Pub Date : 2020-03-06DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2020.1732825
A. Lynn van der Schaaf, S. Caljouw, R. Withagen
Abstract The present study aimed to determine the degree to which play elements have an “open function”, and whether children are attracted to them. The architect van Eyck hypothesized that play elements with an open function attract playing children because such elements do not suggest a certain type of behavior and are, thus, likely to stimulate the children’s creativity. Children of three different age groups (5-6, 7-8, and 11-12 years of age) played freely in a Parkour playground that consists of play elements that were supposed to vary in the degree of having an open function. Based on the judgments of parents on what action children will mainly perform on each of the elements, we concluded that the play elements indeed differed in the degree of having an open function. The play behavior, however, revealed that the children were less attracted to elements with an open function. The implications of these findings are discussed.
{"title":"Are Children Attracted to Play Elements with an Open Function?","authors":"A. Lynn van der Schaaf, S. Caljouw, R. Withagen","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2020.1732825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2020.1732825","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present study aimed to determine the degree to which play elements have an “open function”, and whether children are attracted to them. The architect van Eyck hypothesized that play elements with an open function attract playing children because such elements do not suggest a certain type of behavior and are, thus, likely to stimulate the children’s creativity. Children of three different age groups (5-6, 7-8, and 11-12 years of age) played freely in a Parkour playground that consists of play elements that were supposed to vary in the degree of having an open function. Based on the judgments of parents on what action children will mainly perform on each of the elements, we concluded that the play elements indeed differed in the degree of having an open function. The play behavior, however, revealed that the children were less attracted to elements with an open function. The implications of these findings are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2020.1732825","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46968473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1663704
A. Munion, J. Butner, Jeanine K. Stefanucci, Michael Geuss, T. N. Story
Abstract Object perception occurs within a dynamic world, where the environment and the observer (both body and eyes) are continually moving, shifting and changing. We seek to characterize and quantify this process from a perspective accounting for the interconnected system of motion in the environment, the perceiver and the eye, unfolding through time. Specifically, we build a mathematical representation for object perception based off the circle map equation. We describe an interaction between the eyes’ movement and the movement in the world, in order to better understand how those work together to result in perception. Across three experiments, we show that the stability of the relationship between object perception and complex eye movements can be perturbed and will have a predictable response to said perturbations. In so doing, we provide a different context – a dynamical systems framework – under which we can begin to consider the ecological validity of visual perception models, while recognizing the degree to which the visuo-spatial world is continuously being perturbed and disrupted. In fact, we postulate that such perturbations are capitalized on by the perceptual system, contributing to accurate object and motion identification.
{"title":"An Ecological Approach to Modeling Vision: Quantifying Form Perception Using the Circle Map Equation","authors":"A. Munion, J. Butner, Jeanine K. Stefanucci, Michael Geuss, T. N. Story","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1663704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1663704","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Object perception occurs within a dynamic world, where the environment and the observer (both body and eyes) are continually moving, shifting and changing. We seek to characterize and quantify this process from a perspective accounting for the interconnected system of motion in the environment, the perceiver and the eye, unfolding through time. Specifically, we build a mathematical representation for object perception based off the circle map equation. We describe an interaction between the eyes’ movement and the movement in the world, in order to better understand how those work together to result in perception. Across three experiments, we show that the stability of the relationship between object perception and complex eye movements can be perturbed and will have a predictable response to said perturbations. In so doing, we provide a different context – a dynamical systems framework – under which we can begin to consider the ecological validity of visual perception models, while recognizing the degree to which the visuo-spatial world is continuously being perturbed and disrupted. In fact, we postulate that such perturbations are capitalized on by the perceptual system, contributing to accurate object and motion identification.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1663704","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47454360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1689821
Patrizio Lo Presti
Abstract Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts ‘person’ and ‘affordance’ supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to.
