While political leaders’ role in foreign policy choices has received increasing scholarly attention, surprisingly less is known about how they affect the allocation and distribution of official development aid. This study examines how the material background of political leaders influences their aid allocation strategies in donor countries. We contend that leaders with economic hardship experience distribute more foreign aid than those without such experience. Through socialization, leaders with economic hardship experience become more supportive of public good provisions that address problems related to poverty and inequality. Resultantly, they exhibit more favorable attitudes toward development assistance programs targeting developing countries. We find that political leaders who experienced economic difficulty in their youth are likely to provide more foreign aid, especially social and economic infrastructure aid, than leaders without such experience. By introducing the political leaders’ role, this study contributes to the literature on the interaction between domestic politics and foreign aid.
{"title":"Political Leaders, Economic Hardship, and Foreign Aid Allocation","authors":"Yooneui Kim, Kangwook Han, Sung Min Han","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While political leaders’ role in foreign policy choices has received increasing scholarly attention, surprisingly less is known about how they affect the allocation and distribution of official development aid. This study examines how the material background of political leaders influences their aid allocation strategies in donor countries. We contend that leaders with economic hardship experience distribute more foreign aid than those without such experience. Through socialization, leaders with economic hardship experience become more supportive of public good provisions that address problems related to poverty and inequality. Resultantly, they exhibit more favorable attitudes toward development assistance programs targeting developing countries. We find that political leaders who experienced economic difficulty in their youth are likely to provide more foreign aid, especially social and economic infrastructure aid, than leaders without such experience. By introducing the political leaders’ role, this study contributes to the literature on the interaction between domestic politics and foreign aid.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":"13 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41261287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The study of emotions in foreign policymaking has emphasized dominant discrete emotions and how they each lead to specific action tendencies. Scholars often focus on one emotion to explain decisions and have an additive view of emotions. This article argues that decision-makers often feel conflicting emotions and that emotions are not simply additive. What are conflicting emotions’ consequences for foreign policymaking? How are these conflicts resolved? The cases of President Obama's response to the Syrian chemical weapon attack in 2013 and the rise of ISIS in 2014 provide an occasion to study these questions on major security issues surrounding military intervention. This article argues that when decision-makers feel conflicted emotions their anxiety level rises, and that they are likely to attempt to gain time through procrastination, to resolve their conflict by focusing their attention on new developments, and to seek support to bolster confidence in their decision.
{"title":"Resolving Conflicting Emotions: Obama's Quandaries on the Red Line and the Fight against ISIS","authors":"Philip Beauregard","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The study of emotions in foreign policymaking has emphasized dominant discrete emotions and how they each lead to specific action tendencies. Scholars often focus on one emotion to explain decisions and have an additive view of emotions. This article argues that decision-makers often feel conflicting emotions and that emotions are not simply additive. What are conflicting emotions’ consequences for foreign policymaking? How are these conflicts resolved? The cases of President Obama's response to the Syrian chemical weapon attack in 2013 and the rise of ISIS in 2014 provide an occasion to study these questions on major security issues surrounding military intervention. This article argues that when decision-makers feel conflicted emotions their anxiety level rises, and that they are likely to attempt to gain time through procrastination, to resolve their conflict by focusing their attention on new developments, and to seek support to bolster confidence in their decision.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45446941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russia reacted in markedly different ways to comparable upheavals in Ukraine: the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013/2014. This paper argues that a combination of important external and internal factors led to a change in Russia's dominant national role conceptions, which contributed to Moscow's more assertive foreign policy, exemplified by divergent reactions to these two upheavals. Consequently, the paper aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on role change, demonstrating mechanisms behind such changes and examining the necessary scope conditions. The analysis reveals two types of role change: long-term, comprehensive ones that may lead to shifts in foreign policy behavior and swift changes motivated by contemporary events that result from role conflict.
