Pub Date : 2022-02-21DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2041095
Colin J Davis, S. Lewandowsky
Abstract We introduce this special issue on Thinking about Climate Change by reflecting on the role of psychology in responding adaptively to catastrophic global threats. By way of illustration we compare the threat posed by climate change with the extinction-level threat considered in the recent film Don’t Look Up [McKay, A. (Director). (2021). Don’t Look Up [Film]. Hyperobject Industries]. Human psychology is a critical element in both scenarios. The papers in this special issue discuss the importance of clear communication of scientific information, the dangers of misinformation and the possible role played by motivated reasoning, all themes that are taken up in the film. Ultimately, though, it is not enough to consider psychological factors in isolation: we must also acknowledge that cognitive flaws and psychological motivations are exploited by vested interests that profit from delaying climate action. A global response to a global crisis requires us to ‘look up’ to recognise the threat and to ‘look around’ to go beyond specialist disciplines and national boundaries.
{"title":"Thinking about climate change: look up and look around!","authors":"Colin J Davis, S. Lewandowsky","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2041095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2041095","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We introduce this special issue on Thinking about Climate Change by reflecting on the role of psychology in responding adaptively to catastrophic global threats. By way of illustration we compare the threat posed by climate change with the extinction-level threat considered in the recent film Don’t Look Up [McKay, A. (Director). (2021). Don’t Look Up [Film]. Hyperobject Industries]. Human psychology is a critical element in both scenarios. The papers in this special issue discuss the importance of clear communication of scientific information, the dangers of misinformation and the possible role played by motivated reasoning, all themes that are taken up in the film. Ultimately, though, it is not enough to consider psychological factors in isolation: we must also acknowledge that cognitive flaws and psychological motivations are exploited by vested interests that profit from delaying climate action. A global response to a global crisis requires us to ‘look up’ to recognise the threat and to ‘look around’ to go beyond specialist disciplines and national boundaries.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"51 1","pages":"321 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74013186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-16DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2039293
Xuewei Wang, Yadan Li, Xinyi Li, D. Dai, Weiping Hu
Abstract The aim of this study was to explain previous inconsistent results regarding the effects of positive affect on creative cognition based on the motivational dimensional model of affect theory and provide the underlying neural correlates of the effects of different approach-motivation intensities of positive affect on creative processes (creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation) using the functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) technique. Sixty participants were randomly assigned to three groups (high-approach-motivated positive affect (HAM), low-approach-motivated positive affect (LAM) and affectively neutral state (NS)) to complete corresponding tasks in creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation stages. In the creative idea generation stage, the results indicated that the LAM group achieved a higher performance in flexibility and originality than the NS group. However, compared with the NS group, the LAM group exhibited a lower sensitivity in the creative idea evaluation stage. The fNIRS technique provides an ideal approach with high ecological validity for exploring the issue of affect and creativity. In current study, fNIRS results showed that the HAM group exhibited significantly more activation in the bilateral frontal lobe than the LAM group and NS group in the creative idea generation stage. This result could reflect individuals attempting to overcome a narrowed attentional scope state through the activation of bilateral frontal cortical resources in the creative process. In the creative idea evaluation stage, compared with the NS group, the LAM group showed significant deactivation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is a brain area associated with executive, controlled processing. Moreover, the approach-motivation intensity altered the connectivity between the left prefrontal cortex and left superior temporal gyrus in the creative idea generation stage. Thus, the influences of positive affect on creative cognitive processes (both creative performance and hemodynamic responses) were modulated by the approach-motivation intensity in the creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation stages.
