Australian Journal of Public Administration最新文献

Public services, such as health and other human services, are increasingly being delivered by third-party providers (providers) under contract to public sector organisations (PSOs). While often advantageous to PSOs, this creates a fragmented service context which is difficult for consumers to navigate. Further, providers often deliver services under multiple contracts to multiple funders, with high reporting requirements, high administrative costs, and low operational sustainability. Policymakers have encouraged co-commissioning—where PSOs come together to jointly commission services—to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of outsourcing. This article seeks to understand the costs of co-commissioning in Australia, and consequently the enablers and barriers to co-commissioning. This qualitative study is based on the early experiences of co-commissioning by one of 31 Primary Health Networks (PHNs). Using transaction cost economics (TCE) theory, the study explains how the PHN started co-commissioning services with other PHNs, before co-commissioning with other types of organisations. The PHN also co-commissioned relatively simple activities first, before moving on to more complex services. The insights provided using TCE theory help explain why co-commissioning is initially complicated (and costly), requiring time to understand both the services to be commissioned and the governance requirements of each party involved. While initial transaction costs may be high when co-commissioning, this may reflect organisational learning and capacity development costs - therefore, costs are expected to reduce over time.

Points for practitioners

This paper analyses the strategic interests that inform deforestation policies in Australia, and the variance in policy selections over time. A theory of deliberate policy disproportionality is used to analyse 20 years of regulatory reform in Queensland, focusing on the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) 1999. Application of the framework to this case suggests that political executives were prone to deliberately adopt (dis)proportionate policies as a strategic response to either manage or capitalise on stakeholder support or opposition to any proposed legislative change. The high variance in (dis)proportionate deforestation policies is attributed to how political executives respond to claims made by competing constituencies regarding the costs versus benefits of successive reforms. During key reform phases, policy under-reaction was the norm, and political executives intentionally limited the scope and effectiveness of the VMA 1999 due to perceived impacts on the agricultural sector. Political executives were highly responsive to the emotional investment of rural constituents and averse to introducing policies that required difficult trade-offs. Elections offered strategic opportunities for delivering more proportionate policies that balanced public environmental benefits with economic impacts, as evidenced by a conditional deforestation ban introduced between 2004 and 2012 and reinstated in 2018.

Points for practitioners

During the past 30 years, research on policy analytical capacity's multidimensional nature and the evolution of policy advisory systems (PASs) has both increased knowledge of these processes and structures and opened new avenues of inquiry. While it is clear that changes in PASs in many countries have occurred - featuring processes such as the increased externalisation and politicisation of policy advice - studies of changes among the roles played by core policy professionals in advice provision have lagged. One aspect of this question concerns the nature and extent of changes in this ‘forgotten fundamental’ of advice systems related to how these professionals are arrayed within ‘policy shops’—that is organisational units identified in the 1960s and 1970s as the main organisational home of policy professionals in government. Whether or not such shops have changed from the central-integrated model identified in early studies and, if so, how, remain outstanding and foundational questions. Recent research in Canada has mapped the distribution of policy professionals at the central and provincial level and found more types of analysts and venues than in earlier eras— which range from the ‘classical’ integrated policy shops of the 1960s and 1970s which remain in central agencies and single-purpose line departments to the much more 'distributed' patterns found in many departments dealing with multiple or complex controversial issues. Using Canadian data, this study outlines the development of these organisational types and their distribution in government and discusses the implications of these changes for better understanding the work, and needs, of core professionals in policy advice systems. .

Points for practitioners