Economics & Politics最新文献

Global financial cycles have become a growing concern for scholars and policymakers. Recent research has identified these cycles as originating in American markets, at least in part due to policy innovations in the United States. We articulate a previously unidentified, but powerful, mechanism that influence growth (and growth volatility) in the global economy: expansions in the American financial cycle disproportionately affect global credit conditions, leading to a higher incidence of gross capital inflow surges that subsequently create a boom-bust growth dynamic in recipient economies. We evaluate this argument with an extensive empirical examination of 102 countries from 1975 to 2011 and find substantial support for the argument: US financial market developments produce capital flow cycles that challenge the ability of policymakers to stabilize their macroeconomies. We disaggregate capital flows and find that interbank lending plays a crucial role in driving these outcomes, with the results exhibiting a high degree of robustness to alternative specifications. Domestic policy tools alone may be insufficiently powerful to counteract volatility induced by these capital waves emanating from the core of the global financial system.

This paper introduces the political economy triangle (PET) concept of government spending, special interest groups (SIGs) influence, and income inequality, empirically confirming its existence and unveiling its nature while directly addressing key shortcomings of most prior research on the determinants of such inequality. Using static and dynamic panel techniques and data from the US states, it reports several new results: (i) the findings of previous studies regarding the roles of government spending and interest groups, including labor unions, in income distribution are confirmed, however, their estimated inequality effects grossly underestimate those obtained when endogeneity issues are accounted for explicitly; (ii) a dynamic tripartite relationship between the variables of the PET exists; (iii) government spending and SIGs' influence, including union strength, beyond their direct effects on inequality, have a separate positive impact through their interactions; (iv) the effectiveness of government spending in reducing inequality diminishes as the level of SIGs' influence and union strength increase in the short and long run, (v) the aggregate inequality-increasing effect of SIGs is strengthened and the inequality-reducing effects of unions weakened as the spending rises, in the short run and long run. Finally, the broad implications of these findings are discussed.

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.