This paper explains and corroborates the mechanisms by which civic and political spaces opposed to Hindu nationalism have been attacked, especially after the arrival of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2014. Three mechanisms are discerned for replacing pluralistic values with Hindu majoritarian ones. Sometimes institutions are just allowed to drift by interpreting old rules in new ways. For example, no formal rules for media control have changed but the government’s control over media has increased substantially. At other times, incremental legal and policy changes are executed to make the change explicit, often building on a new moral purpose. To give another example, the FCRA (2010) was amended and weaponized against NGOs in a layered way in 2020. Finally, when political opposition is weak, institutions that have provided guarantees for protecting diversity have simply been displaced by new and radically different ones. This was the case with abrogating Article 370, which converted the special status of the subnational state of Jammu and Kashmir to the status of two federally administered union territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These mechanisms place India in a competitive authoritarian frame, where those in power deploy electoral majorities to systematically attack the political opposition, making it more difficult for it to rise. Despite these propensities, opposition parties have won elections in some of India’s subnational states. The challenges facing the world’s most populous democracy are significant, even though competitive elements co-exist. These elements in a competitive authoritarian regime, however, are under severe stress. India’s democratic credentials can be revived only if the competitive elements of India’s democracy stand united against ethno-nationalist Hindu majoritarianism.
{"title":"India’s Democracy: The Competitive Authoritarian Propensity?","authors":"Rahul Mukherji, Seyed Hossein Zarhani","doi":"10.5509/2023964747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2023964747","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains and corroborates the mechanisms by which civic and political spaces opposed to Hindu nationalism have been attacked, especially after the arrival of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2014. Three mechanisms are discerned for replacing pluralistic values with Hindu majoritarian ones. Sometimes institutions are just allowed to drift by interpreting old rules in new ways. For example, no formal rules for media control have changed but the government’s control over media has increased substantially. At other times, incremental legal and policy changes are executed to make the change explicit, often building on a new moral purpose. To give another example, the FCRA (2010) was amended and weaponized against NGOs in a layered way in 2020. Finally, when political opposition is weak, institutions that have provided guarantees for protecting diversity have simply been displaced by new and radically different ones. This was the case with abrogating Article 370, which converted the special status of the subnational state of Jammu and Kashmir to the status of two federally administered union territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These mechanisms place India in a competitive authoritarian frame, where those in power deploy electoral majorities to systematically attack the political opposition, making it more difficult for it to rise. Despite these propensities, opposition parties have won elections in some of India’s subnational states. The challenges facing the world’s most populous democracy are significant, even though competitive elements co-exist. These elements in a competitive authoritarian regime, however, are under severe stress. India’s democratic credentials can be revived only if the competitive elements of India’s democracy stand united against ethno-nationalist Hindu majoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"304 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134979945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Departing from extant studies that largely focus on gender roles, norm diffusion, or ethnonationalism, this paper highlights policy siting as one understudied factor in determining why and when states manage cultural diversity. Using the case of South Korea’s family-centred multicultural policy, the paper contributes to the growing body of literature on comparative policymaking, multiculturalism, and multi-level citizenship by foregrounding the processes by which governing elites target specific meso-level social institutions as privileged sites of diversity governance. The paper draws on immersive field research conducted between 2017 and 2023 to introduce and analyze the concept of familial multiculturalism to explain how the state locates diversity governance mainly within the family and between family and broader society. Siting diversity governance in powerful meso-level institutions like the nuclear family in shaping state multiculturalism is not unique to Korea. Rather, the paper contends that these institutions play a significant role in cultural management endeavours worldwide. While the content of a multicultural site depends on history and national context, states worldwide seek to mitigate social friction and political backlash by targeting certain intercultural relations and negating or delegitimizing others. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contemporary political ramifications of Korea’s multiculturalism and prospects for future broadening and deepening.
