The article examines temporary extramarital cohabitation arrangements between low-wage Chinese female migrants and their male counterparts in Singapore, a phenomenon which is widely referred to by the migrants as becoming a "temporary couple" or "teaming up to have a life." In the simulated households, the men usually shoulder most of the daily expenses for both members, while the women are expected to take care of the men's intimate needs and most of the housework. The vast majority of the women involved in such arrangements are married and migrated for work on their own. This article, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2019, explores how these women perform and understand such temporary intimacies. I first demonstrate that the women enter the relationships as a reaction to the institutional setup that places them in a suspended status, in which they are treated as nothing more than temporary labourers. I then illustrate how the women put the relationship in a state of suspension: they instrumentalize it as a means to maximize savings, and mark it out as a short-term exception that will end abruptly once they leave Singapore. The structurally imposed and self-inflicted conditions of suspension limit the women's agency to an ambiguous private domain that is away from both work and home. Drawing on my long-term ethnographic fieldwork, this article deploys the notion of suspension as a guiding concept to unravel the tensions and moral anxieties that the women experience with their temporary intimacies.
{"title":"\"Temporary Couples\" among Chinese Migrant Workers in Singapore","authors":"Wei Yang","doi":"10.5509/2021942285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2021942285","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines temporary extramarital cohabitation arrangements between low-wage Chinese female migrants and their male counterparts in Singapore, a phenomenon which is widely referred to by the migrants as becoming a \"temporary couple\" or \"teaming up to have a life.\" In the simulated\u0000 households, the men usually shoulder most of the daily expenses for both members, while the women are expected to take care of the men's intimate needs and most of the housework. The vast majority of the women involved in such arrangements are married and migrated for work on their own. This\u0000 article, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2019, explores how these women perform and understand such temporary intimacies. I first demonstrate that the women enter the relationships as a reaction to the institutional setup that places them in a suspended status, in\u0000 which they are treated as nothing more than temporary labourers. I then illustrate how the women put the relationship in a state of suspension: they instrumentalize it as a means to maximize savings, and mark it out as a short-term exception that will end abruptly once they leave Singapore.\u0000 The structurally imposed and self-inflicted conditions of suspension limit the women's agency to an ambiguous private domain that is away from both work and home. Drawing on my long-term ethnographic fieldwork, this article deploys the notion of suspension as a guiding concept to unravel the\u0000 tensions and moral anxieties that the women experience with their temporary intimacies.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46580387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Technological advances have challenged numerous social and political domains over recent decades, including the materialities and imaginaries of islands and islandness in Oceania. Since the early 2000s, a plurality of schemes, discourses, politics, anxieties, and hopes have coalesced around the possible construction of artificial islands, referred to as floating islands, floating nations, floating cities, or seasteads, depending on the new islands’ imagined purposes and peoples. If achieved, these new, de novo, islands will contribute to an ongoing regional geopolitical remaking that requires urgent attention. However, in examining floating islands as boundary objects, this article suggests that, even if never realized, they are exceptional points of focus for perceiving and reflecting on the uncanny, disruptive character of capital at work in the contemporary Pacific Islands in tension with multi-state regional policy initiatives for collective governance and sustainable ocean management. Moreover, this article argues that floating islands are not the only “artificial islands” producing tensions between communities, states, and international ocean governance frameworks. Deep-sea concessions for mineral exploitation, the spatialization of high-seas fishing rights, and large- and small-scale conservation zones similarly raise issues of the fixity or fluidity of territoriality, sovereignty, rights of access and restriction to common or uncommon marine spaces and their resources, as well as conflicting imaginaries and ideologies around the ocean and Oceania as an open frontier.
