Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2096694
Laura Caravona, L. Macchi
Abstract This paper explores the effect of different types of incubation task (visual, numerical and verbal) with various levels of attentional focus and cognitive effort (non-demanding, low-demanding and high-demanding) on the resolution of insight problems. The most effective was found to be the low-demanding task (regardless of its nature), which although requiring attentional focus, leaves resources available for the unconscious analytical restructuring process, obtaining a high percentage of success in solving the problem shortly after completion of the incubation task. Overall findings support the hypothesis of Unconscious Analytic Thought (UAT), according to which the restructuring required in insight problem solving implies a covert thinking process that includes a relevant, analytic and goal-oriented search. The findings are discussed in the light of UAT and are compared with the main theories of insight in problem solving.
{"title":"Different incubation tasks in insight problem solving: evidence for unconscious analytic thought","authors":"Laura Caravona, L. Macchi","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2096694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2096694","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores the effect of different types of incubation task (visual, numerical and verbal) with various levels of attentional focus and cognitive effort (non-demanding, low-demanding and high-demanding) on the resolution of insight problems. The most effective was found to be the low-demanding task (regardless of its nature), which although requiring attentional focus, leaves resources available for the unconscious analytical restructuring process, obtaining a high percentage of success in solving the problem shortly after completion of the incubation task. Overall findings support the hypothesis of Unconscious Analytic Thought (UAT), according to which the restructuring required in insight problem solving implies a covert thinking process that includes a relevant, analytic and goal-oriented search. The findings are discussed in the light of UAT and are compared with the main theories of insight in problem solving.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"18 1","pages":"559 - 593"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75590206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-05DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2095031
T. Wong, Kinga Morsanyi
Abstract The link between logic and mathematics has been recognized by theorists from different fields, but empirical investigations on this link remain scarce, and even less is known about the mechanisms underlying such a link. The current study aimed to address this issue by investigating the relations between transitive reasoning and children’s mathematical competence, and exploring the potential mechanisms involved. A sample of 101 sixth graders were assessed on their transitive reasoning skills, their mathematics achievement, various potential mediators, as well as general cognitive factors (serving as control variables). The results showed that children’s transitive reasoning performance was significantly related to their mathematics achievement beyond the effects of general cognitive factors, and this relation was mediated by fraction knowledge and Relation to Operands understanding. The findings not only confirmed the relation between transitive reasoning and mathematical competence, but also shed light on the mechanisms underlying such a relation.
{"title":"The link between transitive reasoning and mathematics achievement in preadolescence: the role of relational processing and deductive reasoning","authors":"T. Wong, Kinga Morsanyi","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2095031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2095031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The link between logic and mathematics has been recognized by theorists from different fields, but empirical investigations on this link remain scarce, and even less is known about the mechanisms underlying such a link. The current study aimed to address this issue by investigating the relations between transitive reasoning and children’s mathematical competence, and exploring the potential mechanisms involved. A sample of 101 sixth graders were assessed on their transitive reasoning skills, their mathematics achievement, various potential mediators, as well as general cognitive factors (serving as control variables). The results showed that children’s transitive reasoning performance was significantly related to their mathematics achievement beyond the effects of general cognitive factors, and this relation was mediated by fraction knowledge and Relation to Operands understanding. The findings not only confirmed the relation between transitive reasoning and mathematical competence, but also shed light on the mechanisms underlying such a relation.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"26 1","pages":"531 - 558"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72927973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2030407
Parrish Bergquist, J. Marlon, Matthew H. Goldberg, Abel Gustafson, S. Rosenthal, A. Leiserowitz
Abstract Scientists know that human activities, primarily fossil fuel combustion, are causing Earth’s temperature to increase. Yet in 2021, only 60% of the US population understood that human activities are the primary cause of global warming. We experimentally test whether information about the human causes of global warming influences Americans’ beliefs and concerns about global warming and support for climate policies. We find that communicating information about the human-causes of global warming increases public understanding that global warming is human-caused. This information, both alone and with additional information about climate impacts and policy solutions, also increases public concern about global warming and support for climate policies, although the effects on climate concern and policy support are smaller. Importantly, the treatment effects are consistent across political party, with no backlash effects among Republicans. This suggests that when informed about climate change causes, impacts and solutions, most Americans can update their own climate change beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy support.