{"title":"Multicultural at the Meso-Level: Governing Diversity within the Family in South Korea","authors":"Darcie Draudt","doi":"10.5509/2023964701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2023964701","url":null,"abstract":"Departing from extant studies that largely focus on gender roles, norm diffusion, or ethnonationalism, this paper highlights policy siting as one understudied factor in determining why and when states manage cultural diversity. Using the case of South Korea’s family-centred multicultural policy, the paper contributes to the growing body of literature on comparative policymaking, multiculturalism, and multi-level citizenship by foregrounding the processes by which governing elites target specific meso-level social institutions as privileged sites of diversity governance. The paper draws on immersive field research conducted between 2017 and 2023 to introduce and analyze the concept of familial multiculturalism to explain how the state locates diversity governance mainly within the family and between family and broader society. Siting diversity governance in powerful meso-level institutions like the nuclear family in shaping state multiculturalism is not unique to Korea. Rather, the paper contends that these institutions play a significant role in cultural management endeavours worldwide. While the content of a multicultural site depends on history and national context, states worldwide seek to mitigate social friction and political backlash by targeting certain intercultural relations and negating or delegitimizing others. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contemporary political ramifications of Korea’s multiculturalism and prospects for future broadening and deepening.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134980157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vietnam effectively controlled the Covid-19 pandemic until April 2021, and faced great challenges afterwards, partly due to the spread of the highly transmissible Delta and Omicron strains of the coronavirus. Adopting Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" approach, this article focuses not on the impact of regime type, but on the fear-driven tension and the process of negotiation among different levels of the state apparatus and between state and society during the covid-19 pandemic in Vietnam. The evolution of this pandemic was shaped not only by state measures but also by citizens' fear-driven situational variation in norm compliance, as well as by the historical and cultural backgrounds of a society, specifically the wide sharing of war experiences and the war metaphor in Vietnamese society, and the non-negative meaning of face masks in daily life.
{"title":"Vietnam's War Against COVID-19","authors":"H. V. Luong","doi":"10.5509/2022954757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022954757","url":null,"abstract":"Vietnam effectively controlled the Covid-19 pandemic until April 2021, and faced great challenges afterwards, partly due to the spread of the highly transmissible Delta and Omicron strains of the coronavirus. Adopting Joel Migdal's \"state-in-society\" approach, this article focuses not\u0000 on the impact of regime type, but on the fear-driven tension and the process of negotiation among different levels of the state apparatus and between state and society during the covid-19 pandemic in Vietnam. The evolution of this pandemic was shaped not only by state measures but also by\u0000 citizens' fear-driven situational variation in norm compliance, as well as by the historical and cultural backgrounds of a society, specifically the wide sharing of war experiences and the war metaphor in Vietnamese society, and the non-negative meaning of face masks in daily life.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44314248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper takes a "state-in society" approach to understand the evolution of Pakistan's COVID-19 response, which was laid claim to and contested by multiple agencies within and adjacent to the state, and by multiple levels of government. The capacity of the health system of Pakistan was already overstretched by the needs of its population but in recent years it has been hamstrung by ongoing protests by the medical community concerning the privatisation of public sector hospitals, to which were added protests over the lack of PPE in the public sector. These resulted in frequent closures of out-patient departments at major hospitals. When the government announced a relief package to mitigate effects of COVID, traders and big businesses lobbied the government to obtain the lion's share in the form of concessions such as loan deferments and tax refunds. The unconditional cash grants programme was hyped about by the government but the cash for the poor could not be disbursed effectively due to the absence of local governments at the grass-root level. As an appropriate response to the pandemic, especially in relation to the lockdown policies, was contested and negotiated among multiple actors in the Pakistani state and society, the Pakistan military emerged as a dominant force in this "field of power". In this paper, I present an account of Pakistan's response to COVID-19 as it evolved in 2020 and discuss the implications of this response for democratic culture in Pakistan.
