Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.1.06
Anjan Chakravartty
Traditionally, accounts of natural kinds have run the gamut from strongly conventionalist to strongly realist views. Recently, however, there has been a significant shift toward more conventionalist-sounding positions, even (perhaps especially) among philosophers interested in scientific classification. The impetus for this is a trend toward making anthropocentric features of categories, namely, capacities to facilitate human epistemic (and other) interests via inductive inference, central to an account of kinds. I argue that taking these features seriously is both defensible and compatible with conventionalism, but not compatible with a traditional realism about kinds specifically. Moreover, hopes of achieving compatibility by revising and extending kind realism—into what I call “hyperrealism”—face an insuperable dilemma. The news for realists is not all bad, however: though kind realism proves untenable, closely associated realisms underlying the objectivity of kind discourse may be viable nonetheless.
{"title":"Last Chance Saloons for Natural Kind Realism","authors":"Anjan Chakravartty","doi":"10.5406/21521123.60.1.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Traditionally, accounts of natural kinds have run the gamut from strongly conventionalist to strongly realist views. Recently, however, there has been a significant shift toward more conventionalist-sounding positions, even (perhaps especially) among philosophers interested in scientific classification. The impetus for this is a trend toward making anthropocentric features of categories, namely, capacities to facilitate human epistemic (and other) interests via inductive inference, central to an account of kinds. I argue that taking these features seriously is both defensible and compatible with conventionalism, but not compatible with a traditional realism about kinds specifically. Moreover, hopes of achieving compatibility by revising and extending kind realism—into what I call “hyperrealism”—face an insuperable dilemma. The news for realists is not all bad, however: though kind realism proves untenable, closely associated realisms underlying the objectivity of kind discourse may be viable nonetheless.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48772655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.1.08
P. Forrest
Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation.
{"title":"Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism","authors":"P. Forrest","doi":"10.5406/21521123.60.1.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.08","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48470067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.03
Preston Greene, A. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton
Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future (positive future-bias) and pains to be in the past (negative future-bias). Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value (fragile positive future-bias), or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh future ones (robust positive future-bias)? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust.
{"title":"How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures?","authors":"Preston Greene, A. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future (positive future-bias) and pains to be in the past (negative future-bias). Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value (fragile positive future-bias), or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh future ones (robust positive future-bias)? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45784212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.05
Bin Zhao
According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one's belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the belief in the target proposition when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that if we only examine the belief in the target proposition, then the account fails to account for why beliefs in necessary truths could fall short of knowledge. But, if we also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to preserve epistemic closure. Therefore, the safety account cannot find a safe path between epistemic closure and necessary truths.
{"title":"Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety","authors":"Bin Zhao","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one's belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the belief in the target proposition when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that if we only examine the belief in the target proposition, then the account fails to account for why beliefs in necessary truths could fall short of knowledge. But, if we also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to preserve epistemic closure. Therefore, the safety account cannot find a safe path between epistemic closure and necessary truths.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43247781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.02
Blake McAllister
Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. Moreover, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs. Call this the “classical deontologist” conception of justification. As the original conception, we ought to accept it unless proven untenable. Nowadays, however, most have abandoned classical deontologism as precisely that—untenable. It stands accused of requiring doxastic voluntarism and normative transparency. My goal is to rescue classical deontologism from these accusations. I show how, given a specific form of internalism coupled with a plausible theory of epistemic blame, we can be blameworthy for all of our (non-exempt) unjustified beliefs without transparency or voluntarism. The result is that the classical deontological conception of justification should regain its privileged status.
{"title":"Justification Without Excuses","authors":"Blake McAllister","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. Moreover, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs. Call this the “classical deontologist” conception of justification. As the original conception, we ought to accept it unless proven untenable. Nowadays, however, most have abandoned classical deontologism as precisely that—untenable. It stands accused of requiring doxastic voluntarism and normative transparency. My goal is to rescue classical deontologism from these accusations. I show how, given a specific form of internalism coupled with a plausible theory of epistemic blame, we can be blameworthy for all of our (non-exempt) unjustified beliefs without transparency or voluntarism. The result is that the classical deontological conception of justification should regain its privileged status.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44922857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.06
G. Piccinini
Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.
