{"title":"Handbook on Gender, Diversity and Federalism, edited by Jill Vickers, Joan Grace, and Cheryl N. Collier","authors":"C. Forster","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83494171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hybrid Regimes within Democracies: Fiscal Federalism and Subnational Rentier States, by Carlos Gervasoni","authors":"Michael Buehler","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90219974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Has the UK referendum to leave the EU (Brexit) affected territorial preferences within the UK? We draw on comparative theories of such preferences to address this question, as Brexit can be seen as a shock to a political unit. We test hypotheses in two key regions, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with original surveys fielded at a unique time (September 2019). We randomize making salient different Brexit scenarios and measure support for Scottish independence and unification with Ireland within each region. We find in Scotland the prospect of leaving the EU increases support for independence. This effect is pronounced among those who support the UK remaining in the EU. In Northern Ireland, religious background correlates highly with territorial views, and we find little evidence of Brexit or border-scenario effects. Our results contribute to the literature on decentralization processes and the EU, and provide evidence of when negative shocks affect such preferences.
{"title":"Brexit and Territorial Preferences: Evidence from Scotland and Northern Ireland","authors":"L. Daniels, Alexander Kuo","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Has the UK referendum to leave the EU (Brexit) affected territorial preferences within the UK? We draw on comparative theories of such preferences to address this question, as Brexit can be seen as a shock to a political unit. We test hypotheses in two key regions, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with original surveys fielded at a unique time (September 2019). We randomize making salient different Brexit scenarios and measure support for Scottish independence and unification with Ireland within each region. We find in Scotland the prospect of leaving the EU increases support for independence. This effect is pronounced among those who support the UK remaining in the EU. In Northern Ireland, religious background correlates highly with territorial views, and we find little evidence of Brexit or border-scenario effects. Our results contribute to the literature on decentralization processes and the EU, and provide evidence of when negative shocks affect such preferences.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88659078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carmen Ortega, Fátima Recuero, J. M. Trujillo, P. Oñate
Democracies have experienced two trends in the last decades: the growing personalization of politics and the increasing relevance of regions in the political process. This article addresses these trends by posing two questions: Do political leaders influence the vote in regional elections? Do regional party leaders have a larger impact on voter preferences than their national counterparts in regional elections? To answer these questions, we analyzed five regional elections held in Andalusia between 2004 and 2018. The results show that both national and regional leaders matter in regional elections. However, the effect of national and regional leaders is “conditioned” by the characteristics of the leaders themselves, their respective parties, and citizens’ party attachments. Additionally, there is no clear evidence that the type of relationship between national and regional leaders of the same party—cohesion-like or confrontation-like—and the electoral context variables may affect the voting decision in multi-level government systems.
{"title":"The Impact of Regional and National Leaders in Subnational Elections in Spain: Evidence from Andalusian Regional Elections","authors":"Carmen Ortega, Fátima Recuero, J. M. Trujillo, P. Oñate","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAA040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAA040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Democracies have experienced two trends in the last decades: the growing personalization of politics and the increasing relevance of regions in the political process. This article addresses these trends by posing two questions: Do political leaders influence the vote in regional elections? Do regional party leaders have a larger impact on voter preferences than their national counterparts in regional elections? To answer these questions, we analyzed five regional elections held in Andalusia between 2004 and 2018. The results show that both national and regional leaders matter in regional elections. However, the effect of national and regional leaders is “conditioned” by the characteristics of the leaders themselves, their respective parties, and citizens’ party attachments. Additionally, there is no clear evidence that the type of relationship between national and regional leaders of the same party—cohesion-like or confrontation-like—and the electoral context variables may affect the voting decision in multi-level government systems.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83428770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Identities, Trust, and Cohesion in Federal Systems: Public Perspectives, edited by Jack Jedwab and John Kincaid","authors":"Jennifer Wolak","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45602670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trump, the Administrative Presidency, and Federalism, by Frank J. Thompson, Kenneth K. Wong, and Barry G. Rabe","authors":"Adam L. Warber","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73473170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, by Charles Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAA041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAA041","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85432399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"City, State: Constitutionalism and the Megacity, by Ran Hirschl","authors":"Amal Sethi","doi":"10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/PUBLIUS/PJAB001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48532619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Throughout Latin American federations, programmatic welfare spending is increasingly nationally oriented and bureaucratically delivered. By explaining the logic and the effects of combining two types of federal spending, discretionary and non-discretionary, this article uncovers an additional driver that contributes to understanding policymaking and its implementation not only in Argentina, but potentially in other robust federal systems such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Using original data on federal infrastructure and programmatic social welfare spending for the twenty-four provinces of Argentina between 2003 and 2015, we provide empirical evidence that both forms of spending penalize opposition districts and more populated urban provinces (regardless of partisan affinity), and thus undercut the ability of key governors to become future presidential challengers. This research suggests that presidents of territorially diverse federations with strong governors can utilize the dual-punishment spending strategy to alter the balance of power, reinforcing the dominance of the center.
{"title":"Undermining Governors: Argentina’s Double-Punishment Federal Spending Strategy","authors":"T. Fenwick, L. González","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjaa035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaa035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Throughout Latin American federations, programmatic welfare spending is increasingly nationally oriented and bureaucratically delivered. By explaining the logic and the effects of combining two types of federal spending, discretionary and non-discretionary, this article uncovers an additional driver that contributes to understanding policymaking and its implementation not only in Argentina, but potentially in other robust federal systems such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Using original data on federal infrastructure and programmatic social welfare spending for the twenty-four provinces of Argentina between 2003 and 2015, we provide empirical evidence that both forms of spending penalize opposition districts and more populated urban provinces (regardless of partisan affinity), and thus undercut the ability of key governors to become future presidential challengers. This research suggests that presidents of territorially diverse federations with strong governors can utilize the dual-punishment spending strategy to alter the balance of power, reinforcing the dominance of the center.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2020-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/publius/pjaa035","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41944275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past decades, decentralization has become the new paradigm in how states should organize power territorially. Carefully planned institutional re-designs are the most visible expression thereof. Yet the Great Recession of 2007–2009 has pushed governments into the opposite direction, i.e., towards centralization, to better weather the fiscal drought. Given these contradictory developments, this article compares the effects of twenty-three separate state reforms with the impact of the Great Recession on fiscal centralization in twenty-nine countries over more than two decades. In the main, our analyses attribute a larger effect to design, i.e., pro-active policy making through reforms, than reactive crisis management after a great shock. However, this difference is only apparent once we consider a state’s institutional structure, that is whether a political system is unitary or federal. Our findings thus highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to better understand the drivers of fiscal de/centralization.
{"title":"Shock or Design: What Drives Fiscal De/Centralization? A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Nine OECD Countries, 1995–2017","authors":"Tobias Arnold, S. Mueller, A. Vatter","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjaa032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaa032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over the past decades, decentralization has become the new paradigm in how states should organize power territorially. Carefully planned institutional re-designs are the most visible expression thereof. Yet the Great Recession of 2007–2009 has pushed governments into the opposite direction, i.e., towards centralization, to better weather the fiscal drought. Given these contradictory developments, this article compares the effects of twenty-three separate state reforms with the impact of the Great Recession on fiscal centralization in twenty-nine countries over more than two decades. In the main, our analyses attribute a larger effect to design, i.e., pro-active policy making through reforms, than reactive crisis management after a great shock. However, this difference is only apparent once we consider a state’s institutional structure, that is whether a political system is unitary or federal. Our findings thus highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to better understand the drivers of fiscal de/centralization.","PeriodicalId":47224,"journal":{"name":"Publius-The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/publius/pjaa032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48209453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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