International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

英文中文

Conditional political legislation cycles 有条件的政治立法周期

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-10-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106305

Fabio Padovano , Youssoufa Sy

The Political Legislation Cycles theory predicts peaks of legislative production before elections, as incumbents adopt vote-maximizing strategies to secure reelection. Like for budget cycles, legislative cycles can be interpreted as quantitative evidence of a dynamic inefficiency in the agency relationship between voters and politicians. This paper presents the first panel test of PLC theory, to identify which institutional features generate this inefficiency, exploiting a newly assembled dataset of the legislative activity of twenty electoral democracies, mainly from 1975 to 2010s. The estimates show that the total number of laws decreases at the beginning of a legislature and significantly increases near its end, generally 6 months before, with magnitudes of the cycles varying across countries. These cross-countries variations appear correlated with electoral systems (PR electoral systems generating cycles 67 % greater than majoritarian), government systems, with presidential democracies being characterized by larger cycles especially when governments are divided, and with the degree of fiscal decentralization, with highly decentralized countries showing a legislative cycles 64 % greater. Finally, the level of democracy affects PLC in a nonlinear way. These results provide a quantitative guidance to constitutional reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in the representation of voters’ preferences in democracies

政治立法周期理论预测在选举前立法生产达到高峰，因为现任者采取选票最大化策略以确保连任。与预算周期一样，立法周期可以被解释为选民和政治家之间代理关系动态低效的定量证据。本文提出了PLC理论的第一个面板测试，以确定哪些制度特征导致了这种低效率，利用了一个新组装的20个选举民主国家的立法活动数据集，主要是从1975年到2010年。估计表明，法律总数在立法机关开始时减少，在接近结束时（通常在6个月前）显著增加，周期的幅度因国家而异。这些跨国差异似乎与选举制度（PR选举制度产生的周期比多数选举制度高出67% %）、政府制度（总统制民主的特点是周期更大，特别是在政府分裂的情况下）以及财政分权程度（高度分权的国家的立法周期高出64% %）相关。最后，民主程度以非线性的方式影响PLC。这些结果为旨在提高民主国家选民偏好代表效率的宪法改革提供了定量指导

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引用次数: 0

Collusion in bidding markets: The case of the French public transport industry 投标市场的合谋：法国公共交通行业的案例

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106304

Philippe Gagnepain , David Martimort

We explore empirically the impact of the market sharing collusive practices that were implemented in the French public transportation industry between 1994 and 1999. We build a structural model of bidding markets where innovating firms compete for the market and have the ability to spread the benefits of their innovation through all markets on which they are active. Each local competitive environment shapes the distribution of the prices (the bids) paid by public authorities to transport operators. We recover empirically the distribution of prices and innovation shocks and we show that collusive practices had overall a limited impact on prices. Firms were in reality more interested in avoiding significant financial risks inherent to the activity, as well as the high cost of preparing a tender proposal. As a by-product, we perform a counterfactual analysis that allows us to simulate how an increase in firms’ innovation reduces prices significantly.

我们实证地探讨了1994年至1999年间在法国公共交通行业实施的市场共享合谋行为的影响。我们建立了一个竞标市场的结构模型，在这个模型中，创新企业为市场而竞争，并有能力将其创新的好处传播到它们活跃的所有市场。每个地方的竞争环境决定了公共当局向运输经营者支付的价格（投标）的分布。我们从经验上恢复了价格和创新冲击的分布，并表明合谋行为对价格的总体影响有限。实际上，公司更感兴趣的是避免活动固有的重大财务风险，以及准备投标建议书的高成本。作为副产品，我们进行了反事实分析，使我们能够模拟企业创新的增加如何显著降低价格。

引用次数: 0

Inter-municipal cooperation in drinking water supply: Trade-offs between transaction costs, efficiency and service quality 城市间饮用水供应合作：交易成本、效率和服务质量之间的权衡

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106303

Mehdi Guelmamen , Serge Garcia , Alexandre Mayol

Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) is frequently promoted as a solution to improve the management of local utilities such as drinking water. Yet its effectiveness remains ambiguous: while IMC can create economies of scale, it may also induce transaction costs that undermine its benefits. In France, drinking water services are managed at the municipal level, where local governments can decide whether to cooperate—and if so, whether to adopt a purely technical cooperative arrangement or a more politically integrated, supra-municipal governance structure. Using a comprehensive panel of French water utilities from 2008 to 2021, we investigate the factors that lead municipalities to remain independent. Our econometric analysis, based on a correlated random effects probit model with a control function approach, yields several key findings. First, while IMC is associated with higher water prices, these increased tariffs are offset by better network performance, as indicated by lower water loss indices and improved water quality. Second, we find that the more politically integrated form of cooperation is more common among publicly managed utilities and among municipalities seeking to reduce their dependence on imported water. These findings provide new insights into the governance of common-pool resources, suggesting that while cooperation can improve service provision, its institutional design must carefully balance organizational costs against expected efficiency gains.

