In response, over two-thirds of ICC States Parties issued or joined public statements supporting the Court. Why did some ICC members condemn the sanctions or otherwise express support for the Court, while others did not? We begin by documenting variation in the type and timing of statements before proposing and testing a theory focused on the interaction between security dependence on the United States and domestic rule of law norms. We find that states more dependent on the United States for security were less likely to issue statements; furthermore, among states that issued statements, security dependence was associated with issuing weaker—and fewer—statements. Conversely, states with stronger domestic rule of law issued stronger—and more—statements, although rule of law was not significantly associated with issuing any statement.
{"title":"Who Stands Up for the ICC? Explaining Variation in State Party Responses to US Sanctions","authors":"M. Broache, Kyle Reed","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 On September 2, 2020, the United States sanctioned two International Criminal Court (ICC) officials, under an executive order issued 3 months previously. In response, over two-thirds of ICC States Parties issued or joined public statements supporting the Court. Why did some ICC members condemn the sanctions or otherwise express support for the Court, while others did not? We begin by documenting variation in the type and timing of statements before proposing and testing a theory focused on the interaction between security dependence on the United States and domestic rule of law norms. We find that states more dependent on the United States for security were less likely to issue statements; furthermore, among states that issued statements, security dependence was associated with issuing weaker—and fewer—statements. Conversely, states with stronger domestic rule of law issued stronger—and more—statements, although rule of law was not significantly associated with issuing any statement.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49227637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do some smaller states signal to move away from the US-led liberal order? We look at the ruling group survival in smaller allies to answer this pressing puzzle. Despite accepting the merit of systemic explanations, we simply argue that the ruling groups in smaller states engage with revisionist powers in the international system to sustain and enhance their privileged positions in the domestic policy setting. Hungary, a NATO member, and Pakistan, a traditional ally of the United States, have long been showing signs of shifting toward the China/Russia axis. We explain the behavior of Hungary and Pakistan during the 2010s by focusing on the survival strategies of key ruling groups in those countries. We simply argue that relations of competing great powers with the ruling group in smaller states determine the fate of asymmetric alliance.
{"title":"The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from the US-led Order?","authors":"A. Balcı, Furkan Halit Yolcu","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why do some smaller states signal to move away from the US-led liberal order? We look at the ruling group survival in smaller allies to answer this pressing puzzle. Despite accepting the merit of systemic explanations, we simply argue that the ruling groups in smaller states engage with revisionist powers in the international system to sustain and enhance their privileged positions in the domestic policy setting. Hungary, a NATO member, and Pakistan, a traditional ally of the United States, have long been showing signs of shifting toward the China/Russia axis. We explain the behavior of Hungary and Pakistan during the 2010s by focusing on the survival strategies of key ruling groups in those countries. We simply argue that relations of competing great powers with the ruling group in smaller states determine the fate of asymmetric alliance.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48062057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To what extent can prospect theory’s framing effects and elite and social group cues moderate public support for humanitarian interventions? This study extends the research on public support for humanitarian interventions by capturing the interaction between prospect theory’s framing effects and elite and social group cues on individuals’ willingness to support risky foreign policies. The study incorporates four novel prospect theory decision problems while framing the expected costs as nonequivalent intervals across interventions and US–China trade war scenarios. The results provide evidence that prospect theory framing effects outperform the elite and social group cues in their ability to induce preference shifts among respondents’ willingness to support risk-acceptant or risk-averse humanitarian intervention plans. It also suggests that humanitarian interventions, with US troops on the ground, in a region noncentral for America's national security, retain substantial levels of support among Americans despite their country's changing role in international security.
{"title":"Determining Support for Humanitarian Interventions: Prospect Theory versus Cues","authors":"Zlatin Mitkov","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 To what extent can prospect theory’s framing effects and elite and social group cues moderate public support for humanitarian interventions? This study extends the research on public support for humanitarian interventions by capturing the interaction between prospect theory’s framing effects and elite and social group cues on individuals’ willingness to support risky foreign policies. The study incorporates four novel prospect theory decision problems while framing the expected costs as nonequivalent intervals across interventions and US–China trade war scenarios. The results provide evidence that prospect theory framing effects outperform the elite and social group cues in their ability to induce preference shifts among respondents’ willingness to support risk-acceptant or risk-averse humanitarian intervention plans. It also suggests that humanitarian interventions, with US troops on the ground, in a region noncentral for America's national security, retain substantial levels of support among Americans despite their country's changing role in international security.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47844103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Growing understanding of the connections between the mind and the body, and of the ways in which interoception influences decision-making, may well revolutionize our understanding of how decisions are reached in foreign policy analysis, drawing attention to a phenomenon which has been termed “visceral politics.” Applying the somatic marker theory to an understanding of political decision-making, this manuscript briefly analyses President William McKinley's decision-making prior to the Spanish–American War, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's decisions about the Iran hostage rescue mission, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's Kosovo decision-making, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ decisions about the Bin Laden raid, and National Security Adviser Susan Rice's decision-making about Syria. We draw these five disparate but related examples together in order to illustrate the impact of somatic markers on foreign policy decision-making, a role hitherto neglected in the literature.
{"title":"Visceral Politics and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy Decision-Making","authors":"D. Houghton, Á. Mendez","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Growing understanding of the connections between the mind and the body, and of the ways in which interoception influences decision-making, may well revolutionize our understanding of how decisions are reached in foreign policy analysis, drawing attention to a phenomenon which has been termed “visceral politics.” Applying the somatic marker theory to an understanding of political decision-making, this manuscript briefly analyses President William McKinley's decision-making prior to the Spanish–American War, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's decisions about the Iran hostage rescue mission, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's Kosovo decision-making, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ decisions about the Bin Laden raid, and National Security Adviser Susan Rice's decision-making about Syria. We draw these five disparate but related examples together in order to illustrate the impact of somatic markers on foreign policy decision-making, a role hitherto neglected in the literature.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48192711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a foreign policy actor in its own right, sparking the emergence of EU External Action Studies (EU EAS). Although this thriving field at the intersection of EU Studies and International Relations has gradually matured, the interaction of EU EAS with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has so far remained limited. This contribution discusses whether concepts and approaches from EU EAS hold valuable theoretical insights for FPA, and how these could be exploited. It argues that there is a largely untapped potential for cross-fertilization between the two fields. This claim is illustrated with several examples as well as two short instructive cases that show how the approach to studying the EU's “external effectiveness” helps addressing FPA's blind spot regarding foreign policy impacts, and how the critical agenda on “decentering” EU external action directs much-needed attention to the “foreign” in FPA.
{"title":"Insights for Foreign Policy Analysis from European Union External Action Studies","authors":"Sieglinde Gstöhl, Simon Schunz","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a foreign policy actor in its own right, sparking the emergence of EU External Action Studies (EU EAS). Although this thriving field at the intersection of EU Studies and International Relations has gradually matured, the interaction of EU EAS with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has so far remained limited. This contribution discusses whether concepts and approaches from EU EAS hold valuable theoretical insights for FPA, and how these could be exploited. It argues that there is a largely untapped potential for cross-fertilization between the two fields. This claim is illustrated with several examples as well as two short instructive cases that show how the approach to studying the EU's “external effectiveness” helps addressing FPA's blind spot regarding foreign policy impacts, and how the critical agenda on “decentering” EU external action directs much-needed attention to the “foreign” in FPA.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46210128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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