International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

英文中文

Reinforcing data protection and competition through art. 6(2) of the Digital Markets Act 通过《数字市场法》第 6(2)条加强数据保护和竞争数字市场法》第 6(2)条

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106265

Peter J. van de Waerdt

With the Digital Markets Act (DMA) the European Union has taken significant steps in the regulation of large digital market ecosystems. Data protection and competition law are becoming increasingly intertwined, and the DMA’s goals are tightly aligned with them. However, the provision explicitly intended to address the use (and cross-use) of data within gatekeepers’ ecosystems leaves much to be desired. Art. 5(2) DMA offers no substantive new obligations over the established GDPR system, especially in light of the ECJ’s judgement in Meta v. Bundeskartellamt. Furthermore, the consent exception on which it relies leaves a distinct risk of anti-competitive effects and decreasing privacy as a result of information asymmetries and the powerful market position of gatekeepers. However, art. 6(2) DMA also restricts gatekeepers’ ability to use data, if it was received through gatekeepers’ business users. The protective value of the DMA can be significantly increased if the European Commission adopts broad interpretations of when data is used “in competition with business users”, when it is “collected through commercial activities of business users or their customers” and when it is obtained “on the relevant core platform services or on services provided together with, or in support of, the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper”. Doing so would conform to the interconnected nature of ecosystems’ data collection practices and their competitive position, and it would bolster the Commission’s ability to act against both the anti-competitive effects and potential privacy infringements of data pooling, above and beyond what art. 5(2) DMA offers.

随着《数字市场法》（DMA）的出台，欧盟在监管大型数字市场生态系统方面迈出了重要一步。数据保护与竞争法的关系日益密切，《数字市场法》的目标也与之紧密相连。然而，明确旨在解决把关人生态系统内数据使用（和交叉使用）问题的条款仍有许多不足之处。第 5(2)条DMA 第 5(2)条与 GDPR 既有体系相比没有提供实质性的新义务，尤其是考虑到欧洲法院在 Meta 诉联邦卡特尔局案中的判决。此外，由于信息不对称和守门人强大的市场地位，其所依赖的同意例外会带来明显的反竞争效应和隐私权减少的风险。然而，《德国信息权法》第 6(2)条也限制了对信息的使用。6(2) DMA 还限制了把关人使用数据的能力，如果这些数据是通过把关人的商业用户接收的。如果欧盟委员会对数据何时用于 "与商业用户竞争"、何时 "通过商业用户或其客户的商业活动收集 "以及何时 "在相关核心平台服务上或在与把关人的相关核心平台服务共同提供或支持的服务上 "获得数据进行广义解释，那么《数据保护法》的保护价值就会大大提高。这样做符合生态系统数据收集实践的相互关联性及其竞争地位，并将增强委员会的能力，使其能够在第 5(2)条规定之外，针对数据池的反竞争影响和潜在隐私侵犯采取行动。5(2) DMA 提供的保护。

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引用次数: 0

Vertical interoperability in mobile ecosystems: Will the DMA deliver (what competition law could not)? 移动生态系统中的垂直互操作性：DMA能否实现（竞争法无法实现的）？

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106267

Giuseppe Colangelo , Alba Ribera Martínez

To address concerns about the competitive dynamics of digital markets, the promotion of interoperability has been often pointed out as a fundamental component of policy reform agendas. In the case of mobile ecosystems, the smooth and seamless availability of interoperability features is crucial as third-party devices and apps would be otherwise unable to effectively work and participate within the ecosystems. However, access to application programming interfaces (APIs) may be restricted due to privacy, security, or technical constraints. Further, an ecosystem orchestrator may misuse its rule-setting role to pursue anticompetitive goals by restricting or degrading interoperability for third-party services and devices. The paper aims at investigating whether and how effective interoperability could be achieved through the enforcement of competition rules or whether it would require regulatory interventions, such as those envisaged in the European Digital Markets Act (DMA).