{"title":"Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief","authors":"G. Piccinini","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47430808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.01
Berit Brogaard, M. Slote
Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism and then show that there is a way to be a naturalistic realist that avoids internal inconsistency and uniquely provides for moral normativity.
{"title":"Against and For Ethical Naturalism","authors":"Berit Brogaard, M. Slote","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism and then show that there is a way to be a naturalistic realist that avoids internal inconsistency and uniquely provides for moral normativity.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49450828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.04
Roberto Loss
I argue that the growing-block theory of time and truthmaker maximalism jointly entail that some truthmakers undergo mereological change as time passes. Central to my argument is a grounding-based account of what I call the “purely incremental” nature of the growing-block theory of time. As I will show, the argument presented in this paper suggests that growing-block theorists endorsing truthmaker maximalism have reasons to take composition to be restricted and the “block” of reality to literally grow as time goes by.
{"title":"How the Block Grows","authors":"Roberto Loss","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that the growing-block theory of time and truthmaker maximalism jointly entail that some truthmakers undergo mereological change as time passes. Central to my argument is a grounding-based account of what I call the “purely incremental” nature of the growing-block theory of time. As I will show, the argument presented in this paper suggests that growing-block theorists endorsing truthmaker maximalism have reasons to take composition to be restricted and the “block” of reality to literally grow as time goes by.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48230831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.4.07
s are now used in this journal. Use heading: Abstract. Abstracts should be less than 125 words, informative about the contribution of the article, and in the third person. Acknowledgments (optional) appear unnumbered before numbered Notes entries in Notes section, not indented. Affiliation of author (university name) appears after the article Conclusion and before Notes or References [Flush right, italics] Figures: Figure 1. Figure captions are capitalized in sentence style and with a period. Callouts in text: in Figure 1 (see Fig. 1), coded between paragraphs as Contractions can be used. Headings style (outline format, numbered, unnumbered, etc.) varies with author, although numbers or letters should be followed by a period. When referring to sections of the article in the text, use “section” (no CAP, no abbrev.) Add T3 heading, small caps, run-in, space above, T4, italics, run in, no space above (June 2015). Lists: Numbers or letters for lists should be enclosed on both sides by parentheses Pronouns: First-person pronouns okay when describing the paper (“I advance the following argument in this paper ...”), but try to avoid second person pronouns (‘you,” “your,” etc.). Foreign words or phrases are italicized at first appearance then set roman Translated text is placed in parentheses in the text (with no italics or quotes) and in brackets in References or Notes Tables: Table 1. Table captions are capitalized in sentence style but do not end with a period Grammar and Copyediting
{"title":"American Philosophical Quarterly","authors":"","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.07","url":null,"abstract":"s are now used in this journal. Use heading: Abstract. Abstracts should be less than 125 words, informative about the contribution of the article, and in the third person. Acknowledgments (optional) appear unnumbered before numbered Notes entries in Notes section, not indented. Affiliation of author (university name) appears after the article Conclusion and before Notes or References [Flush right, italics] Figures: Figure 1. Figure captions are capitalized in sentence style and with a period. Callouts in text: in Figure 1 (see Fig. 1), coded between paragraphs as <insert Figure 1 about here> Contractions can be used. Headings style (outline format, numbered, unnumbered, etc.) varies with author, although numbers or letters should be followed by a period. When referring to sections of the article in the text, use “section” (no CAP, no abbrev.) Add T3 heading, small caps, run-in, space above, T4, italics, run in, no space above (June 2015). Lists: Numbers or letters for lists should be enclosed on both sides by parentheses Pronouns: First-person pronouns okay when describing the paper (“I advance the following argument in this paper ...”), but try to avoid second person pronouns (‘you,” “your,” etc.). Foreign words or phrases are italicized at first appearance then set roman Translated text is placed in parentheses in the text (with no italics or quotes) and in brackets in References or Notes Tables: Table 1. Table captions are capitalized in sentence style but do not end with a period Grammar and Copyediting","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44394661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.3.07
R. Rowland
I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for preferences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism.
{"title":"Reasons as Reasons for Preferences","authors":"R. Rowland","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.3.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.3.07","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for preferences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42797174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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