Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.06
Jonathan Mitchell
Recent work on pain focuses on the question “what makes pains unpleasant.” Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to Second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the Second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until there is a convincing explanation of how Second-order desire views can handle masochistic psychology, theorists should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.
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Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.07
Michael Milona
This paper interrogates a widely accepted view about the nature of hope. The view is that hoping that p involves a belief about the prospects of p. It is argued that taking hope to require belief is at odds with some forms of recalcitrant hope and certain ways in which hope patterns similarly to other emotions. The paper concludes by explaining why it matters whether hope requires belief.
{"title":"Does Hope Require Belief?","authors":"Michael Milona","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.07","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper interrogates a widely accepted view about the nature of hope. The view is that hoping that p involves a belief about the prospects of p. It is argued that taking hope to require belief is at odds with some forms of recalcitrant hope and certain ways in which hope patterns similarly to other emotions. The paper concludes by explaining why it matters whether hope requires belief.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43482134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.01
Patrick Todd, B. Rabern
It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?” But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a wrong that x has committed, then all cases in which x blames x (i.e., cases of self-blame) are rendered inappropriate. But it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral failings. And thus, we have a paradox: a conflict between the inappropriateness of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame. We consider several ways of resolving the paradox and contend none is as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves. In defending this starting position, we defend a crucial distinction between self-blame and guilt.
{"title":"The Paradox of Self-Blame","authors":"Patrick Todd, B. Rabern","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?” But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a wrong that x has committed, then all cases in which x blames x (i.e., cases of self-blame) are rendered inappropriate. But it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral failings. And thus, we have a paradox: a conflict between the inappropriateness of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame. We consider several ways of resolving the paradox and contend none is as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves. In defending this starting position, we defend a crucial distinction between self-blame and guilt.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48166723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.02
Donald W. Bruckner
This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being.
{"title":"Perfectionist Preferentism","authors":"Donald W. Bruckner","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper is about two seemingly inconsistent theories of well-being and how to reconcile them. The first theory is perfectionism, the view that the good of a human is determined by human nature. The second theory is preferentism, the view that the good of a human lies in the satisfaction of her preferences. I begin by sketching the theories and then developing an objection against each from the standpoint of the other. I then develop a version of each theory that is meant to address the objection from the other theory. It turns out that these modified perfectionist and preferentist theories are mutually supporting and co-extensive. They can be combined into a new theory, perfectionist preferentism, which is an independently plausible theory of well-being.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48826337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521123.59.2.03
Matthew Mosdell
Lewis Carroll's famous puzzle leads to an explanatory challenge: what must we know to grasp the logical necessity of deductive arguments? This paper argues that intellectualism lacks a philosophically satisfying explanation to that puzzle.