城市间合作经常被宣传为一种改善地方公用事业（如饮用水）管理的解决办法。然而，其有效性仍不明确：尽管整合整合营销可以创造规模经济，但它也可能引发交易成本，从而削弱其效益。在法国，饮用水服务由市一级管理，地方政府可以决定是否合作，如果合作，是采用纯粹的技术合作安排，还是采用政治上更一体化的、超市的治理结构。利用2008年至2021年法国水务公司的综合面板，我们调查了导致市政当局保持独立的因素。我们的计量经济学分析，基于与控制函数方法相关的随机效应概率模型，产生了几个关键的发现。首先，虽然IMC与较高的水价有关，但这些增加的费用被较好的网络性能所抵消，如较低的失水指数和改善的水质所表明的那样。其次，我们发现，在公共管理的公用事业和寻求减少对进口水依赖的市政当局之间，政治上更加一体化的合作形式更为常见。这些发现为公共资源的治理提供了新的见解，表明虽然合作可以改善服务提供，但其制度设计必须仔细平衡组织成本与预期效率收益。

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引用次数: 0

Product liability influences incentives for horizontal mergers 产品负债影响横向并购的激励

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106302

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais , Tim Friehe , Eric Langlais

This paper explores how product liability rules affect merger incentives, with consumer risk perception as a key factor. We find a striking contrast: when consumers overestimate product risk, no liability generates the strongest merger incentives, while strict liability and negligence have weaker, similar effects. Conversely, when consumers underestimate risk, strict liability maximizes merger incentives, and no liability minimizes them. We also demonstrate that horizontal mergers without efficiency effects can unexpectedly increase welfare under no liability or negligence when consumers underestimate risk—a result that is impossible under strict liability.

本文探讨了产品责任规则如何影响并购激励，其中消费者风险感知是一个关键因素。我们发现了一个显著的对比：当消费者高估产品风险时，无责任产生最强的合并激励，而严格责任和疏忽产生的效果较弱，但效果相似。相反，当消费者低估风险时，严格责任会使合并激励最大化，而无责任则会使合并激励最小化。我们还证明，在没有责任或疏忽的情况下，当消费者低估风险时，没有效率效应的横向合并可以意外地增加福利，这是在严格责任下不可能出现的结果。

引用次数: 0

Populist constitutional backsliding and judicial independence: Evidence from Türkiye 民粹主义宪法倒退与司法独立：来自<s:1> rkiye的证据

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106301

Nuno Garoupa , Rok Spruk

This paper examines the long-term institutional consequences of populist constitutional reform, focusing on effective judicial independence in Türkiye. Using the synthetic control method, we estimate the causal effect of the 2010 constitutional referendum, which restructured the judiciary under the rhetoric of modernization, on judicial independence. Türkiye is compared to a carefully selected donor pool of Mediterranean countries with similar institutional trajectories but no comparable judicial intervention during 1987–2023. The results reveal a sharp and sustained decline in judicial independence following the 2010 reforms, predating and paving the way for the more overt constitutional centralization of 2017. These findings contribute to the literature on populism, comparative institutional development, and empirical law and economics, and highlight the role of disguised legal reform in undermining judicial checks on executive power.

本文考察了民粹主义宪政改革的长期制度后果，重点关注乌克兰有效的司法独立。运用综合控制方法，我们估计了2010年宪法公投对司法独立的因果效应，该公投在现代化的修辞下重组了司法。将t rkiye与精心挑选的地中海国家捐赠库进行比较，这些国家在1987-2023年间有着相似的制度轨迹，但没有类似的司法干预。结果显示，在2010年改革之后，司法独立性急剧持续下降，为2017年更加公开的宪法集权铺平了道路。这些发现有助于民粹主义、比较制度发展、实证法学和经济学的研究，并突出了变相的法律改革在削弱对行政权力的司法制衡方面的作用。

引用次数: 0

Where’s Coase? Transaction costs reduction or rent-seeking in determining US environmental policies 科斯在哪里?决定美国环境政策的交易成本降低或寻租行为

