Abstract During the interwar period, two apparently different states, liberal democratic Britain and Fascist Italy, passed similar legislation establishing inchoate offences against military loyalty and obedience. These laws, the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 and article 266 of the 1930 Italian Penal Code, were intended to protect state security and the monopoly of force against political threats. This article compares these laws’ scope, rationales and purposes, and traces their longer-term origins in the consolidation of the modern state. It argues that this comparative historical analysis evidences important intersections in these systems’ uses of criminal law, and provides insights into the forms and extent of authoritarian tendencies and techniques in states’ legal practices, specifically in the security context and more generally within criminal law as a vector of state power across the political spectrum.
{"title":"Inciting Military Disaffection in Interwar Britain and Fascist Italy: Security, Crime and Authoritarian Law","authors":"Stephen Skinner","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract During the interwar period, two apparently different states, liberal democratic Britain and Fascist Italy, passed similar legislation establishing inchoate offences against military loyalty and obedience. These laws, the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 and article 266 of the 1930 Italian Penal Code, were intended to protect state security and the monopoly of force against political threats. This article compares these laws’ scope, rationales and purposes, and traces their longer-term origins in the consolidation of the modern state. It argues that this comparative historical analysis evidences important intersections in these systems’ uses of criminal law, and provides insights into the forms and extent of authoritarian tendencies and techniques in states’ legal practices, specifically in the security context and more generally within criminal law as a vector of state power across the political spectrum.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"356 ","pages":"578-605"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corrigendum to: Balancing Rights and Interests: Reconstructing the Asymmetry Thesis","authors":"Matthias Klatt","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"53 28","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The increasing prevalence of algorithmic decision making (ADM) by public authorities raises a number of challenges for administrative law in the form of technical decisions about the necessary metrics for evaluating such systems, their opacity, the scalability of errors, their use of correlation as opposed to causation and so on. If administrative law is to provide the necessary guidance to enable optimal use of such systems, there are a number of ways in which it will need to become more nuanced and advanced. However, if it is able to rise to this challenge, administrative law has the potential not only to do useful work itself in controlling ADM, but also to support the work of the Information Commissioner’s Office and provide guidance on the interpretation of concepts such as ‘meaningful information’ and ‘proportionality’ within the General Data Protection Regulation.
{"title":"Rethinking Administrative Law for Algorithmic Decision Making","authors":"Rebecca Williams","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The increasing prevalence of algorithmic decision making (ADM) by public authorities raises a number of challenges for administrative law in the form of technical decisions about the necessary metrics for evaluating such systems, their opacity, the scalability of errors, their use of correlation as opposed to causation and so on. If administrative law is to provide the necessary guidance to enable optimal use of such systems, there are a number of ways in which it will need to become more nuanced and advanced. However, if it is able to rise to this challenge, administrative law has the potential not only to do useful work itself in controlling ADM, but also to support the work of the Information Commissioner’s Office and provide guidance on the interpretation of concepts such as ‘meaningful information’ and ‘proportionality’ within the General Data Protection Regulation.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"184 1","pages":"468 - 494"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61432862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the question of the identity of legal systems of non-monistic accounts of law. It critically analyses approaches to individuation based on validity, the nature of individual norms and the purposes for which they are applied, arguing that the latter approach, as endorsed particularly by Raz, offers the most convincing approach to the question of individuation. The article argues that Raz’s own criterion, however, is under-inclusive and misses important reasons why a norm should be individuated in a particular way. The article defends an approach to individuation which builds upon and expands Raz’s approach. This approach emphasises the political importance of legal systems as providing the basis for criteria of individuation. These criteria are also relevant for Dworkin’s account of law as integrity, which, the article argues, also relies on an understanding of individuation notwithstanding Dworkin’s claims to the contrary.
{"title":"Taking Identity Seriously: On the Politics of the Individuation of Legal Systems","authors":"Cormac Mac Amhlaigh","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab040","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the question of the identity of legal systems of non-monistic accounts of law. It critically analyses approaches to individuation based on validity, the nature of individual norms and the purposes for which they are applied, arguing that the latter approach, as endorsed particularly by Raz, offers the most convincing approach to the question of individuation. The article argues that Raz’s own criterion, however, is under-inclusive and misses important reasons why a norm should be individuated in a particular way. The article defends an approach to individuation which builds upon and expands Raz’s approach. This approach emphasises the political importance of legal systems as providing the basis for criteria of individuation. These criteria are also relevant for Dworkin’s account of law as integrity, which, the article argues, also relies on an understanding of individuation notwithstanding Dworkin’s claims to the contrary.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"53 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The aims of this article are twofold: (i) to propose an explanatory framework, focusing on law-making acts, for accounting for whether the formal requirements of the rule of law are fulfilled; and (ii) to propose two further models within this framework. One model, which I call ‘rulebook formalism’, pertains to Parliament’s law-making acts; another model, which I call ‘rights formalism’, concerns the courts’ law-making acts. This distinction results from the different modality of law, ie the different natures of law-making acts. Drawing on speech act theory, I give a general account of the formal requirements as the success conditions of law-making acts. Then, applying this framework, I discuss the formal requirements for Parliament’s law-making acts and the courts’ law-making acts respectively.