{"title":"An Intellectualist Dilemma","authors":"Matthew Mosdell","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.2.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Lewis Carroll's famous puzzle leads to an explanatory challenge: what must we know to grasp the logical necessity of deductive arguments? This paper argues that intellectualism lacks a philosophically satisfying explanation to that puzzle.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46961954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many scholars have rejected cultural evolutionary theory on the grounds that cultural variation is directed and intentionally created, rather than incremental and blind with respect to function, as is the case for novel genetic variation in genetic evolution. Meanwhile, some cultural evolution researchers insist that cultural variation is blind and undirected, and the only directional force is selection of randomlygenerated variants. Here I argue that neither of these positions are tenable. Cultural variation is directed in various ways. While this does not invalidate cultural evolution, more attention should be paid to the different sources of nonrandomness in culturally evolving systems. Introduction Does human culture evolve? Can we draw useful parallels between genetic evolution and cultural change? Can we use similar tools, methods, concepts and theories to understand cultural change as biologists use to understand genetic evolution? The rapid increase in research adopting a cultural evolution framework in the last few decades (Youngblood and Lahti 2018) shows that increasing numbers of scholars are answering “yes” to these questions. Yet in the grand scheme of academic research, cultural evolution remains a fringe pursuit. The majority of the social sciences and humanities reject any kind of evolutionary theorizing for understanding cultural phenomena, including cultural evolution (Slingerland and Collard 2011; Perry and Mace 2010). Even within the evolutionary human behavioral sciences, the theory of cultural evolution is often treated with skepticism (Daly 1982; Atran 2001; Pinker 1997). While there are many reasons for this rejection and skepticism, one common point of contention surrounds the issue of randomness and directionality in the generation of novel cultural variation. This is also a common source of disagreement amongst cultural evolution researchers (Lewens 2015; Claidière et al. 2014). In this paper I argue that there are genuine differences between genetic and cultural evolution in this sense. While some novel cultural variation seems to be generated randomly with respect to selection, akin to the generation of novel genetic variation, there are also several forms of directed cultural variation. I argue that while the latter do not invalidate the theory, approach or methods of cultural evolution, This content downloaded from 92.72.139.75 on Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:19:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY more attention should be paid to the different sources of directedness in culturally evolving systems and their consequences. What is Cultural Evolution? Cultural evolution is the idea that cultural change exhibits fundamental similarities to genetic evolution, such that we can pro-tably view and analyze cultural change as an evolutionary process. “Culture” here is de-ned broadly as any socially transmitted information that passes from person to person nongenetically, via im
许多学者拒绝文化进化理论，理由是文化变异是有指导和有意创造的，而不是像基因进化中的新基因变异那样，在功能上是渐进和盲目的。与此同时，一些文化进化研究者坚持认为，文化变异是盲目的、无方向性的，唯一的方向性力量是对随机产生的变异的选择。在这里，我认为这两种立场都站不住脚。文化差异的导向是多方面的。虽然这并不能否定文化进化，但应该更多地关注文化进化系统中非随机性的不同来源。人类文化是进化的吗?我们能在基因进化和文化变迁之间找到有用的相似之处吗?我们能否像生物学家理解基因进化那样，使用类似的工具、方法、概念和理论来理解文化变迁?在过去的几十年里，采用文化进化框架的研究迅速增加(Youngblood和Lahti 2018)表明，越来越多的学者对这些问题的回答是“是”。然而，在学术研究的宏伟计划中，文化进化仍然是一个边缘追求。大多数社会科学和人文科学拒绝任何形式的进化论理论来理解文化现象，包括文化进化(Slingerland and Collard 2011;Perry and Mace 2010)。即使在进化的人类行为科学中，文化进化理论也经常受到怀疑(Daly 1982;Atran 2001;Pinker 1997)。虽然这种拒绝和怀疑有很多原因，但一个共同的争论点围绕着小说文化变异产生的随机性和方向性问题。这也是文化进化研究者之间分歧的一个常见来源(Lewens 2015;claidi<e:1>等人，2014)。在本文中，我认为在这个意义上，基因进化和文化进化之间存在着真正的差异。虽然一些新的文化变异似乎是在选择中随机产生的，类似于新的遗传变异的产生，但也有几种形式的定向文化变异。我认为后者并没有使文化进化的理论、方法或方法无效。本内容下载自92.72.139.75，星期二，2021年1月26日16:19:44 UTC。所有使用均受https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 /美国哲学季刊的约束，应该更多地关注文化进化系统中直接性的不同来源及其后果。什么是文化进化?文化进化是一种观点，认为文化变化与基因进化具有基本的相似性，因此我们可以将文化变化视为一种进化过程来看待和分析。“文化”在这里被广泛地定义为任何通过模仿、语言、教学或其他社会学习手段在人与人之间通过非遗传方式传递的社会传播信息。这包括我们通俗地称为知识、信念、态度、规范、习俗、技能、词汇、语法和制度的东西。如果进化论是抽象的，就像达尔文(达尔文1859年)所做的那样，是由变异、遗传和差异性组成的系统(列万廷1970年)，那么文化变迁似乎符合作为一个进化过程的标准。文化特征(信仰、思想、态度等)在人群中各不相同;它们(根据定义)从一个人遗传到另一个人，不是遗传的，而是社会的，通过社会学习;并不是所有的特征都有可能随着时间的推移而持续下去，有些想法或信念会以牺牲其他想法或信念为代价而传播(Mesoudi et al. 2004)。达尔文本人在《人类的起源》(达尔文1871)中提出了这种相似之处，他指出了物种进化与人类语言的相似之处。尽管在19世纪后期的新兴社会科学中对这种平行现象产生了最初的兴趣(Hodgson 2005)，但随着社会科学和自然科学在20世纪初出现分歧，这种观点不再受欢迎。20世纪70年代，模因论(Dawkins 1976)、进化认识论(Campbell 1974)以及利用群体遗传学方法对文化进行数学建模(CavalliSforza and Feldman 1981;Boyd和Richerson 1985)。尤其是后者，刺激了一个正在进行的实证项目，包括实验室实验、考古分析、语言学、历史和非人类比较工作(Mesoudi 2011;2017)。正如在许多领域，特别是相对较新的领域一样，有不同的文化进化方法，持有不同的假设。其中包括模因(Blackmore 1999;Dennett 2017)，文化吸引力或文化流行病学(claidi<e:1>等。 许多学者拒绝文化进化理论，理由是文化变异是有指导和有意创造的，而不是像基因进化中的新基因变异那样，在功能上是渐进和盲目的。与此同时，一些文化进化研究者坚持认为，文化变异是盲目的、无方向性的，唯一的方向性力量是对随机产生的变异的选择。在这里，我认为这两种立场都站不住脚。文化差异的导向是多方面的。