Pub Date : 2021-02-08DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.2008003
Alexander P. Burgoyne, Cody A. Mashburn, Jason S. Tsukahara, Zach Hambrick, R. Engle
Abstract A hallmark of intelligent behavior is rationality – the disposition and ability to think analytically to make decisions that maximize expected utility or follow the laws of probability. However, the question remains as to whether rationality and intelligence are empirically distinct, as does the question of what cognitive mechanisms underlie individual differences in rationality. In a sample of 331 participants, we assessed the relationship between rationality and intelligence. There was a common ability underpinning performance on some, but not all, rationality tests. Latent factors representing rationality and general intelligence were strongly correlated (r = .54), but their correlation fell well short of unity. Rationality correlated significantly with fluid intelligence (r = .56), working memory capacity (r = .44), and attention control (r = .49). Attention control fully accounted for the relationship between working memory capacity and rationality, and partially accounted for the relationship between fluid intelligence and rationality. We conclude by speculating about factors rationality tests may tap that other cognitive ability tests miss, and outline directions for further research.
{"title":"Understanding the relationship between rationality and intelligence: a latent-variable approach","authors":"Alexander P. Burgoyne, Cody A. Mashburn, Jason S. Tsukahara, Zach Hambrick, R. Engle","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.2008003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2008003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A hallmark of intelligent behavior is rationality – the disposition and ability to think analytically to make decisions that maximize expected utility or follow the laws of probability. However, the question remains as to whether rationality and intelligence are empirically distinct, as does the question of what cognitive mechanisms underlie individual differences in rationality. In a sample of 331 participants, we assessed the relationship between rationality and intelligence. There was a common ability underpinning performance on some, but not all, rationality tests. Latent factors representing rationality and general intelligence were strongly correlated (r = .54), but their correlation fell well short of unity. Rationality correlated significantly with fluid intelligence (r = .56), working memory capacity (r = .44), and attention control (r = .49). Attention control fully accounted for the relationship between working memory capacity and rationality, and partially accounted for the relationship between fluid intelligence and rationality. We conclude by speculating about factors rationality tests may tap that other cognitive ability tests miss, and outline directions for further research.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"42 1","pages":"1 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72649770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1870247
M. Bar-Hillel
Abstract A stumper is a riddle whose solution is typically so elusive that it does not come to mind, at least initially – leaving the responder stumped. Stumpers work by eliciting a (typically visual) representation of the narrative, in which the solution is not to be found. In order to solve the stumper, the blocking representation must be changed, which does not happen to most respondents. I have collected all the riddles I know at this time that qualify, in my opinion, as stumpers. I have composed a few, and tested many. Whenever rates of correct solutions were available, they are included, giving a rough proxy for difficulty.
{"title":"Stumpers: an annotated compendium*","authors":"M. Bar-Hillel","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1870247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1870247","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A stumper is a riddle whose solution is typically so elusive that it does not come to mind, at least initially – leaving the responder stumped. Stumpers work by eliciting a (typically visual) representation of the narrative, in which the solution is not to be found. In order to solve the stumper, the blocking representation must be changed, which does not happen to most respondents. I have collected all the riddles I know at this time that qualify, in my opinion, as stumpers. I have composed a few, and tested many. Whenever rates of correct solutions were available, they are included, giving a rough proxy for difficulty.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"30 1","pages":"536 - 566"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73577088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-11DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1857306
H. Mercier, Martin Dockendorff, Y. Majima, Anne-Sophie Hacquin, Melissa Schwartzberg
Abstract The Condorcet Jury Theorem, along with empirical results, establishes the accuracy of majority voting in a broad range of conditions. Here we investigate whether naïve participants (in the U.S. and Japan) are aware of this accuracy. In four experiments, participants were provided with information about an assembly voting to decide on one of two options, one being better than the other. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were provided with specific parameters and they vastly underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 3, participants were provided with less specific information, and still underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 4, participants were asked to compare majority rules and supermajority rules. Most participants failed to grasp the relative weakness of supermajority rules. Our results are compatible with participant relying on a simple model of the voting situation based either on the competence of an individual voter, or on the minimum proportion required for a majority to form, making them largely blind to the “miracle of aggregation.”