为了解决对数字市场竞争动态的担忧，促进互操作性经常被指出是政策改革议程的一个基本组成部分。在移动生态系统中，互操作性的流畅和无缝可用性至关重要，否则第三方设备和应用程序将无法有效地在生态系统中工作和参与。但是，由于隐私、安全性或技术限制，对应用程序编程接口（api）的访问可能受到限制。此外，生态系统协调者可能会滥用其规则设置角色，通过限制或降低第三方服务和设备的互操作性来追求反竞争目标。本文旨在调查是否以及如何通过执行竞争规则来实现有效的互操作性，或者是否需要监管干预，如欧洲数字市场法案（DMA）中设想的那样。

引用次数: 0

Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale 竞争执法中的事前与事后：模糊的边界和经济原理

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264

Patrice Bougette , Oliver Budzinski , Frédéric Marty

This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being re-evaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges. In particular, the analysis highlights the emergence of new competition policy approaches that combine regulatory-type interventions with strengthened enforcement strategies.

本文探讨了竞争执法的演变景观，重点关注事前和事后方法之间的动态相互作用。在数字化转型和监管转变的背景下，传统的执法机制正在被重新评估。本研究旨在剖析这些转变背后的经济原理，提出一个平衡法律确定性与应对当代市场挑战所需灵活性的混合框架。该分析特别强调了新的竞争政策方法的出现，这些方法将管制型干预与加强的执法战略相结合。

引用次数: 0

Can independent directors effectively monitor related party transactions? Evidence from Hong Kong 独立董事能否有效监督关联交易？来自香港的证据

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106261

Hong Huang , Charles Zhen Qu , Haitian Lu

This paper empirically investigates whether independent directors of Hong Kong listed companies effectively monitor related party transactions (“RPTs”). We employ a quasi-experimental approach, utilizing a mandatory rule introduced in 2004 that changed the minimum number of independent directors, and enhanced the independence and qualification requirements of independent directors for listed companies. Using a triple-differences setup, we find that companies affected by these new requirements experienced a significant increase in the value of announced RPTs. This positive effect is observed both in companies affected by all aspects of the reform and in those that only needed to increase their number of independent directors. We also observe that return on assets for the affected companies increased significantly following the rule change. However, these affected companies showed no significant reduction in their preference for RPTs. Our findings underscore the positive value created by independent directors of Hong Kong listed companies in vetting RPTs. They suggest that, within an appropriately structured regulatory framework, independent directors, even where the company is owner-controlled, can be effective in enhancing shareholder value. As the regulatory framework resulted from the 2004 reform has remained largely unchanged, our findings are still relevant for Hong Kong and offer valuable insights on the function of independent directors for other jurisdictions, particularly those with ownership-concentrated markets seeking to enhance their RPT monitoring mechanisms.

本文对香港上市公司独立董事是否有效监控关联交易进行实证研究。我们采用了一种准实验方法，利用2004年出台的一项强制性规定，改变了独立董事的最低人数，并提高了上市公司独立董事的独立性和资格要求。使用三重差异设置，我们发现受这些新需求影响的公司在宣布的rpt值上经历了显著的增长。这种积极效应在受到改革各方面影响的公司和那些只需要增加独立董事数量的公司中都可以观察到。我们还观察到，在规则改变后，受影响公司的资产回报率显著增加。然而，这些受影响的公司对rpt的偏好并没有显著降低。我们的研究结果强调了香港上市公司独立董事在审查rpt方面所创造的积极价值。他们认为，在结构合理的监管框架内，独立董事（即使是在由所有者控制的公司）也能有效地提高股东价值。由于2004年改革形成的监管框架基本保持不变，我们的研究结果仍然适用于香港，并为其他司法管辖区，特别是那些寻求加强其RPT监督机制的所有权集中市场的独立董事的职能提供了宝贵的见解。

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引用次数: 0

Corporate control: Persistence and the shifting role of control-enhancing mechanisms in Italian listed firms (1978–2018) 公司控制：意大利上市公司控制增强机制的持久性和角色转换（1978-2018）

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106260

Silvia Rigamonti

This paper analyses the evolution of ownership and control of non-financial listed firms in Italy from 1978 to 2018. Corporate control is persistent in the Italian stock market, and this is a constant trait across time periods. Instead, ownership has changed over time. The use of control-enhancing mechanisms and, relatedly, the wedge has followed an irregular path. Legal and market conditions significantly influence how controlling shareholders structure their ownership and control over time. Family capitalism remains pervasive.

