Pub Date : 2021-08-09DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1959400
Ut Na Sio, K. Kotovsky, J. Cagan
Abstract Creative problem solving is often conceptualised as a process of search. However, little is known about the difficulties of carrying out this search process. We conducted three studies examining how strongly different task characteristics impact creative problem-solving performance. In Study 1, regression analyses on normative data of Remote Associates Test (RAT) problems identified key task characteristics that best predict performance. We replicated these findings in a sample that was more diverse with respect to age and education background and proposed that two key factors may interact in predicting RAT problem difficulty (Study 2). We then confirmed this prediction in a pre-registered study (Study 3). Our results suggest that (a) the semantic distance between the cues and the answer and (b) the number of strong but irrelevant associates are important determinants of RAT problem difficulty, and that their influence is interdependent. Implications for theories and for studies aimed at improving creative problem-solving performance are discussed.
{"title":"Determinants of creative thinking: the effect of task characteristics in solving remote associate test problems","authors":"Ut Na Sio, K. Kotovsky, J. Cagan","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1959400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1959400","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Creative problem solving is often conceptualised as a process of search. However, little is known about the difficulties of carrying out this search process. We conducted three studies examining how strongly different task characteristics impact creative problem-solving performance. In Study 1, regression analyses on normative data of Remote Associates Test (RAT) problems identified key task characteristics that best predict performance. We replicated these findings in a sample that was more diverse with respect to age and education background and proposed that two key factors may interact in predicting RAT problem difficulty (Study 2). We then confirmed this prediction in a pre-registered study (Study 3). Our results suggest that (a) the semantic distance between the cues and the answer and (b) the number of strong but irrelevant associates are important determinants of RAT problem difficulty, and that their influence is interdependent. Implications for theories and for studies aimed at improving creative problem-solving performance are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"38 1","pages":"163 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87172453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-22DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1934119
S. Howarth, S. Handley, V. Polito
Abstract It is well established that beliefs provide powerful cues that influence reasoning. Over the last decade research has revealed that judgments based upon logical structure may also pre-empt deliberative reasoning. Evidence for ‘intuitive logic’ has been claimed using a range of measures (i.e. confidence ratings or latency of response on conflict problems). However, it is unclear how well such measures genuinely reflect logical intuition. In this paper we introduce a new method designed to test for evidence of intuitive logic. In two experiments participants were asked to make random judgments about the logical validity of a series of simple and complex syllogistic arguments. For simple arguments there was an effect of logical validity on random responding, which was absent for complex arguments. These findings provide a novel demonstration that people are intuitively sensitive to logical structure.
{"title":"Uncontrolled logic: intuitive sensitivity to logical structure in random responding","authors":"S. Howarth, S. Handley, V. Polito","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1934119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1934119","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is well established that beliefs provide powerful cues that influence reasoning. Over the last decade research has revealed that judgments based upon logical structure may also pre-empt deliberative reasoning. Evidence for ‘intuitive logic’ has been claimed using a range of measures (i.e. confidence ratings or latency of response on conflict problems). However, it is unclear how well such measures genuinely reflect logical intuition. In this paper we introduce a new method designed to test for evidence of intuitive logic. In two experiments participants were asked to make random judgments about the logical validity of a series of simple and complex syllogistic arguments. For simple arguments there was an effect of logical validity on random responding, which was absent for complex arguments. These findings provide a novel demonstration that people are intuitively sensitive to logical structure.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"8 1","pages":"61 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74814288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-19DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1911847
G. Sędek, P. Verhaeghen, Kamila Lengsfeld, Klara Rydzewska
Abstract Older adults are known to have difficulty with tests of formal reasoning. Inspired by previous work suggesting an influence of participants’ living ecology on reasoning ability, we examined in a group of 270 younger, middle-aged, and older adults whether presenting transitive reasoning problems (i.e., A > B, B > C, hence A > C) as informal narrative stories rather than formal problems might alleviate age-related declines. Formal materials resulted in the usual (strong) age-related differences favouring the young. In contrast, when informal spoken narratives were used and additionally all time pressure was removed, adult age differences were effectively abolished, possibly because the tasks now allow for easier encoding into and retrieval from episodic memory. This suggests that older adults’ real-life reasoning abilities are seriously underestimated when standard testing procedures are used.