{"title":"Persons and Affordances","authors":"Patrizio Lo Presti","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1689821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1689821","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts ‘person’ and ‘affordance’ supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1689821","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43929369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1708200
Steven J. Harrison
Abstract Biological odometry refers to the capacity for perceptually measuring distances traveled during locomotion. In the case of haptic odometry, information about distance traversed is generated from the movements of the legs, with coordinated leg motions (i.e., gait patterns) producing patterns of tissue deformation detectable by the haptic perceptual system. The gait symmetry theory of haptic odometry classifies gaits based upon the symmetry of muscle activation patterns. This classification identifies candidate higher-order variables of haptic odometry and provides a promising basis for understanding the associated patterns of tissue deformation detected by the haptic perceptual system. The theory successfully predicts biases (i.e., underestimations/overestimations) resulting from the manipulation of the gait patterns used in the outbound and return phases of homing tasks. We test gait symmetry theory by considering a previously unexamined key prediction. Two-legged hopping and walking have the same symmetry group classification, therefore, a homing task completed using any combination of two-legged hopping and walking as the outbound/return gaits should produce no systematic biases. Contrary to this prediction we observed systematic biases. We discuss the possibilities for modifying gait symmetry theory to account for our findings, and we present a new alternative theory based upon spatial reference frames.
{"title":"Human Odometry with a Two-Legged Hopping Gait: A Test of the Gait Symmetry Theory","authors":"Steven J. Harrison","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1708200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1708200","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Biological odometry refers to the capacity for perceptually measuring distances traveled during locomotion. In the case of haptic odometry, information about distance traversed is generated from the movements of the legs, with coordinated leg motions (i.e., gait patterns) producing patterns of tissue deformation detectable by the haptic perceptual system. The gait symmetry theory of haptic odometry classifies gaits based upon the symmetry of muscle activation patterns. This classification identifies candidate higher-order variables of haptic odometry and provides a promising basis for understanding the associated patterns of tissue deformation detected by the haptic perceptual system. The theory successfully predicts biases (i.e., underestimations/overestimations) resulting from the manipulation of the gait patterns used in the outbound and return phases of homing tasks. We test gait symmetry theory by considering a previously unexamined key prediction. Two-legged hopping and walking have the same symmetry group classification, therefore, a homing task completed using any combination of two-legged hopping and walking as the outbound/return gaits should produce no systematic biases. Contrary to this prediction we observed systematic biases. We discuss the possibilities for modifying gait symmetry theory to account for our findings, and we present a new alternative theory based upon spatial reference frames.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1708200","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41998939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-26DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1695211
Martin Weichold, G. Thonhauser
Abstract This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.
{"title":"Collective Affordances","authors":"Martin Weichold, G. Thonhauser","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1695211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1695211","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1695211","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42124274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-22DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1634476
P. Cabe
Abstract Some idealized three-dimensional objects approaching a fixed observation point along a symmetrical radial track yield invariant, but paradoxical, optical geometrical effects. Texture elements on a sphere are progressively self-occluded by the visible boundary of the sphere, until, at contact with the observation point, only a single element (point) is available; paradoxically, that single point comes to fill the entire frontal optical field. Optical velocity of a texture element on an approaching spinning sphere goes to infinity, whereas paradoxically the surface area visible goes to zero. Texture elements on the surface of a circular cone approaching an observation point apex-first disappear at contact with the observation point, whereas paradoxically the optical angle subtended by the cone expands to a maximum. With planar objects, off-track texture elements disappear, whereas paradoxically a single central element fills the frontal optical field. Rationalizing the complementary nature of such changing patterns suggests the utility of the global array hypothesis. Extensions to optical information for modeled surfaces are discussed, with a call for additional study of the geometry of optical approach.
{"title":"Looming Paradoxes: Optical Array Yin-Yang and the Global Array Hypothesis","authors":"P. Cabe","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1634476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1634476","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some idealized three-dimensional objects approaching a fixed observation point along a symmetrical radial track yield invariant, but paradoxical, optical geometrical effects. Texture elements on a sphere are progressively self-occluded by the visible boundary of the sphere, until, at contact with the observation point, only a single element (point) is available; paradoxically, that single point comes to fill the entire frontal optical field. Optical velocity of a texture element on an approaching spinning sphere goes to infinity, whereas paradoxically the surface area visible goes to zero. Texture elements on the surface of a circular cone approaching an observation point apex-first disappear at contact with the observation point, whereas paradoxically the optical angle subtended by the cone expands to a maximum. With planar objects, off-track texture elements disappear, whereas paradoxically a single central element fills the frontal optical field. Rationalizing the complementary nature of such changing patterns suggests the utility of the global array hypothesis. Extensions to optical information for modeled surfaces are discussed, with a call for additional study of the geometry of optical approach.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1634476","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41965613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615204
J. Bruineberg, Erik Rietveld
Abstract In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.
