Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0004
Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse
Institutional conditions and organizational efforts are key for understanding how and why the elements constituting competition come about. Several contemporary institutions favour the construction of competition. States, organizations, and individuals are increasingly being seen as actors that are able to compete with each other, and globalization and other recent institutional developments have increased the number of relationships that they can construct. An impressive economic development during the last century has not prevented a continued sense of scarcity and new desires have emerged, not least the desire for status positions. Fourth parties organize social life in ways that create competition by intention or unintentionally. Organizers of contests in politics, markets, sports and many other sectors construct actors, relationships, and scarcity for something desired. Similar efforts have been an essential part of many recent reforms of organizations and markets. The increasing number of prizes and rankings in almost any area of life produces scarcity and is likely to create new desires for goods that per definition are scarce.
{"title":"The origins of competition: institution and organization","authors":"Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Institutional conditions and organizational efforts are key for understanding how and why the elements constituting competition come about. Several contemporary institutions favour the construction of competition. States, organizations, and individuals are increasingly being seen as actors that are able to compete with each other, and globalization and other recent institutional developments have increased the number of relationships that they can construct. An impressive economic development during the last century has not prevented a continued sense of scarcity and new desires have emerged, not least the desire for status positions. Fourth parties organize social life in ways that create competition by intention or unintentionally. Organizers of contests in politics, markets, sports and many other sectors construct actors, relationships, and scarcity for something desired. Similar efforts have been an essential part of many recent reforms of organizations and markets. The increasing number of prizes and rankings in almost any area of life produces scarcity and is likely to create new desires for goods that per definition are scarce.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77482266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0003
Patrik Aspers
This chapter looks at competition, asking how it comes about and how it develops, with a focus on mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment covers the social process due to decisions that actors make for themselves and not for others. Though all actual competition involves mutual adjustment, the focus here is on how a state of competition arises as a consequence of actors who mutually adjust to one another. Competition is seen as an unintended consequence created by actors who may have different desires and intentions and who are observing, adjusting, mimicking, and relating in different ways to what others are doing. The chapter analyses the relationship between mutual adjustment and organized competition and offers empirical examples of the state of competition due to mutual adjustment.
{"title":"Competition by mutual adjustment","authors":"Patrik Aspers","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at competition, asking how it comes about and how it develops, with a focus on mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment covers the social process due to decisions that actors make for themselves and not for others. Though all actual competition involves mutual adjustment, the focus here is on how a state of competition arises as a consequence of actors who mutually adjust to one another. Competition is seen as an unintended consequence created by actors who may have different desires and intentions and who are observing, adjusting, mimicking, and relating in different ways to what others are doing. The chapter analyses the relationship between mutual adjustment and organized competition and offers empirical examples of the state of competition due to mutual adjustment.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87547049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0002
Daniel B. Sands, G. Cattani, J. Porac, J. Greenberg
At the root of the conceptual difficulties in determining the competitive structures that underpin markets is the fact that firms and their product offerings can be described along a large number of attributes, and so be viewed as more or less similar depending on the attributes used for comparison. Our chapter exposes the multi-level cognitive embeddedness of competition among restaurants in New York City. Using field interviews and archival data on restaurant evaluations, categories, pricing, and menus, we employ qualitative counterfactual analysis to address fundamental issues concerning competitive boundaries that cut across categorical, organizational, and transactional perspectives of competition. We argue that conceptualizations of competition are only loosely coupled across different perspectives, and we contend that competitive judgments are better construed as a collective sensemaking process where different actors interact and competitive boundaries are constantly defined, contested, and redefined. Thus, we propose a heuristic framework for understanding the cognitive embeddedness of competition as part of a broader sensemaking perspective of competition.