众所周知，老年人在形式推理测试中有困难。受先前研究表明参与者的生活生态对推理能力的影响的启发，我们对270名年轻人、中年人和老年人进行了研究，以非正式的叙事故事而不是正式的问题来呈现传递性推理问题(即，a > B, B > C，因此a > C)是否可以缓解与年龄相关的衰退。正式材料导致了通常的(强烈的)年龄相关差异，有利于年轻人。相比之下，当使用非正式的口头叙述并消除所有时间压力时，成年人的年龄差异就被有效地消除了，可能是因为这些任务现在允许更容易地编码和提取情景记忆。这表明，当使用标准测试程序时，老年人的现实推理能力被严重低估了。
{"title":"Using stories to assess linear reasoning abolishes the age-related differences found in formal tests","authors":"G. Sędek, P. Verhaeghen, Kamila Lengsfeld, Klara Rydzewska","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1911847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1911847","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Older adults are known to have difficulty with tests of formal reasoning. Inspired by previous work suggesting an influence of participants’ living ecology on reasoning ability, we examined in a group of 270 younger, middle-aged, and older adults whether presenting transitive reasoning problems (i.e., A > B, B > C, hence A > C) as informal narrative stories rather than formal problems might alleviate age-related declines. Formal materials resulted in the usual (strong) age-related differences favouring the young. In contrast, when informal spoken narratives were used and additionally all time pressure was removed, adult age differences were effectively abolished, possibly because the tasks now allow for easier encoding into and retrieval from episodic memory. This suggests that older adults’ real-life reasoning abilities are seriously underestimated when standard testing procedures are used.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"23 1","pages":"623 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85913733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-14DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1911848
R. Lu, Yanna Zhang, Naili Bao, Meng Su, Xingli Zhang, Jiannong Shi
Abstract Creative idea generation engages complex cognitive functions such as working memory capacity (WMC). The relationship between creativity and WMC has remained inconsistent due to the lack of experimental evidence and the mismatching of WMC tasks and creativity measurements. Therefore, we used both measurements and experiments to explore the effects of WMC on creativity with the matching of task types considered. In Study 1, we conducted multiple measurements to explore the relationship between verbal/visuospatial WMC and verbal/figural creativity and found that participants with higher visuospatial WMC performed better in both types of creativity tasks. Furthermore, we conducted two dual task experiments in Study 2 to explore the causal effects of WMC on creativity. We found only interfering with participants’ visuospatial WMC would significantly decrease their creative performances. Moreover, Study 3 ruled out the potential confounding factor of general attention resources in the visuospatial secondary tasks by using a control dual task experiment. These findings indicated that the creative thinking process is likely to rely on visuospatial processing regardless of the form of the presented information.
{"title":"Visuospatial, rather than verbal working memory capacity plays a key role in verbal and figural creativity","authors":"R. Lu, Yanna Zhang, Naili Bao, Meng Su, Xingli Zhang, Jiannong Shi","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1911848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1911848","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Creative idea generation engages complex cognitive functions such as working memory capacity (WMC). The relationship between creativity and WMC has remained inconsistent due to the lack of experimental evidence and the mismatching of WMC tasks and creativity measurements. Therefore, we used both measurements and experiments to explore the effects of WMC on creativity with the matching of task types considered. In Study 1, we conducted multiple measurements to explore the relationship between verbal/visuospatial WMC and verbal/figural creativity and found that participants with higher visuospatial WMC performed better in both types of creativity tasks. Furthermore, we conducted two dual task experiments in Study 2 to explore the causal effects of WMC on creativity. We found only interfering with participants’ visuospatial WMC would significantly decrease their creative performances. Moreover, Study 3 ruled out the potential confounding factor of general attention resources in the visuospatial secondary tasks by using a control dual task experiment. These findings indicated that the creative thinking process is likely to rely on visuospatial processing regardless of the form of the presented information.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"19 1","pages":"29 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78906372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1746692
M. Dujmović, P. Valerjev, Igor Bajšanski
Abstract We conducted a thorough investigation of the impact of representativeness on reasoning and metacognitive processes by employing the Linda problem. In congruent versions, the more representative response choice was also the correct one which was not the case in conflict versions. We manipulated the level of representativeness of the responses by making the component statements more or less representative of presented descriptions. The main findings revealed that higher levels of representativeness led to lower accuracy, faster responses and higher confidence. Detailed analysis revealed that certain reasoning processes heavily depend on representativeness and metacognitive assessments based on it (e.g., decoupling from a representative but incorrect response need not lead to lower confidence though it may be computationally expensive). Finally, responses remained mostly stable after rethinking, while answer changes towards the more representative choice were more likely than the opposite which implies Type 2 processes may support both normative and heuristic thinking.
