AbstractPrevious studies showed that when reading a scenario depicting a harmless moral violation in the domain of purity, people nevertheless implicitly infer that harm was involved. In this study, we assessed whether this “implicit completion” process found in the perception of immoral actions is also present in people with autism spectrum disorder. In two experiments, we found an implicit activation of harm representations in response to all kinds of moral violations in neurotypical adults as well as in adults with autism. These results suggested that the perception of moral violations is relatively preserved in people with autism.Keywords: Moral violationsautistic spectrum disorderaffect misattributionharm perceptionsocial cognition Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets generated and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
{"title":"The implicit perception of harm following moral violations in autism","authors":"Gabriele Osler, Laura Franchin, Giulia Guglielmetti, Stefano Calzolari, Rocco Micciolo, Luca Surian","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259538","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractPrevious studies showed that when reading a scenario depicting a harmless moral violation in the domain of purity, people nevertheless implicitly infer that harm was involved. In this study, we assessed whether this “implicit completion” process found in the perception of immoral actions is also present in people with autism spectrum disorder. In two experiments, we found an implicit activation of harm representations in response to all kinds of moral violations in neurotypical adults as well as in adults with autism. These results suggested that the perception of moral violations is relatively preserved in people with autism.Keywords: Moral violationsautistic spectrum disorderaffect misattributionharm perceptionsocial cognition Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets generated and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136308755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259552
Yuhua Yu, Carola Salvi, Maxi Becker, Mark Beeman
AbstractSolving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided preliminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making.Keywords: Insightproblem-solvingrisk preferencerisk decision-making Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets generated during the current study and the analysis code are publicly available at https://osf.io/5f4ez/.Notes1 Unless specified otherwise, standard errors are reported after the “±” sign.2 Participants were excluded for further analysis if they did not report a correct solution in each solution type, thus yielding insufficient data to analyze (39), failed the embedded attention quality check (47), or provided inconsistent baseline response (6).3 Same as in Exp. 1, participants were informed of the bonus rule at the beginning. To disincentivize participants providing incorrect solutions just to get bonus, the final payout was tied to the correct solutions. If a participant solved fewer than 5 CRAs, the number of bonuses to be paid out would be equal to the number of the correct solutions. Each bonus choice, however, still had equal chance of being selected by computer.Additional informationFundingAir Force Office of Scientific Research [FA8650-15-2-5518]. YY was supported by NIH grant [T32 NS047987].
{"title":"Solving problems with an Aha! increases risk preference","authors":"Yuhua Yu, Carola Salvi, Maxi Becker, Mark Beeman","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259552","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractSolving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided preliminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making.Keywords: Insightproblem-solvingrisk preferencerisk decision-making Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Data availability statementThe datasets generated during the current study and the analysis code are publicly available at https://osf.io/5f4ez/.Notes1 Unless specified otherwise, standard errors are reported after the “±” sign.2 Participants were excluded for further analysis if they did not report a correct solution in each solution type, thus yielding insufficient data to analyze (39), failed the embedded attention quality check (47), or provided inconsistent baseline response (6).3 Same as in Exp. 1, participants were informed of the bonus rule at the beginning. To disincentivize participants providing incorrect solutions just to get bonus, the final payout was tied to the correct solutions. If a participant solved fewer than 5 CRAs, the number of bonuses to be paid out would be equal to the number of the correct solutions. Each bonus choice, however, still had equal chance of being selected by computer.Additional informationFundingAir Force Office of Scientific Research [FA8650-15-2-5518]. YY was supported by NIH grant [T32 NS047987].","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135011100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2223110
M. Knauff, Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda
Abstract The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental, and challenge commentators to justify why they think that beliefs have more or less structure in the human mind than can be captured at the comparative level.
{"title":"How are beliefs represented in the mind?","authors":"M. Knauff, Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2223110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2223110","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental, and challenge commentators to justify why they think that beliefs have more or less structure in the human mind than can be captured at the comparative level.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"39 1","pages":"416 - 426"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74774148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01Epub Date: 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2076742
Roger E Beaty, Yoed N Kenett, Richard W Hass, Daniel L Schacter
Despite its theoretical importance, little is known about how semantic memory structure facilitates and constrains creative idea production. We examine whether the semantic richness of a concept has both benefits and costs to creative idea production. Specifically, we tested whether cue set-size-an index of semantic richness reflecting the average number of elements associated with a given concept-impacts the quantity (fluency) and quality (originality) of responses generated during the alternate uses task (AUT). Across four studies, we show that low-association, sparse, AUT cues benefit originality at the cost of fluency compared to high-association, rich, AUT cues. Furthermore, we found an interaction with individual differences in fluid intelligence in the low-association AUT cues, suggesting that constraints of sparse semantic knowledge can be overcome with top-down intervention. The findings indicate that semantic richness differentially impacts the quality and quantity of generated ideas, and that cognitive control processes can facilitate idea production when conceptual knowledge is limited.