{"title":"Role Change and Russia's Responses to Upheavals in Ukraine","authors":"Damian Strycharz","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Russia reacted in markedly different ways to comparable upheavals in Ukraine: the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013/2014. This paper argues that a combination of important external and internal factors led to a change in Russia's dominant national role conceptions, which contributed to Moscow's more assertive foreign policy, exemplified by divergent reactions to these two upheavals. Consequently, the paper aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on role change, demonstrating mechanisms behind such changes and examining the necessary scope conditions. The analysis reveals two types of role change: long-term, comprehensive ones that may lead to shifts in foreign policy behavior and swift changes motivated by contemporary events that result from role conflict.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47224400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article compares Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) to determine how political risk affects an authoritarian developing country. Using panel data for up to 118 developing countries from 2003 to 2017, and studying different economic investment sectors (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary; energy/non-energy), we find that political risk has varying effects on Chinese overseas FDI. Chinese state firms appear to invest in higher political risk countries regardless of the economic sector, while Chinese private firms tend to invest in states who share similar political ideologies when investing in the energy/primary sector. We also find that both public and private Chinese firms choose geographically proximate countries for economically riskier investments. Our sectoral investment study offers insights into differences in Chinese public and private firms’ political risk tolerance.
{"title":"Political Risk and Economic Sectors: Chinese Overseas Public and Private Investment in the Developing World","authors":"G. Biglaiser, K. Lu","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article compares Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) to determine how political risk affects an authoritarian developing country. Using panel data for up to 118 developing countries from 2003 to 2017, and studying different economic investment sectors (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary; energy/non-energy), we find that political risk has varying effects on Chinese overseas FDI. Chinese state firms appear to invest in higher political risk countries regardless of the economic sector, while Chinese private firms tend to invest in states who share similar political ideologies when investing in the energy/primary sector. We also find that both public and private Chinese firms choose geographically proximate countries for economically riskier investments. Our sectoral investment study offers insights into differences in Chinese public and private firms’ political risk tolerance.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42147624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The success of anti-establishment parties across Europe has fueled debate on the role of populism for foreign policy and its contemporary contestation. The almost-election of Marine Le Pen to the French presidency in 2017, the successes of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany's 2017 and 2021 federal elections, and the central role these populist radical-right (PRR) parties henceforth play in structuring political debate make their wider foreign policy positions an issue of central concern. Yet, we still lack a thorough understanding how populism and radical-right ideology jointly produce a distinct foreign policy positioning beyond European integration. This article tries to narrow this gap by conceptualizing PRR positioning on trade, climate change, development policies, hegemony, and security and defense issues. The comparative analysis of official documents and voting behavior reveals only subtle differences between the Rassemblement national and the AfD, while demonstrating broad commonalities that have the potential to inform research across other cases and world regions on PRR parties’ foreign policy positioning.
欧洲各地反建制政党的成功引发了关于民粹主义在外交政策中的作用及其当代争论的辩论。2017年，马琳·勒庞(Marine Le Pen)差点当选法国总统，德国新选择党(AfD)在2017年和2021年的德国联邦选举中取得成功，这些民粹主义极右翼(PRR)政党今后在政治辩论中发挥的核心作用，使它们更广泛的外交政策立场成为人们关注的核心问题。然而，我们仍然缺乏对民粹主义和极右翼意识形态如何共同产生欧洲一体化之外的独特外交政策定位的透彻理解。本文试图通过概念化PRR在贸易、气候变化、发展政策、霸权以及安全和国防问题上的定位来缩小这一差距。对官方文件和投票行为的比较分析显示，国民大会党和德国新选择党之间只有微妙的差异，同时显示了广泛的共同点，这些共同点有可能为研究其他案例和世界地区的PRR政党的外交政策定位提供信息。