{"title":"Two Types of Formalism of the Rule of Law","authors":"Konatsu Nishigai","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aims of this article are twofold: (i) to propose an explanatory framework, focusing on law-making acts, for accounting for whether the formal requirements of the rule of law are fulfilled; and (ii) to propose two further models within this framework. One model, which I call ‘rulebook formalism’, pertains to Parliament’s law-making acts; another model, which I call ‘rights formalism’, concerns the courts’ law-making acts. This distinction results from the different modality of law, ie the different natures of law-making acts. Drawing on speech act theory, I give a general account of the formal requirements as the success conditions of law-making acts. Then, applying this framework, I discuss the formal requirements for Parliament’s law-making acts and the courts’ law-making acts respectively.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"42 1","pages":"495 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61433379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The legality of decisions made for political purposes is a recurring issue in administrative law. In this article, it will be argued that generalisations should not be made about ‘political’ decisions as a single category. Instead, there are different types of political consideration, which raise different issues when assessing the legality of a decision. This article singles out a particular type of political decision for condemnation: decisions made to gain a political advantage by deliberately changing the systems of democratic accountability. Examples include the engineering of the electoral system to produce favourable results, the use of public power to punish critics and the use of public resources to publish partisan propaganda. The article will argue that the legality of such political decisions should not be assessed solely within the ordinary administrative law framework, but under a constitutional principle of anti-entrenchment and process protection.
{"title":"Political Purposes, Anti-entrenchment and Judicial Protection of the Democratic Process","authors":"J. Rowbottom","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The legality of decisions made for political purposes is a recurring issue in administrative law. In this article, it will be argued that generalisations should not be made about ‘political’ decisions as a single category. Instead, there are different types of political consideration, which raise different issues when assessing the legality of a decision. This article singles out a particular type of political decision for condemnation: decisions made to gain a political advantage by deliberately changing the systems of democratic accountability. Examples include the engineering of the electoral system to produce favourable results, the use of public power to punish critics and the use of public resources to publish partisan propaganda. The article will argue that the legality of such political decisions should not be assessed solely within the ordinary administrative law framework, but under a constitutional principle of anti-entrenchment and process protection.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49097635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way (Moral Impact Theory of Law, MITL). Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness.
{"title":"On the Moral Impact Theory of Law","authors":"Ezequiel H. Monti","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way (Moral Impact Theory of Law, MITL). Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46064353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The article advances an anti-foundationalist account of the key doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the margin of appreciation (MoA) and European consensus (EuC). The first part of the article argues that anti-foundationalism, which understands the existence of human rights as ultimately dependent on social practices and their justification as based on a plurality of values, is a credible conception of human rights grounds. The second part contends that anti-foundationalism offers the best explanation of the MoA and EuC, without making the ECtHR’s practice less normatively appealing. These arguments challenge the dominant critiques of the MoA and EuC, which often assume, but rarely explicitly defend, a foundationalist understanding of human rights. While the ECtHR’s use of the MoA and EuC can be inadequate, this is not because it is mistaken about the grounds of human rights.
{"title":"A New Philosophy for the Margin of Appreciation and European Consensus","authors":"B. Tripkovic","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article advances an anti-foundationalist account of the key doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the margin of appreciation (MoA) and European consensus (EuC). The first part of the article argues that anti-foundationalism, which understands the existence of human rights as ultimately dependent on social practices and their justification as based on a plurality of values, is a credible conception of human rights grounds. The second part contends that anti-foundationalism offers the best explanation of the MoA and EuC, without making the ECtHR’s practice less normatively appealing. These arguments challenge the dominant critiques of the MoA and EuC, which often assume, but rarely explicitly defend, a foundationalist understanding of human rights. While the ECtHR’s use of the MoA and EuC can be inadequate, this is not because it is mistaken about the grounds of human rights.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"42 1","pages":"207 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48696728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recognition of gender equality has become one of the most important trends in contemporary constitutional law. Nonetheless, a crucial question lingers: is it leading to material constitutional transformation? In order to better understand it, this article presents a case study on the constitutional reconfigurations undergone in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings. The main vectors of constitutional change are identified from a descriptive-analytical perspective. Even if they kept idiosyncratic elements of persistent discrimination, the new charters were inserted in the globalised trends of constitutional design, bringing about a strong formal expansion of gender equality rights. On the whole, however, little material progress has been made. This suboptimal material transformation is explained by means of research arguments framed in legal evolutionist theories. Finally, the article elucidates why the greater constitutional verbosity in the recognition of gender equality did not translate into greater parity.
{"title":"Constitutional Transformation and Gender Equality: The Case of the Post-Arab Uprisings North African Constitutions","authors":"Antonio‐Martín Porras‐Gómez","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqab028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqab028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The recognition of gender equality has become one of the most important trends in contemporary constitutional law. Nonetheless, a crucial question lingers: is it leading to material constitutional transformation? In order to better understand it, this article presents a case study on the constitutional reconfigurations undergone in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings. The main vectors of constitutional change are identified from a descriptive-analytical perspective. Even if they kept idiosyncratic elements of persistent discrimination, the new charters were inserted in the globalised trends of constitutional design, bringing about a strong formal expansion of gender equality rights. On the whole, however, little material progress has been made. This suboptimal material transformation is explained by means of research arguments framed in legal evolutionist theories. Finally, the article elucidates why the greater constitutional verbosity in the recognition of gender equality did not translate into greater parity.","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46223345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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