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Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation 公共利益博弈中的领导力与个人社会价值取向的私人信息
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70026
Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai, Lian Xue

We explore whether information on one's own social value orientation (SVO) impacts contributions in a public good game with leadership by example. In doing so, we compare the predictions of a model of belief-based preferences, where payoffs depend on first- and second-order beliefs on the contributions of others, and a model of internalized descriptive norms, where payoffs depend on deviation from an empirical norm. We argue that if pro-social behavior is driven by belief-based preferences, then private information on SVO should not impact contributions, but if the behavior is driven by internalized descriptive norms, then information on its own SVO should impact contributions. We report an experiment with three treatments: no information on SVO, binary information whether pro-self or pro-social, and SVO indicated on a scale from very pro-social to very pro-self. We observe no effect of information on contributions. This finding is inconsistent with internalized descriptive norms. We find that contributions are highest with a pro-social leader.

我们通过实例探讨了个人社会价值取向(SVO)信息是否会影响领导者在公共产品博弈中的贡献。在此过程中,我们比较了基于信念的偏好模型的预测,其中收益取决于对他人贡献的一级和二级信念,以及内化描述性规范模型的预测,其中收益取决于对经验规范的偏离。我们认为,如果亲社会行为是由基于信念的偏好驱动的,那么关于SVO的私人信息不应该影响贡献;但如果行为是由内化的描述性规范驱动的,那么关于其自身SVO的信息应该影响贡献。我们报告了三种处理的实验:无SVO信息,亲自我或亲社会的二元信息,以及从非常亲社会到非常亲自我的SVO量表。我们没有观察到信息对捐款的影响。这一发现与内化的描述性规范不一致。我们发现亲社会领导的贡献是最高的。
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引用次数: 0
Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation 授权是一种信号充分合作下的隐性沟通
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70028
Joanna Franaszek

I examine the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible types through delegation in a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two-sided private information, and communication frictions. A principal consults an agent to choose one of two actions. The principal has some tacit knowledge, which he cannot communicate, and may acquire some imperfect, costly signal about the state of the world. After observing the signal, the principal may choose to act or delegate to the agent, who observes the state of the world perfectly. Even if the principal's information acquisition and the signal are unobservable, the delegation, combined with private information, allows the agent to extract some information about the principal's tacit knowledge. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the agent (upon delegation) can correctly understand “cues” and tailor the action to the principal's needs. In particular, the agent's decision may be non-monotone in the state of the world.

我研究了在一个具有完全一致偏好、双面私人信息和沟通摩擦的沟通博弈中,通过委托传递不可表达类型的隐性信号的问题。委托人咨询代理人,从两种行动中选择一种。委托人拥有一些无法交流的隐性知识,并可能获得一些关于世界状况的不完全、代价高昂的信号。在观察到该信号后,委托人可以选择采取行动或委托代理人采取行动,因为代理人对世界状况的观察是完美的。即使委托人的信息获取和信号都是不可观测的,委托与私人信息相结合,也能让代理人获取一些关于委托人隐性知识的信息。我的研究表明,对于一大类参数来说,存在着一种均衡,在这种均衡中,代理人(在委托后)可以正确理解 "线索",并根据委托人的需求调整行动。特别是,代理人的决策在世界状态下可能是非单调的。
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引用次数: 0
Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators 动态志愿者与拖延者的困境
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70027
Yixuan Shi

Only one trip planner is needed for a group of friends to enjoy a pleasant trip and only one country is needed to coordinate on international talks that can be beneficial for all participating countries. We study a dynamic volunteering dilemma game in which two players choose to volunteer or wait given there have not been any volunteering actions in the past. The players can be procrastinators and the benefits of volunteering arrive later than the costs. We fully characterize the stationary Markov Strotz-Pollak equilibria. When the cost of volunteering is sufficiently small or agents' present-bias parameters are sufficiently close, there always exists an equilibrium in which both players randomize. This equilibrium features stochastic delay, and the delay is exacerbated if one or both agents become more present-biased. However, if the agents differ significantly in their present-bias parameters, this difference may act as a 'natural coordination device' and the unique stationary equilibrium predicts that only the less severe procrastinator volunteers, and this may result in an even quicker provision compared with the case of two exponential discounters.