{"title":"The influence of varying positive affect in approach-motivation intensity on creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation: an fNIRS study","authors":"Xuewei Wang, Yadan Li, Xinyi Li, D. Dai, Weiping Hu","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2039293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2039293","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this study was to explain previous inconsistent results regarding the effects of positive affect on creative cognition based on the motivational dimensional model of affect theory and provide the underlying neural correlates of the effects of different approach-motivation intensities of positive affect on creative processes (creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation) using the functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) technique. Sixty participants were randomly assigned to three groups (high-approach-motivated positive affect (HAM), low-approach-motivated positive affect (LAM) and affectively neutral state (NS)) to complete corresponding tasks in creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation stages. In the creative idea generation stage, the results indicated that the LAM group achieved a higher performance in flexibility and originality than the NS group. However, compared with the NS group, the LAM group exhibited a lower sensitivity in the creative idea evaluation stage. The fNIRS technique provides an ideal approach with high ecological validity for exploring the issue of affect and creativity. In current study, fNIRS results showed that the HAM group exhibited significantly more activation in the bilateral frontal lobe than the LAM group and NS group in the creative idea generation stage. This result could reflect individuals attempting to overcome a narrowed attentional scope state through the activation of bilateral frontal cortical resources in the creative process. In the creative idea evaluation stage, compared with the NS group, the LAM group showed significant deactivation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is a brain area associated with executive, controlled processing. Moreover, the approach-motivation intensity altered the connectivity between the left prefrontal cortex and left superior temporal gyrus in the creative idea generation stage. Thus, the influences of positive affect on creative cognitive processes (both creative performance and hemodynamic responses) were modulated by the approach-motivation intensity in the creative idea generation and creative idea evaluation stages.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"143 1","pages":"70 - 110"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80331421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-12DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2038268
Julia Aspernäs, Arvid Erlandsson, Artur Nilsson
Abstract This study investigated ideological belief bias, and whether this effect is moderated by analytical thinking. A Swedish nationally representative sample (N = 1005) evaluated non-political and political syllogisms and were asked whether the conclusions followed logically from the premises. The correct response in the political syllogisms was aligned with either leftist or rightist political ideology. Political orientation predicted response accuracy for political but not non-political syllogisms. Overall, the participants correctly evaluated more syllogisms when the correct response was congruent with their ideology, particularly on hot-button issues (asylum to refugees, climate change, gender-neutral education, and school marketization). Analytical thinking predicted higher accuracy for syllogisms of any kind among leftists, but it predicted accuracy only for leftist and non-political syllogisms among rightists. This research contributes by refining a promising paradigm for studying politically motivated reasoning, demonstrating ideological belief bias outside of the United States across diverse political issues, and providing the first evidence that analytical thinking may reduce such bias.
{"title":"Motivated formal reasoning: Ideological belief bias in syllogistic reasoning across diverse political issues","authors":"Julia Aspernäs, Arvid Erlandsson, Artur Nilsson","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2038268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2038268","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study investigated ideological belief bias, and whether this effect is moderated by analytical thinking. A Swedish nationally representative sample (N = 1005) evaluated non-political and political syllogisms and were asked whether the conclusions followed logically from the premises. The correct response in the political syllogisms was aligned with either leftist or rightist political ideology. Political orientation predicted response accuracy for political but not non-political syllogisms. Overall, the participants correctly evaluated more syllogisms when the correct response was congruent with their ideology, particularly on hot-button issues (asylum to refugees, climate change, gender-neutral education, and school marketization). Analytical thinking predicted higher accuracy for syllogisms of any kind among leftists, but it predicted accuracy only for leftist and non-political syllogisms among rightists. This research contributes by refining a promising paradigm for studying politically motivated reasoning, demonstrating ideological belief bias outside of the United States across diverse political issues, and providing the first evidence that analytical thinking may reduce such bias.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"423 1 1","pages":"43 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77852884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-18DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2017345
I. Douven
Abstract Many cognitive psychologists have come to regard graded belief as fundamental to our understanding of how humans reason and many have also come to think of probability theory as providing at least part of the norms of correct reasoning. David Over has characterized this development as the emergence of a new paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. The target article argues that the choice of this term was unwarranted and also that it has done more harm than good. This commentary argues that there is nothing in Thomas Kuhn’s work to suggest that he would object to Over’s terminological choice and that there is no evidence that the choice has caused any harm.
{"title":"Is the new paradigm a new paradigm? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)","authors":"I. Douven","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2017345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2017345","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many cognitive psychologists have come to regard graded belief as fundamental to our understanding of how humans reason and many have also come to think of probability theory as providing at least part of the norms of correct reasoning. David Over has characterized this development as the emergence of a new paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. The target article argues that the choice of this term was unwarranted and also that it has done more harm than good. This commentary argues that there is nothing in Thomas Kuhn’s work to suggest that he would object to Over’s terminological choice and that there is no evidence that the choice has caused any harm.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"20 1","pages":"383 - 388"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85086246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-17DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2027814
N. Bulut, S. Gürsoy, Neşe Yorguner, Gresa Çarkaxhiu Bulut, K. Sayar
Abstract Research suggests that people tend to overweight arguments accompanied by neuroscientific terminology, which is dubbed as the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (SANE) in the literature. Such an effect might be of particular significance when it comes to physicians and mental health professionals (MHP), given that it has the potential to cause significant bias in their understanding as well as their treatment approaches toward psychiatric symptoms. In this study, we aimed to test the SANE effect among Turkish medical students, and assess its uniqueness by comparing it with a discipline that still maintains an important role in contemporary psychiatric training in Turkey: psychoanalysis. 109 medical students with a basic level of knowledge of psychiatry and clinical neuroscience were asked to rate the credibility of explanations of differing quality (good vs. circular) for psychological phenomena, followed by three types of information: none, neuroscientific (SNI) or psychoanalytical (SPI). Our findings showed that SNI significantly increased the judged quality of explanations for both conditions with the effect being more prominent for circular explanations. On the other hand, SPI had no effect on good explanations but enhanced the judged quality of circular explanations in a level comparable to that of SNI. For the first time, the SANE effect was replicated among medical students and provided preliminary data in favor of a similar effect for psychoanalytically oriented information.