{"title":"Competition as sense making","authors":"Daniel B. Sands, G. Cattani, J. Porac, J. Greenberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"At the root of the conceptual difficulties in determining the competitive structures that underpin markets is the fact that firms and their product offerings can be described along a large number of attributes, and so be viewed as more or less similar depending on the attributes used for comparison. Our chapter exposes the multi-level cognitive embeddedness of competition among restaurants in New York City. Using field interviews and archival data on restaurant evaluations, categories, pricing, and menus, we employ qualitative counterfactual analysis to address fundamental issues concerning competitive boundaries that cut across categorical, organizational, and transactional perspectives of competition. We argue that conceptualizations of competition are only loosely coupled across different perspectives, and we contend that competitive judgments are better construed as a collective sensemaking process where different actors interact and competitive boundaries are constantly defined, contested, and redefined. Thus, we propose a heuristic framework for understanding the cognitive embeddedness of competition as part of a broader sensemaking perspective of competition.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"05 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85971649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0008
K. Brunsson, Katharina Rahnert
The ideas of competition and financial auditing are both socially esteemed and expected to benefit the national economy. Applying a historical perspective, the chapter clarifies how the relationship between the two ideas emerged and developed. Was it possible for financial auditors to simultaneously compete for the appreciation of two stakeholder groups with conflicting interests—client firms and the users of financial statements? It is concluded that combining the idea of competition with that of financial auditing does not elicit the expected benefits of any of the ideas. Auditors, regulators, and academics all relate the idea of competition to economic relationships with client firms, whereas relationships with other stakeholders are observed rhetorically. Yet these stakeholders constitute the very rationale for financial auditing. The compatibility of institutionalized, socially esteemed ideas is ignored even though this goes contrary to the expected benefits of these ideas.
{"title":"Competition and auditing: esteemed but incompatible ideas","authors":"K. Brunsson, Katharina Rahnert","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The ideas of competition and financial auditing are both socially esteemed and expected to benefit the national economy. Applying a historical perspective, the chapter clarifies how the relationship between the two ideas emerged and developed. Was it possible for financial auditors to simultaneously compete for the appreciation of two stakeholder groups with conflicting interests—client firms and the users of financial statements? It is concluded that combining the idea of competition with that of financial auditing does not elicit the expected benefits of any of the ideas. Auditors, regulators, and academics all relate the idea of competition to economic relationships with client firms, whereas relationships with other stakeholders are observed rhetorically. Yet these stakeholders constitute the very rationale for financial auditing. The compatibility of institutionalized, socially esteemed ideas is ignored even though this goes contrary to the expected benefits of these ideas.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78460918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0006
Nils Brunsson, Linda Wedlin
The likelihood and forms of competition for status—or any other good—are dependent on how the good is allocated in society, and such allocation may, in turn, be strongly influenced by organizational efforts. We discuss the ways by which status allocation is organized in the fields of sports and higher education and analyse how and why certain forms of organization aid in constructing competition. Using the case of higher education, we show how actorhood, relationships, and status scarcity have been organized for a specific entity, the university. We argue that desire for status is more difficult to create by organizational efforts, and such desire may be difficult to justify within an organization. We end the chapter by discussing strategies for organizations competing for status and the risks that such strategies involve.
{"title":"Constructing competition for status: sports and higher education","authors":"Nils Brunsson, Linda Wedlin","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The likelihood and forms of competition for status—or any other good—are dependent on how the good is allocated in society, and such allocation may, in turn, be strongly influenced by organizational efforts. We discuss the ways by which status allocation is organized in the fields of sports and higher education and analyse how and why certain forms of organization aid in constructing competition. Using the case of higher education, we show how actorhood, relationships, and status scarcity have been organized for a specific entity, the university. We argue that desire for status is more difficult to create by organizational efforts, and such desire may be difficult to justify within an organization. We end the chapter by discussing strategies for organizations competing for status and the risks that such strategies involve.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89431281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0014
Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse, K. Lagerström
In this final chapter, we discuss how the preceding chapters illuminate some fundamental questions about competition. How is it constructed? How are the behaviours resulting from competition managed? What are the consequences of competition? How can competition be removed? And, how do these factors vary with the good people compete for? Our aim is to provide an outline of a social science research programme on competition that is long overdue. A central message of the book is that competition seems ubiquitous but that it should not be taken for granted or be naturalized as an inevitable aspect of human existence. Its emergence, maintenance, and change are often the result of intention and purposive efforts, and a central challenge for social science is to learn more about these developments.