{"title":"Theorizing Populist Radical-Right Foreign Policy: Ideology and Party Positioning in France and Germany","authors":"F. Ostermann, Bernhard Stahl","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The success of anti-establishment parties across Europe has fueled debate on the role of populism for foreign policy and its contemporary contestation. The almost-election of Marine Le Pen to the French presidency in 2017, the successes of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany's 2017 and 2021 federal elections, and the central role these populist radical-right (PRR) parties henceforth play in structuring political debate make their wider foreign policy positions an issue of central concern. Yet, we still lack a thorough understanding how populism and radical-right ideology jointly produce a distinct foreign policy positioning beyond European integration. This article tries to narrow this gap by conceptualizing PRR positioning on trade, climate change, development policies, hegemony, and security and defense issues. The comparative analysis of official documents and voting behavior reveals only subtle differences between the Rassemblement national and the AfD, while demonstrating broad commonalities that have the potential to inform research across other cases and world regions on PRR parties’ foreign policy positioning.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44993909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of China's commercially oriented forms of state financing, the dominant type of Chinese aid, on voting alignment between recipient countries and China in the United Nations General Assembly. Previous research has shown these types of aid flows to follow economic interests, suggesting they have no political ramifications. Given the principles, motives and process of China's foreign aid program, and the associated economic and political benefits to capital hungry recipient countries, we believe this to be a premature conclusion. We argue that recipients will respond to Chinese commercially oriented aid flows by aligning more closely their foreign policy with China's. We further argue that regime type will condition this relationship in that democracies will more strongly align with China than autocracies. Leveraging the global coverage of AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance dataset for the period 2000–2014, we find that Chinese commercial aid flows lead to recipients’ foreign policy alignment with China and that democracies strongly align with China in response to such flows while autocracies do not respond so. These results suggest that China's foreign aid yields political influence but in a way that has not yet been uncovered and that differs from other donors, old and new alike. Examinamos el impacto de las formas de financiación estatal con fines comerciales de China, el tipo dominante de ayuda china, en la alineación de votos entre los países receptores y China en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que este tipo de flujos de ayuda obedece a intereses económicos, lo que sugiere que no tiene ramificaciones políticas. Dados los principios, los motivos y el proceso del programa de ayuda exterior de China, y los beneficios económicos y políticos asociados a los países receptores hambrientos de capital, creemos que esta es una conclusión prematura. Sostenemos que los receptores responderán a los flujos de ayuda china orientados al comercio alineando más estrechamente su política exterior con la de China. Además, creemos que el tipo de régimen condicionará esta relación, ya que las democracias se alinearán de modo más sólido con China que las autocracias. Gracias a la cobertura global del conjunto de datos Global Chinese Official Finance de AidData para el periodo 2000–2014, descubrimos que los flujos de ayuda comercial china conducen a la alineación de la política exterior de los receptores con China, y que las democracias se alinean fuertemente con China en respuesta a dichos flujos, mientras que las autocracias no responden así. Estos resultados sugieren que la ayuda exterior de China produce influencia política, pero de una manera que aún no se ha descubierto y que difiere de la de otros donantes, tanto antiguos como nuevos. Nous examinons l'impact des formes de financement commercialement orientées de l’État chinois, le type dominant de l'aide chinoise, sur l'alig
我们研究了中国以商业为导向的国家融资形式(中国援助的主要类型)对受援国与中国在联合国大会上的投票一致性的影响。先前的研究表明，这类援助的流向遵循经济利益，这表明它们没有政治后果。考虑到中国对外援助计划的原则、动机和过程，以及对资本饥渴的受援国的相关经济和政治利益，我们认为这是一个过早的结论。我们认为，受援国将通过使其外交政策更紧密地与中国保持一致来应对中国以商业为导向的援助流动。我们进一步认为，政权类型将制约这种关系，因为民主国家将比专制国家更强烈地与中国结盟。利用2000年至2014年期间AidData全球中国官方金融数据集的全球覆盖范围，我们发现中国的商业援助流动导致受援国的外交政策与中国保持一致，民主国家在应对此类流动时与中国保持强烈一致，而专制国家则没有这样做。这些结果表明，中国的对外援助产生了政治影响力，但其方式尚未被发现，而且与其他捐助国不同，无论新旧。审查中国房地产和商业形式的影响financiación中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响，中国房地产和商业形式的影响。调查前不确定是否有兴趣调查前不确定是否有兴趣调查económicos，不确定是否有兴趣调查前不确定是否有兴趣调查políticas。失去原则，失去动机，失去在中国以外发展的程序，失去受益人económicos，失去políticos协会，失去países，失去资本，失去资本，失去了资本，失去了资本，失去了资本，失去了资本，失去了动力，失去了动力conclusión。Sostenemos que los receptor responderán和los flujos de ayuda china orientados commercialinedo más estrechamente su política external con de china。Además, creemos que el tipo de remimimen条件下的 esta relación, ya que las democracias alinearán de modo más sólido con China que las专制。谢谢全球del conjunto de la cobertura拿督全球中国官方金融de AidData对位el periodo 2000 - 2014, descubrimos,洛德效果并拥有中国conducen la alineacion de la politica外部de los受体反对中国,y,拉斯维加斯市长se alinean fuertemente反对中国en respuesta说变窄,mientras,拉斯维加斯autocracias responden asi。Estos resulttados sulgieren que la ayuda在中国以外产生影响política, perouna manera que aún没有看到，在中国以外产生影响的人在中国以外产生影响的人在中国以外产生影响的人在中国以外产生影响的人在中国以外产生影响的人在中国以外产生影响。Nous审查了“影响形式”、“融资形式”、“商业形式”、“主导形式”、“主导形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”、“支持形式”和“支持形式”。在研究过程中，对不同类型的人进行研究，例如，对不同类型的人进行研究，对不同类型的人进行研究，对不同类型的人进行研究。完成关于原则、动机和程序的规定，关于中国国际方案的规定，关于优势和政治方面的规定，关于薪金和政治方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定，关于薪金和行政方面的规定。目前的情况是，所有的薪金都是由交换的薪金所决定的，商业方面的薪金是由交换的薪金所决定的，政治方面的薪金是由交换的薪金所决定的。事实证明，在不同的情况下，有不同类型的改革，有不同的关系，有不同的措施，有不同的改革，有不同的改革，有不同的改革，有不同的改革。而我们轮胎的利润de la糖皮modiale du全球中国官方金融数据库(financement officiel厨房用漏勺l 'internationale) d 'AidData pour la里面有2000 - 2014等我们已经证实,les通量d 'aide commerciaux厨房用漏勺amenaient les支付destinataires对准器为了政治etrangere苏尔celle de la中国等,les democraties年代'alignaient etroitement苏尔拉中国en响应ces通量那么,les autocraties不reagissaient德的方式。在过去的一年里，中国的国际活动对政治产生了影响;在过去的一年里，中国的活动对政治产生了影响;在过去的一年里，中国的活动对政治产生了影响;在过去的一年里，中国的活动对政治产生了影响。