尽管语义记忆结构在理论上非常重要，但人们对其如何促进和制约创意的产生却知之甚少。我们研究了一个概念的语义丰富程度对创意产生是否既有好处又有代价。具体来说，我们测试了线索集大小--反映与特定概念相关的元素平均数量的语义丰富度指数--是否会影响交替使用任务（AUT）中产生的反应的数量（流畅性）和质量（独创性）。通过四项研究，我们发现与关联度高、内容丰富的交替使用任务线索相比，关联度低、内容稀少的交替使用任务线索有利于原创性，而流畅性则是其代价。此外，我们还发现低关联度 AUT 线索与流畅性智能的个体差异之间存在相互作用，这表明稀疏语义知识的限制可以通过自上而下的干预加以克服。研究结果表明，语义的丰富程度会对所产生想法的质量和数量产生不同程度的影响，当概念知识有限时，认知控制过程可以促进想法的产生。
{"title":"Semantic Memory and Creativity: The Costs and Benefits of Semantic Memory Structure in Generating Original Ideas.","authors":"Roger E Beaty, Yoed N Kenett, Richard W Hass, Daniel L Schacter","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2076742","DOIUrl":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2076742","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite its theoretical importance, little is known about how semantic memory structure facilitates and constrains creative idea production. We examine whether the semantic richness of a concept has both benefits and costs to creative idea production. Specifically, we tested whether cue set-size-an index of semantic richness reflecting the average number of elements associated with a given concept-impacts the quantity (fluency) and quality (originality) of responses generated during the alternate uses task (AUT). Across four studies, we show that low-association, sparse, AUT cues benefit originality at the cost of fluency compared to high-association, rich, AUT cues. Furthermore, we found an interaction with individual differences in fluid intelligence in the low-association AUT cues, suggesting that constraints of sparse semantic knowledge can be overcome with top-down intervention. The findings indicate that semantic richness differentially impacts the quality and quantity of generated ideas, and that cognitive control processes can facilitate idea production when conceptual knowledge is limited.</p>","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"29 2","pages":"305-339"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10128864/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10296400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2134926
Kong-ngai. Pei, Chin-shing Arthur. Chin
Abstract This article seeks, first, to show that much of the existing normative work on argument from expert opinion (AEO) is problematic for failing to be properly informed by empirical findings on expert performance. Second, it seeks to show how, with the analytic tool of Bayesian reasoning, the problem diagnosed can be remedied to circumvent some of the problems facing the scheme-based treatment of AEOs. To establish the first contention, we will illustrate how empirical studies on factors conditioning expert reliability can be drawn upon to re-construct. Walton’s critical questions matching the scheme of AEOs. To establish the second contention, we will illustrate how Walton’s re-constructed set of critical questions can be formalized within a Bayesian network. Finally, we will highlight how the specific ways in which the Bayesian framework we propose is both continuous with and distinct from the models of source reliability put forward by theorists like Bovens and Hartmann (2003).
{"title":"Towards an empirically informed normative Bayesian scheme-based account of argument from expert opinion","authors":"Kong-ngai. Pei, Chin-shing Arthur. Chin","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2134926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2134926","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article seeks, first, to show that much of the existing normative work on argument from expert opinion (AEO) is problematic for failing to be properly informed by empirical findings on expert performance. Second, it seeks to show how, with the analytic tool of Bayesian reasoning, the problem diagnosed can be remedied to circumvent some of the problems facing the scheme-based treatment of AEOs. To establish the first contention, we will illustrate how empirical studies on factors conditioning expert reliability can be drawn upon to re-construct. Walton’s critical questions matching the scheme of AEOs. To establish the second contention, we will illustrate how Walton’s re-constructed set of critical questions can be formalized within a Bayesian network. Finally, we will highlight how the specific ways in which the Bayesian framework we propose is both continuous with and distinct from the models of source reliability put forward by theorists like Bovens and Hartmann (2003).","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"7 1","pages":"726 - 759"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82649676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2132289
Serena Mastria, Sergio Agnoli, G. E. Corazza, M. Grassi, Laura Franchin
Abstract Past research showed that apparently irrelevant information for a creative task at hand can lead to higher creative performance, especially in open-minded individuals. Through two diverse experimental procedures, the present work investigated which type of irrelevance information can inspire (i.e., increase) the creative performance during a divergent thinking (DT) task and how open-minded individuals can be inspired by this kind of information. In Experiment 1, the attentional processing of information that was either apparently relevant or irrelevant for the execution of a verbal DT task was assessed by means of an eye-tracking methodology. In Experiment 2, creative performance was explored through a verbal priming paradigm, which forcedly introduced apparently irrelevant information during the DT task. In both experiments, the level of irrelevance was operationalized in terms of semantic distance between the different kind of information. Results from both experiments highlighted the role of the semantic meaning of the irrelevant information as one of the main determinants, along with Openness, of inspiration (i.e., enhancement) of the creative performance.