{"title":"The Politics of Pakistan's COVID-19 Response: A State-in-Society Approach","authors":"A. Qureshi","doi":"10.5509/2022954731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022954731","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes a \"state-in society\" approach to understand the evolution of Pakistan's COVID-19 response, which was laid claim to and contested by multiple agencies within and adjacent to the state, and by multiple levels of government. The capacity of the health system of Pakistan\u0000 was already overstretched by the needs of its population but in recent years it has been hamstrung by ongoing protests by the medical community concerning the privatisation of public sector hospitals, to which were added protests over the lack of PPE in the public sector. These resulted in\u0000 frequent closures of out-patient departments at major hospitals. When the government announced a relief package to mitigate effects of COVID, traders and big businesses lobbied the government to obtain the lion's share in the form of concessions such as loan deferments and tax refunds. The\u0000 unconditional cash grants programme was hyped about by the government but the cash for the poor could not be disbursed effectively due to the absence of local governments at the grass-root level. As an appropriate response to the pandemic, especially in relation to the lockdown policies, was\u0000 contested and negotiated among multiple actors in the Pakistani state and society, the Pakistan military emerged as a dominant force in this \"field of power\". In this paper, I present an account of Pakistan's response to COVID-19 as it evolved in 2020 and discuss the implications of this response\u0000 for democratic culture in Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48889945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The South Korean response to the COVID-19 pandemic was mainly characterized—whether positively or negatively—as the efficient implementation of surveillance supported by the extensive deployment of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Yet, the fact that the South Korean management of the pandemic was also maintained by citizens' voluntary participation in stringent quarantine policies has received little critical attention. Through the lens of techno-politics, this essay examines the distinctive interplay of digital monitoring systems and civic engagement in South Korea during the pandemic, with particular reference to data surveillance, horizontal collectivism, and a networked multitude. In capturing the essential features of South Korean pandemic politics as reflecting key components of techno-populism, this essay draws out some social theoretical implications of reconsidering the increasingly close relationship between technology and democracy in the pandemic period.
{"title":"Between Surveillance and Freedom: Techno-Politics in South Korea during the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Jaeho Kang","doi":"10.5509/2022954787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022954787","url":null,"abstract":"The South Korean response to the COVID-19 pandemic was mainly characterized—whether positively or negatively—as the efficient implementation of surveillance supported by the extensive deployment of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Yet, the fact that the\u0000 South Korean management of the pandemic was also maintained by citizens' voluntary participation in stringent quarantine policies has received little critical attention. Through the lens of techno-politics, this essay examines the distinctive interplay of digital monitoring systems and civic\u0000 engagement in South Korea during the pandemic, with particular reference to data surveillance, horizontal collectivism, and a networked multitude. In capturing the essential features of South Korean pandemic politics as reflecting key components of techno-populism, this essay draws out some\u0000 social theoretical implications of reconsidering the increasingly close relationship between technology and democracy in the pandemic period.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48076194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this introduction to studies of the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic in four Asian states—India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and South Korea—we first discuss the difficulties in evaluating the performances of different countries, given the varying reliability of data and the different possible criteria that may be applied. In our studies we aim rather to illuminate the process of different state responses, and we go on to summarize evidence on different patterns of response across Asia, situating the four country studies in a comparative context. We then review arguments in the literature about the determinants of different responses, before presenting our framework for the analysis of the politics that underlie these differences. Political leadership has undoubtedly exercised a powerful influence, but in the structural context of the relationships of state and citizens. We argue that understanding of these relationships is advanced by an analytical framework that draws on state-in-society approaches developed in the work of Joel Migdal, Michael Mann, and Peter Evans.
{"title":"Covid-19 in Asia: Governance And The Politics of the Pandemic","authors":"J. Harriss, H. V. Luong","doi":"10.5509/2022954685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022954685","url":null,"abstract":"In this introduction to studies of the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic in four Asian states—India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and South Korea—we first discuss the difficulties in evaluating the performances of different countries, given the varying reliability of data and the\u0000 different possible criteria that may be applied. In our studies we aim rather to illuminate the process of different state responses, and we go on to summarize evidence on different patterns of response across Asia, situating the four country studies in a comparative context. We then review\u0000 arguments in the literature about the determinants of different responses, before presenting our framework for the analysis of the politics that underlie these differences. Political leadership has undoubtedly exercised a powerful influence, but in the structural context of the relationships\u0000 of state and citizens. We argue that understanding of these relationships is advanced by an analytical framework that draws on state-in-society approaches developed in the work of Joel Migdal, Michael Mann, and Peter Evans.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41808100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Administrative "success" or "failure" during the pandemic are hard to assess given uncertainties both of criteria and of data. But there can be no doubt about the mishandling of the pandemic at crucial junctures by the Indian government, or about the culpability of prime minister Narendra Modi himself. He has this in common with other "strongmen" of contemporary world politics, but Modi was unusually successful in turning the events of the pandemic to reinforce his dominance. The immediate political factors that influenced the Indian response had to do with political leadership and with the "decisionism" that characterised Modi's actions, but in the context of the pursuit of the goals of Hindu nationalism. This article explains the responses of the Indian government drawing on a framework based on the comparative analysis of Baum and her co-authors. It shows how the events of the pandemic reflect on India's politics and on the character of the Indian state, using a state-in-society approach suggested by the interlocking arguments of Migdal, Mann and Evans. This highlights and explains the very different responses of the major states of the country.