{"title":"Hidden Strings Attached? Chinese (Commercially Oriented) Foreign Aid and International Political Alignment","authors":"D. Raess, Wanlin Ren, P. Wagner","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the impact of China's commercially oriented forms of state financing, the dominant type of Chinese aid, on voting alignment between recipient countries and China in the United Nations General Assembly. Previous research has shown these types of aid flows to follow economic interests, suggesting they have no political ramifications. Given the principles, motives and process of China's foreign aid program, and the associated economic and political benefits to capital hungry recipient countries, we believe this to be a premature conclusion. We argue that recipients will respond to Chinese commercially oriented aid flows by aligning more closely their foreign policy with China's. We further argue that regime type will condition this relationship in that democracies will more strongly align with China than autocracies. Leveraging the global coverage of AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance dataset for the period 2000–2014, we find that Chinese commercial aid flows lead to recipients’ foreign policy alignment with China and that democracies strongly align with China in response to such flows while autocracies do not respond so. These results suggest that China's foreign aid yields political influence but in a way that has not yet been uncovered and that differs from other donors, old and new alike.\u0000 Examinamos el impacto de las formas de financiación estatal con fines comerciales de China, el tipo dominante de ayuda china, en la alineación de votos entre los países receptores y China en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que este tipo de flujos de ayuda obedece a intereses económicos, lo que sugiere que no tiene ramificaciones políticas. Dados los principios, los motivos y el proceso del programa de ayuda exterior de China, y los beneficios económicos y políticos asociados a los países receptores hambrientos de capital, creemos que esta es una conclusión prematura. Sostenemos que los receptores responderán a los flujos de ayuda china orientados al comercio alineando más estrechamente su política exterior con la de China. Además, creemos que el tipo de régimen condicionará esta relación, ya que las democracias se alinearán de modo más sólido con China que las autocracias. Gracias a la cobertura global del conjunto de datos Global Chinese Official Finance de AidData para el periodo 2000–2014, descubrimos que los flujos de ayuda comercial china conducen a la alineación de la política exterior de los receptores con China, y que las democracias se alinean fuertemente con China en respuesta a dichos flujos, mientras que las autocracias no responden así. Estos resultados sugieren que la ayuda exterior de China produce influencia política, pero de una manera que aún no se ha descubierto y que difiere de la de otros donantes, tanto antiguos como nuevos.\u0000 Nous examinons l'impact des formes de financement commercialement orientées de l’État chinois, le type dominant de l'aide chinoise, sur l'alig","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44333035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Previous research has extensively analyzed the existence and extent of rally effects following crisis initiation with respect to United States public opinion and presidential approval. Relatively less known is how crisis termination affects presidential approval. The theory presented in this article suggests that crisis terminations are prime for rally effects. They are salient, demonstrate competence, and thus activate a significant boost of executive approval akin to rally effects at crisis onset. Insofar as executives might use them as diversionary tools, crisis terminations overcome the strategic conflict avoidance argument and require less cynical assumptions about leaders’ self-interest than the conventional domain of diversionary theory, crisis initiations. We test the claim that crisis terminations have significant ‘‘halo effects’’ using monthly US presidential approval data during forty-eight international crises between 1953 and 2016. Results demonstrate that crisis termination has consistently positive effects on presidential approval. In addition, these surges are conditioned by the degree and disposition of public attention. The findings indicate that US public opinion is quite sensitive to the whole trajectory of an international crisis.