{"title":"What inspires us? An experimental analysis of the semantic meaning of irrelevant information in creative ideation","authors":"Serena Mastria, Sergio Agnoli, G. E. Corazza, M. Grassi, Laura Franchin","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2132289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2132289","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Past research showed that apparently irrelevant information for a creative task at hand can lead to higher creative performance, especially in open-minded individuals. Through two diverse experimental procedures, the present work investigated which type of irrelevance information can inspire (i.e., increase) the creative performance during a divergent thinking (DT) task and how open-minded individuals can be inspired by this kind of information. In Experiment 1, the attentional processing of information that was either apparently relevant or irrelevant for the execution of a verbal DT task was assessed by means of an eye-tracking methodology. In Experiment 2, creative performance was explored through a verbal priming paradigm, which forcedly introduced apparently irrelevant information during the DT task. In both experiments, the level of irrelevance was operationalized in terms of semantic distance between the different kind of information. Results from both experiments highlighted the role of the semantic meaning of the irrelevant information as one of the main determinants, along with Openness, of inspiration (i.e., enhancement) of the creative performance.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"30 1","pages":"698 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85494057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2130428
Marta Stragà, Angela Faiella, Ingrid Santini, Donatella Ferrante
Abstract In two studies, we investigated for the first time the content of children’s counterfactual thoughts about their own experiences. Results showed that the majority of children aged 8-13 were able to produce valid counterfactuals regarding an event that happened to them, despite not achieving an adult-level ability. Comparing counterfactual and prefactual thinking, in Study 1 we found that children showed the same temporal asymmetry previously found in adults: They focused on the controllable features of their experience more in prefactual than counterfactual thinking. However, in Study 2, comparing counterfactuals produced by children and adults after a task in which making errors became salient, children produced more controllable counterfactuals (modifying their own errors) than adults, who still focused on uncontrollable features (as in Study 1). These results suggest that the ability to reason counterfactually in complex and real-life situations is not yet fully developed at age 8-13 years, affecting counterfactual content.
{"title":"“The game would have been better for me if…”: children’s counterfactual thinking about their own performance in a game","authors":"Marta Stragà, Angela Faiella, Ingrid Santini, Donatella Ferrante","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2130428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2130428","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In two studies, we investigated for the first time the content of children’s counterfactual thoughts about their own experiences. Results showed that the majority of children aged 8-13 were able to produce valid counterfactuals regarding an event that happened to them, despite not achieving an adult-level ability. Comparing counterfactual and prefactual thinking, in Study 1 we found that children showed the same temporal asymmetry previously found in adults: They focused on the controllable features of their experience more in prefactual than counterfactual thinking. However, in Study 2, comparing counterfactuals produced by children and adults after a task in which making errors became salient, children produced more controllable counterfactuals (modifying their own errors) than adults, who still focused on uncontrollable features (as in Study 1). These results suggest that the ability to reason counterfactually in complex and real-life situations is not yet fully developed at age 8-13 years, affecting counterfactual content.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"1 1","pages":"663 - 697"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89774759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-16DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2112757
N. Cruz
Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) criticise the use of the term “new paradigm” in the psychology of reasoning and raise important issues about how to advance research in the field. In this commentary I argue that for the latter it would be helpful to clarify further the concepts that reasoning theories rely on, and to strengthen the links between the theories and the empirical observations that would and would not be compatible with them.