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106286

Gary D. Libecap

In 1960, Ronald Coase offered a decentralized bargaining framework for reducing transaction costs in externality mitigation. Subsequent US environmental policies have not made it primary. Policies are centralized and prescriptive. To explore why, I examine the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1977, 1990, the most wide-ranging US environmental law; the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Act of 1976, the primary US fishing regulation; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, suggested to be the most powerful conservation law in the world. It is commonly asserted that the transaction costs of Coase are high relative to command and control. I find no empirical support for this claim; it is not tested; nor does it appear in legislative histories as justification for observed regulation. Prescriptive controls may involve higher transaction costs than Coase. Relevant externalities often are local where information about abatement costs and benefits would be available and costs of defining and trading decentralized property rights potentially lower than in the political arena with larger numbers of heterogeneous parties and objectives. Rent-seeking by political agents rather than transaction cost reduction dominates policy selection. Coase’s efficient collaborative problem solving has not been realized. Although the three laws provide public goods, they appear costly on the margin, inequitable, and mired in political controversy. High costs in all three laws is a key empirical finding. Predictions for policy formation motivated by transaction cost reduction or rent-seeking guide the analysis.

1960年，罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）提出了一个分散的谈判框架，用于降低外部性缓解中的交易成本。美国随后的环境政策并没有把它放在首位。政策是集中的和规定的。为了探究其中的原因，我研究了1970年、1977年和1990年的《清洁空气法修正案》，这是美国范围最广的环境法；1976年的《马格努森-史蒂文斯渔业法》是美国主要的渔业法规；1973年的《濒危物种法》被认为是世界上最强大的保护法律。人们通常断言，科斯的交易成本相对于命令和控制而言是高的。我找不到这种说法的经验支持；它没有经过检验；在立法历史上，它也没有作为遵守规定的理由出现。规定性控制可能涉及比科斯更高的交易成本。相关的外部性往往是地方性的，在这些地方可以获得有关减排成本和效益的信息，界定和交易分散的产权的成本可能低于拥有大量异质政党和目标的政治领域。政策选择的主导因素是政治代理人的寻租行为，而不是交易成本的降低。科斯的高效协作问题解决尚未实现。虽然这三部法律提供了公共产品，但它们似乎代价高昂，不公平，而且陷入了政治争议。这三条法律的高成本是一个关键的实证发现。对交易成本降低或寻租驱动的政策形成的预测指导了分析。

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引用次数: 0

Ideology beyond elections: Path dependence in local public service provision 超越选举的意识形态：地方公共服务提供的路径依赖

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106300

Jean Beuve , Zoé Le Squeren , Marian W. Moszoro

Why do some public services remain in-house while others are outsourced? This long-standing question has garnered considerable attention from both scholars and practitioners, resulting in a rich yet inconclusive body of research, particularly regarding the role of political ideology. Although left-wing governments are often assumed to favor public provision, empirical findings remain mixed. We argue that this ambiguity stems from a narrow, short-term view of ideology that overlooks institutional path dependence. Using data on seven local services across 156 French municipalities, we show that the cumulative presence of left-wing mayors over time significantly increases the likelihood of in-house provision. This long-term ideological anchoring effect is particularly salient for services that are highly sensitive to voters or embedded in long-term governance structures. Our results suggest that ideology matters—not episodically, but persistently and under specific service-level conditions.

为什么有些公共服务保留在内部，而有些则外包？这个长期存在的问题引起了学者和实践者的相当大的关注，导致了一个丰富但不确定的研究体系，特别是关于政治意识形态的作用。尽管左翼政府通常被认为是支持公共供给的，但实证研究结果仍然喜忧参半。我们认为，这种模糊性源于一种狭隘的、短期的意识形态观，忽视了制度路径依赖。利用法国156个城市的7个地方服务的数据，我们表明，随着时间的推移，左翼市长的累积存在显著增加了内部提供服务的可能性。这种长期的意识形态锚定效应对于对选民高度敏感或嵌入长期治理结构的服务尤其突出。我们的研究结果表明，意识形态的影响不是偶然的，而是在特定的服务水平条件下持续存在的。

引用次数: 0

AI devices and liability 人工智能设备与责任

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106284

Kene Boun My, Julien Jacob, Mathieu Lefebvre

We experimentally investigate the effect of the incentives provided by different allocations of liability in the case of (semi)autonomous devices which are a source of risk of accident. Considering three key agents, an AI provider (scientist), a producer, and a consumer, we look at the effect of different liability-sharing rules on the decision-making of each type of agent. We show that assigning liability to the scientist and to the producer is effective in reducing their misbehavior. We also find that assigning liability to the consumer increases her incentive to control the risk of accident in the case of semi-autonomous devices. However, the absence of consumer control (fully autonomous device), coupled with the assignment of liability, decreases the consumer’s propensity to buy the good in the first place. We complete our study with a social welfare analysis which highlights the importance of assigning liability to the producer so that the consumer can have greater confidence in the technology, especially in the case of fully autonomous devices.