{"title":"International Crisis Termination and Presidential Approval","authors":"Kerry Chávez, James Wright","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous research has extensively analyzed the existence and extent of rally effects following crisis initiation with respect to United States public opinion and presidential approval. Relatively less known is how crisis termination affects presidential approval. The theory presented in this article suggests that crisis terminations are prime for rally effects. They are salient, demonstrate competence, and thus activate a significant boost of executive approval akin to rally effects at crisis onset. Insofar as executives might use them as diversionary tools, crisis terminations overcome the strategic conflict avoidance argument and require less cynical assumptions about leaders’ self-interest than the conventional domain of diversionary theory, crisis initiations. We test the claim that crisis terminations have significant ‘‘halo effects’’ using monthly US presidential approval data during forty-eight international crises between 1953 and 2016. Results demonstrate that crisis termination has consistently positive effects on presidential approval. In addition, these surges are conditioned by the degree and disposition of public attention. The findings indicate that US public opinion is quite sensitive to the whole trajectory of an international crisis.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44067586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Targeting different audiences, Chinese foreign policy statements and their official English translations differ significantly. For this research note, I compare the English and Chinese versions of ninety-one foreign policy statements issued by the People's Republic of China and catalog all minor differences, differences in degree, and substantive differences. More than half of the statements contain differences between the Chinese original and the official English translation. I find significant variation in how prominent the three types of differences feature over time as well as across document types and policy-making levels. Most importantly, the majority of substantive differences and differences in degree alter the intentions that China signals. The extent and depth of these differences make it necessary to consider both versions of a document. Fortunately, my analysis also shows that automatic translation can pick up most of the identified differences. Las declaraciones de política exterior china y sus traducciones oficiales al inglés se dirigen a públicos diferentes y difieren de forma significativa. Para esta nota de investigación, comparo las versiones inglesa y china de 91 declaraciones de política exterior emitidas por la República Popular China (RPC) y catalogo todas las diferencias menores, diferencias de grado y diferencias sustanciales. Más de la mitad de las declaraciones contienen diferencias entre el original chino y la traducción oficial al inglés. Encuentro una variación significativa en el grado de prominencia de los tres tipos de diferencias a lo largo del tiempo, así como entre los tipos de documentos y los niveles de elaboración de políticas. Lo más importante es que la mayoría de las diferencias sustanciales y de grado alteran las intenciones que señala China. El grado y profundidad de estas diferencias hacen necesario considerar las dos versiones de un documento. Afortunadamente, mi análisis también muestra que la traducción automática puede dar cuenta de la mayoría de las diferencias identificadas. Ciblant des publics différents, les déclarations de politique étrangère de la Chine et leurs traductions officielles en anglais diffèrent considérablement. Pour cet exposé de recherche, j'ai comparé les versions anglaise et chinoise de 91 déclarations de politique étrangère publiées par la République populaire de Chine (RPC) et j'ai répertorié toutes les différences mineures, les différences de degré et les différences de fond. Plus de la moitié des déclarations comprennent des différences entre l'original chinois et la traduction anglaise officielle. J'ai constaté des variations significatives de l'importance des trois types de différences dans le temps ainsi que dans les types de documents et les niveaux d’élaboration des politiques. Le plus important, c'est que la majorité des différences de fond et de degré modifient les intentions que la Chine signale. L’étendue et la profondeur de ces différences rendent nécessaire