{"title":"The role of representativeness in reasoning and metacognitive processes: an in-depth analysis of the Linda problem","authors":"M. Dujmović, P. Valerjev, Igor Bajšanski","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1746692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1746692","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We conducted a thorough investigation of the impact of representativeness on reasoning and metacognitive processes by employing the Linda problem. In congruent versions, the more representative response choice was also the correct one which was not the case in conflict versions. We manipulated the level of representativeness of the responses by making the component statements more or less representative of presented descriptions. The main findings revealed that higher levels of representativeness led to lower accuracy, faster responses and higher confidence. Detailed analysis revealed that certain reasoning processes heavily depend on representativeness and metacognitive assessments based on it (e.g., decoupling from a representative but incorrect response need not lead to lower confidence though it may be computationally expensive). Finally, responses remained mostly stable after rethinking, while answer changes towards the more representative choice were more likely than the opposite which implies Type 2 processes may support both normative and heuristic thinking.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"39 1","pages":"161 - 186"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90899518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1885488
Matthieu Raoelison, Esther Boissin, G. Borst, Wim De Neys
Abstract Recent reasoning accounts suggest that people can process elementary logical principles intuitively. These controversial “logical intuitions” are believed to result from a learning process in which developing reasoners automatize their application. To verify this automatization hypothesis, we contrasted the reasoning performance of younger (7th grade) and older (12th grade) reasoners with a two-response paradigm. Participants initially responded with the first intuitive response that came to mind and subsequently were allowed to deliberate on classic “bias” problems (base-rate problems and syllogisms). Results showed that in addition to showing less deliberate correction of an initial erroneous response, younger reasoners were specifically less likely to generate the correct response from the outset. The findings lend credence to the role of a developmental automatization process and indicate that developmental improvements in reasoning accuracy are at least partially driven by an improvement in the accuracy of our intuitions.
{"title":"From slow to fast logic: the development of logical intuitions","authors":"Matthieu Raoelison, Esther Boissin, G. Borst, Wim De Neys","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1885488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1885488","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent reasoning accounts suggest that people can process elementary logical principles intuitively. These controversial “logical intuitions” are believed to result from a learning process in which developing reasoners automatize their application. To verify this automatization hypothesis, we contrasted the reasoning performance of younger (7th grade) and older (12th grade) reasoners with a two-response paradigm. Participants initially responded with the first intuitive response that came to mind and subsequently were allowed to deliberate on classic “bias” problems (base-rate problems and syllogisms). Results showed that in addition to showing less deliberate correction of an initial erroneous response, younger reasoners were specifically less likely to generate the correct response from the outset. The findings lend credence to the role of a developmental automatization process and indicate that developmental improvements in reasoning accuracy are at least partially driven by an improvement in the accuracy of our intuitions.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"2 1","pages":"599 - 622"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82193414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-31DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1810122
D. Hilton, Christophe Schmeltzer, Valentin Goulette
Abstract Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation (CFC) because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have occurred anyway due to the action of a pre-empted alternative cause. We propose that commonsense causal questions typically probe specific events that actually happened as and how they did, and show that counterfactuals that probe specific events match selections of actual cause, and dissociations only occur with non-specific counterfactuals. In addition, the pre-empted action is often selected as the or an actual cause when it causes the pre-empting action (auto-pre-emption). Judgements of an action’s responsibility for the outcome track judgements of actual cause following the legal sine qua non principle. Agent reproach is also influenced by the agent's intention. The effects of causal dependency structure and counterfactual question type are robust across the intentionality of the pre-empting action and scenario content.
{"title":"A question of detail: matching counterfactuals to actual cause in pre-emption scenarios","authors":"D. Hilton, Christophe Schmeltzer, Valentin Goulette","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1810122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1810122","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation (CFC) because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have occurred anyway due to the action of a pre-empted alternative cause. We propose that commonsense causal questions typically probe specific events that actually happened as and how they did, and show that counterfactuals that probe specific events match selections of actual cause, and dissociations only occur with non-specific counterfactuals. In addition, the pre-empted action is often selected as the or an actual cause when it causes the pre-empting action (auto-pre-emption). Judgements of an action’s responsibility for the outcome track judgements of actual cause following the legal sine qua non principle. Agent reproach is also influenced by the agent's intention. The effects of causal dependency structure and counterfactual question type are robust across the intentionality of the pre-empting action and scenario content.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"20 1","pages":"350 - 388"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82629463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-08DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1893222
M. Hornsey, C. Chapman, Dexter M. Oelrichs
Abstract People who believe they have greater efficacy to address climate change are more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviour. To confront the climate crisis, it will therefore be essential to understand the processes through which climate change efficacy is promoted. Some interventions in the literature assume that efficacy emerges from analytic reasoning processes: that it is deliberative, verbal, conscious, and influenced by information and education. In the current paper, we critique this notion. We review evidence showing that climate change efficacy perceptions are (a) associated with climate-related distress and threat, (b) prescribed by social norms, (c) associated with social desirability and identity-expressive concerns, (d) surprisingly difficult to change through explicit, verbal instruction, but (e) responsive to imagery. We conclude by examining applied implications of these five propositions and discuss why non-analytic processes might (ironically) be beneficial for sustaining green activism.