一群朋友的愉快旅行,只需要一个旅行规划师;一个国家的国际谈判,只需要一个国家的协调,就能使所有参与国都受益。本文研究了一个动态志愿困境博弈,在给定过去没有任何志愿行为的情况下,两个参与者选择志愿或等待。参与者可能是拖延者,志愿服务的好处来得晚于成本。我们充分刻画了平稳Markov Strotz-Pollak均衡。当自愿的成本足够小,或者行动者的现在偏差参数足够接近时,总是存在一个双方都随机化的均衡。这种均衡具有随机延迟的特点,如果一个或两个主体变得更偏向于现在,延迟就会加剧。然而,如果代理人在他们的现在偏差参数上有显著差异,这种差异可能会作为一种“自然协调装置”,并且独特的平稳均衡预测只有不太严重的拖延者才会自愿,这可能会导致比两个指数折扣者更快的供应。
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引用次数: 0
Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education 发现你是谁:教育的自我探索观
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70023
Sungmin Park

I study the optimal design of information in education. Students in my model have different priors about their talents and update their beliefs after receiving noisy signals about themselves. I show that the socially optimal signal structure depends only on the average priors of the participating students. In particular, an optimal structure encourages a career in which the average participant has a comparative advantage. In an extended model with human capital accumulation, optimal education targets the participants who respond most sensitively to information.

我研究的是教育信息的优化设计。在我的模型中,学生对自己的才能有不同的先验,在接收到关于自己的嘈杂信号后,他们会更新自己的信念。我证明了社会最优信号结构仅取决于参与学生的平均先验。特别是,最优结构鼓励平均参与者具有比较优势的职业生涯。在人力资本积累的扩展模型中,最优教育目标是对信息反应最敏感的参与者。
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引用次数: 0
Games of Social Interactions With Externalities 具有外部性的社交互动游戏
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70021
Subir K. Chakrabarti, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber

This paper studies a class of games in which players' payoffs explicitly depend on their intrinsic preferences over the set of available alternatives, level of social interaction and the global influence of the aggregate societal choices. Using the potential functions approach, we examine the conditions under which the games admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with a special emphasis on the role of social interactions. The existence results are then applied to examine the welfare consequences of the introduction of common goods and the adoption of new technologies.

本文研究了一类游戏,在这些游戏中,玩家的收益明显取决于他们的内在偏好,而不是一组可用的选择、社会互动水平和总体社会选择的整体影响。利用潜在函数方法,我们考察了博弈在纯策略中承认纳什均衡的条件,并特别强调了社会互动的作用。然后应用存在性结果来检验引入公共产品和采用新技术的福利后果。
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引用次数: 0
Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers 中级孔多塞赢家和输家
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70024
Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert

The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that it is possible for all weak Condorcet winners to be weak Condorcet losers at the same time, thus leading to contradictory recommendations regarding their use as normative criteria. After arguing that this anomaly is pervasive, even in the presence of substantial and important domain restrictions, we propose to use intermediate notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: their associated consistency requirements share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that may derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We examine the extent to which our intermediate consistency conditions are compatible with various additional attractive normative criteria. Finally, we introduce a class of social choice functions that are consistent with the recommendations of our new proposals and can be extended to the universal domain through the lexicographical use of complementary choice criteria, in the spirit of previous approaches by noted authors like Pierre Daunou and Duncan Black.

从本质上讲,强孔多塞赢家一致性和强孔多塞输家一致性条件被普遍接受为评价社会选择函数表现的有吸引力的标准。然而,在许多情况下,这些条件是沉默的,因为这样的赢家和输家可能不存在。因此,弱化这些需求以扩展它们所应用的概要文件领域是一项吸引人的任务。然而,经常被提出和接受的这些性质的弱对应物存在一个缺点,即所有弱孔多塞优胜者可能同时是弱孔多塞失败者,从而导致将其用作规范标准的建议相互矛盾。在论证了这种异常现象是普遍存在的,即使存在实质性和重要的领域限制之后,我们建议使用介于这两个极端之间的孔多塞式赢家和输家的中间概念:它们相关的一致性要求共享了强孔多塞赢家一致性和强孔多塞输家一致性的直观吸引力,避免了由于候选人同时被识别为弱孔多塞赢家和输家而可能产生的矛盾推荐。我们检查我们的中间一致性条件在多大程度上与各种附加的有吸引力的规范标准兼容。最后,我们介绍了一类社会选择函数,它与我们的新建议的建议一致,并且可以通过词典编纂使用补充选择标准扩展到通用领域,本着皮埃尔·道努和邓肯·布莱克等著名作者之前的方法的精神。
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引用次数: 0
School Segregation and Outside Options 学校隔离和校外选择
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70025
Sumeyra Akin

We study an allocation problem in which students share school preferences but differ in their outside options. We examine the ex-ante Pareto efficient (and weakly fair) allocations. Their main qualitative property is positive sorting; students with higher outside options are assigned to better schools. This result points out the tension between the policy goals of desegregation and efficiency and cautions policymakers about the difficulty of aligning these two objectives.