{"title":"Intuitions about the epistemic virtues of majority voting","authors":"H. Mercier, Martin Dockendorff, Y. Majima, Anne-Sophie Hacquin, Melissa Schwartzberg","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1857306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1857306","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Condorcet Jury Theorem, along with empirical results, establishes the accuracy of majority voting in a broad range of conditions. Here we investigate whether naïve participants (in the U.S. and Japan) are aware of this accuracy. In four experiments, participants were provided with information about an assembly voting to decide on one of two options, one being better than the other. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were provided with specific parameters and they vastly underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 3, participants were provided with less specific information, and still underestimated the probability that the majority would select the right option. In Experiment 4, participants were asked to compare majority rules and supermajority rules. Most participants failed to grasp the relative weakness of supermajority rules. Our results are compatible with participant relying on a simple model of the voting situation based either on the competence of an individual voter, or on the minimum proportion required for a majority to form, making them largely blind to the “miracle of aggregation.”","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"20 1","pages":"445 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81902675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-11DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1843536
K. Demiddele, Tom Heyman, W. Schaeken
Abstract We examine schoolchildren’s reasoning with spatial relations, such as ‘is to the left of’. Our aims are to obtain a more precise account of the effect of working memory on reasoning, a more detailed understanding of the internal representation of mental models and a developmental perspective. We discuss two experiments in which 348 children, between eight and twelve years old, needed to verify conclusions for 24 reasoning problems describing the spatial relations between pieces of clothing. In both experiments, children in the experimental condition were allowed to take notes by means of paper and pencil. We find that the participants spontaneously draw iconic representations of the items’ spatial ordering, have a strong preference for only considering one possible state of affairs even when more are relevant, and that an explanation in terms of working memory capacity alone cannot fully explain the data.
{"title":"Schoolchildren’s transitive reasoning with the spatial relation ‘is left/right of’","authors":"K. Demiddele, Tom Heyman, W. Schaeken","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1843536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1843536","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine schoolchildren’s reasoning with spatial relations, such as ‘is to the left of’. Our aims are to obtain a more precise account of the effect of working memory on reasoning, a more detailed understanding of the internal representation of mental models and a developmental perspective. We discuss two experiments in which 348 children, between eight and twelve years old, needed to verify conclusions for 24 reasoning problems describing the spatial relations between pieces of clothing. In both experiments, children in the experimental condition were allowed to take notes by means of paper and pencil. We find that the participants spontaneously draw iconic representations of the items’ spatial ordering, have a strong preference for only considering one possible state of affairs even when more are relevant, and that an explanation in terms of working memory capacity alone cannot fully explain the data.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"1 1","pages":"479 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84643053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-06DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1837241
E. Kausel, F. Carrasco, T. Reyes, A. Hirmas, A. Rodríguez
Abstract Research has paid little attention to how overconfidence evolves over time. We examined how task experience (experience within a task using a sequence of items) and outcome feedback affected accuracy, confidence and overconfidence in experiments over several trials. We conducted five studies involving 614 participants and used growth curve modelling and cross-lagged analyses. Findings revealed that mere task experience (without feedback) reduced overestimation linearly. Task experience coupled with feedback reduced overconfidence quadratically; the decreasing rate was initially strong but faded away over time. The decrease in overestimation was explained due to accuracy increasing at a faster rate than confidence did. Accuracy had lagged effects on confidence; a correct estimate led to more confidence in a subsequent estimate. We also found some evidence indicating that confidence had a negative lagged influence on accuracy. This dynamic influence between accuracy and confidence is a unique finding in the overconfidence literature.
{"title":"Dynamic overconfidence: a growth curve and cross lagged analysis of accuracy, confidence, overestimation and their relations","authors":"E. Kausel, F. Carrasco, T. Reyes, A. Hirmas, A. Rodríguez","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1837241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1837241","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research has paid little attention to how overconfidence evolves over time. We examined how task experience (experience within a task using a sequence of items) and outcome feedback affected accuracy, confidence and overconfidence in experiments over several trials. We conducted five studies involving 614 participants and used growth curve modelling and cross-lagged analyses. Findings revealed that mere task experience (without feedback) reduced overestimation linearly. Task experience coupled with feedback reduced overconfidence quadratically; the decreasing rate was initially strong but faded away over time. The decrease in overestimation was explained due to accuracy increasing at a faster rate than confidence did. Accuracy had lagged effects on confidence; a correct estimate led to more confidence in a subsequent estimate. We also found some evidence indicating that confidence had a negative lagged influence on accuracy. This dynamic influence between accuracy and confidence is a unique finding in the overconfidence literature.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"260 1","pages":"417 - 444"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76768499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1847190
Michaela Bronstein, Gordon Pennycook, L. Buonomano, Tyrone D. Cannon
Abstract Analytic and intuitive reasoning processes have been implicated as important determinants of belief in (or skepticism of) fake news. However, the underlying cognitive mechanisms that encourage endorsement of fake news remain unclear. The present study investigated cognitive decoupling/response inhibition and the potential role of conflict processing in the initiation of analytic thought about fake news as factors that may facilitate skepticism. A base-rate task was used to test the hypotheses that conflict processing deficits and inefficient response inhibition would be related to stronger endorsement of fake news. In support of these hypotheses, increased belief in fake (but not real) news was associated with a smaller decrease in response confidence in the presence (vs. absence) of conflict and with inefficient (in terms of response latency) inhibition of prepotent responses. Through its support for these hypotheses, the present study advances efforts to determine who will fall for fake news, and why.