我们通过实验研究了在（半）自主设备作为事故风险来源的情况下，不同责任分配所提供的激励的效果。考虑到三个关键主体，一个人工智能提供者（科学家），一个生产者和一个消费者，我们研究了不同的责任分担规则对每种主体决策的影响。我们表明，将责任分配给科学家和生产者对减少他们的不当行为是有效的。我们还发现，在半自主装置的情况下，将责任分配给消费者会增加其控制事故风险的动机。然而，消费者控制（完全自主设备）的缺失，加上责任的分配，首先降低了消费者购买商品的倾向。我们通过社会福利分析来完成我们的研究，该分析强调了将责任分配给生产者的重要性，这样消费者就可以对技术有更大的信心，特别是在全自动设备的情况下。

引用次数: 0

Liability law, Defensive medicine and Healthcare quality 责任法，防御性医疗和医疗质量

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-08-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106285

Bertrand Chopard

This paper develops a liability model that incorporates both patient heterogeneity and demand for healthcare services. After choosing the quality level of care, healthcare providers use diagnostic information to decide whether to treat patients based on their individual risk profiles. This information determines both the expected treatment costs and the potential compensation in case of a medical accident. We show that under strict liability, a fixed prospective payment can discourage providers from treating most high-risk patients — a phenomenon known as negative defensive medicine — and can lead to under-investment in care quality for those who are treated. Under a negligence rule, high-risk patients may also be denied care, but to a lesser extent. However, the negligence rule may incentivize providers to over-invest in care quality. This inefficiency can be partially mitigated by adjusting the prospective payment level, allowing the negligence rule to better align providers’ incentives with the socially efficient level of care.

本文建立了一个包含患者异质性和医疗保健服务需求的责任模型。在选择了护理的质量水平后，医疗保健提供者使用诊断信息来决定是否根据患者的个人风险概况对其进行治疗。这些信息既决定了预期的治疗费用，也决定了发生医疗事故时的潜在赔偿。我们表明，在严格责任下，固定的预期付款可能会阻止提供者治疗大多数高风险患者——一种被称为消极防御医学的现象——并可能导致对接受治疗的患者的护理质量投资不足。根据过失规则，高风险患者也可能被拒绝治疗，但程度较轻。然而，过失规则可能会激励提供者在护理质量上过度投资。这种低效率可以通过调整预期支付水平来部分缓解，允许疏忽规则更好地将提供者的激励与社会有效的护理水平结合起来。

引用次数: 0

Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices 通知-撤下作为争议解决：对GitHub通知的实证分析

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281

Pengfei Zhang, Ji Li

The Section 512(c) notice-and-takedown regime is a primary mechanism that enforces online copyright in the U.S. The objective is to enable the disputants to settle on their own, but asymmetric information can lead to claimant abuse and bargaining impasse, as critics of Section 512 have pointed out. This paper studies the dispute resolution aspect of the notice-and-takedown. We evaluate two platform remedies (chance-to-change policy and revise-and-resubmit policy) and the recent trend of professionalization in the context of GitHub. We collect a novel sample of 4,684 takedown notices from GitHub and use it to empirically test the disputants’ settlement behavior. Our estimates show that the chance-to-change policy is associated with a higher settlement rate, whereas the revise-and-resubmit policy has little effect. The results are consistent with a signaling theory between the copyright owner and the infringer. To address the potential selection effects of GitHub, we apply text analysis to quantify and control latent attributes of the notices, including writing styles and informativeness, in addition to more substantive features. We also discuss the role of expert representatives and certain textual characteristics that appear influential in the dispute resolution process.

第512(c)条通知和删除制度是美国执行在线版权的主要机制，其目标是使争议者能够自行解决，但正如第512条的批评者所指出的那样，信息不对称可能导致索赔人滥用和讨价还价僵局。本文对通知撤下纠纷解决方面进行了研究。我们评估了两种平台补救措施（更改机会政策和修改和重新提交政策）以及GitHub背景下最近的专业化趋势。我们从GitHub上收集了4,684个下架通知的新样本，并使用它来实证测试争议方的解决行为。我们的估计表明，更改政策的机会与较高的结算率相关，而修改并重新提交政策的影响很小。研究结果与著作权人与侵权人之间的信号理论相一致。为了解决GitHub的潜在选择效应，我们应用文本分析来量化和控制通知的潜在属性，包括写作风格和信息性，以及更实质性的特征。我们还讨论了专家代表的作用和某些文本特征，这些特征在争议解决过程中似乎具有影响力。

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