{"title":"What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of","authors":"J. Bruineberg, Erik Rietveld","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1615204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615204","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48027914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615203
Matthieu M. de Wit, R. Withagen
Abstract Ecological psychology has been criticized for ignoring the brain in its theory formation. In recent years, however, a number of researchers have started asking ecologically-inspired questions about the ways in which not only the embodied activity of the organism in its environment, but also the particulars of the organism's nervous system matter. This work has typically appeared in neuroscience journals, thereby potentially escaping the attention of ecological psychologists. The current article introduces a Special Issue of Ecological Psychology that aims to correct this problem. This issue brings together one empirical and six theoretical articles that develop ideas about the contributions of the nervous system to perception-action. We briefly review each of the articles, identify common themes, and point out the surprising variety in theoretical positions. It is hoped that this Special Issue will help guide discussions amongst ecological psychologists and (ecological) neuroscientists as they confront the question “What should a ‘Gibsonian neuroscience’ look like?”
{"title":"What Should A “Gibsonian Neuroscience” Look Like? Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Matthieu M. de Wit, R. Withagen","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1615203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ecological psychology has been criticized for ignoring the brain in its theory formation. In recent years, however, a number of researchers have started asking ecologically-inspired questions about the ways in which not only the embodied activity of the organism in its environment, but also the particulars of the organism's nervous system matter. This work has typically appeared in neuroscience journals, thereby potentially escaping the attention of ecological psychologists. The current article introduces a Special Issue of Ecological Psychology that aims to correct this problem. This issue brings together one empirical and six theoretical articles that develop ideas about the contributions of the nervous system to perception-action. We briefly review each of the articles, identify common themes, and point out the surprising variety in theoretical positions. It is hoped that this Special Issue will help guide discussions amongst ecological psychologists and (ecological) neuroscientists as they confront the question “What should a ‘Gibsonian neuroscience’ look like?”","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615203","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47233388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615221
Ludger van Dijk, E. Myin
Abstract In one common view, human activity is explained by neural processes, because these implement psychological functions that underlie overt behavior. In the ecological approach, such accounts are taken to be nonexplanatory, because they reify the phenomena they wish to explain. We argue that ecological psychology offers an antidote to such reification with concepts such as resonance, attunement, and anticipation, if they are considered as relational, world-involving activities. Our main claim is that we can understand our scientific explanations of neural phenomena as itself an attunement to sociomaterial practices. This allows us to understand neuroscientific processes as conditions that enable a resonating organism-environment system. In this view, neuroscientific and psychological phenomena are usually found in widely different sociomaterial practices. But we can occasionally achieve coordination between those practices. Establishing that a dependence of a psychological phenomenon on neural events holds is an achievement of a novel practice that we developed and to which we resonate. Thus the more we want to understand what happens inside the nervous system, the more we also need to scrutinize the sociomaterial environment in which we do so.
{"title":"Ecological Neuroscience: From Reduction to Proliferation of Our Resources","authors":"Ludger van Dijk, E. Myin","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1615221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615221","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In one common view, human activity is explained by neural processes, because these implement psychological functions that underlie overt behavior. In the ecological approach, such accounts are taken to be nonexplanatory, because they reify the phenomena they wish to explain. We argue that ecological psychology offers an antidote to such reification with concepts such as resonance, attunement, and anticipation, if they are considered as relational, world-involving activities. Our main claim is that we can understand our scientific explanations of neural phenomena as itself an attunement to sociomaterial practices. This allows us to understand neuroscientific processes as conditions that enable a resonating organism-environment system. In this view, neuroscientific and psychological phenomena are usually found in widely different sociomaterial practices. But we can occasionally achieve coordination between those practices. Establishing that a dependence of a psychological phenomenon on neural events holds is an achievement of a novel practice that we developed and to which we resonate. Thus the more we want to understand what happens inside the nervous system, the more we also need to scrutinize the sociomaterial environment in which we do so.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615221","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45785468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213
Vicente Raja, Michael L. Anderson
Abstract A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.
{"title":"Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience","authors":"Vicente Raja, Michael L. Anderson","doi":"10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.","PeriodicalId":47279,"journal":{"name":"Ecological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44875414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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