{"title":"Why Was the Pandemic Poorly Managed by the Government of India? A State-in-Society Approach","authors":"J. Harriss","doi":"10.5509/2022954707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022954707","url":null,"abstract":"Administrative \"success\" or \"failure\" during the pandemic are hard to assess given uncertainties both of criteria and of data. But there can be no doubt about the mishandling of the pandemic at crucial junctures by the Indian government, or about the culpability of prime minister Narendra\u0000 Modi himself. He has this in common with other \"strongmen\" of contemporary world politics, but Modi was unusually successful in turning the events of the pandemic to reinforce his dominance. The immediate political factors that influenced the Indian response had to do with political leadership\u0000 and with the \"decisionism\" that characterised Modi's actions, but in the context of the pursuit of the goals of Hindu nationalism. This article explains the responses of the Indian government drawing on a framework based on the comparative analysis of Baum and her co-authors. It shows how\u0000 the events of the pandemic reflect on India's politics and on the character of the Indian state, using a state-in-society approach suggested by the interlocking arguments of Migdal, Mann and Evans. This highlights and explains the very different responses of the major states of the country.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48327614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Third-wave democracies have massively adopted mechanisms of judicial review, notably constitutional courts, considered key institutions of successful democratic transitions. By preventing abuses of the constitution and safeguarding people's rights, they act as a bulwark against the claims of potential autocrats. In Thailand, the 1997 democratic transition led to the adoption of a powerful constitutional court tasked with safeguarding democracy from the threats of populism, corruption, and authoritarianism. Yet since its inception, the court's record has been puzzling. It has dissolved most, if not all, of the pro-democracy, anti-military political parties, dismissed all elected prime ministers, and paved the way for two military coups. In short, against established theories linking constitutional courts to democratization, the introduction of constitutional review in Thailand has led to democratic breakdown. To make sense of this puzzle, this article will investigate three variables of the court—strategic interests, ideologies, and institutional design—within the larger bureaucratic structure of the Thai state, to account for the anti-democratic behaviour of Thailand's Constitutional Court. This piece considers materials in Thai and English.
{"title":"Democratic Breakdown through Lawfare by Constitutional Courts: The Case of Post-\"Democratic Transition\" Thailand","authors":"Eugénie Mérieau","doi":"10.5509/2022953475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022953475","url":null,"abstract":"Third-wave democracies have massively adopted mechanisms of judicial review, notably constitutional courts, considered key institutions of successful democratic transitions. By preventing abuses of the constitution and safeguarding people's rights, they act as a bulwark against the\u0000 claims of potential autocrats. In Thailand, the 1997 democratic transition led to the adoption of a powerful constitutional court tasked with safeguarding democracy from the threats of populism, corruption, and authoritarianism. Yet since its inception, the court's record has been puzzling.\u0000 It has dissolved most, if not all, of the pro-democracy, anti-military political parties, dismissed all elected prime ministers, and paved the way for two military coups. In short, against established theories linking constitutional courts to democratization, the introduction of constitutional\u0000 review in Thailand has led to democratic breakdown. To make sense of this puzzle, this article will investigate three variables of the court—strategic interests, ideologies, and institutional design—within the larger bureaucratic structure of the Thai state, to account for the\u0000 anti-democratic behaviour of Thailand's Constitutional Court. This piece considers materials in Thai and English.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45900438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's systematic strategy of autocratization backfired. This paper is based on a model of three pillars of authoritarian regimes. It traces the di erent strategies and measures employed to weaken the opposition and shows that major survival strategies were prone to frequent shifts. At the beginning of his tenure, Najib depicted himself as a reformer, and refined some forms of repression. The regime scrapped central coercive tools such as the Internal Security Act, but later replaced them with kindred, yet ine ective measures. Co-optation was more centralized and "money politics" expanded. The widespread and unprecedented usage of patronage resulted in corruption, which fundamentally destabilized the regime. Legitimation was modified since 2013 to a more Malay-centric and Islamist discourse. Because of this shift, legitimation eroded among ethnic and religious minorities. The prime minister's legitimacy shrank due to corruption scandals. This paper helps gauge the lacking complementarity of the pillars and the failures of an authoritarian regime in crisis, which is important also with a view to political developments in Malaysia since 2018.