我们研究了一个分配问题,其中学生有相同的学校偏好,但他们的外部选择不同。我们考察了事前帕累托有效(弱公平)分配。其主要定性性质为正分选;有更多外部选择的学生被分配到更好的学校。这一结果指出了废除种族隔离和提高效率的政策目标之间的紧张关系,并提醒政策制定者注意协调这两个目标的困难。
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引用次数: 0
Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided? 当多种纯公共物品由私人提供时,收入相等是否使社会福利最大化?
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70016
Jun-ichi Itaya, Atsue Mizushima, Gareth Myles

This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and social welfare when multiple pure public goods are privately provided. With a single public good and identical preferences, an increase in income inequality raises social welfare when it reduces the set of contributors so equality cannot be social optimal. We explore how this result is modified when there are multiple privately-provided public goods. It is shown that regions of neutrality alternate with regions of non-neutrality as income distribution is varied. In particular, in the setting of multiple privately-supplied public goods with non-idential preferences a region of non-neutrality emerges when individuals contribute to different public goods or when only one individual contributes. Moreover, social welfare will always be maximized by an income distribution located in a region of non-neutrality. This result implies that social welfare has local maxima at income distributions with inequality as well as around the equal income distribution. We also explore how the optimal extent of inequality is dependent on preference parameters.

本文分析了私人提供多种纯公共物品时收入分配与社会福利的关系。在单一公共产品和相同偏好的情况下,收入不平等的增加会增加社会福利,因为它减少了贡献者的数量,因此平等不可能是社会最优的。我们探讨了当存在多种私人提供的公共产品时,这一结果是如何被修改的。结果表明,随着收入分配的变化,中立地区与非中立地区交替存在。特别是,在具有非相同偏好的多种私人提供公共产品的情况下,当个人对不同的公共产品做出贡献或只有一个人做出贡献时,就会出现非中立区域。此外,社会福利总是由位于非中立地区的收入分配最大化。这一结果表明,社会福利在收入分配不平等和收入分配平等周围存在局部最大值。我们还探讨了不平等的最优程度如何依赖于偏好参数。
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引用次数: 0
Condorcet Was Wrong, Pareto Was Right: Families, Inheritance and Inequality 孔多塞错了,帕累托是对的:家庭、继承和不平等
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70022
Frank Cowell, Dirk Van de gaer

Using a simple model of family decision making we examine the processes by which the wealth distribution changes over the generations, focusing in particular on the division of fortunes through inheritance and the union of fortunes through marriage. We show that the equilibrium wealth distribution exists under standard assumptions and has a Pareto tail that can be characterized in a simple way for a variety of inheritance rules and marriage patterns. The shape of the distribution is principally determined by the size distribution of families. We show how changes in fertility, inheritance rules and inheritance taxation affect long-run inequality.

通过一个简单的家庭决策模型,我们研究了财富分配在几代人之间的变化过程,特别关注了通过继承进行的财富分配和通过婚姻进行的财富结合。我们证明了均衡财富分配在标准假设下存在,并且具有帕累托尾,可以用一种简单的方式来表征各种继承规则和婚姻模式。分布的形状主要是由家庭的大小分布决定的。我们展示了生育率、继承规则和遗产税的变化如何影响长期的不平等。
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引用次数: 0
Pareto Improving Reforms in the Presence of Spillovers and Spillbacks 存在溢出效应和回溢效应的帕累托改进型改革
IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70018
Ourania Karakosta, Nikos Tsakiris, Nikolaos Vlassis

In this paper, we contribute to the topical debate on the welfare effects of a centralized policy setting within the federal union in the presence of transboundary pollution externalities that affect production possibilities. It is shown that when the production of federal jurisdictions generates spillover effects, which in turn result in spillback effects, harmonization of their public policies towards the uniform optimal cooperative level does not ensure welfare improvement for the federation. We analyze and identify federal policies harmonizing reforms that deliver Pareto improvement in the presence of spillback in addition to spillover effects. These reforms are designed to neutralize all the spillback effects by maintaining the aggregate level of spillover effects constant while increasing the welfare of the federation. This result holds irrespective of the nature and sign of the spillover and spillback effects, as well as for both small and large open economies.

在本文中,我们参与了关于在影响生产可能性的跨界污染外部性存在的情况下,联邦联盟内集中政策设置的福利效应的专题辩论。研究表明,当联邦管辖权的产生产生溢出效应,进而导致溢出效应时,其公共政策向统一最优合作水平的协调并不能保证联邦福利的改善。我们分析和确定联邦政策协调改革,在溢出效应和溢出效应存在的情况下实现帕累托改进。这些改革旨在通过保持溢出效应的总水平不变来中和所有溢出效应,同时增加联邦的福利。无论外溢和溢出效应的性质和迹象如何,无论大小开放经济体,这一结果都是成立的。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Public Economic Theory
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