针对不同的受众，中国外交政策声明及其官方英文翻译差异很大。在本研究说明中，我比较了中华人民共和国发表的91项外交政策声明的英文和中文版本，并列举了所有微小差异、程度差异和实质性差异。超过一半的声明包含中文原文和英文官方译文之间的差异。我发现，随着时间的推移，这三种不同类型的特征如何突出，以及跨文档类型和决策级别的差异程度存在显著差异。最重要的是，大多数实质性差异和程度差异改变了中国发出信号的意图。这些差异的范围和深度使得有必要考虑文档的两个版本。幸运的是，我的分析还表明，自动翻译可以弥补大部分已识别的差异。《中国对外政策宣言》和《官方语言贸易宣言》针对的是不同的政策和重要形式。Para esta nota de investigación，Comparo las versiones inglesa y china de 91 Declaraciones de política exterior emitidas por la República Popular China（中国）和Catalogo todas las diferencias menores，diferencias de grado y differencias sustanciales。Más de la mitad de las declaraciones包含原始奇诺和官方语言传统之间的差异。Encuentro una variación impivativa en el grado de prominencia de los tres tipos de diferencias a lo largo del tiempo，asícomo entre los tipos de documentos y los niveles de elaboración de políticas。最重要的是，在中国，存在着巨大的差异和差异。El grado y profundidad de estas diferencias hacen necesario考虑文件版本。Afortunadamente，mi análisis también muestra que la traducción automática puede dar cuenta de la mayoría de las diferencias identificadas。针对不同的受众，中国的外交政策声明及其官方英文译本差异很大。在本研究报告中，我比较了中华人民共和国（PRC）发布的91份外交政策声明的英文和中文版本，列出了所有微小差异、程度差异和实质性差异。超过一半的声明包括中文原文和官方英文译本之间的差异。我发现，随着时间的推移，以及文件类型和政策制定水平的变化，这三种差异的重要性存在显著差异。最重要的是，大多数实质性和程度上的差异改变了中国的意图。这些差异的范围和深度使得有必要审查文件的两个版本。幸运的是，我的分析还表明，机器翻译工具可以识别大多数已识别的差异。
{"title":"What is Lost in Translation? Differences between Chinese Foreign Policy Statements and Their Official English Translations","authors":"Sabine Mokry","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac012","url":null,"abstract":"Targeting different audiences, Chinese foreign policy statements and their official English translations differ significantly. For this research note, I compare the English and Chinese versions of ninety-one foreign policy statements issued by the People's Republic of China and catalog all minor differences, differences in degree, and substantive differences. More than half of the statements contain differences between the Chinese original and the official English translation. I find significant variation in how prominent the three types of differences feature over time as well as across document types and policy-making levels. Most importantly, the majority of substantive differences and differences in degree alter the intentions that China signals. The extent and depth of these differences make it necessary to consider both versions of a document. Fortunately, my analysis also shows that automatic translation can pick up most of the identified differences. Las declaraciones de política exterior china y sus traducciones oficiales al inglés se dirigen a públicos diferentes y difieren de forma significativa. Para esta nota de investigación, comparo las versiones inglesa y china de 91 declaraciones de política exterior emitidas por la República Popular China (RPC) y catalogo todas las diferencias menores, diferencias de grado y diferencias sustanciales. Más de la mitad de las declaraciones contienen diferencias entre el original chino y la traducción oficial al inglés. Encuentro una variación significativa en el grado de prominencia de los tres tipos de diferencias a lo largo del tiempo, así como entre los tipos de documentos y los niveles de elaboración de políticas. Lo más importante es que la mayoría de las diferencias sustanciales y de grado alteran las intenciones que señala China. El grado y profundidad de estas diferencias hacen necesario considerar las dos versiones de un documento. Afortunadamente, mi análisis también muestra que la traducción automática puede dar cuenta de la mayoría de las diferencias identificadas. Ciblant des publics différents, les déclarations de politique étrangère de la Chine et leurs traductions officielles en anglais diffèrent considérablement. Pour cet exposé de recherche, j'ai comparé les versions anglaise et chinoise de 91 déclarations de politique étrangère publiées par la République populaire de Chine (RPC) et j'ai répertorié toutes les différences mineures, les différences de degré et les différences de fond. Plus de la moitié des déclarations comprennent des différences entre l'original chinois et la traduction anglaise officielle. J'ai constaté des variations significatives de l'importance des trois types de différences dans le temps ainsi que dans les types de documents et les niveaux d’élaboration des politiques. Le plus important, c'est que la majorité des différences de fond et de degré modifient les intentions que la Chine signale. L’étendue et la profondeur de ces différences rendent nécessaire ","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49290627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global wave of populism has recently drawn the attention of foreign policy analysts. Despite significant contributions, we still know little about populist leaders’ conceptions of their nation's identity and how these inform foreign policy preferences. What understanding do populists have regarding what their nation stands for and how high it stands in comparison to others? In this article, I introduce a theoretical model of identity-driven foreign policymaking that examines the national identity conceptions of six populist leaders and their non-populist predecessors via an original quantitative content analysis of foreign policy speeches. The article further assesses whether this identity conception translates into foreign policy preferences for revisionism toward the liberal international order by examining voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. The article contributes to conceptual and methodological approaches in foreign policy analysis to study individuals, as well as provides comparative empirical evidence for what drives populists’ foreign policy thinking.