{"title":"Why it is so hard to teach people they can make a difference: climate change efficacy as a non-analytic form of reasoning","authors":"M. Hornsey, C. Chapman, Dexter M. Oelrichs","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1893222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1893222","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People who believe they have greater efficacy to address climate change are more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviour. To confront the climate crisis, it will therefore be essential to understand the processes through which climate change efficacy is promoted. Some interventions in the literature assume that efficacy emerges from analytic reasoning processes: that it is deliberative, verbal, conscious, and influenced by information and education. In the current paper, we critique this notion. We review evidence showing that climate change efficacy perceptions are (a) associated with climate-related distress and threat, (b) prescribed by social norms, (c) associated with social desirability and identity-expressive concerns, (d) surprisingly difficult to change through explicit, verbal instruction, but (e) responsive to imagery. We conclude by examining applied implications of these five propositions and discuss why non-analytic processes might (ironically) be beneficial for sustaining green activism.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"31 1","pages":"327 - 345"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77503418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-28DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1891967
Dáša Vedejová, V. Čavojová
Abstract Confirmation bias is often used as an umbrella term for many related phenomena. Information searches, evidence interpretation, and memory recall are the three main components of the thinking process involved in hypothesis testing most relevant to investigations of confirmation bias; yet these have rarely been explored using a unified paradigm. Therefore, this paper examines how confirmation bias works in each of these three stages of reasoning, using four controversial topics. Participants (N = 199) first indicated their attitudes and then answered tasks measuring confirmation bias. The results showed that confirmation bias was most prevalent in information search as participants tended to search for information confirming their prior attitudes. During information interpretation, confirmation bias occurred only for more polarizing topics. On the other hand, our results did not show confirmation bias in memory recall, as there was no difference in recall of information confirming or disconfirming prior attitudes for any of the topics. Although our attitudes affect the way we process information, it seems the effect varies depending on the reasoning stage, and this can have implications for debiasing strategies.
{"title":"Confirmation bias in information search, interpretation, and memory recall: evidence from reasoning about four controversial topics","authors":"Dáša Vedejová, V. Čavojová","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1891967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1891967","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Confirmation bias is often used as an umbrella term for many related phenomena. Information searches, evidence interpretation, and memory recall are the three main components of the thinking process involved in hypothesis testing most relevant to investigations of confirmation bias; yet these have rarely been explored using a unified paradigm. Therefore, this paper examines how confirmation bias works in each of these three stages of reasoning, using four controversial topics. Participants (N = 199) first indicated their attitudes and then answered tasks measuring confirmation bias. The results showed that confirmation bias was most prevalent in information search as participants tended to search for information confirming their prior attitudes. During information interpretation, confirmation bias occurred only for more polarizing topics. On the other hand, our results did not show confirmation bias in memory recall, as there was no difference in recall of information confirming or disconfirming prior attitudes for any of the topics. Although our attitudes affect the way we process information, it seems the effect varies depending on the reasoning stage, and this can have implications for debiasing strategies.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"17 1","pages":"1 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85280289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-13DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1878473
J. D. Hoover, A. Healy
Abstract Three experiments explored the effects of word problem cueing on debiasing versions of the bat-and-ball problem. In the experimental condition order, participants solved a simpler isomorphic version of the problem prior to solving a standard version that, critically, had the same item-and-dollar amounts. Conversely, in the control condition order, participants solved the standard version prior to solving the isomorph. Across the first 2 experiments, participants cued with the isomorph were more likely to correctly solve the standard version of the problem. In the third experiment, this cueing effect was not replicated, but importantly cued participants were more likely to correctly solve the standard version of the problem with other item-and-dollar amounts, indicating near transfer. Far transfer was evident in faster response times to other problems in the Cognitive Reflection Test following practice. Along with providing converging evidence for the cueing account, these results are consistent with recent attentional debiasing findings.
{"title":"The bat-and-ball problem: a word-problem debiasing approach","authors":"J. D. Hoover, A. Healy","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1878473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1878473","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Three experiments explored the effects of word problem cueing on debiasing versions of the bat-and-ball problem. In the experimental condition order, participants solved a simpler isomorphic version of the problem prior to solving a standard version that, critically, had the same item-and-dollar amounts. Conversely, in the control condition order, participants solved the standard version prior to solving the isomorph. Across the first 2 experiments, participants cued with the isomorph were more likely to correctly solve the standard version of the problem. In the third experiment, this cueing effect was not replicated, but importantly cued participants were more likely to correctly solve the standard version of the problem with other item-and-dollar amounts, indicating near transfer. Far transfer was evident in faster response times to other problems in the Cognitive Reflection Test following practice. Along with providing converging evidence for the cueing account, these results are consistent with recent attentional debiasing findings.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"7 1","pages":"567 - 598"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82547671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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