虽然这并不能否定文化进化，但应该更多地关注文化进化系统中非随机性的不同来源。人类文化是进化的吗?我们能在基因进化和文化变迁之间找到有用的相似之处吗?我们能否像生物学家理解基因进化那样，使用类似的工具、方法、概念和理论来理解文化变迁?在过去的几十年里，采用文化进化框架的研究迅速增加(Youngblood和Lahti 2018)表明，越来越多的学者对这些问题的回答是“是”。然而，在学术研究的宏伟计划中，文化进化仍然是一个边缘追求。大多数社会科学和人文科学拒绝任何形式的进化论理论来理解文化现象，包括文化进化(Slingerland and Collard 2011;Perry and Mace 2010)。即使在进化的人类行为科学中，文化进化理论也经常受到怀疑(Daly 1982;Atran 2001;Pinker 1997)。虽然这种拒绝和怀疑有很多原因，但一个共同的争论点围绕着小说文化变异产生的随机性和方向性问题。这也是文化进化研究者之间分歧的一个常见来源(Lewens 2015;claidi<e:1>等人，2014)。在本文中，我认为在这个意义上，基因进化和文化进化之间存在着真正的差异。虽然一些新的文化变异似乎是在选择中随机产生的，类似于新的遗传变异的产生，但也有几种形式的定向文化变异。我认为后者并没有使文化进化的理论、方法或方法无效。本内容下载自92.72.139.75，星期二，2021年1月26日16:19:44 UTC。所有使用均受https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 /美国哲学季刊的约束，应该更多地关注文化进化系统中直接性的不同来源及其后果。什么是文化进化?文化进化是一种观点，认为文化变化与基因进化具有基本的相似性，因此我们可以将文化变化视为一种进化过程来看待和分析。“文化”在这里被广泛地定义为任何通过模仿、语言、教学或其他社会学习手段在人与人之间通过非遗传方式传递的社会传播信息。这包括我们通俗地称为知识、信念、态度、规范、习俗、技能、词汇、语法和制度的东西。如果进化论是抽象的，就像达尔文(达尔文1859年)所做的那样，是由变异、遗传和差异性组成的系统(列万廷1970年)，那么文化变迁似乎符合作为一个进化过程的标准。文化特征(信仰、思想、态度等)在人群中各不相同;它们(根据定义)从一个人遗传到另一个人，不是遗传的，而是社会的，通过社会学习;并不是所有的特征都有可能随着时间的推移而持续下去，有些想法或信念会以牺牲其他想法或信念为代价而传播(Mesoudi et al. 2004)。达尔文本人在《人类的起源》(达尔文1871)中提出了这种相似之处，他指出了物种进化与人类语言的相似之处。尽管在19世纪后期的新兴社会科学中对这种平行现象产生了最初的兴趣(Hodgson 2005)，但随着社会科学和自然科学在20世
{"title":"BLIND AND INCREMENTAL OR DIRECTED AND DISRUPTIVE? ON THE NATURE OF NOVEL VARIATION IN HUMAN CULTURAL EVOLUTION","authors":"A. Mesoudi","doi":"10.2307/48600682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48600682","url":null,"abstract":"Many scholars have rejected cultural evolutionary theory on the grounds that cultural variation is directed and intentionally created, rather than incremental and blind with respect to function, as is the case for novel genetic variation in genetic evolution. Meanwhile, some cultural evolution researchers insist that cultural variation is blind and undirected, and the only directional force is selection of randomlygenerated variants. Here I argue that neither of these positions are tenable. Cultural variation is directed in various ways. While this does not invalidate cultural evolution, more attention should be paid to the different sources of nonrandomness in culturally evolving systems. Introduction Does human culture evolve? Can we draw useful parallels between genetic evolution and cultural change? Can we use similar tools, methods, concepts and theories to understand cultural change as biologists use to understand genetic evolution? The rapid increase in research adopting a cultural evolution framework in the last few decades (Youngblood and Lahti 2018) shows that increasing numbers of scholars are answering “yes” to these questions. Yet in the grand scheme of academic research, cultural evolution remains a fringe pursuit. The majority of the social sciences and humanities reject any kind of evolutionary theorizing for understanding cultural phenomena, including cultural evolution (Slingerland and Collard 2011; Perry and Mace 2010). Even within the evolutionary human behavioral sciences, the theory of cultural evolution is often treated with skepticism (Daly 1982; Atran 2001; Pinker 1997). While there are many reasons for this rejection and skepticism, one common point of contention surrounds the issue of randomness and directionality in the generation of novel cultural variation. This is also a common source of disagreement amongst cultural evolution researchers (Lewens 2015; Claidière et al. 2014). In this paper I argue that there are genuine differences between genetic and cultural evolution in this sense. While some novel cultural variation seems to be generated randomly with respect to selection, akin to the generation of novel genetic variation, there are also several forms of directed cultural variation. I argue that while the latter do not invalidate the theory, approach or methods of cultural evolution, This content downloaded from 92.72.139.75 on Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:19:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY more attention should be paid to the different sources of directedness in culturally evolving systems and their consequences. What is Cultural Evolution? Cultural evolution is the idea that cultural change exhibits fundamental similarities to genetic evolution, such that we can pro-tably view and analyze cultural change as an evolutionary process. “Culture” here is de-ned broadly as any socially transmitted information that passes from person to person nongenetically, via im","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"58 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69448129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.
{"title":"BELIEF-LIKE IMAGINING AND CORRECTNESS","authors":"Alon Chasid","doi":"10.2307/48614002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48614002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69453888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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