{"title":"Information about the human causes of global warming influences causal attribution, concern, and policy support related to global warming","authors":"Parrish Bergquist, J. Marlon, Matthew H. Goldberg, Abel Gustafson, S. Rosenthal, A. Leiserowitz","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2030407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2030407","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scientists know that human activities, primarily fossil fuel combustion, are causing Earth’s temperature to increase. Yet in 2021, only 60% of the US population understood that human activities are the primary cause of global warming. We experimentally test whether information about the human causes of global warming influences Americans’ beliefs and concerns about global warming and support for climate policies. We find that communicating information about the human-causes of global warming increases public understanding that global warming is human-caused. This information, both alone and with additional information about climate impacts and policy solutions, also increases public concern about global warming and support for climate policies, although the effects on climate concern and policy support are smaller. Importantly, the treatment effects are consistent across political party, with no backlash effects among Republicans. This suggests that when informed about climate change causes, impacts and solutions, most Americans can update their own climate change beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy support.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"21 1","pages":"465 - 486"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78065176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2091040
Thea Behrens, Max Räuker, Michelle Kalbfleisch, F. Jäkel
Abstract When solving problems people flexibly apply different tactics. Here, we use Sudoku to study this flexibility. In a think-aloud study participants use at least two tactics, a cell-based and a number-based tactic, and have personal preferences for one or the other. Response times in two follow-up experiments indicate that participants can be biased towards either tactic by task instructions and task requirements. We argue that previous research often used biasing task designs and therefore underestimated participants’ flexibility and overestimated the importance of a problem’s complexity. Furthermore, our experiments demonstrate that if a tactic does not lead to a solution, participants are able to switch to the other. We model each tactic and we show that only by incorporating switching we can fit the data.
{"title":"Flexible use of tactics in Sudoku","authors":"Thea Behrens, Max Räuker, Michelle Kalbfleisch, F. Jäkel","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2091040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2091040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When solving problems people flexibly apply different tactics. Here, we use Sudoku to study this flexibility. In a think-aloud study participants use at least two tactics, a cell-based and a number-based tactic, and have personal preferences for one or the other. Response times in two follow-up experiments indicate that participants can be biased towards either tactic by task instructions and task requirements. We argue that previous research often used biasing task designs and therefore underestimated participants’ flexibility and overestimated the importance of a problem’s complexity. Furthermore, our experiments demonstrate that if a tactic does not lead to a solution, participants are able to switch to the other. We model each tactic and we show that only by incorporating switching we can fit the data.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"16 1","pages":"488 - 530"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78138626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2071990
Refael Tikochinski, Elisha Y. Babad
Abstract Wishful thinking (WT) of Israeli voters was measured in the unprecedented event of three failing national elections repeated within one year. WT is considered as Type 1 fast/intuitive thinking leading to bias. A novel method for measuring WT – including relevant campaign information and distinguishing between “WT for self” and “WT for others” – was introduced. WT components of voters in leading and trailing camps were compared across the three elections to examine whether patterns would be consistent or haphazard. Despite the presumed uncontrolled nature of WT, the patterns were not haphazard but rather consistent. We also tried to debias WT by applying a novel variation of incentive intervention to shift respondents from fast thinking to slow, rational Type 2 thinking. Unlike past studies, the method was extremely effective in debiasing WT and leading to realistic predictions. However, this was true only for self-WT and not for WT for others.