本文分析了1978 - 2018年意大利非金融类上市公司所有权和控制权的演变。公司控制在意大利股票市场持续存在，这是一个贯穿各个时期的不变特征。相反，所有权随着时间的推移而变化。控制增强机制的使用，以及与之相关的楔形结构遵循了不规则的路径。随着时间的推移，法律和市场条件会显著影响控股股东如何构建其所有权和控制权。家族资本主义仍然普遍存在。

引用次数: 0

(Not) Canceling out the cross-section: Mitigating the effect of peremptory challenges on jury selection （不）取消横截面：减轻强制性质疑对陪审团选择的影响

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106259

Francis X. Flanagan

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. According to current precedent, this requires individual jurors to be unbiased and the jury to have a fair possibility of being a representative cross-section of the community. I show that current selection procedures systematically exclude certain types of jurors, making it impossible to achieve a representative cross-section. I argue that this violates the requirements for an impartial jury, and I propose an alternative jury selection procedure that is incentive compatible and eliminates the distortion created by the current system. The new procedure also reduces the variance of the seated jury relative to a random selection, when measuring variance by distance to the median jury, which makes the application of justice less arbitrary. Data from Mississippi and Louisiana are analyzed to illustrate the results.

美国宪法第六修正案保证刑事被告有权获得公正的陪审团。根据目前的先例，这要求个别陪审员是公正的，陪审团有公平的可能性成为社会的代表性横截面。我表明，目前的选择程序系统地排除了某些类型的陪审员，使得不可能实现具有代表性的横截面。我认为这违反了公正陪审团的要求，我提出了一种替代的陪审团选择程序，这种程序是激励相容的，并消除了现行制度造成的扭曲。新程序还减少了坐席陪审团相对于随机选择的方差，通过测量与中间陪审团的距离来衡量方差，这使得司法的应用不那么任意性。分析了密西西比州和路易斯安那州的数据来说明结果。

引用次数: 0

Balancing power and performance: The role of managerial rent in competitive advantage 权力与绩效的平衡：管理租金在竞争优势中的作用

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106258

Chandra S. Mishra

We study whether managerial power enhances the firm’s competitive advantage (excess asset return). We find a positive impact of managerial power on excess asset return and management compensation, consistent with the managerial rent model. However, excess asset return (long-term performance) and management compensation increase at a decreasing rate with an increase in managerial power. We derive a novel measure of managerial power. Managerial power is positively associated with the firm’s shadow options and firm-specific risk. The managerial rent model strengthens managerial power theory in that managerial power enables managers to extract a share of the firm surplus, which in turn motivates managers to generate a firm surplus, suggesting a positive relationship between managerial power and firm performance. The excess asset return generated is shared between the shareholders and managers, resulting in an above-normal pay for management. However, we find that high managerial power reduces the positive impact of management compensation on the firm performance.

研究管理层权力是否能提高企业的竞争优势（超额资产收益）。我们发现管理层权力对超额资产收益和管理层薪酬存在正向影响，这与管理层租金模型相一致。然而，随着管理层权力的增加，超额资产收益（长期绩效）和管理层薪酬的增长呈递减趋势。我们得出了一种衡量管理权力的新方法。管理权力与企业的影子期权和企业特有风险呈正相关。管理租金模型强化了管理权力理论，因为管理权力使管理者能够提取一部分企业剩余，这反过来又激励管理者产生企业剩余，表明管理权力与企业绩效之间存在正相关关系。产生的超额资产回报由股东和管理者分享，从而导致管理层获得高于正常水平的薪酬。然而，我们发现高管理层权力会降低管理层薪酬对公司绩效的正向影响。