{"title":"Conceptual clarity and empirical testability: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)","authors":"N. Cruz","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2112757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2112757","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) criticise the use of the term “new paradigm” in the psychology of reasoning and raise important issues about how to advance research in the field. In this commentary I argue that for the latter it would be helpful to clarify further the concepts that reasoning theories rely on, and to strengthen the links between the theories and the empirical observations that would and would not be compatible with them.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"55 1","pages":"396 - 408"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77553361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-10DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2109730
J. Orzechowski, A. Gruszka, Kamil Michalik
Abstract The current study focuses on the relationship between working memory (WM) and flexibility, which is a dimension of divergent thinking. The research consisted of two experiments in which the participants’ task was to categorize given objects into as many categories as possible. We assumed that manipulation of the visual or relational complexity of a set of figures would respectively affect WM’s ability to maintain and process goal-relevant information. Additionally, the dual-task paradigm was used to observe the relocation of attention resources in the task because WM capacity is limited by attention resources. We hypothesized that both attentional control and the ability to maintain/process goal-relevant information in WM would affect the level of flexibility. The results show that an increased load on WM storage and on processing mechanisms leads to a decline in flexibility scores, which becomes especially apparent when the secondary task, which makes WM capacity more vulnerable, is applied. We conclude that the flexibility of divergent thinking is equally positively associated with the efficiency of WM mechanisms, i.e., storage and processing of current information, and the ability to use controlled attention.
{"title":"The impact of working memory on divergent thinking flexibility","authors":"J. Orzechowski, A. Gruszka, Kamil Michalik","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2109730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2109730","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The current study focuses on the relationship between working memory (WM) and flexibility, which is a dimension of divergent thinking. The research consisted of two experiments in which the participants’ task was to categorize given objects into as many categories as possible. We assumed that manipulation of the visual or relational complexity of a set of figures would respectively affect WM’s ability to maintain and process goal-relevant information. Additionally, the dual-task paradigm was used to observe the relocation of attention resources in the task because WM capacity is limited by attention resources. We hypothesized that both attentional control and the ability to maintain/process goal-relevant information in WM would affect the level of flexibility. The results show that an increased load on WM storage and on processing mechanisms leads to a decline in flexibility scores, which becomes especially apparent when the secondary task, which makes WM capacity more vulnerable, is applied. We conclude that the flexibility of divergent thinking is equally positively associated with the efficiency of WM mechanisms, i.e., storage and processing of current information, and the ability to use controlled attention.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"54 1","pages":"643 - 662"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87640410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897
Nikola Erceg, Zvonimir Galić, Andreja Bubić, Dino Jelić
Abstract People can solve reasoning tasks in different ways depending on how much conflict they detected and whether they were accurate or not. The hybrid dual-process model presumes that these different types of responses correspond to different strengths of logical intuitions, with correct responses given with little conflict detection indicating very strong, and incorrect responses given with little conflict detection very weak logical intuitions. Across two studies, we observed that individual differences in abilities, skills, and dispositions underpinned these different response types, with correct non-detection trials being related to highest, and incorrect non-detection trials to lowest scores on these traits, both for cognitive reflection and belief-bias tasks. In sum, it seems that every individual difference variable that we measured was important for the development of strong logical intuitions, with numeracy and the need for cognition being especially important for intuitive correct responding to cognitive reflection tasks. In line with the hybrid dual-process model, we argue that abilities and dispositions serve primarily for developing mindware and strong intuitions, and not for detecting conflict, which has repercussions for the validity of these tasks as measures of reflection/analytical thinking.
{"title":"Who detects and why: how do individual differences in cognitive characteristics underpin different types of responses to reasoning tasks?","authors":"Nikola Erceg, Zvonimir Galić, Andreja Bubić, Dino Jelić","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People can solve reasoning tasks in different ways depending on how much conflict they detected and whether they were accurate or not. The hybrid dual-process model presumes that these different types of responses correspond to different strengths of logical intuitions, with correct responses given with little conflict detection indicating very strong, and incorrect responses given with little conflict detection very weak logical intuitions. Across two studies, we observed that individual differences in abilities, skills, and dispositions underpinned these different response types, with correct non-detection trials being related to highest, and incorrect non-detection trials to lowest scores on these traits, both for cognitive reflection and belief-bias tasks. In sum, it seems that every individual difference variable that we measured was important for the development of strong logical intuitions, with numeracy and the need for cognition being especially important for intuitive correct responding to cognitive reflection tasks. In line with the hybrid dual-process model, we argue that abilities and dispositions serve primarily for developing mindware and strong intuitions, and not for detecting conflict, which has repercussions for the validity of these tasks as measures of reflection/analytical thinking.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"92 1","pages":"594 - 642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76682327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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