{"title":"Competition unbundled: taking stock and looking forward","authors":"Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse, K. Lagerström","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"In this final chapter, we discuss how the preceding chapters illuminate some fundamental questions about competition. How is it constructed? How are the behaviours resulting from competition managed? What are the consequences of competition? How can competition be removed? And, how do these factors vary with the good people compete for? Our aim is to provide an outline of a social science research programme on competition that is long overdue. A central message of the book is that competition seems ubiquitous but that it should not be taken for granted or be naturalized as an inevitable aspect of human existence. Its emergence, maintenance, and change are often the result of intention and purposive efforts, and a central challenge for social science is to learn more about these developments.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"118 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78931383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0001
Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse
Competition is currently found in many, if not most, social domains, such as the economy, politics, public services, sports, culture, higher education, and science. But competition is not endemic to any of these fields. Rather, it has been constructed by those involved or by observers. We ask what competition is and how it can be introduced into a new context. Critically reflecting on insights from economics, management studies and sociology, we define competition as a combined social construction of four factors: actorhood, relationships among actors, scarcity, and desire. We shed light on asymmetric constructions of competition among different actors. Our definition leaves open the effect of competition on behaviour: competition may lead competitors to avoid interaction with each other or to cooperate; it may motivate people to try harder or it may demotivate them. Finally, we discuss issues for further research that follow from our understanding of competition.
{"title":"A new understanding of competition","authors":"Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Nils Brunsson, Raimund Hasse","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Competition is currently found in many, if not most, social domains, such as the economy, politics, public services, sports, culture, higher education, and science. But competition is not endemic to any of these fields. Rather, it has been constructed by those involved or by observers. We ask what competition is and how it can be introduced into a new context. Critically reflecting on insights from economics, management studies and sociology, we define competition as a combined social construction of four factors: actorhood, relationships among actors, scarcity, and desire. We shed light on asymmetric constructions of competition among different actors. Our definition leaves open the effect of competition on behaviour: competition may lead competitors to avoid interaction with each other or to cooperate; it may motivate people to try harder or it may demotivate them. Finally, we discuss issues for further research that follow from our understanding of competition.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90828055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0007
N. Arnold
Ranks are often seen as drivers for competition. This chapter critically examines the link between ranks and competition by investigating the actors’ actual desire for the highest positions. Empirically, the author examines the role of the food waste hierarchy in establishing status competition in the food waste field. This discrete ranking creates ‘winners’ at the top (the challengers that prevent food waste by generating demand for it), who respond enthusiastically to the food waste hierarchy to benefit from status gains. In contrast, the ‘losers’ at the bottom (biogas plants) show very little interest in improving their position. They do not see themselves as players in such a competitive game and direct their attention towards other competitions outside the field. The chapter argues that ranks do not necessarily induce competition, since the actors may be involved in multiple competitions and decide whether it is worth pursuing high status within each one.
{"title":"Avoiding competition: the effects of rankings in the food waste field","authors":"N. Arnold","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Ranks are often seen as drivers for competition. This chapter critically examines the link between ranks and competition by investigating the actors’ actual desire for the highest positions. Empirically, the author examines the role of the food waste hierarchy in establishing status competition in the food waste field. This discrete ranking creates ‘winners’ at the top (the challengers that prevent food waste by generating demand for it), who respond enthusiastically to the food waste hierarchy to benefit from status gains. In contrast, the ‘losers’ at the bottom (biogas plants) show very little interest in improving their position. They do not see themselves as players in such a competitive game and direct their attention towards other competitions outside the field. The chapter argues that ranks do not necessarily induce competition, since the actors may be involved in multiple competitions and decide whether it is worth pursuing high status within each one.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75367936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0012
Fabien Foureault
This chapter tries to identify the conditions under which a fourth party can tame competition in order to achieve cooperation. It relies on an in-depth case study of a multinational corporation acquired by a private equity firm through leveraged buy-out during the 2000s. It is shown that the private equity firm wanted to foster collaboration among competing operating units to increase firm performance but that it failed, despite the interest of many middle managers. The main reason was that top managers of these operating units, facing the great recession, strategically impeded cooperation because they thought that the private equity firm could break up the corporation in the near future, a belief inscribed in the ‘moral economy’ of managerialism. It is concluded that competition may be more easily reversed in firms with different types of owners or in other sectors where self-interested behaviour is less institutionalized.