{"title":"Floating Islands, Frontiers, and Other Boundary Objects on the Edge of Oceania’s Futurity","authors":"Alexander Mawyer","doi":"10.5509/2021941123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2021941123","url":null,"abstract":"Technological advances have challenged numerous social and political domains over recent decades, including the materialities and imaginaries of islands and islandness in Oceania. Since the early 2000s, a plurality of schemes, discourses, politics, anxieties, and hopes have coalesced\u0000 around the possible construction of artificial islands, referred to as floating islands, floating nations, floating cities, or seasteads, depending on the new islands’ imagined purposes and peoples. If achieved, these new, de novo, islands will contribute to an ongoing regional\u0000 geopolitical remaking that requires urgent attention. However, in examining floating islands as boundary objects, this article suggests that, even if never realized, they are exceptional points of focus for perceiving and reflecting on the uncanny, disruptive character of capital at work in\u0000 the contemporary Pacific Islands in tension with multi-state regional policy initiatives for collective governance and sustainable ocean management. Moreover, this article argues that floating islands are not the only “artificial islands” producing tensions between communities,\u0000 states, and international ocean governance frameworks. Deep-sea concessions for mineral exploitation, the spatialization of high-seas fishing rights, and large- and small-scale conservation zones similarly raise issues of the fixity or fluidity of territoriality, sovereignty, rights of access\u0000 and restriction to common or uncommon marine spaces and their resources, as well as conflicting imaginaries and ideologies around the ocean and Oceania as an open frontier.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"94 1","pages":"123-144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45263629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Papua New Guinea’s first deep-sea mining project, once touted as the first of its kind in the world, now appears to be “dead in the water.” The mining company behind it has been liquidated, the mining equipment has been rendered obsolete, and the host government has been made to look foolish for supporting the enterprise. This paper examines the application of two concepts—that of the “resource frontier” and that of the “actornetwork”— to reach an understanding of the history of this apparent failure. By elaborating on the additional concept of a “network junction,” it seeks to show how arguments about the feasibility or fallibility of this particular project, and deep-sea mining proposals more broadly, have been related to arguments about a range of other issues in which scientific and technological uncertainties are associated with environmental and social impacts or environmental and political risks. Instead of seeking to explain the failure of this project by reference to the attributes of a specific type of maritime resource frontier, the paper shows how the articulation of different policy networks creates the appearance of a frontier in which human and nonhuman actors have combined to produce a variety of unpredictable and open-ended outcomes. From this point of view, the history of this project’s failure cannot simply be read as the outcome of a contest between two groups of human actors with clearly defined interests or ideologies, nor does it necessarily spell the end of the policy network in which this project has been embedded.
{"title":"Discombobulated Actor-Networks in a Maritime Resource Frontier","authors":"C. Filer, Jennifer Gabriel, M. Allen","doi":"10.5509/202194197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/202194197","url":null,"abstract":"Papua New Guinea’s first deep-sea mining project, once touted as the first of its kind in the world, now appears to be “dead in the water.” The mining company behind it has been liquidated, the mining equipment has been rendered obsolete, and the host government has\u0000 been made to look foolish for supporting the enterprise. This paper examines the application of two concepts—that of the “resource frontier” and that of the “actornetwork”— to reach an understanding of the history of this apparent failure. By elaborating\u0000 on the additional concept of a “network junction,” it seeks to show how arguments about the feasibility or fallibility of this particular project, and deep-sea mining proposals more broadly, have been related to arguments about a range of other issues in which scientific and technological\u0000 uncertainties are associated with environmental and social impacts or environmental and political risks. Instead of seeking to explain the failure of this project by reference to the attributes of a specific type of maritime resource frontier, the paper shows how the articulation of different\u0000 policy networks creates the appearance of a frontier in which human and nonhuman actors have combined to produce a variety of unpredictable and open-ended outcomes. From this point of view, the history of this project’s failure cannot simply be read as the outcome of a contest between\u0000 two groups of human actors with clearly defined interests or ideologies, nor does it necessarily spell the end of the policy network in which this project has been embedded.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"94 1","pages":"97-122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46999706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper interprets the disrupted establishment of the Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary, a 620,000 square kilometre marine protection area, as a crucial moment in Pacific frontier making. The development of large-scale protected marine areas is a politically charged frontier tool, in which states garner international recognition and environmental renown by setting aside large swathes of their exclusive economic zones. In the Kermadec Sanctuary, this enclosure hit against an assemblage of Indigenous histories, ecologies, repatriated fishing rights, and privatized fishing quota challenging the oftmarginalized agency of Indigenous people in frontier narratives. This paper argues that three factors are fundamental to untangling this conflict: first, the historical trajectory of terraqueous territorialization in the Kermadec region, second, the post-Treaty of Waitangi settlement dynamics of Maori marine environments, and third, the common ecosystem services model underlying conservation and extraction.
{"title":"The Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary: Terraqueous Territorialization and Māori Marine Environments","authors":"Fiona McCormack","doi":"10.5509/202194177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/202194177","url":null,"abstract":"This paper interprets the disrupted establishment of the Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary, a 620,000 square kilometre marine protection area, as a crucial moment in Pacific frontier making. The development of large-scale protected marine areas is a politically charged frontier tool, in which\u0000 states garner international recognition and environmental renown by setting aside large swathes of their exclusive economic zones. In the Kermadec Sanctuary, this enclosure hit against an assemblage of Indigenous histories, ecologies, repatriated fishing rights, and privatized fishing quota\u0000 challenging the oftmarginalized agency of Indigenous people in frontier narratives. This paper argues that three factors are fundamental to untangling this conflict: first, the historical trajectory of terraqueous territorialization in the Kermadec region, second, the post-Treaty of Waitangi\u0000 settlement dynamics of Maori marine environments, and third, the common ecosystem services model underlying conservation and extraction.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"94 1","pages":"77-96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48608383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the last decades, the Pacific Ocean has been the locus of an unequalled rush for space and resources involving intertwined public and corporate interests, external powers, and Pacific Island states and territories. This rush is driven by three intersecting motivations aiming to: (1) exploit marine resources; (2) protect marine biodiversity and mitigate the effects of climate change; and (3) establish sovereignties over marine spaces. In this context, the fluidity of saltwater environments gives rise to specific issues of enforcement, control, and governance. This special issue examines these reconfigurations of/in the Pacific Ocean, stressing potentially conflicting frontier processes, in the light of a structuring tension between trends of ocean grabbing and ocean commoning.