引用次数: 0

When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption 政府什么时候攻击司法？政治腐败的解释力

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248

Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay

In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption, the objective of this study is to understand 1) whether and, if so, how corruption affects governments’ attacks on the judiciary and 2) whether and, if so, how its effect changes across different political contexts. We argue that in countries with fully or partially independent media, verbal attacks on the judiciary would increase with the level of corruption. However, in regimes where the media is not independent, political corruption would not have a significant effect on attacks on the judiciary. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis across 165 countries (1991–2022) to test our hypotheses. The empirical results support our hypotheses. To better understand the causal mechanisms through which corruption and media independence together trigger governments’ verbal attacks on the judiciary, we compare the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in the second part of the study.

近几十年来，世界目睹了民选政府口头攻击司法机构、指责法官有偏见或声称法院裁决有政治动机的各种例子。尽管这种限制法院的做法很普遍，但我们对政府究竟何时决定口头攻击司法机构知之甚少。关注政治腐败的影响，本研究的目的是了解1)腐败是否以及如果存在，腐败如何影响政府对司法机构的攻击；2)腐败是否以及如果存在，其影响如何在不同的政治背景下发生变化。我们认为，在拥有完全或部分独立媒体的国家，对司法机构的口头攻击会随着腐败程度的增加而增加。然而，在媒体不独立的政权中，政治腐败不会对攻击司法系统产生重大影响。我们对165个国家（1991-2022）进行了时间序列横断面分析，以检验我们的假设。实证结果支持我们的假设。为了更好地理解腐败和媒体独立共同引发政府对司法机构的口头攻击的因果机制，我们在研究的第二部分比较了阿根廷、巴西和委内瑞拉的案例。

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引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach 公共服务经营者的公共成本分配：一种公理方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.

鉴于确保提供基本公共服务和维持公平竞争的双重目标，准确的成本分配对公共服务经营者和监管机构都是一项挑战。运营商有义务为所有人提供基本的公共服务，这可能会产生额外的费用。为了弥补这一点，运营商获得国家援助，这是由与这些义务相关的净成本评估确定的。然而，这些辅助措施带来了扭曲竞争的风险，因为运营商可能会利用它们来补贴竞争活动。为了避免这种风险，必须采用一种精确的费用分配方法，充分评估这些债务的净费用。这种方法必须满足有效防止交叉补贴的特定性质。在本文中，我们提出了一种基于合作博弈论的方法，该方法为公共服务提供中的活动和义务之间的共同成本分配提供了解决方案。我们采用了一种规范的方法，引入了一套防止交叉补贴的理想公理。我们在这些公理的基础上给出了我们提出的解决方案的两个特征。此外，我们还展示了我们的方法来分配公共服务运营商的共同成本。

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Did recreational marijuana legalization increase crime in the long run? 从长远来看，娱乐性大麻合法化会增加犯罪吗？

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106246

Sunyoung Lee

This study comprehensively examines the long-term effects of state-level recreational marijuana legalization on crime rates by employing a difference-in-differences with multiple time periods methodology. The findings of this study do not yield conclusive evidence supporting a reduction in crime rates after legalizing recreational marijuana. Rather, they underscore notable positive associations with property crimes and suggest potential correlations with violent crimes, highlighting the critical need for continued research to help policymakers better understand the complex implications of cannbis policy and develop more nuanced, evidence-based approaches. Robustness checks, including synthetic control method and sensitivity analyses, confirm the reliability of these results.

本研究采用多时期差异中差异方法，全面考察了州级娱乐性大麻合法化对犯罪率的长期影响。这项研究的结果并没有提供确凿的证据来支持娱乐性大麻合法化后犯罪率的降低。相反，他们强调了大麻与财产犯罪的显著正相关关系，并提出了与暴力犯罪的潜在关联，强调了继续研究的迫切需要，以帮助政策制定者更好地理解大麻政策的复杂含义，并制定更细致的、基于证据的方法。鲁棒性检验，包括综合控制方法和灵敏度分析，证实了这些结果的可靠性。

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