{"title":"Voters’ wishful thinking in an unprecedented event of three national elections repeated within one year: fast thinking, bias, high emotions and potential rationality","authors":"Refael Tikochinski, Elisha Y. Babad","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2071990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2071990","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Wishful thinking (WT) of Israeli voters was measured in the unprecedented event of three failing national elections repeated within one year. WT is considered as Type 1 fast/intuitive thinking leading to bias. A novel method for measuring WT – including relevant campaign information and distinguishing between “WT for self” and “WT for others” – was introduced. WT components of voters in leading and trailing camps were compared across the three elections to examine whether patterns would be consistent or haphazard. Despite the presumed uncontrolled nature of WT, the patterns were not haphazard but rather consistent. We also tried to debias WT by applying a novel variation of incentive intervention to shift respondents from fast thinking to slow, rational Type 2 thinking. Unlike past studies, the method was extremely effective in debiasing WT and leading to realistic predictions. However, this was true only for self-WT and not for WT for others.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"38 1","pages":"250 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88752399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2075035
D. Calvillo, Jonathan Bratton, Victoria C. Velazquez, Thomas J. Smelter, D. Crum
Abstract Cognitive reflection, or the ability to inhibit intuitive and incorrect responses in favour of correct responses, predicts performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. The present study examined interventions to improve cognitive reflection. In two experiments, college students (N = 491) were assigned to one of three conditions, completed two versions of a cognitive reflection test (CRT), and then completed transfer tasks. Between the two CRTs, some participants were provided with elaborative feedback, others were instructed to consider additional responses for their initial responses and the final group was a control. In both experiments, CRT performance increased between the first and second CRT in the feedback and instruction groups, but not in the control group. There was little evidence, however, for transfer to other tasks. These results suggest that cognitive reflection performance can be improved with brief interventions but that this improvement may not transfer to related tasks.
{"title":"Elaborative feedback and instruction improve cognitive reflection but do not transfer to related tasks","authors":"D. Calvillo, Jonathan Bratton, Victoria C. Velazquez, Thomas J. Smelter, D. Crum","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2075035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2075035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Cognitive reflection, or the ability to inhibit intuitive and incorrect responses in favour of correct responses, predicts performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. The present study examined interventions to improve cognitive reflection. In two experiments, college students (N = 491) were assigned to one of three conditions, completed two versions of a cognitive reflection test (CRT), and then completed transfer tasks. Between the two CRTs, some participants were provided with elaborative feedback, others were instructed to consider additional responses for their initial responses and the final group was a control. In both experiments, CRT performance increased between the first and second CRT in the feedback and instruction groups, but not in the control group. There was little evidence, however, for transfer to other tasks. These results suggest that cognitive reflection performance can be improved with brief interventions but that this improvement may not transfer to related tasks.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"64 1","pages":"276 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73218782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2066724
Tim George, Marta K. Mielicki
Abstract People are often inaccurate in their predictions of performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. We tested whether receptivity to bullshit – the tendency to perceive meaningless statements as profound – would relate to the accuracy of metacognitive judgments on several problem-solving tasks. Individuals who were highly receptive to bullshit were less accurate in their predictions of performance on creative problem-solving tasks, but not on verbal analogy or recall tasks. Further, individuals with high BS receptivity were less able to discriminate between solvable and unsolvable problems when making metacognitive judgments. These findings support the possibility that the tendency to perceive semantic connections where none exist, as indicated by high bullshit receptivity, may lead to inaccurate predictions of performance on tasks that require noticing and utilizing distant semantic connections.
{"title":"Bullshit receptivity, problem solving, and metacognition: simply the BS, not better than all the rest","authors":"Tim George, Marta K. Mielicki","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2066724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2066724","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People are often inaccurate in their predictions of performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. We tested whether receptivity to bullshit – the tendency to perceive meaningless statements as profound – would relate to the accuracy of metacognitive judgments on several problem-solving tasks. Individuals who were highly receptive to bullshit were less accurate in their predictions of performance on creative problem-solving tasks, but not on verbal analogy or recall tasks. Further, individuals with high BS receptivity were less able to discriminate between solvable and unsolvable problems when making metacognitive judgments. These findings support the possibility that the tendency to perceive semantic connections where none exist, as indicated by high bullshit receptivity, may lead to inaccurate predictions of performance on tasks that require noticing and utilizing distant semantic connections.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"5 1","pages":"213 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87610504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-09DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2047105
K. Teigen, Alf Børre Kanten
Abstract People commonly use terms like ‘random’, ‘by chance’, or ‘accidentally’ when they describe occurrences that sidestep the normal course of events, with no apparent causal link to ongoing activities. Such intrusive events are typically perceived as happening all of a sudden. This was demonstrated in seven experiments (N = 1299) by asking people to identify statements they believed belonged to stories about chance events, and by comparing chance vs. non-chance events from their own life and from the lives of others. Suddenness also appeared to be more strongly associated with beginnings than with endings of an episode. Thus, statements about sudden beginnings of a career or a relationship were more readily believed to happen ‘by chance’ than ‘not by chance’. But life-changing events did not become more accidental simply by being placed in the beginning of a ‘life chapter’. These studies highlight a central but neglected feature of perceived randomness.
