International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

We examine an important yet understudied form of reputational sanction in China, namely public criticisms imposed on culpable firms by the Chinese stock exchanges from 2013 to 2018. We find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and they were affected by several factors, including financing propensity, governance mechanism, and equity nature. However, the market reaction is significantly negative only for firms relying on external financing and non-state enterprises, and importantly, becomes insignificant in cases where the firm had self-exposed misconduct before the official announcement of public criticism. Further, we examine other effects of public criticism, finding that public criticism does not improve firms’ long-term values, nor produce strong deterrence to change their behaviour. Overall, the evidence of the effects of public criticism on culpable firms is mixed, suggesting that reputational sanction is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of market regulation in China.

This paper critically examines J. Mark Ramseyer’s "Contracting for sex in the Pacific War," published in the International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 65, March 2021, Article 105971.

The connection between court resources and judicial behavior has long been acknowledged. This article examines the linkages between local governments' fiscal pressures and Chinese judges' decisions on financial sanctions. Based on data from criminal verdicts of official corruption and county government expenditures, this study finds that Chinese judges are more likely to impose financial penalties, especially fines, when judicial expenditures in a region are low. The conclusion remains unchanged after accounting for the endogeneity problem using the age of the county party secretary and the per capita financial expenditure lagged for one period as instrumental variables. Finally, the imprisonment penalty without increasing revenue is used to test the placebo, and no effect of fiscal pressure on the imprisonment penalty is found.

We investigate the impact of legal insider trading announcements on stock returns in Vietnam. Vietnamese insiders must announce their trading intentions in advance as well as after the actual trade, which contrasts with the vast majority of countries where only post-trade announcement is mandatory. This regulatory setting allows to put to test the predictions from the theoretical models of advance disclosures (Huddart et al., 2004, Lenkey, 2014). Consistent with the theoretical literature, we find that the abnormal returns are large and significant after the pre-trade announcement, showing that the market takes into consideration the information content of the insiders' intention to trade. In addition, no significant stock price effect is found after the announcement of the actual trade occurrence or cancellation. We argue in favor of the implementation of advance disclosure policies since they help mitigate the returns obtained by insiders, better share the profits with outsiders and contribute to a better information dissemination.

Are judges motivated only by policy preferences? Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents, such as judges, to follow the law. We use the random assignment of U.S. Federal judges setting geographically-local precedent to document the causal impact of court decisions in a hierarchical legal system. We examine lower court cases filed before and resolved after higher court decisions and find that lower courts are 29%–37% points more likely to rule in the manner of the higher court. The results obtain when the higher court case was decided in the same doctrinal area as the pending case and when the higher court case was decided on the merits. Reversals by the higher court have no significant effects. These results provide evidence that judges are motivated to follow the law and are not solely motivated by policy preferences.

Since the late 1990s, the U.S. has experienced a substantial rise in drug overdose and overdose deaths due to the increased use of opioid drugs. This study estimates the effects of the opioid epidemic on crime relying for identification on geographic variation in the distribution of OxyContin, which in turn was driven by initial state drug prescription policies. Using Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data, I find that compared to states with stringent prescription policies, states more exposed to OxyContin had 25% higher violent crime rates. Thus, the supply shock of opioids combined with loose policies on prescription drugs created unintended and negative consequences beyond health and mortality. This conclusion is supported by suggestive evidence on mechanisms of mood instability, alcohol abuse, and illegal drug markets.

Does skill dominate luck in online poker? In many countries around the world, the legality of the online poker industry rests on courts’ evaluation of the “skill dominance” criterion. Because it is not precisely defined, however, the skill dominance criterion may be misleading when it comes to the legal qualification of online gambling activities. We argue that this concept might be better framed as “do skilled players dominate the game” than as “does skill dominate game outcomes”. We introduce a novel, comprehensive dataset on online poker play – where we follow 91,439 players over 40 consecutive months (representing over 85 million hands played) – and develop simple tests to show that (i) skill in the game drives individual results, and (ii) players improve their skills with experience and quit playing the game as a function of starting ability. A lower bound estimate suggests that it takes at least 7 months of full-time training for a novice to acquire the basic skills exhibited by the most experienced players in our data. We conclude that the scholarly debate around this industry may move beyond that of its legality to focus instead on issues of regulation. Beyond the case of online poker, the procedures and tools we develop can be readily transferred to evaluate the skill dominance criterion in other purported games of skill, such as sports betting or stock trading.

Civilian targets of terrorist or criminal attacks (e.g., sport stadiums, chemical or nuclear industry; infrastructure such as ports or pipelines) are often owned by the private agents who choose how to guard against potential attacks. This creates an important externality problem, as some of the benefits of better protection accrue to other private agents who would suffer from an attack. We analyze a model in which a social planner wants to provide incentives for the deployment of defensive technologies. Our results show that some features of the Safety Act, enacted after the 2001 terror attacks, are probably counterproductive.

Ronald Coase pioneered the transaction cost approach to the modern analysis of institutions, contracts, and property rights. We argue that core theory enhances Coase’s transaction cost approach by injecting considerations of coalition formation and stability into the analysis. Analysis of coalitional stability also provides additional insights regarding the nature of transaction costs and the efficiency of institutional arrangements when there are such costs. Overcoming the empty core is potentially an important function of contracts, institutions, and property rights. Empty cores complement transaction costs in rationalizing real-world institutional arrangements.

This study examines the stock market reaction to one of the major environmental disasters of the world mining industry: the Mariana dam collapse in Brazil. Based on an event study, we evaluated the impact on the mining companies’ abnormal returns surrounding the disaster and also investigated whether post-event judicial decisions affected the companies. Our results show a significant negative effect around the days of the event, reporting a 5 % drop in daily returns. Regarding the legal efforts, our findings suggest the coordination time and the benefits granted by authorities as being interpreted positively, reducing market’s expectation of an agile or severe punishment following Mariana’s dam disaster.