{"title":"Reversing competition: the case of corporate governance","authors":"Fabien Foureault","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898012.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter tries to identify the conditions under which a fourth party can tame competition in order to achieve cooperation. It relies on an in-depth case study of a multinational corporation acquired by a private equity firm through leveraged buy-out during the 2000s. It is shown that the private equity firm wanted to foster collaboration among competing operating units to increase firm performance but that it failed, despite the interest of many middle managers. The main reason was that top managers of these operating units, facing the great recession, strategically impeded cooperation because they thought that the private equity firm could break up the corporation in the near future, a belief inscribed in the ‘moral economy’ of managerialism. It is concluded that competition may be more easily reversed in firms with different types of owners or in other sectors where self-interested behaviour is less institutionalized.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91352862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1177/10245294211025948
Laura Deruytter, Griet Juwet, David Bassens
According to political economists, the state’s governance of infrastructure is becoming prone to processes of financialization. To date, however, research on how state owners of infrastructure enable and react to the entry of financial logics into such domains remains limited. This paper mobilizes the case of Eandis, a Flemish energy grid company, as a typical case to examine the causal mechanisms involved when state-owned utilities become subject to financial logics. During the 2000s, Flemish municipalities increased their ownership of Eandis, while the company deepened its debt exposure to optimize return on capital. In 2016, Eandis aimed to attract private financial equity and selected a Chinese investment fund as a potential co-shareholder. Although this buy-in was blocked, the conditions under which the state-owned company became increasingly entangled with financial markets remain unchanged and warrant a deeper examination. To explain this trajectory, we identify two causal mechanisms in the fields of market-making and ownership strategies by the multiscalar state. First, we show how regulatory models caused Eandis to focus on financial metrics such as credit ratings, subjecting management to financial market disciplines. Second, we find that budgetary constraints, combined with top-down utility governance, have made municipalities dependent on financial returns on utilities. The interaction between market-making and financial ownership strategies institutionalizes a financialized gridlock, in which municipal shareholders’ interests conflict with the need for low consumer fees and green grid investment. We argue that reforming the regulatory framework and strengthening fiscal solidarity across state layers would allow states to develop non-financialized strategies.
{"title":"Why do state-owned utilities become subject to financial logics? The case of energy distribution in Flanders","authors":"Laura Deruytter, Griet Juwet, David Bassens","doi":"10.1177/10245294211025948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294211025948","url":null,"abstract":"According to political economists, the state’s governance of infrastructure is becoming prone to processes of financialization. To date, however, research on how state owners of infrastructure enable and react to the entry of financial logics into such domains remains limited. This paper mobilizes the case of Eandis, a Flemish energy grid company, as a typical case to examine the causal mechanisms involved when state-owned utilities become subject to financial logics. During the 2000s, Flemish municipalities increased their ownership of Eandis, while the company deepened its debt exposure to optimize return on capital. In 2016, Eandis aimed to attract private financial equity and selected a Chinese investment fund as a potential co-shareholder. Although this buy-in was blocked, the conditions under which the state-owned company became increasingly entangled with financial markets remain unchanged and warrant a deeper examination. To explain this trajectory, we identify two causal mechanisms in the fields of market-making and ownership strategies by the multiscalar state. First, we show how regulatory models caused Eandis to focus on financial metrics such as credit ratings, subjecting management to financial market disciplines. Second, we find that budgetary constraints, combined with top-down utility governance, have made municipalities dependent on financial returns on utilities. The interaction between market-making and financial ownership strategies institutionalizes a financialized gridlock, in which municipal shareholders’ interests conflict with the need for low consumer fees and green grid investment. We argue that reforming the regulatory framework and strengthening fiscal solidarity across state layers would allow states to develop non-financialized strategies.","PeriodicalId":46999,"journal":{"name":"Competition & Change","volume":"26 1","pages":"266 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10245294211025948","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44848035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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