{"title":"Out of the blue: on the suddenness of perceived chance events","authors":"K. Teigen, Alf Børre Kanten","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2047105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2047105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People commonly use terms like ‘random’, ‘by chance’, or ‘accidentally’ when they describe occurrences that sidestep the normal course of events, with no apparent causal link to ongoing activities. Such intrusive events are typically perceived as happening all of a sudden. This was demonstrated in seven experiments (N = 1299) by asking people to identify statements they believed belonged to stories about chance events, and by comparing chance vs. non-chance events from their own life and from the lives of others. Suddenness also appeared to be more strongly associated with beginnings than with endings of an episode. Thus, statements about sudden beginnings of a career or a relationship were more readily believed to happen ‘by chance’ than ‘not by chance’. But life-changing events did not become more accidental simply by being placed in the beginning of a ‘life chapter’. These studies highlight a central but neglected feature of perceived randomness.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"37 1","pages":"137 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85043660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-07DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2047106
C. Dewey
Abstract Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models. In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated theoretical, experimental, and modelling strategy to better test DPT. First, I propose that Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning are defined as reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control, respectively. Second, I argue that reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control can be effectively isolated using debiasing paradigms that manipulate metacognitive heuristics (e.g., processing fluency) to prevent or trigger metacognitive control, respectively. Third, I argue that monotonic modelling can allow us to decisively test DPT only when we use them to analyse data from this particular kind of debiasing paradigm.
{"title":"Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory","authors":"C. Dewey","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2047106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2047106","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models. In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated theoretical, experimental, and modelling strategy to better test DPT. First, I propose that Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning are defined as reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control, respectively. Second, I argue that reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control can be effectively isolated using debiasing paradigms that manipulate metacognitive heuristics (e.g., processing fluency) to prevent or trigger metacognitive control, respectively. Third, I argue that monotonic modelling can allow us to decisively test DPT only when we use them to analyse data from this particular kind of debiasing paradigm.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"116 1","pages":"177 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80372308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-04DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2022.2046158
M. Lindeman, Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, T. Riekki
Abstract Research on the reasons for vaccine hesitancy has largely focused on factors directly related to vaccines. In contrast, the present study focused on cognitive factors that are not conceptually related to vaccines but that have been linked to other epistemically suspect beliefs such as conspiracy theories and belief in fake news. This survey was conducted before the Covid-19 pandemic (N = 356). The results showed that anti-vaccination attitudes decreased slightly with cognitive abilities and analytic thinking styles, and strongly with scientific literacy. In addition, anti-vaccination attitudes increased slightly with teleological bias and strongly with an intuitive thinking style, ontological biases, and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results suggest that the same cognitive mechanisms that predispose to other epistemically suspect beliefs may predispose to anti-vaccination attitudes as well. The findings also indicate that pro-vaccination communication should focus on early prevention and that interventions against vaccine hesitancy should strive to be intuitively appealing.
{"title":"Searching for the cognitive basis of anti-vaccination attitudes","authors":"M. Lindeman, Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, T. Riekki","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2022.2046158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2022.2046158","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research on the reasons for vaccine hesitancy has largely focused on factors directly related to vaccines. In contrast, the present study focused on cognitive factors that are not conceptually related to vaccines but that have been linked to other epistemically suspect beliefs such as conspiracy theories and belief in fake news. This survey was conducted before the Covid-19 pandemic (N = 356). The results showed that anti-vaccination attitudes decreased slightly with cognitive abilities and analytic thinking styles, and strongly with scientific literacy. In addition, anti-vaccination attitudes increased slightly with teleological bias and strongly with an intuitive thinking style, ontological biases, and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results suggest that the same cognitive mechanisms that predispose to other epistemically suspect beliefs may predispose to anti-vaccination attitudes as well. The findings also indicate that pro-vaccination communication should focus on early prevention and that interventions against vaccine hesitancy should strive to be intuitively appealing.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"31 1","pages":"111 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77888160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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