{"title":"Introduction: The New Scramble for the Pacific: A Frontier Approach","authors":"Elodie Fache, P. Meur, E. Rodary","doi":"10.5509/202194157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/202194157","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decades, the Pacific Ocean has been the locus of an unequalled rush for space and resources involving intertwined public and corporate interests, external powers, and Pacific Island states and territories. This rush is driven by three intersecting motivations aiming to:\u0000 (1) exploit marine resources; (2) protect marine biodiversity and mitigate the effects of climate change; and (3) establish sovereignties over marine spaces. In this context, the fluidity of saltwater environments gives rise to specific issues of enforcement, control, and governance. This\u0000 special issue examines these reconfigurations of/in the Pacific Ocean, stressing potentially conflicting frontier processes, in the light of a structuring tension between trends of ocean grabbing and ocean commoning.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"94 1","pages":"57-76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44850338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China has substantially increased its engagement with Pacific Island countries since 2006, driving heightened geostrategic competition between traditional powers and China in the region. Research on Pacific Island countries by Chinese scholars has grown rapidly in recent years, but this development and its relationship with policy needs are little-known outside China. By analyzing the 129 journal articles published by Chinese scholars on Pacific studies between 2006–2019, with supporting interviews, this research aims to expand the debate on the policy-research nexus, especially in the Chinese context, by introducing Pacific studies in China. It argues that official policy needs have largely shaped Pacific studies in China, and that researchers who seek to influence policy-making tend to find the process slow and indirect. This research will also improve our understanding of Chinese scholars’ intellectual support of China’s Pacific diplomacy on certain topics.
{"title":"Policy-Research Nexus: The Case of Pacific Studies in China","authors":"Denghua Zhang","doi":"10.5509/202194133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/202194133","url":null,"abstract":"China has substantially increased its engagement with Pacific Island countries since 2006, driving heightened geostrategic competition between traditional powers and China in the region. Research on Pacific Island countries by Chinese scholars has grown rapidly in recent years, but\u0000 this development and its relationship with policy needs are little-known outside China. By analyzing the 129 journal articles published by Chinese scholars on Pacific studies between 2006–2019, with supporting interviews, this research aims to expand the debate on the policy-research\u0000 nexus, especially in the Chinese context, by introducing Pacific studies in China. It argues that official policy needs have largely shaped Pacific studies in China, and that researchers who seek to influence policy-making tend to find the process slow and indirect. This research will also\u0000 improve our understanding of Chinese scholars’ intellectual support of China’s Pacific diplomacy on certain topics.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"94 1","pages":"33-56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41616054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes how democratization has affected the dynamics of candidate selection in South Korea. After democratization in the late 1980s, it was expected that intra-party democracy would follow. In response to increasing public demand, the major parties adopted primary systems in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, most candidates for the legislature are still nominated by a small number of central party elites without additional ballots in the local branches. To explain the persistence of such exclusive, centralized features of candidate selection, I highlight the limited impact democratization has had on the political environment in which the parties operate. More specifically, since the 1987 democratization process resulted in a compromise agreement established by a small number of party leaders, South Korea retained much of the political legacy from authoritarian times, such as an electoral system advantageous to the major parties and legal provisions restricting electoral campaigns, party activities, and political participation. The continuation of these political institutions makes radical candidate selection reform highly unlikely as the party elites have no incentive to expand and decentralize the selection process. Without significant changes to the political institutions at the national level, the dominance of the central party elite over the final outcome of candidate selection looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
{"title":"Candidate Selection Reform in South Korea: The Persistence of Exclusive Practices Despite Inclusive Rules","authors":"E. Woo","doi":"10.5509/2020934735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2020934735","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how democratization has affected the dynamics of candidate selection in South Korea. After democratization in the late 1980s, it was expected that intra-party democracy would follow. In response to increasing public demand, the major parties adopted primary systems\u0000 in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, most candidates for the legislature are still nominated by a small number of central party elites without additional ballots in the local branches. To explain the persistence of such exclusive, centralized features of candidate selection, I highlight the limited\u0000 impact democratization has had on the political environment in which the parties operate. More specifically, since the 1987 democratization process resulted in a compromise agreement established by a small number of party leaders, South Korea retained much of the political legacy from authoritarian\u0000 times, such as an electoral system advantageous to the major parties and legal provisions restricting electoral campaigns, party activities, and political participation. The continuation of these political institutions makes radical candidate selection reform highly unlikely as the party elites\u0000 have no incentive to expand and decentralize the selection process. Without significant changes to the political institutions at the national level, the dominance of the central party elite over the final outcome of candidate selection looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"93 1","pages":"735-758"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48945827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Populists in Southeast Asia generally refrain from invoking anti-migrant and anti-minority sentiments as part of their mobilizational strategies. This differentiates them from "exclusionary" populists in Europe, even though many Southeast Asian countries are diverse societies with long histories of migration and ethnic chauvinism. Because the categories of peoplehood that were set alongside the onset of mass politics at independence remain salient today, they constrain contemporary Asian populists' rhetorical and mobilizational strategies—even in Southeast Asia's diverse societies. The Southeast Asian experience reveals the importance of historical sequence in nationalist mobilization and mass incorporation in shaping popular identity, citizenship, and membership in contemporary populism.