{"title":"Belief in fake news, responsiveness to cognitive conflict, and analytic reasoning engagement","authors":"Michaela Bronstein, Gordon Pennycook, L. Buonomano, Tyrone D. Cannon","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1847190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1847190","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Analytic and intuitive reasoning processes have been implicated as important determinants of belief in (or skepticism of) fake news. However, the underlying cognitive mechanisms that encourage endorsement of fake news remain unclear. The present study investigated cognitive decoupling/response inhibition and the potential role of conflict processing in the initiation of analytic thought about fake news as factors that may facilitate skepticism. A base-rate task was used to test the hypotheses that conflict processing deficits and inefficient response inhibition would be related to stronger endorsement of fake news. In support of these hypotheses, increased belief in fake (but not real) news was associated with a smaller decrease in response confidence in the presence (vs. absence) of conflict and with inefficient (in terms of response latency) inhibition of prepotent responses. Through its support for these hypotheses, the present study advances efforts to determine who will fall for fake news, and why.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"3 1","pages":"510 - 535"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80958611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Affective forecasting: Why can’t people predict their emotions?","authors":"P. Ayton, Alice Pott, N. Elwakili","doi":"10.4324/9781003059745-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003059745-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75344764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-22DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1990126
M. Knauff, Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda
Abstract For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning.
{"title":"When nomenclature matters: Is the “new paradigm” really a new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning?","authors":"M. Knauff, Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1990126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1990126","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"16 1","pages":"341 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89058086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1823478
Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda, M. Knauff
Abstract Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductively. But it is still not clear how people reason with unfamiliar conditionals when they are instructed to reason as in daily life. Can probabilities also predict reasoning with unfamiliar content? In two experiments we instructed participants to reason as in everyday life and to evaluate conclusions from familiar and unfamiliar conditionals. Results showed that reasoning with familiar conditionals can be predicted by the conditional probability. For unfamiliar conditionals, however, this was not the case. Conclusions from unfamiliar conditionals were accepted more strongly than what could be expected according to their conditional probability. Our findings challenge probabilistic theories of reasoning and suggest that other approaches, such as a dual-strategy model, describe our results more adequately.
{"title":"Everyday reasoning with unfamiliar conditionals","authors":"Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda, M. Knauff","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1823478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1823478","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductively. But it is still not clear how people reason with unfamiliar conditionals when they are instructed to reason as in daily life. Can probabilities also predict reasoning with unfamiliar content? In two experiments we instructed participants to reason as in everyday life and to evaluate conclusions from familiar and unfamiliar conditionals. Results showed that reasoning with familiar conditionals can be predicted by the conditional probability. For unfamiliar conditionals, however, this was not the case. Conclusions from unfamiliar conditionals were accepted more strongly than what could be expected according to their conditional probability. Our findings challenge probabilistic theories of reasoning and suggest that other approaches, such as a dual-strategy model, describe our results more adequately.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"42 1","pages":"389 - 416"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89232123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1679256
M. Król, M. Król
Abstract The beauty contest game is widely used to study the determinants of strategic thinking. Here, we examine the role of theory of mind in strategic reasoning by comparing both performance and the reasoning process in participants with autism vs. typically developing controls. Pantelis and Kennedy (2017) reported a surprising lack of difference between answers of participant with autism vs. controls in the game. Here, we study the process rather than just the outcome of reasoning by using a ‘payoff calculator’ with which one can simulate the game’s outcome before answering. We find that control participants play best response to others’ hypothetical choices entered into the calculator, while participants with autism are less strategic, choosing larger answers relative to those attributed to others. However, this difference could not be explained by the differences in the theory of mind between the groups with and without autism.
{"title":"Autism limits strategic thinking after all: A process tracing study of the beauty contest game","authors":"M. Król, M. Król","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1679256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1679256","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The beauty contest game is widely used to study the determinants of strategic thinking. Here, we examine the role of theory of mind in strategic reasoning by comparing both performance and the reasoning process in participants with autism vs. typically developing controls. Pantelis and Kennedy (2017) reported a surprising lack of difference between answers of participant with autism vs. controls in the game. Here, we study the process rather than just the outcome of reasoning by using a ‘payoff calculator’ with which one can simulate the game’s outcome before answering. We find that control participants play best response to others’ hypothetical choices entered into the calculator, while participants with autism are less strategic, choosing larger answers relative to those attributed to others. However, this difference could not be explained by the differences in the theory of mind between the groups with and without autism.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"37 1","pages":"615 - 626"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81276896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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