{"title":"Failed Autocratization: Malaysia under Najib Razak (2009–2018)","authors":"Andreas Ufen","doi":"10.5509/2022953527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022953527","url":null,"abstract":"Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's systematic strategy of autocratization backfired. This paper is based on a model of three pillars of authoritarian regimes. It traces the di erent strategies and measures employed to weaken the opposition and shows that major survival strategies\u0000 were prone to frequent shifts. At the beginning of his tenure, Najib depicted himself as a reformer, and refined some forms of repression. The regime scrapped central coercive tools such as the Internal Security Act, but later replaced them with kindred, yet ine ective measures. Co-optation\u0000 was more centralized and \"money politics\" expanded. The widespread and unprecedented usage of patronage resulted in corruption, which fundamentally destabilized the regime. Legitimation was modified since 2013 to a more Malay-centric and Islamist discourse. Because of this shift, legitimation\u0000 eroded among ethnic and religious minorities. The prime minister's legitimacy shrank due to corruption scandals. This paper helps gauge the lacking complementarity of the pillars and the failures of an authoritarian regime in crisis, which is important also with a view to political developments\u0000 in Malaysia since 2018.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44913988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A growing global trend towards authoritarianism has left democracy, especially its liberal form, under strain. This has occurred despite earlier promises of democratization between the end of the Cold War and the early twenty-first century. Our essay examines how the dynamics of post-democratization politics have played out across several polities in Southeast and Northeast Asia. These regions once included supposed "third wave" democracies and polities apparently on the cusp of political liberalization. Such expectations have not panned out. Instead, the region has generally witnessed either significant authoritarian resilience or autocratic resurgence following spurts of political openness. We examine how such autocratic dynamics have played out following earlier movements toward democratization. Specifically, we identify three key elements of post- democratization politics associated with autocratic success and democratic robustness based on contributions to this special issue, and suggest pathways through which they can a ect political outcomes. Dominant beliefs can prime accommodation with authoritarianism given pervasive acceptance of state-driven ideologies while identification with liberal values can drive democratic consolidation and resistance to autocracy, regardless of wealth and education. Ostensibly democratic institutions, such as constitutional courts, can become anti-democratic instruments when the exercise of their independent prerogatives means upholding autocratic tendencies that align with their interests and outlooks. Agents and their decisions can both prompt and stymie autocratization, whether intentionally or inadvertently; strategies to consolidate authority can fracture even dominant ruling coalitions. Examining the role ideas, institutions, and agents play in post-democratic politics can further e orts at understanding the current authoritarian wave and its limits.
{"title":"Post-democratizing Politics in Southeast and Northeast Asia","authors":"J. I. Chong, Norma Osterberg-Kaufmann","doi":"10.5509/2022953417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5509/2022953417","url":null,"abstract":"A growing global trend towards authoritarianism has left democracy, especially its liberal form, under strain. This has occurred despite earlier promises of democratization between the end of the Cold War and the early twenty-first century. Our essay examines how the dynamics of post-democratization\u0000 politics have played out across several polities in Southeast and Northeast Asia. These regions once included supposed \"third wave\" democracies and polities apparently on the cusp of political liberalization. Such expectations have not panned out. Instead, the region has generally witnessed\u0000 either significant authoritarian resilience or autocratic resurgence following spurts of political openness. We examine how such autocratic dynamics have played out following earlier movements toward democratization. Specifically, we identify three key elements of post- democratization politics\u0000 associated with autocratic success and democratic robustness based on contributions to this special issue, and suggest pathways through which they can a ect political outcomes. Dominant beliefs can prime accommodation with authoritarianism given pervasive acceptance of state-driven\u0000 ideologies while identification with liberal values can drive democratic consolidation and resistance to autocracy, regardless of wealth and education. Ostensibly democratic institutions, such as constitutional courts, can become anti-democratic instruments when the exercise of their independent\u0000 prerogatives means upholding autocratic tendencies that align with their interests and outlooks. Agents and their decisions can both prompt and stymie autocratization, whether intentionally or inadvertently; strategies to consolidate authority can fracture even dominant ruling coalitions.\u0000 Examining the role ideas, institutions, and agents play in post-democratic politics can further e orts at understanding the current authoritarian wave and its limits.","PeriodicalId":47041,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41419920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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