{"title":"Migrants, Minorities, and Populism in Southeast Asia Thomas Pepinsky","authors":"Thomas B. Pepinsky","doi":"10.5509/2020933593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2020933593","url":null,"abstract":"Populists in Southeast Asia generally refrain from invoking anti-migrant and anti-minority sentiments as part of their mobilizational strategies. This differentiates them from \"exclusionary\" populists in Europe, even though many Southeast Asian countries are diverse societies with long\u0000 histories of migration and ethnic chauvinism. Because the categories of peoplehood that were set alongside the onset of mass politics at independence remain salient today, they constrain contemporary Asian populists' rhetorical and mobilizational strategies—even in Southeast Asia's diverse\u0000 societies. The Southeast Asian experience reveals the importance of historical sequence in nationalist mobilization and mass incorporation in shaping popular identity, citizenship, and membership in contemporary populism.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"93 1","pages":"593-610"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5509/2020933593","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42586666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The dominant literature on Cambodian politics over the past two decades suggested that a mixture of elite and mass clientelism had enabled the hegemonic Cambodian People's Party (CPP) to rule via competitive but authoritarian elections, while lessening its previous reliance on repression and violence. Such explanations did not predict the upswing in contestation in the country in 2013 and thereafter. Neither do they account for the crackdown that followed. Following literature that draws attention to the tensions in building and maintaining political coalitions under authoritarianism, and demonstrating the difficulties in maintaining competitive authoritarianism over time, this article draws attention to structural, institutional, and distributional impediments to the CPP leadership in building and maintaining effective reciprocal relations with electoral clients while simultaneously balancing the interests of the military and other elites at the core of the regime. To make its argument, the article compares weaknesses in the CPP's electoral clientelism with the effectiveness of patronage within the security forces, seen through the lens of Cambodia's experience of land dispossession. It shows that an extractive and exclusive political economy privileged the interests of regime insiders over potential mass electoral clients precisely during the same period the CPP was supposed to be securing its hold on power via mass electoral clientelism. This further explains why the regime fell back on repression over reform in response to the upswing in contestation manifest from 2013, and why, despite the failings of its mass patronage project, repression has nevertheless been successful as a strategy for regime survival during a period of heightened popular contestation.
{"title":"Reassessing Cambodia's Patronage System(s) and the End of Competitive Authoritarianism: Electoral Clientelism in the Shadow of Coercion","authors":"Neil Loughlin","doi":"10.5509/2020933497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2020933497","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant literature on Cambodian politics over the past two decades suggested that a mixture of elite and mass clientelism had enabled the hegemonic Cambodian People's Party (CPP) to rule via competitive but authoritarian elections, while lessening its previous reliance on repression\u0000 and violence. Such explanations did not predict the upswing in contestation in the country in 2013 and thereafter. Neither do they account for the crackdown that followed. Following literature that draws attention to the tensions in building and maintaining political coalitions under authoritarianism,\u0000 and demonstrating the difficulties in maintaining competitive authoritarianism over time, this article draws attention to structural, institutional, and distributional impediments to the CPP leadership in building and maintaining effective reciprocal relations with electoral clients while\u0000 simultaneously balancing the interests of the military and other elites at the core of the regime. To make its argument, the article compares weaknesses in the CPP's electoral clientelism with the effectiveness of patronage within the security forces, seen through the lens of Cambodia's experience\u0000 of land dispossession. It shows that an extractive and exclusive political economy privileged the interests of regime insiders over potential mass electoral clients precisely during the same period the CPP was supposed to be securing its hold on power via mass electoral clientelism. This further\u0000 explains why the regime fell back on repression over reform in response to the upswing in contestation manifest from 2013, and why, despite the failings of its mass patronage project, repression has nevertheless been successful as a strategy for regime survival during a period of heightened\u0000 popular contestation.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"93 1","pages":"497-518"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41477748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}