{"title":"The seductive allure effect extends from neuroscientific to psychoanalytic explanations among Turkish medical students: preliminary implications of biased scientific reasoning within the context of medical and psychiatric training","authors":"N. Bulut, S. Gürsoy, Neşe Yorguner, Gresa Çarkaxhiu Bulut, K. Sayar","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2027814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2027814","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research suggests that people tend to overweight arguments accompanied by neuroscientific terminology, which is dubbed as the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (SANE) in the literature. Such an effect might be of particular significance when it comes to physicians and mental health professionals (MHP), given that it has the potential to cause significant bias in their understanding as well as their treatment approaches toward psychiatric symptoms. In this study, we aimed to test the SANE effect among Turkish medical students, and assess its uniqueness by comparing it with a discipline that still maintains an important role in contemporary psychiatric training in Turkey: psychoanalysis. 109 medical students with a basic level of knowledge of psychiatry and clinical neuroscience were asked to rate the credibility of explanations of differing quality (good vs. circular) for psychological phenomena, followed by three types of information: none, neuroscientific (SNI) or psychoanalytical (SPI). Our findings showed that SNI significantly increased the judged quality of explanations for both conditions with the effect being more prominent for circular explanations. On the other hand, SPI had no effect on good explanations but enhanced the judged quality of circular explanations in a level comparable to that of SNI. For the first time, the SANE effect was replicated among medical students and provided preliminary data in favor of a similar effect for psychoanalytically oriented information.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"42 1","pages":"625 - 644"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88703534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-10DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2022532
P. Johnson-Laird, S. Khemlani
Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (this issue) critique the "new paradigm" – a framework that replaces logic with probabilities – on the grounds that there existed no "old” paradigm for it to supplant. Their position is supported by the large numbers of theories that theorists developed to explain the Wason selection task, syllogisms, and other tasks. We propose some measures to inhibit such facile theorizing, which threatens the viability of cognitive science. We show that robust results exist contrary to the new paradigm, and that it is unable to account for other results.
{"title":"What happened to the “new paradigm”? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)","authors":"P. Johnson-Laird, S. Khemlani","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2022532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2022532","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (this issue) critique the \"new paradigm\" – a framework that replaces logic with probabilities – on the grounds that there existed no \"old” paradigm for it to supplant. Their position is supported by the large numbers of theories that theorists developed to explain the Wason selection task, syllogisms, and other tasks. We propose some measures to inhibit such facile theorizing, which threatens the viability of cognitive science. We show that robust results exist contrary to the new paradigm, and that it is unable to account for other results.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"54 1","pages":"409 - 415"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89261868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-30DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2022531
M. Oaksford
Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) object to using the term “new paradigm” to describe recent developments in the psychology of reasoning. This paper concedes that the Kuhnian term “paradigm” may be queried. What cannot is that the work subsumed under this heading is part of a new, progressive movement that spans the brain and cognitive sciences: Bayesian cognitive science. Sampling algorithms and Bayes nets used to explain biases in JDM can implement the Bayesian new paradigm approach belying any advantages of mental models theory (MMT) at the algorithmic level. Moreover, this paper argues that new versions of MMT lack a computational level theory and questions the grounds for MMTs much-vaunted generality. The paper then examines common ground on the importance of small-scale models/simulations of the world and the importance of argumentation in the social domain rather than individual reasoning. Finally, the paper concludes that although there may be prospects for moving reasoning research forward in a more collective, collaborative manner, many disagreements remain to be resolved.
{"title":"Mental models, computational explanation and Bayesian cognitive science: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)","authors":"M. Oaksford","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2022531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2022531","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) object to using the term “new paradigm” to describe recent developments in the psychology of reasoning. This paper concedes that the Kuhnian term “paradigm” may be queried. What cannot is that the work subsumed under this heading is part of a new, progressive movement that spans the brain and cognitive sciences: Bayesian cognitive science. Sampling algorithms and Bayes nets used to explain biases in JDM can implement the Bayesian new paradigm approach belying any advantages of mental models theory (MMT) at the algorithmic level. Moreover, this paper argues that new versions of MMT lack a computational level theory and questions the grounds for MMTs much-vaunted generality. The paper then examines common ground on the importance of small-scale models/simulations of the world and the importance of argumentation in the social domain rather than individual reasoning. Finally, the paper concludes that although there may be prospects for moving reasoning research forward in a more collective, collaborative manner, many disagreements remain to be resolved.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"1 1","pages":"371 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88430732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-30DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2017346
D. Over
Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda argue as much in support of revised mental model theory (RMMT) as they argue against talk of a new paradigm caused by the probabilistic approach in the psychology of reasoning. They claim that RMMT is not essentially different from classical mental model theory (CMMT) and not essentially different from the probabilistic approach. There are many serious questions to ask about RMMT. But RMMT is a massive modalization of aspects of the extensional CMMT, and it follows the probabilistic approach in having an intensional focus that justifies talk of a new paradigm.
