The main aim of this paper is to compare the size and size-adjusted power properties of four residual-based and one maximum-likelihood-based panel cointegration tests with the help of Monte Carlo simulations. In this study the panel-rho, the group-rho, the parametric panel-t, the parametric group-t statistics of Pedroni(1999} and the standardized LR-bar statistic of Larsson et al.(2001} are considered. The simulation results indicate that the panel-t and the standardized LR-bar statistic have the best size and power properties among the five panel cointegration test statistics evaluated.
{"title":"Comparison of Panel Cointegration Tests","authors":"D. K. Örsal","doi":"10.18452/4048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18452/4048","url":null,"abstract":"The main aim of this paper is to compare the size and size-adjusted power properties of four residual-based and one maximum-likelihood-based panel cointegration tests with the help of Monte Carlo simulations. In this study the panel-rho, the group-rho, the parametric panel-t, the parametric group-t statistics of Pedroni(1999} and the standardized LR-bar statistic of Larsson et al.(2001} are considered. The simulation results indicate that the panel-t and the standardized LR-bar statistic have the best size and power properties among the five panel cointegration test statistics evaluated.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2007-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90274284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-03-13DOI: 10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1_3
Tim Friehe
{"title":"On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law","authors":"Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1_3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1_3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2007-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80439131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy.
{"title":"Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note","authors":"Raul Caruso","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.975023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.975023","url":null,"abstract":"This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87677960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68437-4_13
A. Morone, P. Morone
{"title":"Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can We Learn?","authors":"A. Morone, P. Morone","doi":"10.1007/978-3-540-68437-4_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68437-4_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89006528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-10-16DOI: 10.1920/WP.CEM.2006.2206
N. Rosati
The behaviour of the permanent and transitory economic shocks for different levels of households' welfare is studied using both consumption and income measures. After testing for heteroskedasticity of the economic shocks, we use local polynomial regression models to estimate the variance of the shocks conditional on welfare level. Italian data covering the period 1980-2004 show evidence of heteroskedasticity of both the transitory and the permanent economic shocks, with the poor experiencing higher variances. The permanent shocks seem to have a more uniform effect at all welfare levels.
{"title":"A nonparametric analysis of welfare and the economic shocks","authors":"N. Rosati","doi":"10.1920/WP.CEM.2006.2206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1920/WP.CEM.2006.2206","url":null,"abstract":"The behaviour of the permanent and transitory economic shocks for different levels of households' welfare is studied using both consumption and income measures. After testing for heteroskedasticity of the economic shocks, we use local polynomial regression models to estimate the variance of the shocks conditional on welfare level. Italian data covering the period 1980-2004 show evidence of heteroskedasticity of both the transitory and the permanent economic shocks, with the poor experiencing higher variances. The permanent shocks seem to have a more uniform effect at all welfare levels.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2006-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76428614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Uzawa (1961) has shown that balanced growth requires technological progress to be strictly Harrod neutral (purely labor-augmenting). This paper offers a slightly more general variant of the theorem that does not require assumptions about savings behavior or factor pricing and is much easier to prove.
{"title":"A Variant of Uzawa's Theorem","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.897","url":null,"abstract":"Uzawa (1961) has shown that balanced growth requires technological progress to be strictly Harrod neutral (purely labor-augmenting). This paper offers a slightly more general variant of the theorem that does not require assumptions about savings behavior or factor pricing and is much easier to prove.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82074908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-10-31DOI: 10.4324/9780203927168.ch3
Koji Shimomura, M. Kemp
We examine the role of radical international differences in preferences in determining patterns of international trade, given that the trading countries share a common technology and identical factor endowment ratios. It is characteristic of our model that the equilibrium autarkic commodity price ratios are unique and negative and that there is a unique positive equilibrium free-trade price ratio, implying that the positive equilibrium free-trade price ratio is not bounded by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios. This finding contrasts sharply with the familiar Torrens-Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin propositions
{"title":"Trade Between Countries with Radically Different Preferences","authors":"Koji Shimomura, M. Kemp","doi":"10.4324/9780203927168.ch3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203927168.ch3","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of radical international differences in preferences in determining patterns of international trade, given that the trading countries share a common technology and identical factor endowment ratios. It is characteristic of our model that the equilibrium autarkic commodity price ratios are unique and negative and that there is a unique positive equilibrium free-trade price ratio, implying that the positive equilibrium free-trade price ratio is not bounded by the equilibrium autarkic price ratios. This finding contrasts sharply with the familiar Torrens-Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin propositions","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2005-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77788686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-01DOI: 10.3929/ETHZ-A-010574890
A. Bommier
Intertemporal correlation aversion is an intuitive concept indicating whether an individual prefers lotteries concerning consumption at different moments in time to be positively or negatively correlated. I show that the difference between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related, in a simple way, to the index of intertemporal correlation aversion.
{"title":"Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution and Correlation Aversion","authors":"A. Bommier","doi":"10.3929/ETHZ-A-010574890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3929/ETHZ-A-010574890","url":null,"abstract":"Intertemporal correlation aversion is an intuitive concept indicating whether an individual prefers lotteries concerning consumption at different moments in time to be positively or negatively correlated. I show that the difference between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related, in a simple way, to the index of intertemporal correlation aversion.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80892273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-11-15DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONMOD.2006.04.006
Karim Barhoumi
{"title":"Exchange Rate Pass-Through Into Import Prices In Developing Countries: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Karim Barhoumi","doi":"10.1016/J.ECONMOD.2006.04.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONMOD.2006.04.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2004-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83899876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-05-24DOI: 10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/1545
L. Lambertini
I investigate R&D efforts for process innovation in a monopoly with uncertain demand. Two different models are proposed, where either (i) the reservation price is affected by an additive shock and the marginal production cost is increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock on the slope of demand combines with a flat marginal production cost. In either case, price-setting behaviour generates a larger R&D investment than quantity-setting behaviour. An Arrovian interpretation of the first result and a Schumpeterian interpretation of the second are proposed.
{"title":"Process R&D in Monopoly under Demand Uncertainty","authors":"L. Lambertini","doi":"10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/1545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/1545","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate R&D efforts for process innovation in a monopoly with uncertain demand. Two different models are proposed, where either (i) the reservation price is affected by an additive shock and the marginal production cost is increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock on the slope of demand combines with a flat marginal production cost. In either case, price-setting behaviour generates a larger R&D investment than quantity-setting behaviour. An Arrovian interpretation of the first result and a Schumpeterian interpretation of the second are proposed.","PeriodicalId":47355,"journal":{"name":"Economics Bulletin","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2004-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80984060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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