{"title":"Populist Minds Think Alike? National Identity Conceptions and Foreign Policy Preferences of Populist Leaders","authors":"Gordon M. Friedrichs","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The global wave of populism has recently drawn the attention of foreign policy analysts. Despite significant contributions, we still know little about populist leaders’ conceptions of their nation's identity and how these inform foreign policy preferences. What understanding do populists have regarding what their nation stands for and how high it stands in comparison to others? In this article, I introduce a theoretical model of identity-driven foreign policymaking that examines the national identity conceptions of six populist leaders and their non-populist predecessors via an original quantitative content analysis of foreign policy speeches. The article further assesses whether this identity conception translates into foreign policy preferences for revisionism toward the liberal international order by examining voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. The article contributes to conceptual and methodological approaches in foreign policy analysis to study individuals, as well as provides comparative empirical evidence for what drives populists’ foreign policy thinking.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47012320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reintegrates the frontier into debates about contemporary global affairs. Its analytical focus is the United States, because despite widespread agreement that it constitutes a “frontier nation,” we lack clear explanations of what the American frontier is today and what role(s) it occupies in US politics and foreign policy. To resolve this, the article ontologically reconceptualizes the frontier, arguing that it first constitutes a narrative, rather than a spatial, construct. Instead of conquering a once self-evident frontier, the United States has a long-standing tradition of narrative “frontiering” as the ideational (re)production of frontiers. The frontier has been most consistently understood not in terms of territory but ideas, with Washington's modern-day “frontiers of freedom”—notably in the Asia Pacific—as real and consequential as those of the past. The frontier-as-narrative represents a performative act about what the United States is and how it should engage at peripheral borderlands of its identity. Beyond the United States, frontiers are created and actioned anew to reshape international affairs.
{"title":"Frontiering International Relations: Narrating US Policy in the Asia Pacific","authors":"O. Turner","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orac009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article reintegrates the frontier into debates about contemporary global affairs. Its analytical focus is the United States, because despite widespread agreement that it constitutes a “frontier nation,” we lack clear explanations of what the American frontier is today and what role(s) it occupies in US politics and foreign policy. To resolve this, the article ontologically reconceptualizes the frontier, arguing that it first constitutes a narrative, rather than a spatial, construct. Instead of conquering a once self-evident frontier, the United States has a long-standing tradition of narrative “frontiering” as the ideational (re)production of frontiers. The frontier has been most consistently understood not in terms of territory but ideas, with Washington's modern-day “frontiers of freedom”—notably in the Asia Pacific—as real and consequential as those of the past. The frontier-as-narrative represents a performative act about what the United States is and how it should engage at peripheral borderlands of its identity. Beyond the United States, frontiers are created and actioned anew to reshape international affairs.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42656025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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