{"title":"The new paradigm and massive modalization: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)","authors":"D. Over","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2017346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2017346","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda argue as much in support of revised mental model theory (RMMT) as they argue against talk of a new paradigm caused by the probabilistic approach in the psychology of reasoning. They claim that RMMT is not essentially different from classical mental model theory (CMMT) and not essentially different from the probabilistic approach. There are many serious questions to ask about RMMT. But RMMT is a massive modalization of aspects of the extensional CMMT, and it follows the probabilistic approach in having an intensional focus that justifies talk of a new paradigm.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"72 1","pages":"389 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75661263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2015439
E. Tubau
Abstract Over the last decades, understanding the sources of the difficulty of Bayesian problem solving has been an important research goal, with the effects of numerical format and individual numeracy being widely studied. However, the focus on the comprehension of probability numbers has overshadowed the relational reasoning demand of the Bayesian task. This is particularly the case when the statistical data are verbally described since the requested quantitative relation (posterior ratio) is misaligned with the presented ones (prior and likelihood ratios). In this regard, here I develop the proposal that research on Bayesian reasoning might improve by considering the notational alignment framework of mathematical problem-solving. Specifically, this framework can help to understand the sources of the main difficulties underlying Bayesian inferences based on verbal descriptions. In essence, the present proposal supports the general claim in math education regarding the need to foster relational comprehension to avoid misleading alignments and improve problem solving.
{"title":"Why can it be so hard to solve Bayesian problems? Moving from number comprehension to relational reasoning demands","authors":"E. Tubau","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2015439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2015439","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the last decades, understanding the sources of the difficulty of Bayesian problem solving has been an important research goal, with the effects of numerical format and individual numeracy being widely studied. However, the focus on the comprehension of probability numbers has overshadowed the relational reasoning demand of the Bayesian task. This is particularly the case when the statistical data are verbally described since the requested quantitative relation (posterior ratio) is misaligned with the presented ones (prior and likelihood ratios). In this regard, here I develop the proposal that research on Bayesian reasoning might improve by considering the notational alignment framework of mathematical problem-solving. Specifically, this framework can help to understand the sources of the main difficulties underlying Bayesian inferences based on verbal descriptions. In essence, the present proposal supports the general claim in math education regarding the need to foster relational comprehension to avoid misleading alignments and improve problem solving.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"3 1","pages":"605 - 624"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91053825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-09DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2000494
C. Hadjichristidis, Janet Geipel, Kishore Gopalakrishna Pillai
Abstract Previous research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on whether its description mentions examples (“What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to Warsaw, Budapest, Prague or some other European city?”) or does not mention examples (“What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to a European city?”). Here, we examined descriptions that mention examples and manipulated whether these are relatively similar (e.g., Warsaw, Budapest, Prague) or diverse (e.g., Warsaw, Marseilles, Helsinki). Four experiments (N = 1112) revealed a diversity effect: Overall, descriptions with diverse examples received higher probability judgments than descriptions with similar examples. We discuss several possible mechanisms for this effect, such as that descriptions with diverse examples prompt fuller representations of the target category or that the effect is driven by a representativeness or proximity heuristic.
{"title":"Diversity effects in subjective probability judgment","authors":"C. Hadjichristidis, Janet Geipel, Kishore Gopalakrishna Pillai","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2000494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2000494","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Previous research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on whether its description mentions examples (“What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to Warsaw, Budapest, Prague or some other European city?”) or does not mention examples (“What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to a European city?”). Here, we examined descriptions that mention examples and manipulated whether these are relatively similar (e.g., Warsaw, Budapest, Prague) or diverse (e.g., Warsaw, Marseilles, Helsinki). Four experiments (N = 1112) revealed a diversity effect: Overall, descriptions with diverse examples received higher probability judgments than descriptions with similar examples. We discuss several possible mechanisms for this effect, such as that descriptions with diverse examples prompt fuller representations of the target category or that the effect is driven by a representativeness or proximity heuristic.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"39 1","pages":"290 - 319"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86416394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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